With their profound, spiritual breezes, every sound and breath of air in Ramadan announces in a most exalted and exhilarating style all the pleasures we would like to taste in life and the hopes of good we deeply cherish.

Coming like successive rays of light, the smiling days of Ramadan envelop us with the expectations, hopes and joys they carry from the worlds beyond, and present to us samples from Paradise.

When Ramadan begins, our inner life, its thoughts and feelings, is renewed and strengthened. Breezes of mercy, coming in different wavelengths, unite with our hopes and expectations, and penetrate our hearts. In the enchanting days and illumined nights of Ramadan, we feel as if all the obstacles blocking our way to God are removed and the hills on that way are levelled.

Like rain pouring on the earth, Ramadan comes with streams of meanings and emotions that water dried and thirsty hearts, making the inner worlds of people propitious for new meanings and conceptions. By means of the light of the days, hours and minutes of this blessed month, hearts attain such spiritual depth and become so purified that they never desire to leave its climate of peace.

As Ramadan approaches, we live the delight of anticipation and preparation for it. The food and drink that come into our kitchens in the days before it comes, put us in mind of it with a thrill of expectation. And then it comes at last, laden with mercy and forgiveness. As soon as it honours us, each of us finds himself in a spiral of light rising toward the heavens and advances toward the Unknown Existent One in a new spiritual mood in the night-time and in another, different spiritual mood in daytime. We open our eyes to each of its days with a different solemnity and self-possession and reach every evening in an enchanting, delightful serenity.

The pleasant nights of Ramadan receive warmest welcome from all souls. Eyes look more deeply in them and people feel deeper love for each other. Everyone desires to do good to everyone and passions and ill-feeling are subjugated to a certain extent. In Ramadan everyone feels so much more attached to God and is so careful in his relations with others that it is impossible not to see this.

Believing souls taste the contentment of belief more deeply and experience the blessing of the good morals prescribed by Islam and the spiritual ease of doing good to others. Moreover, they try to expand, to share, this contentment, blessing and ease with others. Since these souls at rest are convinced that one day will come when this life will end in an eternal happiness and whatever they suffer and sacrifice here for God’s sake will be returned with very great reward, they struggle against their animal appetites in a mood of doing an act of worship. The meals they take at sunset to break the fast give them the pleasure of worship and are followed by early night prayer with the addition of the supererogatory service of worship particular to Ramadan. The meals they take before dawn to start fasting are united with supererogatory night prayer (tahajjud) and become a dimension of their nearness to God. Streets are filled with the people going to and returning from mosques, in which declarations of ‘God is the Greatest’ resound as in the Masjid al-Haram in Makka. You would think that the streets are each a mosque and each mosque is Ka’ba. The people shaped by Ramadan in this way, though mortal in nature, gain a sort of eternity and each of their acts done in the consciousness of deliberate worship becomes a ceremony pertaming to the Hereafter.

Nights are experienced more deeply and in consideration of the afterlife, and days are spent as portions of time dominated by resolution and strong will-power. Those fasting for God’s sake feel a thrill of joy, and spend every and each day in the excitement of a new re-union. They reach every morning in an indescribable feeling as if they were called to a new testing. You can discern on their faces a sign of humility mixed with solemnity, a feeling of nothingness before God together with serenity and seriousness and melancholy combined with a feeling of security. Their every act reflects spiritual peace and exhilaration coming from adherence to God’s will and confidence in Him, and sincerity and kindness acquired by being cleansed in the cascades of the Qur’an. As if created from light and consisting in only their shadows, they are very careful to give no one any harm or trouble. Respect and courtesy are so much a part of their nature that, even after a day of thirst and hunger and resisting their carnal desires, they remain gentle and pure-hearted. They display a mood shaped by fear and reverence, discipline and contentment, solemnity and politeness. They are respectful and reverent toward the Almighty and well-mannered and sincere toward one another.

Their faces and eyes reflect different degrees and dimensions of depth of spiritual realms and are radiant with the lights of the unseen world. Though each individual may have been shaped by a different climate and different ideas,-all of them, including the intelligent and pure-hearted, those used to a disciplined, careful life and those a bit untidy and careless, the nervous and the calm, those very sensitive to problems of the age and those a little unfeeling, the rich and the poor, the happy and sorrowful, the healthy and the ill, the white and black-share almost the same feelings in Ramadan. They reach the night and morning together, listen to the call to prayers and perform the prayers together, take the meals before dawn and break their fasts together. They feel together one of the two instances of rejoicing promised for those who fast [The Prophet said: There are two instances of rejoicing for one who fasts: one when he breaks his fast, the other when he will receive the reward of fasting in the Hereafter.]

All Muslims, whatever their nationality or country of origin or temperament or social status or physical state, come together and breathe the same ‘air’ in the climate of Ramadan. In it, their souls are shaped in a way particular to that climate, and they share a sort of deeply-felt happiness which can be experienced only by spirit beings. Ramadan has a fascinating effect on Muslims that leaves its positive imprints on even the souls of the poorest and most oppressed people.

Ramadan envelops us with many beauties: the pleasure in the supererogatory prayers performed after the prescribed night service; consciousness of the blessings of Ramadan; the light that pours on us both from the heaven and from the lights that decorate the mosques; the nearness of the Creative Power and Its message of compassion and forgiveness whispered in our hearts. As if planned and commanded in order to kindle such feelings and thoughts in us, each element of the public rites in Ramadan causes the ‘strings’ of our heats to resonate: the calls made from minarets and the blessings called on the Prophet, upon him be peace and blessings, and the pronouncements of Divine Unity, Grandeur and Glory which resound in our ears, all prepare our souls for worship. They awake us to spiritual and celestial truths and enable even the crudest soul to perform its duties of worship in the way those duties are meant to be performed.

The voices rising from minarets meet with the voices of the inhabitants of the heavens and resound throughout the heavens and the earth. They penetrate our souls and take us through a climate of purest meanings and poetry, a realm of sweet imagination. In this pleasant atmosphere, we feel as if it is Ramadan which pours from the heavens, which is discerned on the faces of people and scents the air and is written in the lights of the mosques. Enchanted by this calm and peaceful atmosphere, we achieve a sort of infinitude and feel as if comprehending the whole of existence. Ramadan captivates particularly those open to eternity to such an extent that they experience nothing else than it.

I remember well that during my childhood when there was as yet no electricity in cities, people walked to mosques with kerosene lamps in the darkness of night. We imagined that Ramadan was walking around in the alleys in the lights of those lamps. Under the influence of poetry, meaning and deep spirituality which Ramadan poured into our souls, we desired that it should never come to an end. Nevertheless, despite our heartfelt desire, it flew away and the festive day followed it with all its pomp.

There are different definitions of euthanasia, each putting the emphasis on different parts of the concept. The word itself is derived from a compound of two Greek words-“eu” and “thanatos”-meaning literally a good death. It is generally understood today as the intentional putting to death by artificial means of persons with incurable or painful disease (Mason & McCall Smith, 1994, p.316). The decision to end a person’s life may involve direct interventions (active euthanasia) or withholding of life-prolonging measures (passive euthanasia). If the decision reflects the person’s own consciously and expressly declared wishes, it is called voluntary euthanasia. Where the person does not know about the decision and has not expressly approved it in advance it is called non-voluntary euthanasia. Another type of euthanasia, namely involuntary euthanasia, occurs whenever such a decision is implemented against the express wishes of the individual. (See Harris, 1985, p.82.)

Those who argue in favour of euthanasia usually presuppose a person’s absolute ownership of his or her body and life; as people are entitled to dispose as they choose of the things they own, the analogy is that they may also choose the circumstances most appropriate for them to ‘dispose’ of ‘their’ life. This is the rationale behind voluntary euthanasia.

However, the ownership (or property right) of humans over their bodies is not a property right in the usual sense of the term. Munzer (1990) defines various types of ‘ownership’, ‘property right’ etc. and concludes: “Most body rights are personal rather than property rights; examples are rights not to be murdered, not to be searched without a warrant or just cause, not to be compelled to testify against oneself, not to be libelled or slandered, to speak freely, and to exclude others from sexual or other physical contacts”. However, he says: “Some body rights are property rights whether weak, such as the right to donate an organ upon death, or strong, such as the right of publicity or the right to sell blood or semen ; but these weak and strong property rights are neither so numerous nor so central as to establish that person’s ‘own’ themselves” (ibid., p.57). Evidently, it is not very easy to propose or prohibit euthanasia by using the ‘property rights’ argument. (Perhaps we can summarise the issue by saying that the language of ‘property rights’ is appropriate only in the context of commercial/contractual transactions. If it ever was, it is no longer thought proper to speak of buying or selling human beings outright; we only speak nowadays of buying or selling an individual’s time or skills.)

Voluntary euthanasia has been likened to suicide in many respects. Therefore almost all religious traditions reject it; they reject the idea of terminating one’s life, and declare it to be one of the greatest misdeeds (Smoker, 1986, p.96). According to this understanding, our lives and our bodies are given by God. We are stewards and not owners of our lives, hence to contrive the ending of our own lives or to harm our bodies knowingly is a sign of disrespect to the ‘real owner’.

Roman Catholic theologians have reflected on matters of death and dying for centuries. The Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s 1980 declaration on Euthanasia, approved by Pope John Paul II, states: 1) None can make an attempt on the life of an innocent person without opposing God’s love for that person, without violating a fundamental right, and therefore without committing a crime of the utmost gravity; 2) Everyone has the duty to lead his or her life in accordance with God’s plan. That life is entrusted to the individual as a good that must bear fruit already here on earth, but that finds its full perfection only in eternal life; 3) Intentionally causing one’s own death, or suicide, is therefore equally as wrong as murder; such an action on the part of a person is to be considered as rejection of God’s sovereignty and loving plan. Therefore euthanasia is a violation of the divine law, an offence against the dignity of the human person, a crime against life, and an attack on humanity.

Among the Protestant denominations that oppose voluntary euthanasia are the Lutherans, Mennonites, Methodists, Presbyterians, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Episcopalians, Christian Scientists and Baptists. The rationale for rejecting the option of euthanasia or assisted suicide is based generally on the maxim, “only God can give life and only God should take it”.

The four branches of Judaism-Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and Reconstructionist-all forbid active euthanasia. The ancient Torah and Talmud did not address euthanasia or assisted suicide. However, in recent years, rabbis have answered questions about death and dying in “responsa” that have come to be considered authoritative. For example, a responsum from the Reform Jewish tradition addressing euthanasia (Bettam, 1950) declares: “Human life is more than a biological phenomenon; it is the gracious gift of God, it is the in-breathing of His spirit. Man is more than a minute particle of the great mass known as society: “The spirit of God hath made me,” avers Job in the midst of his suffering, “and the breath of the Almighty gives me life” (Job 33:4). Thus, human life, coming from God, is sacred, and must be nurtured with great care. And man is endowed with unique and hidden worth and must be treated with reverence.”

