1) Organic integration (tawhid) vs artificial fragmentation. Whereas ma‘rifa presupposes the total application of the principle of tawhid on all levels-divine, cosmic and human-the modernist outlook is characterized by a tendency to divide and compartmentalize, separating for example, religion from society, ethics from knowledge.

2) Certainty vs doubt. Whereas for ma‘rifa, a preexisting faith, preferably based on verification, must become certitude, for the modernist, faith is itself something which must be proved, and this in a climate dominated by scepticism.

3) Metaphysical profundity vs positivist superficiality. Whereas in ma‘rifa all relative truths are seen as reflections of one Absolute Truth, the modern outlook is characterized by the view of modern science: only that is true which is empirically proven so.

4) Sense of the sacred vs profane materialism. Whereas in ma‘rifa, the surrounding world of nature is suffused with meaning and holiness, being so many ‘signs’ of God, for the modernist, nature is there to be manipulated and dominated for the sake of material goals.

5) Eschatological realism vs worldly naivete. The pursuit of ma‘rifa requires an initial detachment from the life of this world, an awareness of its relative and fleeting nature. The Qur’an stresses this in many places, referring to the life of this world as ‘play’ (la‘ib), for example: (29.64) ‘The life of this world is naught but sport and play; and the abode of the Hereafter, that is true life, if only they knew.’ The ‘they’ could easily apply to those who identify with the underlying dynamic of the modern world: an all-consuming hunger for things of this world, a preoccupation with terrestrial life that in marginalizes concern with God and one’s final ends: and this is truly a form of naivete, a deluded, implicit belief in the permanence of one’s life in this fragile world.

6) Spiritual virtue vs moral relativism. From the viewpoint of ma‘rifa, the virtues are reflections of divine qualities: ‘Acquire the character traits of God’, said the Prophet. The realization of the fundamental virtues is thus an absolute pre-requisite for any spiritual endeavour, any effective movement towards God. Virtue is a spiritual imperative, and it is for this reason that many Sufi treatises describe the virtues as stations on the way to God. On the other hand, the modernist will tend to reduce virtue to a purely ethical rather than a spiritual imperative, viewing it chiefly in respect of its social function. The modern liberal ethos of moral relativism erodes further the spiritual meaning of virtue.

7) Liberating objectivity vs inescapable subjectivism. Ma‘rifa both presupposes and produces a degree of objectivity both towards one’s self: according to the terms used in the Qur’an, one must pass from the state of the nafs al-lawwama, the self-accusing soul, to the nafs al-mutma’inna, the soul at peace in the presence of God. This transition comes about through a relentless war against one’s own vices, faults, and weaknesses, the war referred to by the Prophet as the jihad al-akbar, the greatest of all jihads. Such a war against oneself would be regarded in modern psychology simply as the imbalanced indulgence of a guilt complex. Modern psychology shies away from the notion of sin, preferring a false tranquility in the context of immorality to a true peace based on a wholesome effort of self- improvement. The essential shortcoming of modern psychology was summed by Jung in a moment of frank confession when he wrote: ‘The object of psychology is the psychic; unfortunately, it is also its subject’ (Sword of Gnosis, p.153). There can therefore be no objective view of the psychic except by something that by definition transcends the psychic: and this can only be the spirit, breathed by God into man at the time of his creation, and cultivated by man insofar as he conforms to the higher calling of his nature, or else stifled and suffocated by man insofar as he remains heedless of his true nature.

8) Theocentrism vs humanism. The way of ma‘rifa is centred on God here and now, taking to heart what the Qur’an says (50.16): ‘We are closer to man than his jugular vein.’ The aspirant to ma‘rifa, in other words, seeks fulfillment in God through this mysterious divine presence within his own being. Humanism is a caricature of this aspiration, a desire for fulfillment within the bounds of one’s own humanity, a quest for immortality apart from God -which is exactly what Satan promises man: ‘O Adam, shall I show you the tree of immortality and a kingdom that does not waste away?’ (20.120) For the modernist, the expulsion of the divine is ‘liberating’; it puts man centre-stage, his own authority in all matters, free to define his own ‘morality’: in its excess, this view claims that ‘gods come and go’, only the humanist enterprise remains!

9) Wise authority vs pedagogical anarchy. Whereas the modernist outlook encourages each student to seek originality and to be irreverent to received opinion, ma‘rifa envisages a teaching process in which the disciple humbly learns from a master. Al-Ghazali (Book of Knowledge, p. 129) advises the student to submit to his teacher with the same degree of trust and humility as a sick patient would submit to a skilled physician.

10) Spiritual realization vs epistemological rationalism. Whereas the modernist sees knowledge as something accessible exclusively by rational means, ma‘rifa regards ultimate knowledge as the fruit of spiritual realization. One of the central precepts of ma‘rifa is intensification of worship for the sake of realizing the ultimate truths in the heart and not just knowing them with the mind. This approach derives from clear Qur’anic commands, for example: ‘And worship your Lord so that (hatta) certainty might come to you’ (15:99). It is conveyed also by many hadiths of the Prophet: ‘For everything there is a means of polishing, and the polish for hearts is the remembrance of God (dhikr)’. Believers are exhorted to perform the dhikr so that the light of truth may dawn in their hearts. As for those modernist Muslims who regard the practice of dhikr as useless, an appropriate reply is the Qur’anic verse: ‘Woe be to those whose hearts have become hardened against the remembrance (dhikr) of God; they are in clear error’ (39:22).

11) Assimilative extinction vs cognitive individualism. Whereas in ma‘rifa ultimate knowledge is assimilated in a mode which is predicated on the effacement of individual identity, in the modernist outlook knowledge is something acquired by the individual and further reinforces the notion of individual identity. The essence of ma‘rifa is of course knowledge of God. But it is said repeatedly in the Sufi tradition that none knows God but God. What this means is that it is only that divine spark of consciousness within man that can know God. Al-Ghazali (Mishkat, p.59) writes that ‘everything has two faces, a face of itself and a face of its Lord; in respect of its own face it is nothingness, but in respect of the face of God it is being. Thus there is nothing in existence save God and His Face.’ This ultimate realization of La ilaha illa-llah, the summit of ma’rifa, presupposes the complete extinction of one’s own particularity, one’s own face, everything in oneself that is other than what Ibn ‘Arabi calls the huwiyya, the ‘He-ness’ of God. Thus one speaks of the ‘arif bi-llah the knower through God, not the knower of God. Ma‘rifa of the highest kind therefore consists in knowing-concretely, and not just theoretically-the true Subject of Knowledge: God Himself, before whom the individual is strictly nothing. All of this is expressed very succinctly in one of Ibn ‘Arabi’s treatises: ‘extinction in contemplation; the deepest meaning of this type of contemplation is conveyed by means of an esoteric interpretation of the Prophet’s description of ihsan: ‘that you worship God as if you saw Him, and if you do not see Him, He sees you’. The Arabic wording is such that, by effecting a stop in the middle of the phrase ‘if you do not see Him’, the meaning is completely transformed into: (in lam takun: tarahu) if you are not, see Him’ (Extinction, 48-9).

12) Primordial immutability vs evolutionary progressivism. Whereas ma‘rifa envisages human perfectibility as an inward spiritual quality that is primordially ingrained in human nature, the modernist strives after a material progress to be attained in the future on the outward plane of society. Ma‘rifa does envisage progress, but one that is spiritual and not sheerly material; and it regards man not as having evolved from a primitive ape to an intelligent human, but on the contrary, sees man as having been made in the finest stature, and then having been reduced to the lowest of the low, as the Qur’an says (95.4-5). The inevitable decline of mankind as a whole is also stated in the sura al-Wa qi‘a (56), where the foremost are described as being many in the early times and few in later times. There are several hadiths to this effect, one a prophecy that has truly come to pass in our own times: ‘You will follow the ways of those that were before you (that is, the Christians and Jews) span for span and cubit for cubit until if they went down into the hole of a poisonous reptile, you would follow them.’ It would be appropriate here to address one particularly striking way in which some modernist Muslims are following the West down into this hole: namely, the lamentable attack mounted by would-be re-formers of Islam on their own spiritual tradition, Sufism. This anti-Sufi attitude, in the name of ‘progress’ and reform, is a desacralization of religion or a form of unconscious secularism. For it must be remembered that secularism is not the direct antithesis of religion, as is atheism; rather, it is a force which first marginalizes religion, and then enters into religion itself. One has only to look at the Christian Church in our times to see how, instead of religion determining social norms, it is social fashions that determine religion.