Islam also opposes euthanasia. The Qur’an and Sunnah, the authoritative sources of Islamic law, do not speak specifically about euthanasia. However, according to the Qur’an God is the Creator of life. Consequently, persons do not own their lives and have no right to end them or to ask others to do so. The Prophet Muhammad is reported as saying: “None of you should wish to die because a harm befalls him. If he is so determined, let him pray: ‘Oh God, let me live as long as life is good for me, and let me die if death is good for me’.” This saying might be interpreted as a permission for euthanasia or deliberate termination of life, if the phrasing of the supplication were “let me kill myself” or “let me be killed” rather than “let me die”, which cannot be so interpreted. A contemporary Islamic scholar has argued: “God may deprive an individual of something he or she values, but grant that individual a manifold return for that loss in the Hereafter. By means of that loss, God makes you feel your need, your powerlessness, your poverty in relation to Him. In this way, He makes you turn to Him with a weightier sincerity, a fuller heart, and so makes you worthier of His Blessing and Favour. Thus your apparent loss is in reality a gain” (Gulen, 1994, p.162). One recent study indicated that the degree of religious observance is a factor that influences the desire for maximal medical intervention. It is argued that fundamental beliefs of the more religious elements of society, regardless of which religion, tend towards an approach in which sanctity of life, rather than quality of life, becomes the prime determinant (Hammerman, 1997). Therefore, it is not surprising, among believing people, to come across those who are remarkably contented in spite of circumstances of great hardship, suffering and pain.

One of the primary things that makes euthanasia unacceptable is the involvement of a second party. Since life is inherently valuable, no one should play a part, directly or indirectly, in terminating a life. Since 1961, it is not illegal in Britain to commit suicide, although it is punishable to help an individual to kill himself. However it is claimed that when the life is objectively meaningless, rather than subjectively, the termination of life and help for it can be justified, and in euthanasia cases lives are generally objectively meaningless. Kohl (1987) made the distinction between these two as follows: “A life is subjectively meaningless when an individual earnestly believes he or she cannot possess, can no longer possess, or cannot achieve, any goals. A life is objectively meaningless when any of the aforementioned intersensual and intersubjective conditions exists and is known, or is capable of being known, to be irreversible.” In another article, after stating that meaningful life is a precondition for a good life, Kohl (1979) said: “An ideally good life is like an ideal meal. What most men desire is a splendid meal with a splendid dessert. So, when the dessert is far from splendid, it is good for the person, as well as for those who must take care of that person, to terminate the life. But, as was mentioned in the report by the working party which reviewed the BMA s guidelines on euthanasia, termination of life requires doctors to examine their ethical convictions rather than their scientific ones. And throughout the many shifts of scientific opinion in medicine, one pervasive feature of medical practice has remained unchanged-the conviction that human life is of inestimable value and ought to be protected and cherished (BMA, 1986, pp.l8-19). But nowadays, as with many other things, these convictions are also under discussion, and tend to he challenged.

Although there is a trend toward legalising the practice of euthanasia, strong resistance to it persists. Here are some of the traditional arguments against euthanasia. One concern is that, along with the justifiable cases of terminally ill people asking for and receiving a quick, merciful death, there would inevitably be cases in which euthanasia would be clearly wrong. Another is that, a law legalising euthanasia might well be abused, with some person’s life being ended, against his or her consent, for a motive other than mercy. We also know that diagnoses and prognoses of a disease can be wrong. For instance, predicting how long someone may live with cancer is very difficult at best. Some whom we expected to die in a few months might live on for years, conversely some might live a much shorter time than we, the care-givers, anticipate. Another valid concern is that the right to die may well become a duty to die. For instance, frail, disabled elderly people who are financial and emotional burdens on their families may feel some pressure to ask for euthanasia. Finally, even apart from moral and ethical considerations, legalising euthanasia has the potential to weaken and damage the relationship between patients and physicians. (See Cundiff, 1992.)

Bearing in mind that euthanasia is, all said and done, the termination by one means or another of a human life, the justification for it will always be questionable. It needs to be questioned and debated very closely indeed by the concerned public, as well as by health care professionals, lawyers, theologians and politicians.

References

• Bettarn, I, (1950) Euthanasia, American Reform Responsa, 60, PP. 107-20. [The responsa discussed were drafted in answer to a bill signed by 2000 physicians in New York State in 1948 supporting legalization of euthanasia.]
• BMA [1986) Report of the Working Party to Review the BMA’s Guidance on Euthanasia, London, pp.16-19.
• Cundiff, D. (1992) Euthanasia is not the Answer, Humana Press, New Jersey.
• Gulen, F. (1994) Questions, Truestar Publications Ltd, London.
• Hammerman, C. (1997) Decision-making in the Critically III Neonate: Cultural Background v. Individual Life Experiences, Journal of Medical Ethics, 23, pp.164-9.
• Harris, J. (1985) The Value of Life, Routledge, London.
• Kohl, M. (1979) Voluntary Ending of Life in de Vries, A. & Carmi, A. (edst) The Dying Human, Turtledove Publication, Ramat can, pp. 253-62.
• Kohl, M. (1987) Moral Arguments For and Against Maximally Treating the Detective Newborn, in McMillan, R.C., Engelbardt Jr, H.T. and Spicker, S.F. (eds) Euthanasia and the Newborn, D. Reidel Pub. Comp. Dordrecht, pp.233-52.
• Mason, J.K and McCall Smith, R.A. (1994) Law and Medical Ethics, Butterwortbs, London.
• Munzer, S.R. (1990). A Theory of Property, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
• Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (1980) Declaration on Eurhanasia, Vatican City.
• Smoker, B. (1986) A Rejoinder to Religious and Non-Consequentialist Objections in Downing, A.B. and Smoker, B. (eds) Voluntary Euthanasia: Experts Debate the Right to Die, Peter Owen, London.

A more systematic approach to language and cognition began in the 1920s. During the 20s and 30s Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf separately claimed that language is the main factor in the constructive process, that, in effect, language determines thought. Whorf claimed in his Collected Papers on Metalinguitics that language is the prime factor in objectification of reality. Language determines thought and certain aspects of it restrict our view of the world. A weaker form of the ‘language hypothesis’ does not insist that language determines thought, but that language predisposes the way people think.

During the 50s, when behaviourism was the intellectual fashion, there were not many studies on language and cognition. The stimulus-response-reinforcement model favoured by the behaviourists was applied to language acquisition by Skinner in his book Verbal Behaviour. According to Skinner, verbal behaviour can be acquired if the set of appropriate responses is frequently followed by reinforcement. Reinforcement, he claimed, is equally important after language has been acquired. The purpose and function of reinforcement is to maintain the strength of the response. Language acquisition and verbal behaviour are regarded as mechanical processes. Verbal behaviour can only develop in a social context, with the participation of another person or audience. The speaker learns to speak eventually only in the presence of a listener; the reinforcement that a speaker needs is absent or present when a listener is absent or present. This view treats language as a learning behaviour that can be changed or manipulated with the help of reinforcement, or deprivation, in other words ‘a specific controlling condition … control of verbal stimuli.’

Skinner presents three different types of behaviour which control the verbal stimuli: the echoic, the textual and the intraverbal. ‘Echoic’ behaviour is when the response consists of a sound pattern reproducing something very similar to the stimulus. It is established in the child through the special reinforcement that Skinner calls ‘educational’. Educational reinforcement is provided by institutions whose behaviour is influenced by economic reinforcement: for example, when a teacher gets some financial (or other) rewards for teaching the child how to acquire language effectively. ‘Textual’ behaviour relates to learning how to read. It too is established through educational reinforcement. The stimulus in this case is a text which may be in the form of pictures, formalised pictographs, characters or (more commonly) letters or symbols of an alphabet. ‘Textual’ behaviour describes the way people acquire the skill of writing. Writing behaviour has all the characteristics of ‘echoic’ behaviour, but expressed in visual rather than auditory terms. Three stages are distinguished: the stage of producing the necessary materials, the stage of making differentiated marks, and the stage of transmitting these marks to the reader.

In the case of intraverbal behaviour there is no correspondence between stimulus and response-produced, as in echoic behaviour or as in the correspondence between different dimensional systems as in the textual behaviour. This allows the consideration of all types of vocal and textual stimuli and responses in all combinations at the same time. Interestingly, Skinner regards translation as a ‘special case of intraverbal behaviour’.

Skinner’s approach to thought was abstract, not empirically based. His view was that the results of human thought can be most unpredictable and are therefore severely difficult to explain. So, the simplest and most satisfactory way of explaining thought is to consider it as a behaviour. Thought is not a secretive way of influencing the behaviour, but it is behaviour itself, the ‘sum total’ of the responses to the world and the environment the behaviour ‘lives’ in. He concludes: ‘When we study human thought we study behaviour.’

In the 60s the debate about language was between two conflicting positions. The behaviourist accounts of language and language-acquisition in terms of association, and the approach of Chomsky and his colleagues who presented a linguistic analysis strongly linked with psychology. Their basic argument was that the stimuli-response theory was highly irrelevant with respect to language acquisition. Being mainly interested in the syntactic forms of language they believed that the deep structures of sentences are abstract and inexplicable by the simplistic arguments put forward by the behaviourists. Their debate with the behaviourists, and the theoretical papers in which they criticized and cast doubt on their views, did not leave much room for attention to childhood development and how the processes of that development affect their language acquisition.

Piaget, although not a psychologist by profession (he started out as a biologist), showed a great interest in the way children think. He believed, in contradistinction to Sapir-Whorf, that thought determines language, a position since known as the ‘cognition hypothesis’. The basic difference between language studies in the 60s and Piaget’s approach was that Piaget’s interest was in children aged six and above, and investigated the first structured language during and shortly after the stage of two-word utterance. He discussed language and the thinking of the child, the language function, the questions that children put, and understanding between children.

Piaget and Chomsky came to be the most recognised and respected representatives of the cognitive movement; their work has inspired and influenced so many and to such an extent, that one can rightly speak of a school of thought within the field of cognitive studies. Chomsky had revolutionary and controversial views about language and thought sharply contrasted with anything that had come before. He claimed that every child has an innate knowledge system that contains abstract linguistic structures that are not taught rather, they are already part of the child’s system from birth. He hypothesized that under those circumstances, there must exist a set of grammatical rules that would produce syntactic descriptions for any sentence in any given language. Piaget on the other hand believed that a child must go through several stages to acquire an adult level of logical thought. The effect of the environment on a child’s thought and language is, for Piaget, crucial. Language is an extremely broad set of human capacities. Identical mental operations underlie one’s encounters with a wide range of materials and topics such as space, time, casualty and morality. So the later forms of thought can be located in earlier forms. Piaget examined the child and his mind as an active and constructive agent, that slowly gains knowledge and logic through developing cognitive processes. Chomsky’s view was different; he saw the mind as a set of pre-programmed units fully equipped, that need only a modest trigger from the environment to function. In other words Piaget considered human linguistic capacities as a product of a general ‘constructed’ intellectual development, whereas Chomsky insisted that they are a highly specialised part of the human genetic inheritance, largely separate from any other human faculty. They are, Chomsky said, a kind of an innate knowledge that has only to unfold. The Piagetian cognitive hypothesis claims that language derives from thought. Chomsky takes a radically different view, arguing that language is divorced from thinking. He claims that each human intellectual faculty is located in different areas of the brain, maturing at its own rate and through distinct processes. To make this statement more comprehensible, Chomsky used the analogy of bodily organs: he regarded the mind as a set of organs, like the liver or the lungs or the heart. A heart is not taught to beat, but matures according to its own genetic timetable. The same is true of ‘language’ as well as to other ‘organs of the mind’, that are programmed to function over time according to a genetic timetable.

Although both used and developed models provided by biology and logic, they showed interest in very different kinds of examples and explanations. Piaget tried to give a rich description of the stages that children pass through to achieve a higher level of knowledge. So he developed an elaborate technical vocabulary, rooted in biology, and he based his conclusions upon errors that children made when he gave them his famous challenging puzzles to solve. His ability to give convincing answers to the problems of the development of knowledge, and his hard work in collecting and synthesizing an enormous amount of data, are his big contribution to this field.

Chomsky’s contribution is no less important. His difference from Piaget is that he was not concerned to describe behavioural phenomena; his concern was the development of linguistic science and how its approach and methods could carry into the social sciences. His views of language as a part of an innate and universal system of knowledge and language are the same, had huge influence, although it is an hypothesis impossible to prove.

In October 1975, Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky were invited to express their ideas and present their theories in a meeting which took place at the Abbaye de Royaumont in France. The historical importance of this ‘rendezvous’ was noted by the psychology and linguistic community all over the world and even scientists from behavioural and empirical areas attended the occasion. Piaget and Chomsky exchanged views about language and cognition, but, as people who attended the Royaumont meeting commented, there was no agreed conclusion, only exploration of issues.

It is hardly surprising that no firm conclusions were reached at that meeting. The study of cognition is not an empirical study of given data or facts susceptible to quantitative measurement or experimentation. The subject-matter has to do with human psychology, where different views, theories, methods and experiments are used, different schools are created and several disciplines such as anthology, biology, philosophy etc. are involved together. Without ignoring the important contribution of schools such as behaviourism, psychoanalysis etc., only the further development of the cognitive movement appears likely to give satisfactory answers to issues that arise everyday about language and thought. The charm of uncertainty will draw the passion for further research that will lead from mere confusion to a new theory, a new argument for appraisal or debate.

Useful reading 

• Appel, M,H. (1977) Topics in Cognitive Development.
• Drorni, E. (1993) Language and Cognition: A Developmental Perspective.
• Massimo, P. (1979) Language and Learning.
• Skinner, B. (1957) Verbal Behaviour.
• Vasniadou, S. (1993) Language and Thought.
• Vhorf B.L. (1952) Collected Papers on Metalinguitics. 

While it is true that crimes committed against an individual usually affect society as well, in many cases it is the victims whose rights are directly violated (Udeh 1990, p.l94). Since they suffer directly from the crime, they should have a role in the process of ‘punishment’ or ‘pardoning’, a process which concerns them, both physically and emotionally, at least as much as it concerns society. In modern Western legal systems, consideration of victims’ rights is a separate procedure from the punishment process. But a legal system that aims to compensate victims needs to consider ‘emotional’ as well as ‘material’ suffering.

Involvement of the victims in the punishment process should not be regarded simply as a means of giving them access to retaliation or retribution; it is also a highly effective means of emotional release for victims. Whatever punishment is decreed by the court, if the victims are not consulted, they may feel ‘let down’ by the system. Involving them can help restore credibility to the legal system, as well as having, in certain cultures, an extra deterrent affect on potential criminals.

2. Offender and victim

The concept of victim involvement is well established in the Islamic system, but is relatively new in the West and has not yet been systematically worked out. Until the 1990s, Western legal systems were primarily concerned with the rights of suspects and offenders. Since then, attention has increasingly been drawn to direct involvement of victims. A revised and strengthened Victim’s Charter was published in 1996 along with Guidance to Services from the Association of Chief Officers of Probation (ACOP, 1996). It envisages consultation of the victims before decisions are made about release conditions of offenders serving long sentences (see Nettleton et al., 1976, p.3). Some argued that providing information to victims about release plans for offenders could open the latter to (possibly violent) reprisal, (Kosh and Williams 1995, p.15) and in any case, had the offender not been punished already? On the victims’ side, Nettleton et al. (1997a) noted that: ‘… it was not uncommon for victims of serious offences to move house, even moving to a completely new area, on hearing that an offender was likely to be allowed to resettle in their mutual home area.’ In such a case the law effectively allows an offender to once more offend against the same victim.

3. Crimes committed against individuals and society

Every crime which harms an individual may also harm the society. Depending on the level of injury to the individual or society, the punishment in the Islamic legal system is classified under three broad categories as hadd, ta’zir and qisas or diyya.

3. 1. Hadd, (‘limit’, ‘restrictive ordinance’) refers to the five offences of zina (‘fornication’ or ‘adultery’), ‘false accusation, ‘wine-drinking’, ‘theft’ and ‘highway robbery’ for which fixed penalties are laid down in the Shari‘a. Such acts are essentially regarded as crimes against God (Heyd, 1973, p.340). The punishment prescribed by the Law cannot be reduced or increased even in response to the promptings of compassion (Siddiqi 1979, p.8).

3. 2. Ta’zir is a discretionary punishment aimed at deterrence and, where that is appropriate, reform of the offender.

3. 3. Qisas is a divine ordinance restricting retribution to parity with the crime (life for life, injury for injury, etc.). Right of retribution may be waived in favour of blood-money or diyya (Heyd 1973, p.339); further, even this compensation may be waived by the victim in favour of outright forgiveness.. Yusuf Ali (1989, p.71) states that the translation ‘retaliation’ for qisas is incorrect. Retaliation carries the sense of returning evil for evil, which is what happened in the blood-feuds of the pre-Islamic period: the crime and its consequences were kept going by the feuds, not resolved and put an end to. Qisas means that one who has committed a particular crime may be lawfully punished in the same way and to the same degree as his crime, unless the victim (or representative of the victim) accepts compensation, or chooses outright forgiveness. Whether retribution or forgiveness is chosen, the aim is to close the circle on the crime, and not to let it persist.

4. The involvement of the victim in the punishment process

Of the three choices open to the victim, retribution, compensation, outright forgiveness, the Qur’an commends the Muslims to agree a settlement or to forgive the offender. The injured party (plaintiff or victim’s next of kin) is permitted to pardon the culprit altogether or to make a ‘settlement’ (sulh) with him (Heyd 1973, p.339), but retribution remains a legal right.

Western discussions of qisas translate it as retaliation, which connotes vindictiveness or revenge rather than redress of a wrong by equalizing the harm (Bassiouni 1982, p.203).

The Qur’an in this matter continues the tradition of the Judaeo-Christian teachings concerning law of eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth. As we noted, this law forbids the victim or victim’s family to demand more in punishment than was suffered. This practice proved its effectiveness in preserving social order in the early period of Islam when there was no organized system of criminal justice and penalties were carried out by the victim or victim’s family rather than by institutions and their official personnel (Bassiouni 1982, p.204).

One of the aims of qisas is to limit the consequences of certain categories of wrongdoing. Furthermore, some provisions in the Qur’an indicate that the retributive punishment must be inflicted in the manner least likely to aggravate the situation. The principle satisfies the general human need to have justice done on the perpetrator of crime while precluding unnecessary harm. That general human need can also be satisfied by the state or community acting for and on behalf of the victim, as most contemporary systems of criminal justice aspire to do.

The alternative penalty called diyya (or compensation) to be paid by the wrong-doer or his family to the victim or his/her family. Diyya is payable in certain cases of homicide and bodily harm upon a scale proportionate to the degree of incapacity or injury caused (Heyd, 1973: 338). The principle of diyya finds analogous expression in the contemporary science of victimology, whereby compensation emphasizes decriminalization of the act and compensation of the victim as an alternative to the traditional punishment of incarceration. As

between qisas and diyya, the Qur’an clearly commends the latter and forgiveness (2.178). The preference illustrates the bond of continuity between temporal law and religion since the forgiver will be rewarded in heaven, which, for a Muslim, is a much greater reward than any other. Thus, the combination of diyya and forgiveness produces a powerful material and spiritual inducement to forgo retribution (Bassiouni 1982, p.205). When the victim has the right and the choice to demand punishment or pardon the offender, in many cases, the victim chooses to forgive. One of the reasons behind this preference is that the victim believes that he will be rewarded by the God for his forgiveness.

Finally, critics of Islam wrongly imagine that punishments must be inflicted every day and on a mass scale. They also fancy that Islamic societies daily witness flogging, hand-cutting and stoning to death. The fact is that such deterrent punishments have been executed very rarely. For example, the punishment for theft was carried out only six times over a period of four hundred years-clear proof that such punishment was primarily meant to prevent crime (Siddiqi 1979, p.40).

5. The effects of the involvement of the victim

The systematic involvement of the victim in the punishment process is unique to Islam. It makes two important contributions in the criminal justice field. Firstly, involvement of the victim appeases the victim who otherwise feels shunned or ignored by the legal system. It is the victim who suffers from the crime first, and therefore must have a say in the punishment or pardoning of the offender.

Secondly, the involvement of the victim in the punishment process may also have a deterrent effect on likely offenders. Some offenders may be happy to commit certain acts and face the legal punishment which sometimes, for them, may be a very short imprisonment. But if they believe that their victim(s) might have a say in the punishment which they face, this may deter them. We may also add, here, the spiritual and moral force of forgiveness, if that option is chosen by the victim or victim’s party, in inwardly reforming the offender through practical demonstration of unselfishness.

6. Forgiveness as an option

There are many verses in the New Testament which urge, if not quite require, the victim to forgive the offender (Matthew 18. 21-35; Acts 13. 26- 39; Ephesians 4.32-32; Luke 6.27-31): ‘But I tell you who hear me: Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, pray for those who ill-treat you. If someone strikes you on one cheek, turn him the other also. If someone takes your cloak, do not stop him taking your tunic’ (Luke 6. 27-29).

By contrast, the Qur’an commends but does not require the victim to forgive the aggressor: ‘O you who believe! The law of equality is prescribed to you in cases of murder; the free for the free, the slave for the slave, the women for the women, but if a remission is made by the brother of the slain, then grant any reasonable demand and compensate him with handsome gratitude. This is a concession and a mercy from your Lord. After this whoever exceeds the limits shall be in grave chastisement.’ (2.178)

The option to forgive is a right that belongs to the victim, not to the court. Most legal systems, if not all, do countenance, for particular reasons and in different ways, a reduction or even suspension of punishment. My argument, based upon the Qur’an, is that, just as victims may not demand a punishment greater than is prescribed by law, so too the court may not deny their right to either reduce the punishment prescribed or forgive the crime outright.

The New Testament, as we saw, requires Christians to forgive; no other option is sanctioned by the religion-not retribution, nor compensation-only forgiveness. In a famous text the ancient lex talionis is almost explicitly abrogated: ‘You have heard that it was said, “An eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth.” But now I tell you: do not take revenge on someone who wrongs you. If anyone slaps you on the right cheek, let him slap your left cheek too. And if someone takes you to court to sue for your shirt let him have your coat as well.’ (New Testament, 1976, p.14).