In terms of the new progressive paradigm the eschatological realism referred to earlier becomes ‘pessimism’; to be detached from the world is deemed ‘irresponsible’; devotion to the jihad al-akbar is ‘selfish’; giving priority to contemplation over action is ‘decadent’; engaging in dhikr is ‘vain’, while entering a forty-day spiritual retreat, sheer ‘escapism’…

In contrast to this capitulation to modernism, let us cite the attitude of the great Sufi and mujahid, the Emir ‘Abd al-Qadir. In a remarkable document entitled Letter to the French, he explained how he was not at all impressed by their scientific and technological achievements. They arose out of a spirit of practical application, he wrote, which could lead to ‘damnable activities’. Whilst Islam, on the other hand, despite its decadence and material weakness, remained faithful to a spirit of metaphysics that opened onto knowledge of God. He thus urged the French, for their own good, to make an effort to understand Islam and its living spiritual tradition. Whereas the Emir was dismissive of the material advantages of the West, he was at the same time respectful towards its Christian tradition; many of today’s Muslim modernists, on the contrary, are contemptuous of the spiritual tradition of the West while emulating its material success. There is here a stark contrast between an inferiority complex that derives from implicitly material standards, and an unshakable conviction, derived from explicitly spiritual values. It might be said that today’s Muslims suffer from this inferiority complex in the measure that their criterion of value is determined by material, ‘horizontal’ norms; while only those in the spiritual tradition, those who benefit concretely from the baraka, or grace, of that tradition, are able to share with the Emir the knowledge both of the intrinsic and immutable value of the Islamic civilization, and of the ways in which this civilization, despite its aspects of decadence, is superior to modern civilization, despite the latter’s practical benefits. In fact, if one looks at the number of Europeans who have converted to Islam through Sufism, one sees that it is the very element that was most evidently lacking in mainstream Western society-the sacred-that proves most compelling; and, conversely, it is the ramifications of this same element that most embarrasses would-be Muslim reformers. It is above all else the perspective of ma‘rifa at the heart of Sufism that takes into account the ever-present possibility of regenerating the sacred, whatever the outward circumstances of life, since the original nature of man, his fitra, remains intact even if clouded by forgetfulness: the Qur’an says: ‘so set thy purpose for religion as one by nature upright, the fitra of God, that upon which he fashioned man. There is no change in the creation of God.’ Rather than striving to attain some imaginary future progress, the aspirant to ma‘rifa searches simply to be true to his human nature, made in the image of God.

In conclusion, this point must be stressed: the realization of one’s highest gift, the knowledge of God, is at the same time the fulfillment of the very purpose of creation. ‘I was a hidden treasure, and I loved to be known; so I created the world’. To marginalize ma‘rifa is to be unfaithful to the reason for our very existence as beings capable of knowing the hidden treasure.

ATM is currently one of the most attractive technologies in the digital data communications field. In ATM, information is transmitted in short fixed-length blocks that are called cells (Figure 1). An ATM cell consists of a header and a data field that carries the actual information-either video, voice or data. The cell header contains a label denoting the routing address.

Not only was ATM created to overcome the difficulties in existing transfer methods but also to allow the creation of a Broadband Integrated Service Digital Network (B-ISDN).

Transmission speeds up to the physical limits (e.g., 622.05 Mbps signaling rate nowadays) are achievable with ATM. By contrast, there are limitations to the upgrading possible, with the most popular traditional Local Area Network (LAN) topologies (e.g., Ethernet and Token Ring), to higher bandwidth, which means incapacity to support current and of course future real-time applications.

Although the connection-oriented ATM was initially designed for Wide Area Networks (WANs), its unique features including flexibility, scalability, high transfer capacity and support for multimedia applications, also fired the imagination of the LAN vendors in the early 1990s. Since ATM is suitable for both LANs and WANs, historical separation of traditional LANs that are connectionless and WANs that are connection-oriented will eventually disappear. This will form a universal platform for data communications as well as replace the conventional LAN topologies. With full deployment of ATM in design, manufacturing and maintenance of the future networks, the overall costs will be relatively smaller.

The traditional LANs use a shared media-access (e.g. bus) method. That means all stations of the network have to share one transmission medium and have to contend for access. The limitations of shared media-access method are overcome by the ATM’s new approach of switching systems based on central media-access management (Figure 2). Since each user has a dedicated connection to one of the ATM switch ports, users no longer need to contend for access as opposed to the legacy LANs. Moreover ATM LAN users are provided WAN services through another port on the LAN switch. On the other side, the traditional LANs have no direct wide-area capabilities-they must depend on a separate piece of equipment to convert the LAN rates and protocols into WAN-compatible format.

Problems that arise in transmission through the current networks of voice, video and data simultaneously (or in real-time) could well be prevented by using ATM.

With its low-cost networking and technology ATM will soon provide scientist and engineers greater global freedom to exchange data, images (e.g., medical imaging applications) and models in real-time. Beyond the physical boundaries of classrooms, students (especially disabled) will be able to be part of a class and interact with others just as though they were there using high-speed and reliable ATM networks.

GLOSSARY

B-ISDN: A high-speed (above 1.544 Mbps signaling rate) network standard that grew from traditional narrowband ISDN.

Connection-oriented: A network (e.g., WANs) that establishes, either permanently or on a call-by-call basis, a specific circuit path for transmission.

Connectionless: A network (e.g., legacy LANs) in which no particular path is established for the transfer of information.

Ethernet: A LAN using 10 Mbps signaling rate.

LAN: High-speed network connecting personal computers, printers, and other data equipment within an office or campus.

Mbps: Mega bit per second

Token Ring: A LAN using 4 or 16 Mbps signaling rate.

WAN: High-speed network connecting communications equipment nationally and internationally.

References

• PARULKAR G. M.: ‘Local ATM Networks’, IEEE Network March 1993, p.S-9.
• VENIERIS I. S., ANGELOPOULOS J. D. & STASSINOPOULOS G. I.:
• ‘Efficient Use of Protocol Stacks for LAN/MAN-ATM Interworking’, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications October 1993, 11(8) p.1160-1170,.
• KIM B.G. & WANG P.: ‘ATM Network: Goals and Challenges’, Communications of the ACM February 199538 (2), pp. 39-44.
• The ATM Forum: http:/ /www.atmforum.com/

Before passing on the arguments for the existence of man’s free will, we should point out:

Most of the Western orientalists accuse Islam of being fatalistic. Whereas, except a small sect-Jabriya-no one in the history of Islam has defended fatalism. Almost all the Western philosophies of history are, by contrast, based on the irresistibility of what they call historical laws and therefore fatalistic. The outlines of those philosophies of history may be summed up as follows:

a. Mankind is in a continuous progress towards the final happy end.

b. This progress depends on the fatalistic, irresistible laws of history which are completely independent of man, so a man must, in any case, obey these laws, otherwise he is certain to be eliminated.

c. All the stages, primitive, feudal or capitalistic, through which mankind inevitably pass in the course of time to the final happy end should not be criticized, because mankind have nothing to do other than passing through them.

What is implied concerning the political conditions of time by all such philosophies of history may be this: The present socio-economic and even the political conditions of the world are inevitable, because they were dictated by nature, which decrees that only the able and the powerful can survive. If the laws of history dictated by nature are in favour of the West, the communities that choose to survive must concede to the dominion of the West.

What distinguishes the Qur’anic concept of history from other philosophies is that, first of all, while philosophers of history or sociologists build their conceptions on the interpretation of past events and present situations, the Qur’an deals with the matter from the perspective of unchanging principles. Second, contrary to the fatalism of all other philosophies, the Qur’an lays great emphasis on the free choice and moral conduct of the individual. Although Divine Will, emphasized by the Qur’an, could be regarded as, in some respects, the counterpart of the ‘Geist’ in the Hegelian philosophy and of absolute, irresistible laws of history in other philosophies, the Qur’an never denies human free will. God, according to the Qur’an, tests man in this life so that man himself should sow the ‘field’ of the world to harvest in the next life, which is eternal. For this reason, the stream of events-successes and failures, victories and defeats, prosperity and decay-all are the occasions which God causes to follow one another for mankind, to the end that the good may be distinguished from the evil. Testing must evidently require that the one who is tested should possess free will to prefer between what is lawful and unlawful or what is good and bad. Thus, according to the Qur’an, what makes history is not a compelling Divine Will, rather it is man’s own choice, the operation of which God Almighty has made a simple condition for the coming into effect of His universal will. If this point is understood well enough, then it will be easy to see how groundless are the Western philosophies of history especially with respect to their conception of ‘inevitable end’.

After these preliminary notes, we can discuss the existence of man’s free will:

a. A man feels remorse when he commits something wrong. He begs God’s forgiveness for his sins. If he troubles someone or does someone harm, he begs that person to excuse him. All this shows that man does on his own whatever he does or he himself decides to do something and how to do it. If he had no free will to exercise in doing the actions he does and were compelled to do them by a superior power, why should he become remorseful and beg forgiveness if he has done something wrong or committed a sin?

b. Obviously enough, we choose to move our hands or say something or stand up to go somewhere. We see that there is nothing, no fetters around our necks, to compel us to do or not to do something. We feel free to, for example, read a useful book in our leisure time to sit and watch TV. Nothing or no one makes us pray to God or not by force. None of us move by a remote control in the hands of an invisible superior power.

c. We hesitate, reason, make comparisons, judge the circumstances, choose and decide before doing something. For example, when two of our friends invite us to different places or suggest doing different things, before deciding, we hesitate, make comparisons and finally come to a decision. Likewise, perhaps a hundred times a day, we act in the same way, that is, we think, hesitate, judge the circumstances, make comparisons and then decide, in the face of the opposed appeals of good and evil within us.

d. When we are wronged, we sometimes go to a court and bring suit against him who has wronged us. Neither we nor the court ascribe the wrong done to us to a compelling superior power like Destiny, nor does the one accused attempt to excuse himself by blaming that power The virtuous and wicked, those who are promoted to high ranks in social life and those who waste their time idly, those who are rewarded for their good acts or successes and those who are punished for their crimes-all this shows that everyone acts of his free will, under no compulsion.

e. Only the insane are not held responsible for their acts. Reason and other mental faculties with which man is endowed require that man should be free in his decisions and acts, and actually show that he is so. Without free will, neither human reason nor other faculties have a meaning.

f. Animals have no will power. They act under the guidance of God, which materialistic science calls instinct. For example, a bee always builds hexagonal hives. Since it has no will power to decide on the form of its hives, it never attempts to make, for example, a nest or a triangular hive. However, human beings decide between many alternatives before doing or building something. Also, we are free to change our minds. It usually occurs that we make changes in our decisions in the face of emergencies or new, better proposals. This is also indicative of man’s will power.