Is this a sustainable way for society to deal with crime, or to restore the moral and emotional order which crime violates? Legal punishment has its root in the natural impulse to revenge a wrong suffered. The impulse is gratified through retaliation by or on behalf of the victim. Later, this retaliation is taken on by the state on behalf of society in general and the victim in particular. Indeed, it has been argued that the state’s assumption of the function of revenge is what constituted the beginning of criminal law (Dakkak 1994:88).

Requiring the victim to forgive the aggressor outright without the option of a measured, legally defined, retribution, goes against human nature. It denies a vital need, individual and collective, for redress which has a deterrent function as well as a role in restoring a violated moral and emotional equilibrium. In sum, the human need for redress should not be left out any more than the human desire to forgive should be left out.

Conclusion

Modern Western legal systems are adapted to a philosophy that regards the individual’s life in this world as the be-all and end-all. Very often criminals are treated very leniently because, it is argued, they are victims of circumstances, psychological complexes, nervous disorders, beyond their control. This attitude is contrary to natural justice insofar as it denies to the victims of crime their need to forgive if they choose and are able, or to agree to a compensatory settlement, or to demand the prescribed punishment. Giving the victims a say in the punishment process, according to the Islamic pattern described above, returns to victims their rights and duties in a matter that directly concerns them, and concerns them most. It constitutes a major contribution to the field of victimology and is, characteristically of Islam, a supremely well-balanced approach. It is high time Western legal philosophy and procedures took note of it and learnt from it.

References

• A. John Simmons, Marshall Cohen, Joshua Cohen, Charles R. Beitz (eds) (1995) Punishment: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
• Abdul Qader Oudah Shaheed (1987) Criminal Law of Islam, vol.1, International Islamic Publishers, Karachi.
• Abdulkadir Qdeh (1990) Mukayeseli Islam Hukuku ve Beseri Hukuk, Rehber Yayinlari, Ankara.
• Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1989) The Holy Qur’an: Text, Translation and Commentary, Amana Corporation, Maryland.
• Association of Chief Officers of Probation (1996) Probation Services and Victims of Crime, ACOP, Wakefield.
• Hilary Nettleton, Sandra Walklate & Brian Williams (1997a) Probation Training with the
• Victim in Mind: Partnership, Values and Organizations, Keele University Press, Keele.
• Hilary Nettleton, Sandra Walklate & Brian Williams (1997b) ‘Three models of probation
• involvement with victims of crime’, paper presented to the British Criminology Conference, Queen’s University of Belfast, 15-18 July 1997.
• Kosh, M. and Wiliams, B. (1995) The Probation Service and Victims of Crime: A Pilot Study, Keele University Press, Keele.
• M. Chertif Bassiouni, (ed.) (1982) The Islamic Criminal Justice System, Oceana Publications, Inc., New York.
• M. Shakry El-Dakkak (1994) Repentance as a Defence: Comparative Study under Islamic
• Law, Common Law and Continental Law, A. S. Noordeen, Kuala Lumpur.
• New Testament (1976) Good News Edition, The Bible Society Collins/Fount, Swindon.
• Uriel Heyd (1979) Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law, (ed. by V. L. Menage), Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Although it is difficult to explain the concept of understanding briefly, we will try to give a brief account of its meaning and consequences in the context of teaching from the viewpoint of constructivist learning.

Is it sensible to assume that ‘Everything which has been taught has also been understood’? Accumulating research on understanding reveals that it is not that simple. Not every teaching generates understanding. Von Glasersfeld (1990), commenting on the present situation, argues that something must be wrong as some children are leaving school unable to read and write or handle numbers properly, and knowing nothing about the scientific nature of the world. He relates this to teaching practices derived from behaviourist models; he is critical of the removal of the distinction between training on the one hand and, on the other, teaching which aims at generating understanding. Whether training manages to generate understanding is, he says, a matter of chance.

Understanding, in fact, is a very complex phenomenon to describe both philosophically and practically. In one attempt to do so (Skemp, 1989), two categories of understanding are defined: relational and instrumental. Relational understanding corresponds to intelligent learning. Instrumental understanding means habit-learning or learning ‘rules without reasons’. The advantages of instrumental understanding are: its being easier to grasp; providing more immediate and obvious rewards; and yielding the right answers more quickly. The advantages of relational understanding, on the other hand, are: it is more adaptable to new tasks; and what is learnt is easier to remember.

A shift towards relational understanding may provide the necessary motivation for students to learn more effectively. However, teaching for relational understanding suffers a major drawback. Selinger (1994) states: ‘Encouraging pupils to learn more relationally can be problematic for both teachers and their pupils; the investment required to make connections is greater than in instrumental learning and the contents of the curriculum need to be considered, so that connections can be easily and readily established.’

II. CONSTRUCTIVISM IN THE CLASSROOM

In constructivism, knowledge is always contextual. The so-called “objective” mathematical knowledge is the product of active construction which we make and share with others (Wood, 1995). Understanding, then, means constructing acts on the shared mathematical objects (ibid.).

The two major assumptions of constructivism can he summarised as follows (Caprio, 1995):

a) Knowledge is not objective, and does not have an absolute structure. What we know and understand is only our perceptions of reality.

b) Teachers help students to develop new insights. This is done by leading students to develop their own analogies, examples and non-examples, proof methods, new ways of solving a problem etc. The teacher, in short, attempts to teach thinking.

In the behavouristic model, the body of knowledge in. a subject-matter is the object of teaching. The teacher’s task is to transmit (or inject) that knowledge into the learner (who does not have it) through an adequate discourse. Constructivism questions this transmission-based approach. It assumes that students have their own paradigms before coming to class, some of which are invalid or incomplete. The duty of the teacher is to guide students on their way through reaching out to that in the knowledge they bring to class which is viable.

According to Pateman and Johnson (1990), constructivist ideas have influenced teaching practices. Teachers need to set up the temporal, discursive and cognitive space for students to construct concepts (Mousley, 1993). Mousley uses the term “moments” to describing the events in the classroom in which teachers and students create space for themselves; this term reflects the immediate nature of very small periods in which the potential of the lesson changes continuously. Her observations indicate that the decisions taken by the teacher in those moments help or prevent students to make sense. That is, the learners do not have command of the learning situation. Learning still depends on the teachers’ residual authority. Therefore, she suggests, teachers should leave more interpretive space in the learning process by presenting the students with loosely-defined tasks.

Jaworski (1994), commenting on the demands of constructivism on teaching methods, says that getting inside the head of the student helps teachers to build a model of the student’s conceptual level; language is a tool for that purpose, and the errors and apparent misconceptions of students can provide the feedback information the teacher needs to understand and adapt to the student’s level of understanding.

Teaching is heavily reliant on what the learner already knows. The duty of the teacher, in the constructivist model, is to help the student to construct new knowledge or discriminate alternative concepts, and to guide them to commonly shared concepts.

Constructivism, being a theory of learning, does not say much directly about teaching methods. Instead, it specifies the methods that are not appropriate (Orton, 1994). But since teaching and learning are complementary and reciprocal, it is inevitable that this theory has many implications for teaching. Von Glaserfeld (1987), for instance, listed some possible consequences of constructivism for teaching:

a) There will be a separation between teaching of understanding and training which aims (only) at repetition of behaviours.

b) Educators will be interested in what is going on in the minds of the children rather than in their overt responses.

c) The teacher will realise that language is a tool to help learners to construct understanding, rather than a mechanism for transferring knowledge.

d) There is a shift in the perception of errors from being something undesirable (which teaching should eliminate) to being possible indicators of the process whereby students make sense of their experiential worlds. The teacher’s duty is to detect those errors which yield information about how and why the child deviates from the teacher’s expectations.

e) There is a shift toward seeking knowledge about learners’ conceptual structures and finding ways to modify them.

A metaphor for teaching in the constructivist framework is “facilitate” (Lerman, 1993), as opposed to “inject” for the typical behaviourist approach.

Making Students Make Sense

Mason (1989) lists some aims of a teacher concerned to help his or her students make sense. He would like students to have seen connections, experienced a crystallisation of experiences subsumed under a general concept, gained a sense of coherence of a topic etc. Elaborating on the issue of the aims of teacher and students, Mason states that “subordination of teaching to learning” and “starting where the students are” do not mean that the teacher’s aims are the same as those of students. Rather, the aims should be confluent. The factors that determine student success in these aims depend on: teacher attitudes toward learning and teaching; the interest and commitment of the teacher; the extent to which teaching evokes students’ capabilities; and the extent to which students share the teacher’s goals.

Listening to the students while they are trying to make sense is a powerful way to get to know how they understand a topic. This talking can be among themselves or with the teacher. The ideal would be to talk to students about their understanding individually, but that is practically impossible. If they are talking with each other, the teacher can listen to different groups and gets an overall sense. Teachers’ dependence on that “overall sense” may not always be a reliable basis for making decisions about any individual student, but in a classroom situation it is inevitable.

III. TEACHING FOR UNDERSTANDING

Helping children to develop their perceptions is more productive than helping them to acquire particular ideas or bits of information. The necessary and sufficient condition for achieving this is to have a rough understanding of their current perceptions. It is essential for the teacher to have knowledge about pupils’ past experiences so that remedial actions may take place accordingly (Threlfall 1990).

Discovery and inquiry-based methods are acceptable ways to facilitate understanding. What is not good for the teacher is to sit back and await answers from the students without putting in any effort. Rather, the teacher should arrange the learning environment in order to enable useful experiences for the students. Although they can use some directive statements sometimes, much talking on the part of the teacher does not contribute to better understanding on the part of the learner (Orton & Frobisher, 1996).

Rote Learning vs. Meaningful Learning

Meaningful learning occurs if previously isolated bits of information are organised and restructured into new relationships. In other words, meaningful learning takes place as new knowledge is integrated into the learner’s existing knowledge. There is no one-and-only methods (e.g. discovery learning) for making this happen. Any method, such as expository teaching, is appropriate if it ensures that new learning is linked to existing knowledge (Orton, 1987).

In rote learning generally, the schema remain fixed. What is learned remains closely tied to where it has been learned, therefore it cannot be generalised to other contexts. It stays the memory as isolated bits of information. The learning of bare facts and procedures falls in this category.

Despite having little effect on learning, repetition and drill may be useful for the acquisition of declarative knowledge (Mayer, 1983). Repetition influences not only how much is learned but also the structure of what is learned. In fact, there is a misunderstanding, says Von Glasersfeld (1990), about the role of rote learning and memorization. He states that, they are not unnecessary. There are matters that simply have to be learned in a direct mechanical way. Orton (1994) argues that rote-learning has unfairly been associated with behaviourism and is a necessary method for learning. It takes place in a natural way.

Discovery Learning

Students in discovery learning situations are led, with limited teacher support, to discover the abstract from the concrete, and encouraged to make connections from seemingly disconnected events. In other words, discovery learning transfers the burden from the teacher to the student (Corno and Snow, 1986).

Discovery learning is advocated by constructivism because of the opportunities for discussion, negotiation and the exchange of ideas (Orton, 1994). The teacher’s role here is to initiate students to make their own interpretations which makes it easier for them to learn. But case studies conducted in classrooms reveal that what the teachers claim to be discovery learning is not discovery learning in its fullest sense (Wood, et al., 1990). The teachers rather impose on students what they are supposed to discover.

IV. CONCLUSION

No two students are same. Hence, it is impossible to find two identical teaching experiences. That is, “there is no royal road to teaching and learning.” The suggestions for good teaching do not comprise a method but rather promote a perspective. The teacher cannot do the learning for any pupil (Mason, 1989). At the end of the day, the so called “transmission process” (Jaworski, 1989) depends on students’ own construction of what the teacher says. It, indeed, is not surprising that there frequently is a discrepancy between the two.

Finally, understanding is not the comprehension of an absolute reality but establishing a fit between the old and the new experience (Von Glasersfeld 1984 in Jaworski, 1994). To make students attain understanding, teachers should keep in mind that the teacher’s role is as a facilitator, setting up constructivist learning environments which provide useful experiences for students; there is no ready-made teaching strategy for facilitating understanding: a constructivist approach can use a repertoire of methods, the only thing excluded is passivity on the part of teachers or students; finally, teachers’ knowledge of what their students already know is the only source enabling them to plan their actions.

References 

• Caprio, (1995) in Constructivism in Education, Steffe, L.P. & Gale, J, (eds), Lawrence Erlbaum.
• rno, I. & Snow, R.E. (1986) ‘Adapting teaching to indiviual differences among learners’ in Wittrock, M.C. (ed.) Handbook of Research on Teaching, New York & London, Macmillan Publishing Co, pp.605-29.
• Jaworski, B. (1989) ‘Mathematics teaching; belief and practice’ in Ernest, P. (ed), Teaching Mathematics; The State of the Art, New York & London, Falmer Press.
• Jaworski, B. (1994) Investigating Mathematics Teaching; A Constructivist lnquiry London, Falmer Press.
• Lerman, S. (1994) ‘Metaphors for mind and metaphors for teaching and learning mathematics’, Proceedings of the 18th International Conference for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, vol. 3, Lisbon, Portugal.
• Mason, J. (1989) ‘Teaching (pupils to make sense) and assessing (the sense they make)’ in Ernest, P. (ed), Teaching Mathematics; The State of the Art, New York & London, Falmer Press.
• Mayer, R.E. (1983) ‘Can you repeat that? Qualitative effects of repetitions and advance organisation learning from Science prose’, Journal of Educational Psychology, 75(1), pp.40-9.
• Mousley, J. (1993) ‘Constructivism; epistemology to pratice’, Proceedings of the 18th International Conference for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, vol. 3, Lisbon, Portugal.
• Orton, A (1987) Learning Mathematics: Issues, Theory and Classroom, London, Cassell.
• Orton, A. (1994) ‘Learning mathematics: implications for teaching’ in Orton, A. & Wain, G. (eds)., Issues in Teaching Mathematics, London, Cassell.
• Orton, A. & Frobisher, L. (1996) Insights into Teaching Mathematics, London, Cassell.
• Pateman N.A. & Johnson DC (1990) ‘Curriculum and co structivism in early childhood mathematics’ in Steffe L.P. & Wood T. (eds) Transforming Children’s mathematical Education; International Perspectives, New York, Macmillan, pp. 346-56.
• Selinger, M. (1994) ‘Understanding’ in Selinger, M (ed.) Teaching Matheniatics, London & New York, Routledge. Skemp, R.R. (1989) Mathematics in the Primary School, London, Routledge.
• Threlfall. J. (1990) ‘An exploration of the way in which children and adults understand the mathematical concept of addition’. Unpublished doctoral thesis, Leeds, U.K.
• Von Glaserfeld (1987) Constructioism, in Husen T. & Postlethwaite N. (eds) International Encyclopedia of Education, vol. 1, Oxford, Pergamon.
• Wood, T. (1995) ‘From alternative epistemologies to practice in education; Rethinking what it means to teach and learn’ in Steffe, L.P. & Gale, J. (eds) Constructioism in Education, Lawrence Erlbaum.
• Wood, T.; Cobb, P. & Yackel, E. (1995) ‘Reflections on learning and teaching mathematics in Elementary School’ in Steffe, L.P. & Gale, J. (eds) Constructioism in Education, Lawrence Erlbaum.

Before discussing this further, it will be useful to define our terms. By ‘creation theory’ is meant something like this: the Creator, by an act of will which occurred outside of the cosmos, directly willed into being the first plant and animal species, separately and independently of each other. Any subsequent changes or mutations were accomplished only within the species boundaries. No essential modifications or evolution (such as of more complicated species from simpler ones) occurred after that. In the past the earth was at least once flooded extensively. Geological investigations show clearly that this extensive flooding led to the destruction and extinction of a large number of living creatures.

According to the modern ‘evolution theory’, all life evolved from one simple primitive cell, which came out of dead, lifeless matter by chance, then hit upon a method of replication and adaptation which (again by random trial and error over vast periods of time) led to the many varieties of living species each fitted for competitive survival in its particular niche in the environment. The whole process of evolution took several hundred million years. Large geological events are explained as natural phenomena occurring in specific periods of time and without a world-wide destruction of the earth by flood.

The first creation of man was not observed by man; it is an unrepeatable historical event, unsuited to ‘testing by experiment’, the standard procedure in modern science. Further, creation cannot be disproved: it is impossible to devise or conduct an experiment that could falsify the claim put forward by the creation theory. It is for that reason unacceptable as a scientific theory. That does not mean it is false; nor does it mean it is true. However, it is clear that the creation theory shows good correlations with the results of fossil investigation. To some extent, it can be tested in the same way as other historical claims are matched and tested with appropriately corroborative historical documents.

Evolution theory likewise does not fulfil all the criteria which would justify calling it a scientific theory. The great modifications of evolution were never observed; the claims of the theory fall outside of experimental and scientific methods. Nobody has ever observed or could ever observe how a fish became a frog or a monkey became a human; no human witnessed or could ever witness the origin of the cosmos or of life.

A well-known bit of evidence often used to argue for evolution theory is the case of the moth Biston betularia. The moths of this species found in England before the industrial revolution were predominantly white. The effects of industrial pollution blackened rocks and tree-bark. The number of white moths in the population, now fatally exposed to their predators, fell drastically, while the number of black moths rose. Today in the industrialized regions of England, 95% of the moths are black: they had better camouflage and therefore a higher survival rate, eventually dominating the population. Thus, the environment ‘selected’ or favoured the black over the white variety.

While this case clearly illustrates adaptive evolution within a species or, more precisely, the adaptation capacity to certain conditions with which all living beings are endowed by creation, it equally clearly does not illustrate evolution from one species to another. The latter kind of change or ‘macro-evolution’ is never observable. As a famous supporter of evolution, Dobzhansky, put it-evolution can never be repeated or reversed (no life-form ever evolves back to what it allegedly had once been); the time periods reckoned for major changes to occur exceed by far the life-span of mankind as a whole; it is impossible to test the theory scientifically and therefore it cannot be presented to anti-evolutionists in a way that would force them to change their position.

Some evolutionist scientists are objective and honest enough to accept that evolution theory is no more scientific than the creation theory. For example, providing a short list of the theory’s weaknesses, Harris pointed out that creationists demand from the evolutionists an explanation of (a) how random mutations led to adaptations, (b) why natural selection acts only for the benefit of some species, (c) why natural selection allowed the survival of organs which are obviously not used. We now understand, Harris maintains, that neither theory is rational, that both depend on axioms.

In the Preface of the 1971 edition of Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species, Mathews, pointing out that the evolution of the animals has never been demonstrated, asks: Is biology now a science or a belief system?

It does not follow from the fact that neither theory is ‘scientific’ according to the strict criteria, that either is necessarily wrong. However, since evolution theory claims that evolution occurred according to natural laws, these laws must be valid at the present time (as in the past), and the theory may not contradict those laws. But the evolutionists insist that the non-demonstrability of evolution, its central weakness as a scientific theory, must be accepted as a consequence of the enormous slowness of evolutionary processes. They further insist that creation theory should be removed from scientific textbooks, it should not be investigated scientifically, and certainly not presented as an alternative to evolution. But their argument that creation theory cannot be scientifically tested applies equally to evolution theory. Similarly, their objection that creation theory promotes religion and belief in supernatural agency, applies equally to evolution theory which promotes atheism as a belief system and accords to random ‘natural’ processes the role of supernatural agency. If it is wrong or improper to teach the former, it must be wrong or improper to teach the latter also.

In practice, evolution theory has become an unofficial state-supported religion sponsored directly by its exclusive place on all curricula; a dogma that binds students of biology to the closed horizons of evolution theory in schools, colleges and universities. However, more and more scientists are finding the courage to assert that grave inconsistencies between evolutionary theory and scientific laws or experimental results exist. Also, many scientists are arguing that the creation model is free from such inconsistencies and offers a better explanation of the established facts about the origin of living organisms. Even some followers of evolutionary theory are admitting to being dissatisfied with it and to seeking a ‘better’ theory that fits and explains the known facts in a properly scientific way.

The essential claim of modern evolutionary theory is that the processes of evolution resulted from natural selection of the coincidental mutational modifications in the genetic code. This selection was realized in relation to modifications of the environment. Natural selection is an agent, acting through coincidences and working in mutated genes. But that does not explain (as it was once thought and hoped it would) very much at all. There is a fatal circularity, a fatal self-validation, in the theory of selection. Which living creatures survived? Answer: those that adapted to the changes in their environment. Which living creatures adapted? Answer: those that survived. There is no explanatory effectiveness in this kind of reasoning.

It is impossible to explain, why some species only live until they produce the next generation. We only know that because they were created in that way. Scientists who support the creation model believe that natural selection leads to species extending modifications towards ever-increasing complexity. Natural selection has the merely negative function of eventually removing from the environment species that have failed to realize their potential to adapt.

According to modern evolutionary theory, all processes of change are initiated by mutations. Mutations are random, heritable modifications in the chromosomes or genes, which are complete functioning elements. Whatever happens randomly can nevertheless be calculated according to known and established mathematical principles. Therefore, it should be possible to calculate and predict the numbers of mutations necessary to effect a change in the organism. In short, if we really believe that evolution resulted through coincidence, then the time period needed for the transformation of a protozoon to a human can be worked out. One group of mathematicians who support the evolution theory did compute the time needed. The results of their calculations were that it would take one billion times longer than the five billion of years that the world has existed. In sum, it is impossible for evolution to have happened by chance. Why then do we allow that impossibility to be taught in schools presented in textbooks as if it were truth? It is impossible to justify.

Likewise, between yesterday and today there is a thin veil that cannot hinder the spirit from passing and penetrate into yesterday and the past beyond that. Whereas, with respect to the body, this distance is so great as to require a year to travel. Also, the veils between the outer and inner dimensions of existence and between the world and the Hereafter are thin and transparent for the men of heart and spirit, while they are extremely thick for those obeying their carnal selves and bodily desires.