The nature of man’s free will

Man’s free will is not something visible like the parts of the body. Nor does it have a material existence. However, that something has no visible, material existence does not mean it does not exist. Everyone has two eyes but we can also see with a third eye we have. We see with our two eyes the things in the external, material world. As for the third eye we have, we see the things beyond events and the physical world with it. The free will is like the third eye of ours, which you may call insight. It is an inclination or an inner force by which man prefers and decides.

Man will and God creates. The project or a plan of a building has no value or use unless you start to construct the building according to it. Actually, it is the building which is visible and serves many purposes for man. However, that building has been built according to its plan. Man’s free will is, in a sense, like that plan, according to which man decides and acts and God creates man’s actions. Creation and acting or doing something are different things. God’s creation means that God gives actual existence to man’s choices and actions in the physical world. Without God’s creation, man cannot do anything.

We can explain the role of man’s free will and actions and God’s guidance and creation by means of an analogy:

In order to illuminate a huge, magnificent palace, we must install in it a lighting system. However, after we have installed the lighting system, the illumination of the palace will still require that we should touch the switch and turn on the lights. Unless we touch the switch, the lights will not be turned on and the palace will still remain in darkness despite the lighting system. In a like way, man is a magnificent palace of God, which is illuminated by belief in God. God has supplied him with the necessary lighting system: He has given him intellect, the powers of reasoning and sensing, and the faculties of learning, making comparisons and preferences between opposite things. Nature and events and also the Divinely revealed religion are like the source of the electricity with which this Divine palace-man-will be illuminated. Nevertheless, man’s illumination with belief requires that he should use his free will and touch the switch. Man’s touching the switch means petitioning God to illuminate him with belief. In a manner befitting a slave at the door of his lord, man must petition the Lord of the Universe to illuminate him and make him thereby a king’ in the universe. When he does so, the Lord of the Universe will behave towards him in a way befitting Himself and promote him to the rank of kingship over the other realms of creation.

In His treatment of man and His acts with respect to man, God takes man’s free choice into account and regards it as the cause for creating man’s deeds. That is, man is not, as some assert, a victim of Destiny or one wronged by Fate. However insignificant it seems, and in comparison with God’s creative acts it is insignificant, man’s free will is the cause of his deeds. God’s way of acting is that He makes huge bodies out of things as small as minutest particles and makes simple means for creating many important results. For example, he makes a huge pine tree out of a tiny seed and makes man’s inclinations or free choice in eternal happiness or punishment in the eternal world.

In order to understand better the part of man, including his will power, in his acts or accomplishments, it is enough to consider his part in the food with which he is fed. Without earth, water, air and the heat of the sun, even a particle of which the whole of humankind are unable to produce or create despite their vast technology, man cannot procure even a single morsel of his food. In addition, the whole of humankind are also unable to produce a single seed of corn. Also, it is not man himself who endows himself with intellect and other mental faculties and power to produce corn. Furthermore, it is not, again, man himself who has created his body and established the relation between it and the food. With all its parts and organs and cells, the body operates not under the control or supervision of man himself. Have you ever thought that if a man had to set his heart like a clock at a fixed time every morning, how long he could continue his life? Obviously, almost all the parts of the universe, which is, like a most developed organism, so complicated, yet so harmonious, a system, cooperate with one another according to the most delicate measures in order that a single morsel of food can be produced. So, in fact, a single morsel is almost the same price as the whole of the universe, which the whole of mankind are unable to pay, and man’s part in the production of that morsel is utterly negligible: it consists of the effort he exerts.

Is it possible for us to give enough thanks to God for even a morsel of food? If only the picture of a bunch of grapes had been shown to us, could the whole of mankind produce it, even if they worked in close cooperation? Whereas God nourishes us with all those bounties of His for nothing and in return demands from us almost nothing. If, for example, He had stipulated that we should perform a thosunad rak‘ahs(units) of prayer in return for a bushel of wheat, in order to survive, we would have been obliged to do that. If, again, He had sent a single drop of rain in return for a rak‘ah of prayer, then we would have been doing nothing but spend all of our lives praying. Supposing you are left in the scorching heat in the middle of a desert, would you not give whatever you had for a single glass of water?

How can we pay the thanks for each limb of our body? When we see the ill and crippled in hospitals or when we are ill, we can understand how valuable health is, and how can we pay the thanks due for our health? The worship which God Almighty orders us to do is, in fact, for our benefit, for our spiritual refinement and a good personal and collective life. Furthermore, if we believe in and worship God, He will reward us with infinite happiness and bounties in an external world, in Paradise.

In sum, we see that almost everything we have is given to us for nothing, our part in the bounties we enjoy in the world is quite negligible. Like this, the will power we have is equally negligible when compared to the consequences which God Almighty creates as a result of our use of it. However weak it is and however difficult it is to understand its true nature, God creates our actions according to the choices and decisions which we make through our will power.

The relation between Divine Destiny and man’s free will

In human history, people have suffered difficulties to distinguish or reconcile Divine Will and human free will. Some have gone so far as to deny man a free will to act and determine his life, while others have attributed to man himself even the creation of his deeds, completely ignoring the role of Destiny in his life. However, Islam is a middle way; as it is in every other issue, what is right in the matter of the relation between Destiny and man’s free will is also following the middle way. That is, Divine Destiny dominates over the whole of existence, including the human realm, while man obviously has a free will by using which he directs his life. In three succeeding verses coming at the and of sura al-Takwir, the Qur’an expresses the true nature of relation between Destiny and man’s free will: This (the Qur’an) is not but a reminder onto the worlds, onto whoever among you wills to walk straight. You do not will, unless God wills, the Lord of the Worlds. (al-Takwir, 27-9) These verses attribute absolute will to God Almighty but does not exclude man from having a will power to exercise in directing or designing his life. In another verse (al-Saffat, 37.96) the Qur’an declares that it is God Who creates us and whatever we do and therefore ascribes creation to God exclusively. In other verses such as Fulfil (your part of) the covenant so that I fulfil (my part of) the covenant (al-Baqara, 2.40), if you help God(‘s religion), He will help you and will make your foothold firm (Muhammad, 47.7), and God changes not the condition of a people unless they change what is in their hearts (al-Ra’d, 13.11), it speaks about a contract or covenant between God and man, openly declares that it is man himself who directs history. Except for the human realm and jinn, who have free will and therefore are accountable for their acts, Divine Destiny is the single absolutely and exclusively dominant factor in existence. In order to reconcile Destiny and man’s free will, the following explanations may be worth consideration: a. Destiny is a title for Divine Knowledge. As explained before, God’s Knowledge comprehends everything within and beyond time and space. If you know beforehand that a certain thing will happen at a certain future time and that things happens at exactly the time you predicted, it does not mean that that thing’s happening was caused by your knowledge beforehand that it would happen. Since every thing and every event in the universe is comprehended in God’s Knowledge, He has written such a thing will happen at such a time and a place, and it does. Although there is not the slightest difference between what God has written for a man and what that man does, this is not because God’s having written it forces man to do it, rather it is because man willed to do that and did it. Consider this example: a train is traveling between Istanbul and Ankara, at a certain speed according to the characteristics of its manufacture and the conditions of the railway, and Istanbul is at a known distance from Ankara.

Also, there are a certain number of stations along the way, at each of which the train stops for a certain time. Taking all these matters into consideration, a time-table is written in advance. The time-table’s being prepared in advance is not the cause of the train’s traveling. Again, the time and duration of such heavenly events as the solar and lunar eclipses are known and written down beforehand through astronomical calculations. This does not mean that the sun or the moon is eclipsed at that certain time because astronomers knew it beforehand and recorded. The truth is exactly reverse: since astronomers knew beforehand when the sun or the moon would be eclipsed, they recorded it. There is the same relation between Destiny and man’s free will. b. Man’s free will is not something excluded from Destiny; rather, Destiny includes man’s free will. For example, one asks you whether the clock in the next room is working or not. You hear its sound and answer that it is working. The one who asks you about the clock will not need to ask you whether the hands of the clock are moving. Because the working of the clock means that the wheel of the clock is working and its hand are moving. In an analogous way, Destiny and man’s free will are not independent of each other.

As regards Destiny, man is neither a dried leaf blown by the wind, nor is he completely independent from Destiny. As Islam follows the middle way in every issue—for example, it allows neither debauchery nor intolerable self-denial, or it neither advises celibacy nor allows illicit intercourses, and so on—it has also established the right way in the issue of Destiny and man’s free will. In other words, Islam has explained the true relation between Destiny and man’s free will. According to its explanation, wills and does a thing, and God creates it. c. Cause and effect are not separable in the view of Destiny. That is, it is destined that this cause will produce that effect. But, from there it cannot be argued that, for example, shooting a man dead should not be regarded as a crime because the dead man was destined to die at this time anyway so he would have died even if he had not been shot. Such an argument is baseless since that man is actually destined to die as a result of being shot. The argument that he would have died even he had not been shot mean that he died without a cause, and in this case we should not be able to explain how he died. It should be remembered that there are not two kinds of Destiny—one for the cause, and the other for the effect. Destiny is one. d. People tend to, excluding themselves from the passage of time, imagine a limit for past time which extends through a certain chain of things, and they call it ‘azel’—past eternity. But to reason according to such an imagination is not right and acceptable.