Similarly, between your night and day there is a fine interval, which is your “eyelid”. When you open the eye of your self, your night disappears and your day shines. If, on the other hand, you forget what you are, you fall into a permanent night. Also, whoever looks at the universe for the sake of the Almighty, whatever he witnesses becomes a (source of) knowledge for him; if he looks with a view of heedlessness and from the perspective of material or natural causes, whatever he regards as knowledge becomes sheer ignorance.

Again, between the illumination of Aya Sofya (Hagia Sophia) and its being in thick darkness at night there is a time as short as switching off the lights. The flash of lightning and its disappearance take place almost at the same instant. The darkening of the sky with dark clouds and its clearing through the removal of dark clouds from the face of the sun by a breeze of mercy happen just one after the other in a short time. One who looks and sees with the light of faith and belief in Divine Unity, sees the universe filled with light and in friendship, mutual love and affection, and all things and beings in it as amiable, living brothers. Whereas one who looks with unbelief, sees all things and beings as dreadful corpses, strangers hostile to one another. He also sees the universe in veils of darkness one above the other and himself in a deep sea covered by waves riding upon waves, above which are clouds; when he puts forth his hand, he can hardly see it.

Also, the veil between the two faces of a mirror is thinner than a leaf but there is as great a difference between them as the distance between east and west. With a movement of a finger, the mirror either smiles at you or your face is completely dark. In the same way, the deeds of man have two aspects or “faces”. The deeds done with the intention to please God provide you with a transparent face in the depth of which numberless manifestations are reflected. The lack of such intention or the deeds not done for the sake of God show the dark, opaque face which bears nothing in the name of truth.

While the dark face has no depth and can contain nothing, with the exception of occupying space the size of itself, the transparent face, because of its relation to the immaterial world of ideas or symbols can, by virtue of its transparency, contain numberless huge things. In the same way, life has two faces, the first of which relates to the world and is dark, narrow and transient, while the other relating to the Truth is transparent, broad and permanent. The heedless carnal self, under the influence of a devilish sophistry, wears the dark face but demands what is possible in the transparent face like seeking eternity.

The key of creation is in the hands of man, in his ego. Although the doors of creation seem to be open, they are actually closed. The Truth, glory be to Him, has entrusted man with a key with which all the doors of creation are opened and the treasury of the Creator is unveiled. The key entrusted to you is ego, which is itself an enigma. When you solve that enigma by knowing its nature, creation is opened to you.

God Almighty, may His Glory be exalted, has given man ego so that it should serve as a unit of comparison to understand the attributes of Divine Lordship.

When man knows what ego is, he comes to see it as fine and weak like a conscious hair in the rope of man’s existence, like a thin stripe in the cloth of man’s nature, like an alif-the first Arabic letter-in the book of the individual. It has also two faces, one turned to good, a passive recipient of God’s bounties and blessings, not the agent, the other turned to evils and non-existence and being itself agent. It has an illusory nature, imagined lordship and sovereignty, and existence as weak as not to bear anything by itself. It is to function like a thermometer or other like instrument with which things and properties are measured. It is a measure with which to know the absolute, all-en-compassing Attributes of the Necessarily-Existent Being.

Man should be well aware of this and, becoming a referent of He has indeed prospered who purifies it. (Qur’an. 91.9) fulfil what is due to the Trust he has been charged with.

If you reflect on ego as a unit of comparison to comprehend the Creator’s Attributes and Names, it becomes an eye for you to see whatever exists in the universe. The information you get from the universe finds in ego what will confirm it and make it into real knowledge. Then its claim of lordship or sovereignty and self-ownership comes to an end, and it perceives that its existence is only an illusory one. Whereas if you consider ego as having an independent existence of itself and thereby breach the Trust, you will be among those referred to in And indeed he has ruined it who stunts and spoils it (91.10) For it is ego which the heavens, the earth and mountains shrank from bearing since, with that aspect of it, ego is the source of associating partners with God, all evils and kinds of misguidance. If ego hides itself from you, it grows thick and swells until it swallows you and, with all your existence, you become an ego. Then it grows stronger with tribal and then racial fanaticism until it has become a devil contending against the commandment of its Maker. Then it likens other people and things and natural causes with itself, attributing to each self-ownership and sovereignty, and thus falls into a tremendous kind of associating partners with God. While in this state, if you move your eyes throughout the creation, everything is closed in your face just when it seems to have opened to you, for your eyes return to your self and you see everything as colored by ego. The color of ego is associating partners with God or denial of Him. Even if all the horizons were clearly filled with the most manifest signs (of the existence and Unity of the Creator), what remains in ego would be a dark point covering all those signs.

An Important matter

Ego has two faces, one represented by Prophethood, the other by human, (materialistic) philosophy.

The first face is the origin of pure servanthood to God. With this face, ego points to God, not itself, and has an illusory, dependent existence. Although it appears to be self-owning, in fact it is owned and disposed by another-God. It has a supposed, not an established, reality. Its duty is to be a measure, a unit of comparison, to understand the Attributes of the Creator. This is the reality of ego, as it was seen by the Prophets, who submitted the whole of existence to God. They affirmed and demonstrated that God has no partners at all, either in His Sovereignty or in His Lordship or Divinity. In His hand are the keys of all things and He has absolute power over all things. From this transparent face of ego, the All-Compassionate has grown a blessed tree of servanthood whose blessed branches spreading through the garden of the universe hang with clusters of fruits of Messengers, Prophets, saints, and truth-seeking, pure scholars glittering in darkness like stars.

As to philosophy, it considers ego as having an independent, self-owned existence showing to itself. Philosophers have supposed that ego has an established reality and that its duty is to be perfected through self-love. In this supposition many kinds of associating partners with God have originated and on the head of ego has grown the accursed tree of misguidance. The branch of the power of lust of this tree, which appreciates unjust might or force and physical beauty enamoured of show, has given to mankind idols deified (by their admirers) while themselves bow (before their admirers) in an attitude of adoration. The branch of the power of wrath has saddled mankind with Pharaohs and Nimrods. The branch of the power of reason has produced atheists and materialists. Philosophers attribute to God only a part of His kingdom and attribute the rest to other than the Almighty.

Although ego is essentially like air or vapor, because of the philosophers’ illomened view, it grows denser, becoming like fluid and then, because of superficial familiarity, like a solid thing. Afterwards, because of heedlessness it gets frozen and, thereafter, because of rebellion, gets stronger and swells until it swallows its owner. It becomes broader with tribal or racial attitudes and then, because of ascribing to other people and natural causes self-existence and ownership and even creativity, as it ascribes the same to itself, ego starts to contend against the commandment of its Creator. Some philosophers have felt compelled to believe that natural causes have real effect in creation and control of things, and attribute creativity to nature and chance. That is why they deny the Resurrection and accept that spirits or, as is the case with materialists, matter have no beginning. May God assail them! How perverse they are! Because of conceit, they have become playthings of devils, who have thrown them into the pits of misguidance.

Ego in the normocosmos-man-is the counterpart of nature in the macro-cosmos: both have been attributed partnership with God and therefore deified. Whoever denies false deities and believes in God, has laid hold of the most firm handle that is impossible to break. God is All-Hearing, All-Knowing. (2.256)

The law of growth operates in a tree. The seed of a tree, from which it grows, is the essence of that tree. As is known, the seed is contained by the fruit and, unless somehow impeded, it grows by eternal Favouring into the tree and again is placed in the fruit growing on that tree. The fruit is the most valuable, most esteemed, most pleasant, most important and most illustrious part of the tree, being the aim of its existence. The universe is a tree, the basic elements like earth, water, air and fire being its branches, plants its leaves, animals its flowers and mankind its fruits.

The most radiant of those fruits and the most illustrious, greatest, most beautiful, most noble, most comprehensive and most beneficial of them is the Prophet Muhammad, upon him be peace and blessings, the master of the Messengers, the leader of the pious, and the beloved of the Lord of the Worlds. He is the commander of the “cavalry” of the Prophets and the pious ones faithful to their allegiance and promises, and the most virtuous of all creatures. He is the bearer of the standard of the greatest glory through belief in and submission to Divine Unity and the owner of the most esteemed and dignified rope through Islam. He is the witness of eternal mysteries and observer of the lights and the translator of the tongues of those preceding him. He is the source of knowledge, forbearance and wisdom. He attained the highest rank of servanthood and was distinguished with the highest morality of the purest ranks: the greatest friend of God and His most noble beloved, upon him be the most meritorious of blessings and peace so long as the heavens and earth remain.

Take my hand. O master of the Messengers,
You are the desired and sought, O man fest light of God’s Munificence;
I have no leader, no refuge, other than you.
My proof is, ‘There is no god but God and Muhammad is God’s Messenger.” 

Darwin himself agreed on better adaptation, and increasing complexification, but wholly rejected the idea that the evolutionary progress of organisms had any kind of moral implication. He understood the ‘improvement’ implied in ‘progress through evolution’ in a functional rather than an ethical, moral, or social sense.

Darwinism – Spencerism

By some analogy to its biological counterpart, Social Darwinism argues that the struggle for existence among humans may be expected to yield social progress, just as struggle among human communities does produce evolutionary adaptive results. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), English sociologist and philosopher, was the pioneer of this approach, so much so that Social Darwinism might, in many respects, be better called ‘Social Spencerism’. Spencer was raised in the competitive atmosphere of the Industrial Revolution and remained one of the great champions of laissez-faire economics. It was he who coined the term ‘survival of the fittest’ to describe natural selection, although he was never a convinced Darwinist. He had already accepted a progressive view of human society, and the idea of biological evolution, during the 1850s, before Darwin’s theory became public. For Spencer, Malthus’s ‘law’ of demographic change was the dynamic agent of social development, constantly forcing societies to progress economically in order to escape the pressure of limited resources. At the same time, he was convinced by Lamarck’s arguments for evolution and began to see the possibility of constructing a synthesis that would unite all aspects of natural and human evolution under the same laws.

Social Darwinism and the American Way

Social Darwinism received some of its widest support in the U.S where the laissez-faire economics developed in England and France in the late 18th century was vigorously espoused, and where, after the successful War of Independence, rights of the individual (especially in the form of freedom from government interference) were enthusiastically promoted. The leading Social Darwinist in American academic circles was William Graham Sumner (1840-1910), Professor of political economy and social science at Yale which, under his influence, became a kind of pulpit for Social Darwinism. His ideas were derived chiefly from Spencer. He viewed the capitalist system with great favour because it allowed the free play of the ‘competition of life’. Unlike Spencer, he was very pessimistic and didn’t look forward to a future state of equilibrium. The well-known industrialist and philanthropist, Andrew Carnegie (1 835-191 4), held the view that individualism, private property, the law of accumulation of wealth and the law of competition promoted the highest and best in human achievements. Other businessman liked to see (and present) themselves as successful survivors in the struggle for existence. For example Rockefeller said: ‘The growth of a large business is merely survival of the fittest…’. Interestingly, many rich American industrialists and businessmen found no difficulty in accommodating Christianity to the Darwinian idea of a competitive struggle which ‘necessarily’ eliminated the weaker parties in the struggle.

War of nations and races

It is not surprising that Social Darwinist arguments were readily extended to the conclusion that evolutionary progress of mankind is furthered by inter-racial or inter-national struggles. The theory of evolution could be and was used in justifications of wars for national or racial supremacy. The best known writer in this vein was the German historian Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896). In his ‘Politics’, he argued that the weak must perish, and that they perish ‘justly’: ‘The grandeur of history lies in the perpetual conflict of nations, and it is simply foolish to desire the suppression of their rivalry.’

Though Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) never stated explicitly that he was drawing on Darwin’s theory of evolution, we can easily see the Hitlerian doctrine of racial superiority a kind of Darwinism carried to logical extreme of madness. (Darwin himself might have had some racist tendencies. For example, he wrote: ‘The more civilized so-called Caucasian races have beaten the Turkish hollow in the struggle for existence. Looking to the world at no very distant date, what an endless number of the lower races will have been eliminated by the higher civilized races throughout the world.’)

Influence on political ideology

Spencerian Social Darwinism reached its peak of influence in 1882, when Spencer visited U.S. for an extensive lecture tour. But that tour also coincided with the beginning of questioning and reaction. Leading the reaction was Lester Frank Ward (1841-1913), a geologist and a professor of sociology. Ward took his stand on the side of nurture in the growing controversy of nature vs. nurture. His thoughts can be described as reformed or liberal Social Darwinism, repudiating the struggle doctrines of the laissez-faire school in favour of emphasis on social improvement through attention to the conditions of the social environment.

Australia, in the period from 1860 to 1885, saw the most frequent advocacy of Spencerian evolutionary ideas. Many Spencerian, Darwinian and Malthusian ideas and slogans were repeated by politicians, businessmen, academics, and journalists, just as in the U.S. But the succeeding period of economic depression dampened the enthusiasm, again as in the U.S., and criticisms began to develop and made themselves felt in the 1880s.

Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, various political and intellectual ideologies were clearly inspired to some degree by Social Darwinism-militarism, colonialism, racism, Nazism. Even socialism and anarchism were influenced by this doctrine. Marx and Engels were much interested in Darwin’s work, and used his theory to underpin their notion of the historical evolution of class struggle.

Essentialism and relativism

The influence of Darwinism on philosophical ideas was considerable and many-sided, but the precise way this influence worked is by no means easy to state in simple terms. Generally, Darwinian theory promoted or assisted the decline of Essentialism and the concomitant rise of relativism in many branches of philosophy. The doctrine of essences, all allegedly ‘ultimate explanations’, was driven out of philosophy. The American school of philosophy called ‘Pragmatism’, developed in the 1870s, was self-consciously influenced by Darwinism, some of its proponents being firm believers. Notably, Chauncy Wright (1830-1875), who, to Darwin’s considerable pleasure, defended the Darwinian theory against the perceptive attacks of some Catholic scholars. Charles Pierce (1839-1914), after his careful study of Darwin’s work, envisaged a kind natural selection process acting on ideas.

Ethics

Darwin himself was one of the first to consider the relationship between ethical theory and evolutionary doctrines, as when he argued that altruism might have had an evolutionary origin. He tried to show how ethical behaviour would have survival value, and thus might become established in human societies. But Darwin didn’t take the further step and say that one might distinguish between right and wrong by considering what had happened during the course of evolution, or where it was going in future. Evolution in itself did not provide an ethical code. Herbert Spencer, however, went beyond Darwin and hinted that this would be a possibility, as he wrote, ‘The conduct to which we apply the name good, is the relatively more evolved conduct, and … bad is the name we apply to conduct which is relatively less evolved.’

Such opinions were countered by T. H. Huxley in his 1893 essay, ‘Evolution and ethics’, saying that one cannot possibly draw any moral or ethical conclusions from a consideration of the course of evolution, evolution and ethics are quite distinct. Although his arguments were quite persuasive, others went on attempting to derive ethical norms from the evolutionary process.

Exclusion of the supernatural

Darwinian theory was purely naturalistic; it made no appeal to entities such as God, divine spirits, hypothetical intellects, final causes, souls or Platonic ideas. By providing an alternative naturalistic explanation of design, Darwin made it seem less necessary to construct a view of the world that invoked some kind of supernatural being. Darwin’s theories therefore gave considerable support to materialist interpretations of the world. The old mind/body dualism of Descartes and his followers would be replaced by a monistic materialism. This attitude proved particularly attractive in Germany, in the writings of the members of so-called ‘Monist League’, the work of the philosopher/biologist, Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) being particularly prominent. Haeckel, once regarded as a progressive liberal opposed to the excesses of arbitrary state power, has (in the light of more recent studies) come to be considered as one of formative influences on German Nazism. The three main strands in his thought were German Romantic Idealism, scientific positivism and materialism, and Darwinism. But Haeckel’s materialism was interestingly different; for him, atoms were endowed with souls.

Also drawing on biological evolution, although less directly, was the philologist and nihilist professor, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), particularly in his poetic-philosophic discourse work Thus Spoke Zarathustra. He believed that by a proper exercise of will, certain men might evolve into a world-elite of ‘Ubermenschen’ or Supermen. Superman would be his own master and might succeed to the rank and authority traditionally associated with God.

Metaphysics

Henri Bergson, a French philosopher, (1859-1941), accorded primacy to spirit and intuition, rather than matter and analysis. Metaphysics was concerned with spirit and intuition, and he sided with the metaphysicians. Bergson’s evolutionism, though all-pervasive in his system, was very different from Darwin’s naturalistic, mechanistic or materialistic doctrine of evolution by natural selection. It is clear that Bergson far transcended the hard ground of Darwinian science and moved on to the lusher fields of speculative metaphysics. In its time, his work Creative Evolution aroused considerable excitement and enthusiasm.

On the subject of metaphysics Darwin himself was somewhat sceptical: ‘To study metaphysics as it has always been studied appears to me to be like puzzling at astronomy without mechanics.’ He felt that one who had explained the (biological) origin of man, who knew what a baboon was, had done more to explain man than Locke.

Religion

Darwinism’s impact on religion can be summarized by saying that it undermined religious beliefs, and was one of the major influences in encouraging agnosticism. Its naturalistic structure opposed the teleological basis of Christianity and other religions. Between 1830 and 1875, we observe an evolution in British society and particularly British scientific society. In 1830s, science as a profession was just beginning, and because of the peculiarities of British higher education there were strong links between science and organized religion. The next forty to fifty years saw those links weaken and break; and evolutionism, particularly Darwinian evolutionism gained the opportunity to be used. Darwin succeeded where Chambers (who proposed a designed evolution) failed, because Darwin had earned respect as a scientist. So for this change in Victorian Britain, the Darwinian Revolution was part cause and part effect.

Conclusion

Evolution, one of the fundamental discoveries and concepts in modern thought, is central to modem biology and to the use of biology in modern society. Without it, genetics, physiology, ecology, and every other aspect of biology would lack coherence. Evolution has also added new perspectives to the discussions on scientific methodology. More dramatic (and famous) has been the theory’s extra-scientific impacts. Evolution has been and probably will remain a doctrine that has consequences for our understanding of the nature of man, and the purpose (or lack of purpose) in his existence. Also, because of its social implications, as in human genetics, evolution is a subject highly charged with emotion, and much of the literature on it suffers from unspoken and often untested assumptions. It is very difficult to discuss the theory with objectivity. Discussion of it tends to spill over to virtually every area of discourse in the humanities and social sciences: Sociology, Economics, Politics, Theology, Philosophy, Psychology, Anthropology, Literature, and Music.

1) Organic integration (tawhid) vs artificial fragmentation. Whereas ma‘rifa presupposes the total application of the principle of tawhid on all levels-divine, cosmic and human-the modernist outlook is characterized by a tendency to divide and compartmentalize, separating for example, religion from society, ethics from knowledge.

2) Certainty vs doubt. Whereas for ma‘rifa, a preexisting faith, preferably based on verification, must become certitude, for the modernist, faith is itself something which must be proved, and this in a climate dominated by scepticism.

3) Metaphysical profundity vs positivist superficiality. Whereas in ma‘rifa all relative truths are seen as reflections of one Absolute Truth, the modern outlook is characterized by the view of modern science: only that is true which is empirically proven so.

4) Sense of the sacred vs profane materialism. Whereas in ma‘rifa, the surrounding world of nature is suffused with meaning and holiness, being so many ‘signs’ of God, for the modernist, nature is there to be manipulated and dominated for the sake of material goals.

5) Eschatological realism vs worldly naivete. The pursuit of ma‘rifa requires an initial detachment from the life of this world, an awareness of its relative and fleeting nature. The Qur’an stresses this in many places, referring to the life of this world as ‘play’ (la‘ib), for example: (29.64) ‘The life of this world is naught but sport and play; and the abode of the Hereafter, that is true life, if only they knew.’ The ‘they’ could easily apply to those who identify with the underlying dynamic of the modern world: an all-consuming hunger for things of this world, a preoccupation with terrestrial life that in marginalizes concern with God and one’s final ends: and this is truly a form of naivete, a deluded, implicit belief in the permanence of one’s life in this fragile world.

6) Spiritual virtue vs moral relativism. From the viewpoint of ma‘rifa, the virtues are reflections of divine qualities: ‘Acquire the character traits of God’, said the Prophet. The realization of the fundamental virtues is thus an absolute pre-requisite for any spiritual endeavour, any effective movement towards God. Virtue is a spiritual imperative, and it is for this reason that many Sufi treatises describe the virtues as stations on the way to God. On the other hand, the modernist will tend to reduce virtue to a purely ethical rather than a spiritual imperative, viewing it chiefly in respect of its social function. The modern liberal ethos of moral relativism erodes further the spiritual meaning of virtue.

7) Liberating objectivity vs inescapable subjectivism. Ma‘rifa both presupposes and produces a degree of objectivity both towards one’s self: according to the terms used in the Qur’an, one must pass from the state of the nafs al-lawwama, the self-accusing soul, to the nafs al-mutma’inna, the soul at peace in the presence of God. This transition comes about through a relentless war against one’s own vices, faults, and weaknesses, the war referred to by the Prophet as the jihad al-akbar, the greatest of all jihads. Such a war against oneself would be regarded in modern psychology simply as the imbalanced indulgence of a guilt complex. Modern psychology shies away from the notion of sin, preferring a false tranquility in the context of immorality to a true peace based on a wholesome effort of self- improvement. The essential shortcoming of modern psychology was summed by Jung in a moment of frank confession when he wrote: ‘The object of psychology is the psychic; unfortunately, it is also its subject’ (Sword of Gnosis, p.153). There can therefore be no objective view of the psychic except by something that by definition transcends the psychic: and this can only be the spirit, breathed by God into man at the time of his creation, and cultivated by man insofar as he conforms to the higher calling of his nature, or else stifled and suffocated by man insofar as he remains heedless of his true nature.