For better understanding of this subtle point, the following example may help: Imagine that you are standing with a mirror in your hand, that everything reflected on the right represents the past, while everything reflected on the left represents the future. The mirror can reflect one direction only since it cannot show both sides at the same time as you are holding it. If you wish to reflect both directions at the same time, it would be necessary to rise high above your original position so that left and right directions are united into one and nothing remains to be called first or last, beginning or end. As already mentioned, Divine Destiny is in some respects identical with Divine Knowledge. It is described in a Prophetic saying as containing all times and events in a single point, where first and last, beginning and end, what has happened and what will happen, are all united into one. And we are not excluded from it so that our understanding of time and events could be like a mirror to the space of the past. e. Man cannot be the creator of his actions. For if he were the creator of his own actions, then he would himself be the ultimate cause of them, and his will would be cancelled. Since, according to logic, if a thing is not necessary, it will not exist. That means for something to come into existence there has to be a real complete cause, but a complete cause makes the existence of something compulsory so there will be no room for choice. f. Although man’s free will is too inefficient to cause something to happen, Almighty God has made its operation a simple condition for the coming into effect of His universal Will. He guides man in whatever direction man wishes by the use of his free will so that man remains responsible for the consequences of his choice.

As an example, if you were to take a child upon your shoulders, and then leave him free to decide where he would like to go and he elected for you to take him up a high mountain, and in consequence he caught cold, he would have no right to blame you for that. Indeed, you might even punish him because he wanted to go up the mountain. In like manner, Almighty God, the Most Just of judges, never coerces His servants into doing something, and He has accordingly made His Will somewhat dependent on man’s free-will. We may summarize the discussion so far in five points: ^1234567

O you who believe! Refrain from cherishing suspicions about others for some of such suspicions are a grave sin, and do not spy. And let some of you not backbite the others. Would anyone among you love to eat of the flesh of his dead brother? (You see that) you abhor it. Fear God. Surely God is the All-Relenting, the All-Compassionate.

Ibrahim Adham, one of the famous Muslim Sufis, left a table of food where a Muslim was backbitten, and said:

– I came here to eat food, but you have begun eating rotten flesh.

Khalid Rabi’, a famous Muslim saint, narrates:

– Some people were backbiting a man at that time in the mosque. I warned them not to do that but later when they began backbiting another one, I also happened to utter a few ill words about him. That night I had a dream in which a tall, dark man offered me a dish of bacon. I refused it saying that bacon was regarded as foul and therefore forbidden by my religion. He responded to me:

– You ate something fouler than this in the day just past.

When I woke up, I felt the smell and taste of that bad flesh in my mouth and stomach. I asked for God’s forgiveness for forty days.

To those who backbit him, Hasan al-Basri, one of the most famous Muslims ascetics who lived in the seventh century, sent a present with a letter in which he wrote:

– I have heard that you talked ill about me. By doing so, you took over my sins and gave me your spiritual merits. I request you to accept this present in return for the good you did me.

Imam Sha’rani, a Muslim scholar and saint who lived in Egypt in the 16th century, writes:

After the people receive in the Hereafter the records in which the deeds they did in this world are registered, some people will say to God Almighty: ‘O God! Where are the prayers and fasts I did and the alms I gave? None of them have been recorded here.’

God replies to them:

– Whatever good you did was recorded there. However, you were not able to keep those good deeds. You gave their merits to those you backbit. Go and look at the records of your brothers whom you backbit! You will see them there!

Again Imam Sha’rani writes:

Together with his people, the Prophet Moses, upon him be peace, prayed to God for rain for three days, but even a drop of rain did not come. When Moses asked God about the reason why rain did not come, God answered:

Your prayer is unacceptable by Me, for there is one among you who always talks ill about his brothers and backbites them.

The Prophet Moses entreated God to inform them who that man was so that they could expel him from among them. However, the Almighty responded:

O Moses! Would you like to cause me to backbite a man?

‘Abdullah ibn Masud, one of the leading Companions of the Prophet Muhammad, upon him be peace and blessings, used to say to those who backbit others:

– Stand up and do wudu’! For what comes out of your mouths is not less foul than what comes out of your bowels.

With their profound, spiritual breezes, every sound and breath of air in Ramadan announces in a most exalted and exhilarating style all the pleasures we would like to taste in life and the hopes of good we deeply cherish.

Coming like successive rays of light, the smiling days of Ramadan envelop us with the expectations, hopes and joys they carry from the worlds beyond, and present to us samples from Paradise.

When Ramadan begins, our inner life, its thoughts and feelings, is renewed and strengthened. Breezes of mercy, coming in different wavelengths, unite with our hopes and expectations, and penetrate our hearts. In the enchanting days and illumined nights of Ramadan, we feel as if all the obstacles blocking our way to God are removed and the hills on that way are levelled.

Like rain pouring on the earth, Ramadan comes with streams of meanings and emotions that water dried and thirsty hearts, making the inner worlds of people propitious for new meanings and conceptions. By means of the light of the days, hours and minutes of this blessed month, hearts attain such spiritual depth and become so purified that they never desire to leave its climate of peace.

As Ramadan approaches, we live the delight of anticipation and preparation for it. The food and drink that come into our kitchens in the days before it comes, put us in mind of it with a thrill of expectation. And then it comes at last, laden with mercy and forgiveness. As soon as it honours us, each of us finds himself in a spiral of light rising toward the heavens and advances toward the Unknown Existent One in a new spiritual mood in the night-time and in another, different spiritual mood in daytime. We open our eyes to each of its days with a different solemnity and self-possession and reach every evening in an enchanting, delightful serenity.

The pleasant nights of Ramadan receive warmest welcome from all souls. Eyes look more deeply in them and people feel deeper love for each other. Everyone desires to do good to everyone and passions and ill-feeling are subjugated to a certain extent. In Ramadan everyone feels so much more attached to God and is so careful in his relations with others that it is impossible not to see this.

Believing souls taste the contentment of belief more deeply and experience the blessing of the good morals prescribed by Islam and the spiritual ease of doing good to others. Moreover, they try to expand, to share, this contentment, blessing and ease with others. Since these souls at rest are convinced that one day will come when this life will end in an eternal happiness and whatever they suffer and sacrifice here for God’s sake will be returned with very great reward, they struggle against their animal appetites in a mood of doing an act of worship. The meals they take at sunset to break the fast give them the pleasure of worship and are followed by early night prayer with the addition of the supererogatory service of worship particular to Ramadan. The meals they take before dawn to start fasting are united with supererogatory night prayer (tahajjud) and become a dimension of their nearness to God. Streets are filled with the people going to and returning from mosques, in which declarations of ‘God is the Greatest’ resound as in the Masjid al-Haram in Makka. You would think that the streets are each a mosque and each mosque is Ka’ba. The people shaped by Ramadan in this way, though mortal in nature, gain a sort of eternity and each of their acts done in the consciousness of deliberate worship becomes a ceremony pertaming to the Hereafter.

Nights are experienced more deeply and in consideration of the afterlife, and days are spent as portions of time dominated by resolution and strong will-power. Those fasting for God’s sake feel a thrill of joy, and spend every and each day in the excitement of a new re-union. They reach every morning in an indescribable feeling as if they were called to a new testing. You can discern on their faces a sign of humility mixed with solemnity, a feeling of nothingness before God together with serenity and seriousness and melancholy combined with a feeling of security. Their every act reflects spiritual peace and exhilaration coming from adherence to God’s will and confidence in Him, and sincerity and kindness acquired by being cleansed in the cascades of the Qur’an. As if created from light and consisting in only their shadows, they are very careful to give no one any harm or trouble. Respect and courtesy are so much a part of their nature that, even after a day of thirst and hunger and resisting their carnal desires, they remain gentle and pure-hearted. They display a mood shaped by fear and reverence, discipline and contentment, solemnity and politeness. They are respectful and reverent toward the Almighty and well-mannered and sincere toward one another.

Their faces and eyes reflect different degrees and dimensions of depth of spiritual realms and are radiant with the lights of the unseen world. Though each individual may have been shaped by a different climate and different ideas,-all of them, including the intelligent and pure-hearted, those used to a disciplined, careful life and those a bit untidy and careless, the nervous and the calm, those very sensitive to problems of the age and those a little unfeeling, the rich and the poor, the happy and sorrowful, the healthy and the ill, the white and black-share almost the same feelings in Ramadan. They reach the night and morning together, listen to the call to prayers and perform the prayers together, take the meals before dawn and break their fasts together. They feel together one of the two instances of rejoicing promised for those who fast [The Prophet said: There are two instances of rejoicing for one who fasts: one when he breaks his fast, the other when he will receive the reward of fasting in the Hereafter.]

All Muslims, whatever their nationality or country of origin or temperament or social status or physical state, come together and breathe the same ‘air’ in the climate of Ramadan. In it, their souls are shaped in a way particular to that climate, and they share a sort of deeply-felt happiness which can be experienced only by spirit beings. Ramadan has a fascinating effect on Muslims that leaves its positive imprints on even the souls of the poorest and most oppressed people.

Ramadan envelops us with many beauties: the pleasure in the supererogatory prayers performed after the prescribed night service; consciousness of the blessings of Ramadan; the light that pours on us both from the heaven and from the lights that decorate the mosques; the nearness of the Creative Power and Its message of compassion and forgiveness whispered in our hearts. As if planned and commanded in order to kindle such feelings and thoughts in us, each element of the public rites in Ramadan causes the ‘strings’ of our heats to resonate: the calls made from minarets and the blessings called on the Prophet, upon him be peace and blessings, and the pronouncements of Divine Unity, Grandeur and Glory which resound in our ears, all prepare our souls for worship. They awake us to spiritual and celestial truths and enable even the crudest soul to perform its duties of worship in the way those duties are meant to be performed.

The voices rising from minarets meet with the voices of the inhabitants of the heavens and resound throughout the heavens and the earth. They penetrate our souls and take us through a climate of purest meanings and poetry, a realm of sweet imagination. In this pleasant atmosphere, we feel as if it is Ramadan which pours from the heavens, which is discerned on the faces of people and scents the air and is written in the lights of the mosques. Enchanted by this calm and peaceful atmosphere, we achieve a sort of infinitude and feel as if comprehending the whole of existence. Ramadan captivates particularly those open to eternity to such an extent that they experience nothing else than it.

I remember well that during my childhood when there was as yet no electricity in cities, people walked to mosques with kerosene lamps in the darkness of night. We imagined that Ramadan was walking around in the alleys in the lights of those lamps. Under the influence of poetry, meaning and deep spirituality which Ramadan poured into our souls, we desired that it should never come to an end. Nevertheless, despite our heartfelt desire, it flew away and the festive day followed it with all its pomp.

There are different definitions of euthanasia, each putting the emphasis on different parts of the concept. The word itself is derived from a compound of two Greek words-“eu” and “thanatos”-meaning literally a good death. It is generally understood today as the intentional putting to death by artificial means of persons with incurable or painful disease (Mason & McCall Smith, 1994, p.316). The decision to end a person’s life may involve direct interventions (active euthanasia) or withholding of life-prolonging measures (passive euthanasia). If the decision reflects the person’s own consciously and expressly declared wishes, it is called voluntary euthanasia. Where the person does not know about the decision and has not expressly approved it in advance it is called non-voluntary euthanasia. Another type of euthanasia, namely involuntary euthanasia, occurs whenever such a decision is implemented against the express wishes of the individual. (See Harris, 1985, p.82.)

Those who argue in favour of euthanasia usually presuppose a person’s absolute ownership of his or her body and life; as people are entitled to dispose as they choose of the things they own, the analogy is that they may also choose the circumstances most appropriate for them to ‘dispose’ of ‘their’ life. This is the rationale behind voluntary euthanasia.

However, the ownership (or property right) of humans over their bodies is not a property right in the usual sense of the term. Munzer (1990) defines various types of ‘ownership’, ‘property right’ etc. and concludes: “Most body rights are personal rather than property rights; examples are rights not to be murdered, not to be searched without a warrant or just cause, not to be compelled to testify against oneself, not to be libelled or slandered, to speak freely, and to exclude others from sexual or other physical contacts”. However, he says: “Some body rights are property rights whether weak, such as the right to donate an organ upon death, or strong, such as the right of publicity or the right to sell blood or semen ; but these weak and strong property rights are neither so numerous nor so central as to establish that person’s ‘own’ themselves” (ibid., p.57). Evidently, it is not very easy to propose or prohibit euthanasia by using the ‘property rights’ argument. (Perhaps we can summarise the issue by saying that the language of ‘property rights’ is appropriate only in the context of commercial/contractual transactions. If it ever was, it is no longer thought proper to speak of buying or selling human beings outright; we only speak nowadays of buying or selling an individual’s time or skills.)

Voluntary euthanasia has been likened to suicide in many respects. Therefore almost all religious traditions reject it; they reject the idea of terminating one’s life, and declare it to be one of the greatest misdeeds (Smoker, 1986, p.96). According to this understanding, our lives and our bodies are given by God. We are stewards and not owners of our lives, hence to contrive the ending of our own lives or to harm our bodies knowingly is a sign of disrespect to the ‘real owner’.

Roman Catholic theologians have reflected on matters of death and dying for centuries. The Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s 1980 declaration on Euthanasia, approved by Pope John Paul II, states: 1) None can make an attempt on the life of an innocent person without opposing God’s love for that person, without violating a fundamental right, and therefore without committing a crime of the utmost gravity; 2) Everyone has the duty to lead his or her life in accordance with God’s plan. That life is entrusted to the individual as a good that must bear fruit already here on earth, but that finds its full perfection only in eternal life; 3) Intentionally causing one’s own death, or suicide, is therefore equally as wrong as murder; such an action on the part of a person is to be considered as rejection of God’s sovereignty and loving plan. Therefore euthanasia is a violation of the divine law, an offence against the dignity of the human person, a crime against life, and an attack on humanity.

Among the Protestant denominations that oppose voluntary euthanasia are the Lutherans, Mennonites, Methodists, Presbyterians, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Episcopalians, Christian Scientists and Baptists. The rationale for rejecting the option of euthanasia or assisted suicide is based generally on the maxim, “only God can give life and only God should take it”.

The four branches of Judaism-Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and Reconstructionist-all forbid active euthanasia. The ancient Torah and Talmud did not address euthanasia or assisted suicide. However, in recent years, rabbis have answered questions about death and dying in “responsa” that have come to be considered authoritative. For example, a responsum from the Reform Jewish tradition addressing euthanasia (Bettam, 1950) declares: “Human life is more than a biological phenomenon; it is the gracious gift of God, it is the in-breathing of His spirit. Man is more than a minute particle of the great mass known as society: “The spirit of God hath made me,” avers Job in the midst of his suffering, “and the breath of the Almighty gives me life” (Job 33:4). Thus, human life, coming from God, is sacred, and must be nurtured with great care. And man is endowed with unique and hidden worth and must be treated with reverence.”

Islam also opposes euthanasia. The Qur’an and Sunnah, the authoritative sources of Islamic law, do not speak specifically about euthanasia. However, according to the Qur’an God is the Creator of life. Consequently, persons do not own their lives and have no right to end them or to ask others to do so. The Prophet Muhammad is reported as saying: “None of you should wish to die because a harm befalls him. If he is so determined, let him pray: ‘Oh God, let me live as long as life is good for me, and let me die if death is good for me’.” This saying might be interpreted as a permission for euthanasia or deliberate termination of life, if the phrasing of the supplication were “let me kill myself” or “let me be killed” rather than “let me die”, which cannot be so interpreted. A contemporary Islamic scholar has argued: “God may deprive an individual of something he or she values, but grant that individual a manifold return for that loss in the Hereafter. By means of that loss, God makes you feel your need, your powerlessness, your poverty in relation to Him. In this way, He makes you turn to Him with a weightier sincerity, a fuller heart, and so makes you worthier of His Blessing and Favour. Thus your apparent loss is in reality a gain” (Gulen, 1994, p.162). One recent study indicated that the degree of religious observance is a factor that influences the desire for maximal medical intervention. It is argued that fundamental beliefs of the more religious elements of society, regardless of which religion, tend towards an approach in which sanctity of life, rather than quality of life, becomes the prime determinant (Hammerman, 1997). Therefore, it is not surprising, among believing people, to come across those who are remarkably contented in spite of circumstances of great hardship, suffering and pain.

One of the primary things that makes euthanasia unacceptable is the involvement of a second party. Since life is inherently valuable, no one should play a part, directly or indirectly, in terminating a life. Since 1961, it is not illegal in Britain to commit suicide, although it is punishable to help an individual to kill himself. However it is claimed that when the life is objectively meaningless, rather than subjectively, the termination of life and help for it can be justified, and in euthanasia cases lives are generally objectively meaningless. Kohl (1987) made the distinction between these two as follows: “A life is subjectively meaningless when an individual earnestly believes he or she cannot possess, can no longer possess, or cannot achieve, any goals. A life is objectively meaningless when any of the aforementioned intersensual and intersubjective conditions exists and is known, or is capable of being known, to be irreversible.” In another article, after stating that meaningful life is a precondition for a good life, Kohl (1979) said: “An ideally good life is like an ideal meal. What most men desire is a splendid meal with a splendid dessert. So, when the dessert is far from splendid, it is good for the person, as well as for those who must take care of that person, to terminate the life. But, as was mentioned in the report by the working party which reviewed the BMA s guidelines on euthanasia, termination of life requires doctors to examine their ethical convictions rather than their scientific ones. And throughout the many shifts of scientific opinion in medicine, one pervasive feature of medical practice has remained unchanged-the conviction that human life is of inestimable value and ought to be protected and cherished (BMA, 1986, pp.l8-19). But nowadays, as with many other things, these convictions are also under discussion, and tend to he challenged.

Although there is a trend toward legalising the practice of euthanasia, strong resistance to it persists. Here are some of the traditional arguments against euthanasia. One concern is that, along with the justifiable cases of terminally ill people asking for and receiving a quick, merciful death, there would inevitably be cases in which euthanasia would be clearly wrong. Another is that, a law legalising euthanasia might well be abused, with some person’s life being ended, against his or her consent, for a motive other than mercy. We also know that diagnoses and prognoses of a disease can be wrong. For instance, predicting how long someone may live with cancer is very difficult at best. Some whom we expected to die in a few months might live on for years, conversely some might live a much shorter time than we, the care-givers, anticipate. Another valid concern is that the right to die may well become a duty to die. For instance, frail, disabled elderly people who are financial and emotional burdens on their families may feel some pressure to ask for euthanasia. Finally, even apart from moral and ethical considerations, legalising euthanasia has the potential to weaken and damage the relationship between patients and physicians. (See Cundiff, 1992.)