8) Theocentrism vs humanism. The way of ma‘rifa is centred on God here and now, taking to heart what the Qur’an says (50.16): ‘We are closer to man than his jugular vein.’ The aspirant to ma‘rifa, in other words, seeks fulfillment in God through this mysterious divine presence within his own being. Humanism is a caricature of this aspiration, a desire for fulfillment within the bounds of one’s own humanity, a quest for immortality apart from God -which is exactly what Satan promises man: ‘O Adam, shall I show you the tree of immortality and a kingdom that does not waste away?’ (20.120) For the modernist, the expulsion of the divine is ‘liberating’; it puts man centre-stage, his own authority in all matters, free to define his own ‘morality’: in its excess, this view claims that ‘gods come and go’, only the humanist enterprise remains!

9) Wise authority vs pedagogical anarchy. Whereas the modernist outlook encourages each student to seek originality and to be irreverent to received opinion, ma‘rifa envisages a teaching process in which the disciple humbly learns from a master. Al-Ghazali (Book of Knowledge, p. 129) advises the student to submit to his teacher with the same degree of trust and humility as a sick patient would submit to a skilled physician.

10) Spiritual realization vs epistemological rationalism. Whereas the modernist sees knowledge as something accessible exclusively by rational means, ma‘rifa regards ultimate knowledge as the fruit of spiritual realization. One of the central precepts of ma‘rifa is intensification of worship for the sake of realizing the ultimate truths in the heart and not just knowing them with the mind. This approach derives from clear Qur’anic commands, for example: ‘And worship your Lord so that (hatta) certainty might come to you’ (15:99). It is conveyed also by many hadiths of the Prophet: ‘For everything there is a means of polishing, and the polish for hearts is the remembrance of God (dhikr)’. Believers are exhorted to perform the dhikr so that the light of truth may dawn in their hearts. As for those modernist Muslims who regard the practice of dhikr as useless, an appropriate reply is the Qur’anic verse: ‘Woe be to those whose hearts have become hardened against the remembrance (dhikr) of God; they are in clear error’ (39:22).

11) Assimilative extinction vs cognitive individualism. Whereas in ma‘rifa ultimate knowledge is assimilated in a mode which is predicated on the effacement of individual identity, in the modernist outlook knowledge is something acquired by the individual and further reinforces the notion of individual identity. The essence of ma‘rifa is of course knowledge of God. But it is said repeatedly in the Sufi tradition that none knows God but God. What this means is that it is only that divine spark of consciousness within man that can know God. Al-Ghazali (Mishkat, p.59) writes that ‘everything has two faces, a face of itself and a face of its Lord; in respect of its own face it is nothingness, but in respect of the face of God it is being. Thus there is nothing in existence save God and His Face.’ This ultimate realization of La ilaha illa-llah, the summit of ma’rifa, presupposes the complete extinction of one’s own particularity, one’s own face, everything in oneself that is other than what Ibn ‘Arabi calls the huwiyya, the ‘He-ness’ of God. Thus one speaks of the ‘arif bi-llah the knower through God, not the knower of God. Ma‘rifa of the highest kind therefore consists in knowing-concretely, and not just theoretically-the true Subject of Knowledge: God Himself, before whom the individual is strictly nothing. All of this is expressed very succinctly in one of Ibn ‘Arabi’s treatises: ‘extinction in contemplation; the deepest meaning of this type of contemplation is conveyed by means of an esoteric interpretation of the Prophet’s description of ihsan: ‘that you worship God as if you saw Him, and if you do not see Him, He sees you’. The Arabic wording is such that, by effecting a stop in the middle of the phrase ‘if you do not see Him’, the meaning is completely transformed into: (in lam takun: tarahu) if you are not, see Him’ (Extinction, 48-9).

12) Primordial immutability vs evolutionary progressivism. Whereas ma‘rifa envisages human perfectibility as an inward spiritual quality that is primordially ingrained in human nature, the modernist strives after a material progress to be attained in the future on the outward plane of society. Ma‘rifa does envisage progress, but one that is spiritual and not sheerly material; and it regards man not as having evolved from a primitive ape to an intelligent human, but on the contrary, sees man as having been made in the finest stature, and then having been reduced to the lowest of the low, as the Qur’an says (95.4-5). The inevitable decline of mankind as a whole is also stated in the sura al-Wa qi‘a (56), where the foremost are described as being many in the early times and few in later times. There are several hadiths to this effect, one a prophecy that has truly come to pass in our own times: ‘You will follow the ways of those that were before you (that is, the Christians and Jews) span for span and cubit for cubit until if they went down into the hole of a poisonous reptile, you would follow them.’ It would be appropriate here to address one particularly striking way in which some modernist Muslims are following the West down into this hole: namely, the lamentable attack mounted by would-be re-formers of Islam on their own spiritual tradition, Sufism. This anti-Sufi attitude, in the name of ‘progress’ and reform, is a desacralization of religion or a form of unconscious secularism. For it must be remembered that secularism is not the direct antithesis of religion, as is atheism; rather, it is a force which first marginalizes religion, and then enters into religion itself. One has only to look at the Christian Church in our times to see how, instead of religion determining social norms, it is social fashions that determine religion.

In terms of the new progressive paradigm the eschatological realism referred to earlier becomes ‘pessimism’; to be detached from the world is deemed ‘irresponsible’; devotion to the jihad al-akbar is ‘selfish’; giving priority to contemplation over action is ‘decadent’; engaging in dhikr is ‘vain’, while entering a forty-day spiritual retreat, sheer ‘escapism’…

In contrast to this capitulation to modernism, let us cite the attitude of the great Sufi and mujahid, the Emir ‘Abd al-Qadir. In a remarkable document entitled Letter to the French, he explained how he was not at all impressed by their scientific and technological achievements. They arose out of a spirit of practical application, he wrote, which could lead to ‘damnable activities’. Whilst Islam, on the other hand, despite its decadence and material weakness, remained faithful to a spirit of metaphysics that opened onto knowledge of God. He thus urged the French, for their own good, to make an effort to understand Islam and its living spiritual tradition. Whereas the Emir was dismissive of the material advantages of the West, he was at the same time respectful towards its Christian tradition; many of today’s Muslim modernists, on the contrary, are contemptuous of the spiritual tradition of the West while emulating its material success. There is here a stark contrast between an inferiority complex that derives from implicitly material standards, and an unshakable conviction, derived from explicitly spiritual values. It might be said that today’s Muslims suffer from this inferiority complex in the measure that their criterion of value is determined by material, ‘horizontal’ norms; while only those in the spiritual tradition, those who benefit concretely from the baraka, or grace, of that tradition, are able to share with the Emir the knowledge both of the intrinsic and immutable value of the Islamic civilization, and of the ways in which this civilization, despite its aspects of decadence, is superior to modern civilization, despite the latter’s practical benefits. In fact, if one looks at the number of Europeans who have converted to Islam through Sufism, one sees that it is the very element that was most evidently lacking in mainstream Western society-the sacred-that proves most compelling; and, conversely, it is the ramifications of this same element that most embarrasses would-be Muslim reformers. It is above all else the perspective of ma‘rifa at the heart of Sufism that takes into account the ever-present possibility of regenerating the sacred, whatever the outward circumstances of life, since the original nature of man, his fitra, remains intact even if clouded by forgetfulness: the Qur’an says: ‘so set thy purpose for religion as one by nature upright, the fitra of God, that upon which he fashioned man. There is no change in the creation of God.’ Rather than striving to attain some imaginary future progress, the aspirant to ma‘rifa searches simply to be true to his human nature, made in the image of God.

In conclusion, this point must be stressed: the realization of one’s highest gift, the knowledge of God, is at the same time the fulfillment of the very purpose of creation. ‘I was a hidden treasure, and I loved to be known; so I created the world’. To marginalize ma‘rifa is to be unfaithful to the reason for our very existence as beings capable of knowing the hidden treasure.

ATM is currently one of the most attractive technologies in the digital data communications field. In ATM, information is transmitted in short fixed-length blocks that are called cells (Figure 1). An ATM cell consists of a header and a data field that carries the actual information-either video, voice or data. The cell header contains a label denoting the routing address.

Not only was ATM created to overcome the difficulties in existing transfer methods but also to allow the creation of a Broadband Integrated Service Digital Network (B-ISDN).

Transmission speeds up to the physical limits (e.g., 622.05 Mbps signaling rate nowadays) are achievable with ATM. By contrast, there are limitations to the upgrading possible, with the most popular traditional Local Area Network (LAN) topologies (e.g., Ethernet and Token Ring), to higher bandwidth, which means incapacity to support current and of course future real-time applications.

Although the connection-oriented ATM was initially designed for Wide Area Networks (WANs), its unique features including flexibility, scalability, high transfer capacity and support for multimedia applications, also fired the imagination of the LAN vendors in the early 1990s. Since ATM is suitable for both LANs and WANs, historical separation of traditional LANs that are connectionless and WANs that are connection-oriented will eventually disappear. This will form a universal platform for data communications as well as replace the conventional LAN topologies. With full deployment of ATM in design, manufacturing and maintenance of the future networks, the overall costs will be relatively smaller.

The traditional LANs use a shared media-access (e.g. bus) method. That means all stations of the network have to share one transmission medium and have to contend for access. The limitations of shared media-access method are overcome by the ATM’s new approach of switching systems based on central media-access management (Figure 2). Since each user has a dedicated connection to one of the ATM switch ports, users no longer need to contend for access as opposed to the legacy LANs. Moreover ATM LAN users are provided WAN services through another port on the LAN switch. On the other side, the traditional LANs have no direct wide-area capabilities-they must depend on a separate piece of equipment to convert the LAN rates and protocols into WAN-compatible format.

Problems that arise in transmission through the current networks of voice, video and data simultaneously (or in real-time) could well be prevented by using ATM.

With its low-cost networking and technology ATM will soon provide scientist and engineers greater global freedom to exchange data, images (e.g., medical imaging applications) and models in real-time. Beyond the physical boundaries of classrooms, students (especially disabled) will be able to be part of a class and interact with others just as though they were there using high-speed and reliable ATM networks.

GLOSSARY

B-ISDN: A high-speed (above 1.544 Mbps signaling rate) network standard that grew from traditional narrowband ISDN.

Connection-oriented: A network (e.g., WANs) that establishes, either permanently or on a call-by-call basis, a specific circuit path for transmission.

Connectionless: A network (e.g., legacy LANs) in which no particular path is established for the transfer of information.

Ethernet: A LAN using 10 Mbps signaling rate.

LAN: High-speed network connecting personal computers, printers, and other data equipment within an office or campus.

Mbps: Mega bit per second

Token Ring: A LAN using 4 or 16 Mbps signaling rate.

WAN: High-speed network connecting communications equipment nationally and internationally.

References

• PARULKAR G. M.: ‘Local ATM Networks’, IEEE Network March 1993, p.S-9.
• VENIERIS I. S., ANGELOPOULOS J. D. & STASSINOPOULOS G. I.:
• ‘Efficient Use of Protocol Stacks for LAN/MAN-ATM Interworking’, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications October 1993, 11(8) p.1160-1170,.
• KIM B.G. & WANG P.: ‘ATM Network: Goals and Challenges’, Communications of the ACM February 199538 (2), pp. 39-44.
• The ATM Forum: http:/ /www.atmforum.com/