Bearing in mind that euthanasia is, all said and done, the termination by one means or another of a human life, the justification for it will always be questionable. It needs to be questioned and debated very closely indeed by the concerned public, as well as by health care professionals, lawyers, theologians and politicians.

References

• Bettarn, I, (1950) Euthanasia, American Reform Responsa, 60, PP. 107-20. [The responsa discussed were drafted in answer to a bill signed by 2000 physicians in New York State in 1948 supporting legalization of euthanasia.]
• BMA [1986) Report of the Working Party to Review the BMA’s Guidance on Euthanasia, London, pp.16-19.
• Cundiff, D. (1992) Euthanasia is not the Answer, Humana Press, New Jersey.
• Gulen, F. (1994) Questions, Truestar Publications Ltd, London.
• Hammerman, C. (1997) Decision-making in the Critically III Neonate: Cultural Background v. Individual Life Experiences, Journal of Medical Ethics, 23, pp.164-9.
• Harris, J. (1985) The Value of Life, Routledge, London.
• Kohl, M. (1979) Voluntary Ending of Life in de Vries, A. & Carmi, A. (edst) The Dying Human, Turtledove Publication, Ramat can, pp. 253-62.
• Kohl, M. (1987) Moral Arguments For and Against Maximally Treating the Detective Newborn, in McMillan, R.C., Engelbardt Jr, H.T. and Spicker, S.F. (eds) Euthanasia and the Newborn, D. Reidel Pub. Comp. Dordrecht, pp.233-52.
• Mason, J.K and McCall Smith, R.A. (1994) Law and Medical Ethics, Butterwortbs, London.
• Munzer, S.R. (1990). A Theory of Property, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
• Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (1980) Declaration on Eurhanasia, Vatican City.
• Smoker, B. (1986) A Rejoinder to Religious and Non-Consequentialist Objections in Downing, A.B. and Smoker, B. (eds) Voluntary Euthanasia: Experts Debate the Right to Die, Peter Owen, London.

A more systematic approach to language and cognition began in the 1920s. During the 20s and 30s Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf separately claimed that language is the main factor in the constructive process, that, in effect, language determines thought. Whorf claimed in his Collected Papers on Metalinguitics that language is the prime factor in objectification of reality. Language determines thought and certain aspects of it restrict our view of the world. A weaker form of the ‘language hypothesis’ does not insist that language determines thought, but that language predisposes the way people think.

During the 50s, when behaviourism was the intellectual fashion, there were not many studies on language and cognition. The stimulus-response-reinforcement model favoured by the behaviourists was applied to language acquisition by Skinner in his book Verbal Behaviour. According to Skinner, verbal behaviour can be acquired if the set of appropriate responses is frequently followed by reinforcement. Reinforcement, he claimed, is equally important after language has been acquired. The purpose and function of reinforcement is to maintain the strength of the response. Language acquisition and verbal behaviour are regarded as mechanical processes. Verbal behaviour can only develop in a social context, with the participation of another person or audience. The speaker learns to speak eventually only in the presence of a listener; the reinforcement that a speaker needs is absent or present when a listener is absent or present. This view treats language as a learning behaviour that can be changed or manipulated with the help of reinforcement, or deprivation, in other words ‘a specific controlling condition … control of verbal stimuli.’

Skinner presents three different types of behaviour which control the verbal stimuli: the echoic, the textual and the intraverbal. ‘Echoic’ behaviour is when the response consists of a sound pattern reproducing something very similar to the stimulus. It is established in the child through the special reinforcement that Skinner calls ‘educational’. Educational reinforcement is provided by institutions whose behaviour is influenced by economic reinforcement: for example, when a teacher gets some financial (or other) rewards for teaching the child how to acquire language effectively. ‘Textual’ behaviour relates to learning how to read. It too is established through educational reinforcement. The stimulus in this case is a text which may be in the form of pictures, formalised pictographs, characters or (more commonly) letters or symbols of an alphabet. ‘Textual’ behaviour describes the way people acquire the skill of writing. Writing behaviour has all the characteristics of ‘echoic’ behaviour, but expressed in visual rather than auditory terms. Three stages are distinguished: the stage of producing the necessary materials, the stage of making differentiated marks, and the stage of transmitting these marks to the reader.

In the case of intraverbal behaviour there is no correspondence between stimulus and response-produced, as in echoic behaviour or as in the correspondence between different dimensional systems as in the textual behaviour. This allows the consideration of all types of vocal and textual stimuli and responses in all combinations at the same time. Interestingly, Skinner regards translation as a ‘special case of intraverbal behaviour’.

Skinner’s approach to thought was abstract, not empirically based. His view was that the results of human thought can be most unpredictable and are therefore severely difficult to explain. So, the simplest and most satisfactory way of explaining thought is to consider it as a behaviour. Thought is not a secretive way of influencing the behaviour, but it is behaviour itself, the ‘sum total’ of the responses to the world and the environment the behaviour ‘lives’ in. He concludes: ‘When we study human thought we study behaviour.’

In the 60s the debate about language was between two conflicting positions. The behaviourist accounts of language and language-acquisition in terms of association, and the approach of Chomsky and his colleagues who presented a linguistic analysis strongly linked with psychology. Their basic argument was that the stimuli-response theory was highly irrelevant with respect to language acquisition. Being mainly interested in the syntactic forms of language they believed that the deep structures of sentences are abstract and inexplicable by the simplistic arguments put forward by the behaviourists. Their debate with the behaviourists, and the theoretical papers in which they criticized and cast doubt on their views, did not leave much room for attention to childhood development and how the processes of that development affect their language acquisition.

Piaget, although not a psychologist by profession (he started out as a biologist), showed a great interest in the way children think. He believed, in contradistinction to Sapir-Whorf, that thought determines language, a position since known as the ‘cognition hypothesis’. The basic difference between language studies in the 60s and Piaget’s approach was that Piaget’s interest was in children aged six and above, and investigated the first structured language during and shortly after the stage of two-word utterance. He discussed language and the thinking of the child, the language function, the questions that children put, and understanding between children.

Piaget and Chomsky came to be the most recognised and respected representatives of the cognitive movement; their work has inspired and influenced so many and to such an extent, that one can rightly speak of a school of thought within the field of cognitive studies. Chomsky had revolutionary and controversial views about language and thought sharply contrasted with anything that had come before. He claimed that every child has an innate knowledge system that contains abstract linguistic structures that are not taught rather, they are already part of the child’s system from birth. He hypothesized that under those circumstances, there must exist a set of grammatical rules that would produce syntactic descriptions for any sentence in any given language. Piaget on the other hand believed that a child must go through several stages to acquire an adult level of logical thought. The effect of the environment on a child’s thought and language is, for Piaget, crucial. Language is an extremely broad set of human capacities. Identical mental operations underlie one’s encounters with a wide range of materials and topics such as space, time, casualty and morality. So the later forms of thought can be located in earlier forms. Piaget examined the child and his mind as an active and constructive agent, that slowly gains knowledge and logic through developing cognitive processes. Chomsky’s view was different; he saw the mind as a set of pre-programmed units fully equipped, that need only a modest trigger from the environment to function. In other words Piaget considered human linguistic capacities as a product of a general ‘constructed’ intellectual development, whereas Chomsky insisted that they are a highly specialised part of the human genetic inheritance, largely separate from any other human faculty. They are, Chomsky said, a kind of an innate knowledge that has only to unfold. The Piagetian cognitive hypothesis claims that language derives from thought. Chomsky takes a radically different view, arguing that language is divorced from thinking. He claims that each human intellectual faculty is located in different areas of the brain, maturing at its own rate and through distinct processes. To make this statement more comprehensible, Chomsky used the analogy of bodily organs: he regarded the mind as a set of organs, like the liver or the lungs or the heart. A heart is not taught to beat, but matures according to its own genetic timetable. The same is true of ‘language’ as well as to other ‘organs of the mind’, that are programmed to function over time according to a genetic timetable.

Although both used and developed models provided by biology and logic, they showed interest in very different kinds of examples and explanations. Piaget tried to give a rich description of the stages that children pass through to achieve a higher level of knowledge. So he developed an elaborate technical vocabulary, rooted in biology, and he based his conclusions upon errors that children made when he gave them his famous challenging puzzles to solve. His ability to give convincing answers to the problems of the development of knowledge, and his hard work in collecting and synthesizing an enormous amount of data, are his big contribution to this field.

Chomsky’s contribution is no less important. His difference from Piaget is that he was not concerned to describe behavioural phenomena; his concern was the development of linguistic science and how its approach and methods could carry into the social sciences. His views of language as a part of an innate and universal system of knowledge and language are the same, had huge influence, although it is an hypothesis impossible to prove.

In October 1975, Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky were invited to express their ideas and present their theories in a meeting which took place at the Abbaye de Royaumont in France. The historical importance of this ‘rendezvous’ was noted by the psychology and linguistic community all over the world and even scientists from behavioural and empirical areas attended the occasion. Piaget and Chomsky exchanged views about language and cognition, but, as people who attended the Royaumont meeting commented, there was no agreed conclusion, only exploration of issues.

It is hardly surprising that no firm conclusions were reached at that meeting. The study of cognition is not an empirical study of given data or facts susceptible to quantitative measurement or experimentation. The subject-matter has to do with human psychology, where different views, theories, methods and experiments are used, different schools are created and several disciplines such as anthology, biology, philosophy etc. are involved together. Without ignoring the important contribution of schools such as behaviourism, psychoanalysis etc., only the further development of the cognitive movement appears likely to give satisfactory answers to issues that arise everyday about language and thought. The charm of uncertainty will draw the passion for further research that will lead from mere confusion to a new theory, a new argument for appraisal or debate.

Useful reading 

• Appel, M,H. (1977) Topics in Cognitive Development.
• Drorni, E. (1993) Language and Cognition: A Developmental Perspective.
• Massimo, P. (1979) Language and Learning.
• Skinner, B. (1957) Verbal Behaviour.
• Vasniadou, S. (1993) Language and Thought.
• Vhorf B.L. (1952) Collected Papers on Metalinguitics. 

While it is true that crimes committed against an individual usually affect society as well, in many cases it is the victims whose rights are directly violated (Udeh 1990, p.l94). Since they suffer directly from the crime, they should have a role in the process of ‘punishment’ or ‘pardoning’, a process which concerns them, both physically and emotionally, at least as much as it concerns society. In modern Western legal systems, consideration of victims’ rights is a separate procedure from the punishment process. But a legal system that aims to compensate victims needs to consider ‘emotional’ as well as ‘material’ suffering.

Involvement of the victims in the punishment process should not be regarded simply as a means of giving them access to retaliation or retribution; it is also a highly effective means of emotional release for victims. Whatever punishment is decreed by the court, if the victims are not consulted, they may feel ‘let down’ by the system. Involving them can help restore credibility to the legal system, as well as having, in certain cultures, an extra deterrent affect on potential criminals.

2. Offender and victim

The concept of victim involvement is well established in the Islamic system, but is relatively new in the West and has not yet been systematically worked out. Until the 1990s, Western legal systems were primarily concerned with the rights of suspects and offenders. Since then, attention has increasingly been drawn to direct involvement of victims. A revised and strengthened Victim’s Charter was published in 1996 along with Guidance to Services from the Association of Chief Officers of Probation (ACOP, 1996). It envisages consultation of the victims before decisions are made about release conditions of offenders serving long sentences (see Nettleton et al., 1976, p.3). Some argued that providing information to victims about release plans for offenders could open the latter to (possibly violent) reprisal, (Kosh and Williams 1995, p.15) and in any case, had the offender not been punished already? On the victims’ side, Nettleton et al. (1997a) noted that: ‘… it was not uncommon for victims of serious offences to move house, even moving to a completely new area, on hearing that an offender was likely to be allowed to resettle in their mutual home area.’ In such a case the law effectively allows an offender to once more offend against the same victim.

3. Crimes committed against individuals and society

Every crime which harms an individual may also harm the society. Depending on the level of injury to the individual or society, the punishment in the Islamic legal system is classified under three broad categories as hadd, ta’zir and qisas or diyya.

3. 1. Hadd, (‘limit’, ‘restrictive ordinance’) refers to the five offences of zina (‘fornication’ or ‘adultery’), ‘false accusation, ‘wine-drinking’, ‘theft’ and ‘highway robbery’ for which fixed penalties are laid down in the Shari‘a. Such acts are essentially regarded as crimes against God (Heyd, 1973, p.340). The punishment prescribed by the Law cannot be reduced or increased even in response to the promptings of compassion (Siddiqi 1979, p.8).

3. 2. Ta’zir is a discretionary punishment aimed at deterrence and, where that is appropriate, reform of the offender.

3. 3. Qisas is a divine ordinance restricting retribution to parity with the crime (life for life, injury for injury, etc.). Right of retribution may be waived in favour of blood-money or diyya (Heyd 1973, p.339); further, even this compensation may be waived by the victim in favour of outright forgiveness.. Yusuf Ali (1989, p.71) states that the translation ‘retaliation’ for qisas is incorrect. Retaliation carries the sense of returning evil for evil, which is what happened in the blood-feuds of the pre-Islamic period: the crime and its consequences were kept going by the feuds, not resolved and put an end to. Qisas means that one who has committed a particular crime may be lawfully punished in the same way and to the same degree as his crime, unless the victim (or representative of the victim) accepts compensation, or chooses outright forgiveness. Whether retribution or forgiveness is chosen, the aim is to close the circle on the crime, and not to let it persist.

4. The involvement of the victim in the punishment process

Of the three choices open to the victim, retribution, compensation, outright forgiveness, the Qur’an commends the Muslims to agree a settlement or to forgive the offender. The injured party (plaintiff or victim’s next of kin) is permitted to pardon the culprit altogether or to make a ‘settlement’ (sulh) with him (Heyd 1973, p.339), but retribution remains a legal right.

Western discussions of qisas translate it as retaliation, which connotes vindictiveness or revenge rather than redress of a wrong by equalizing the harm (Bassiouni 1982, p.203).

The Qur’an in this matter continues the tradition of the Judaeo-Christian teachings concerning law of eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth. As we noted, this law forbids the victim or victim’s family to demand more in punishment than was suffered. This practice proved its effectiveness in preserving social order in the early period of Islam when there was no organized system of criminal justice and penalties were carried out by the victim or victim’s family rather than by institutions and their official personnel (Bassiouni 1982, p.204).

One of the aims of qisas is to limit the consequences of certain categories of wrongdoing. Furthermore, some provisions in the Qur’an indicate that the retributive punishment must be inflicted in the manner least likely to aggravate the situation. The principle satisfies the general human need to have justice done on the perpetrator of crime while precluding unnecessary harm. That general human need can also be satisfied by the state or community acting for and on behalf of the victim, as most contemporary systems of criminal justice aspire to do.

The alternative penalty called diyya (or compensation) to be paid by the wrong-doer or his family to the victim or his/her family. Diyya is payable in certain cases of homicide and bodily harm upon a scale proportionate to the degree of incapacity or injury caused (Heyd, 1973: 338). The principle of diyya finds analogous expression in the contemporary science of victimology, whereby compensation emphasizes decriminalization of the act and compensation of the victim as an alternative to the traditional punishment of incarceration. As

between qisas and diyya, the Qur’an clearly commends the latter and forgiveness (2.178). The preference illustrates the bond of continuity between temporal law and religion since the forgiver will be rewarded in heaven, which, for a Muslim, is a much greater reward than any other. Thus, the combination of diyya and forgiveness produces a powerful material and spiritual inducement to forgo retribution (Bassiouni 1982, p.205). When the victim has the right and the choice to demand punishment or pardon the offender, in many cases, the victim chooses to forgive. One of the reasons behind this preference is that the victim believes that he will be rewarded by the God for his forgiveness.

Finally, critics of Islam wrongly imagine that punishments must be inflicted every day and on a mass scale. They also fancy that Islamic societies daily witness flogging, hand-cutting and stoning to death. The fact is that such deterrent punishments have been executed very rarely. For example, the punishment for theft was carried out only six times over a period of four hundred years-clear proof that such punishment was primarily meant to prevent crime (Siddiqi 1979, p.40).

5. The effects of the involvement of the victim

The systematic involvement of the victim in the punishment process is unique to Islam. It makes two important contributions in the criminal justice field. Firstly, involvement of the victim appeases the victim who otherwise feels shunned or ignored by the legal system. It is the victim who suffers from the crime first, and therefore must have a say in the punishment or pardoning of the offender.

Secondly, the involvement of the victim in the punishment process may also have a deterrent effect on likely offenders. Some offenders may be happy to commit certain acts and face the legal punishment which sometimes, for them, may be a very short imprisonment. But if they believe that their victim(s) might have a say in the punishment which they face, this may deter them. We may also add, here, the spiritual and moral force of forgiveness, if that option is chosen by the victim or victim’s party, in inwardly reforming the offender through practical demonstration of unselfishness.

6. Forgiveness as an option

There are many verses in the New Testament which urge, if not quite require, the victim to forgive the offender (Matthew 18. 21-35; Acts 13. 26- 39; Ephesians 4.32-32; Luke 6.27-31): ‘But I tell you who hear me: Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, pray for those who ill-treat you. If someone strikes you on one cheek, turn him the other also. If someone takes your cloak, do not stop him taking your tunic’ (Luke 6. 27-29).

By contrast, the Qur’an commends but does not require the victim to forgive the aggressor: ‘O you who believe! The law of equality is prescribed to you in cases of murder; the free for the free, the slave for the slave, the women for the women, but if a remission is made by the brother of the slain, then grant any reasonable demand and compensate him with handsome gratitude. This is a concession and a mercy from your Lord. After this whoever exceeds the limits shall be in grave chastisement.’ (2.178)

The option to forgive is a right that belongs to the victim, not to the court. Most legal systems, if not all, do countenance, for particular reasons and in different ways, a reduction or even suspension of punishment. My argument, based upon the Qur’an, is that, just as victims may not demand a punishment greater than is prescribed by law, so too the court may not deny their right to either reduce the punishment prescribed or forgive the crime outright.

The New Testament, as we saw, requires Christians to forgive; no other option is sanctioned by the religion-not retribution, nor compensation-only forgiveness. In a famous text the ancient lex talionis is almost explicitly abrogated: ‘You have heard that it was said, “An eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth.” But now I tell you: do not take revenge on someone who wrongs you. If anyone slaps you on the right cheek, let him slap your left cheek too. And if someone takes you to court to sue for your shirt let him have your coat as well.’ (New Testament, 1976, p.14).

Is this a sustainable way for society to deal with crime, or to restore the moral and emotional order which crime violates? Legal punishment has its root in the natural impulse to revenge a wrong suffered. The impulse is gratified through retaliation by or on behalf of the victim. Later, this retaliation is taken on by the state on behalf of society in general and the victim in particular. Indeed, it has been argued that the state’s assumption of the function of revenge is what constituted the beginning of criminal law (Dakkak 1994:88).

Requiring the victim to forgive the aggressor outright without the option of a measured, legally defined, retribution, goes against human nature. It denies a vital need, individual and collective, for redress which has a deterrent function as well as a role in restoring a violated moral and emotional equilibrium. In sum, the human need for redress should not be left out any more than the human desire to forgive should be left out.

Conclusion

Modern Western legal systems are adapted to a philosophy that regards the individual’s life in this world as the be-all and end-all. Very often criminals are treated very leniently because, it is argued, they are victims of circumstances, psychological complexes, nervous disorders, beyond their control. This attitude is contrary to natural justice insofar as it denies to the victims of crime their need to forgive if they choose and are able, or to agree to a compensatory settlement, or to demand the prescribed punishment. Giving the victims a say in the punishment process, according to the Islamic pattern described above, returns to victims their rights and duties in a matter that directly concerns them, and concerns them most. It constitutes a major contribution to the field of victimology and is, characteristically of Islam, a supremely well-balanced approach. It is high time Western legal philosophy and procedures took note of it and learnt from it.

References

• A. John Simmons, Marshall Cohen, Joshua Cohen, Charles R. Beitz (eds) (1995) Punishment: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
• Abdul Qader Oudah Shaheed (1987) Criminal Law of Islam, vol.1, International Islamic Publishers, Karachi.
• Abdulkadir Qdeh (1990) Mukayeseli Islam Hukuku ve Beseri Hukuk, Rehber Yayinlari, Ankara.
• Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1989) The Holy Qur’an: Text, Translation and Commentary, Amana Corporation, Maryland.
• Association of Chief Officers of Probation (1996) Probation Services and Victims of Crime, ACOP, Wakefield.
• Hilary Nettleton, Sandra Walklate & Brian Williams (1997a) Probation Training with the
• Victim in Mind: Partnership, Values and Organizations, Keele University Press, Keele.
• Hilary Nettleton, Sandra Walklate & Brian Williams (1997b) ‘Three models of probation
• involvement with victims of crime’, paper presented to the British Criminology Conference, Queen’s University of Belfast, 15-18 July 1997.
• Kosh, M. and Wiliams, B. (1995) The Probation Service and Victims of Crime: A Pilot Study, Keele University Press, Keele.
• M. Chertif Bassiouni, (ed.) (1982) The Islamic Criminal Justice System, Oceana Publications, Inc., New York.
• M. Shakry El-Dakkak (1994) Repentance as a Defence: Comparative Study under Islamic
• Law, Common Law and Continental Law, A. S. Noordeen, Kuala Lumpur.
• New Testament (1976) Good News Edition, The Bible Society Collins/Fount, Swindon.
• Uriel Heyd (1979) Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law, (ed. by V. L. Menage), Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Although it is difficult to explain the concept of understanding briefly, we will try to give a brief account of its meaning and consequences in the context of teaching from the viewpoint of constructivist learning.

Is it sensible to assume that ‘Everything which has been taught has also been understood’? Accumulating research on understanding reveals that it is not that simple. Not every teaching generates understanding. Von Glasersfeld (1990), commenting on the present situation, argues that something must be wrong as some children are leaving school unable to read and write or handle numbers properly, and knowing nothing about the scientific nature of the world. He relates this to teaching practices derived from behaviourist models; he is critical of the removal of the distinction between training on the one hand and, on the other, teaching which aims at generating understanding. Whether training manages to generate understanding is, he says, a matter of chance.

Understanding, in fact, is a very complex phenomenon to describe both philosophically and practically. In one attempt to do so (Skemp, 1989), two categories of understanding are defined: relational and instrumental. Relational understanding corresponds to intelligent learning. Instrumental understanding means habit-learning or learning ‘rules without reasons’. The advantages of instrumental understanding are: its being easier to grasp; providing more immediate and obvious rewards; and yielding the right answers more quickly. The advantages of relational understanding, on the other hand, are: it is more adaptable to new tasks; and what is learnt is easier to remember.

A shift towards relational understanding may provide the necessary motivation for students to learn more effectively. However, teaching for relational understanding suffers a major drawback. Selinger (1994) states: ‘Encouraging pupils to learn more relationally can be problematic for both teachers and their pupils; the investment required to make connections is greater than in instrumental learning and the contents of the curriculum need to be considered, so that connections can be easily and readily established.’

II. CONSTRUCTIVISM IN THE CLASSROOM

In constructivism, knowledge is always contextual. The so-called “objective” mathematical knowledge is the product of active construction which we make and share with others (Wood, 1995). Understanding, then, means constructing acts on the shared mathematical objects (ibid.).

The two major assumptions of constructivism can he summarised as follows (Caprio, 1995):

a) Knowledge is not objective, and does not have an absolute structure. What we know and understand is only our perceptions of reality.

b) Teachers help students to develop new insights. This is done by leading students to develop their own analogies, examples and non-examples, proof methods, new ways of solving a problem etc. The teacher, in short, attempts to teach thinking.

In the behavouristic model, the body of knowledge in. a subject-matter is the object of teaching. The teacher’s task is to transmit (or inject) that knowledge into the learner (who does not have it) through an adequate discourse. Constructivism questions this transmission-based approach. It assumes that students have their own paradigms before coming to class, some of which are invalid or incomplete. The duty of the teacher is to guide students on their way through reaching out to that in the knowledge they bring to class which is viable.

According to Pateman and Johnson (1990), constructivist ideas have influenced teaching practices. Teachers need to set up the temporal, discursive and cognitive space for students to construct concepts (Mousley, 1993). Mousley uses the term “moments” to describing the events in the classroom in which teachers and students create space for themselves; this term reflects the immediate nature of very small periods in which the potential of the lesson changes continuously. Her observations indicate that the decisions taken by the teacher in those moments help or prevent students to make sense. That is, the learners do not have command of the learning situation. Learning still depends on the teachers’ residual authority. Therefore, she suggests, teachers should leave more interpretive space in the learning process by presenting the students with loosely-defined tasks.

Jaworski (1994), commenting on the demands of constructivism on teaching methods, says that getting inside the head of the student helps teachers to build a model of the student’s conceptual level; language is a tool for that purpose, and the errors and apparent misconceptions of students can provide the feedback information the teacher needs to understand and adapt to the student’s level of understanding.

Teaching is heavily reliant on what the learner already knows. The duty of the teacher, in the constructivist model, is to help the student to construct new knowledge or discriminate alternative concepts, and to guide them to commonly shared concepts.

Constructivism, being a theory of learning, does not say much directly about teaching methods. Instead, it specifies the methods that are not appropriate (Orton, 1994). But since teaching and learning are complementary and reciprocal, it is inevitable that this theory has many implications for teaching. Von Glaserfeld (1987), for instance, listed some possible consequences of constructivism for teaching:

a) There will be a separation between teaching of understanding and training which aims (only) at repetition of behaviours.

b) Educators will be interested in what is going on in the minds of the children rather than in their overt responses.

c) The teacher will realise that language is a tool to help learners to construct understanding, rather than a mechanism for transferring knowledge.

d) There is a shift in the perception of errors from being something undesirable (which teaching should eliminate) to being possible indicators of the process whereby students make sense of their experiential worlds. The teacher’s duty is to detect those errors which yield information about how and why the child deviates from the teacher’s expectations.

e) There is a shift toward seeking knowledge about learners’ conceptual structures and finding ways to modify them.

A metaphor for teaching in the constructivist framework is “facilitate” (Lerman, 1993), as opposed to “inject” for the typical behaviourist approach.

Making Students Make Sense

Mason (1989) lists some aims of a teacher concerned to help his or her students make sense. He would like students to have seen connections, experienced a crystallisation of experiences subsumed under a general concept, gained a sense of coherence of a topic etc. Elaborating on the issue of the aims of teacher and students, Mason states that “subordination of teaching to learning” and “starting where the students are” do not mean that the teacher’s aims are the same as those of students. Rather, the aims should be confluent. The factors that determine student success in these aims depend on: teacher attitudes toward learning and teaching; the interest and commitment of the teacher; the extent to which teaching evokes students’ capabilities; and the extent to which students share the teacher’s goals.

Listening to the students while they are trying to make sense is a powerful way to get to know how they understand a topic. This talking can be among themselves or with the teacher. The ideal would be to talk to students about their understanding individually, but that is practically impossible. If they are talking with each other, the teacher can listen to different groups and gets an overall sense. Teachers’ dependence on that “overall sense” may not always be a reliable basis for making decisions about any individual student, but in a classroom situation it is inevitable.

III. TEACHING FOR UNDERSTANDING

Helping children to develop their perceptions is more productive than helping them to acquire particular ideas or bits of information. The necessary and sufficient condition for achieving this is to have a rough understanding of their current perceptions. It is essential for the teacher to have knowledge about pupils’ past experiences so that remedial actions may take place accordingly (Threlfall 1990).

Discovery and inquiry-based methods are acceptable ways to facilitate understanding. What is not good for the teacher is to sit back and await answers from the students without putting in any effort. Rather, the teacher should arrange the learning environment in order to enable useful experiences for the students. Although they can use some directive statements sometimes, much talking on the part of the teacher does not contribute to better understanding on the part of the learner (Orton & Frobisher, 1996).

Rote Learning vs. Meaningful Learning

Meaningful learning occurs if previously isolated bits of information are organised and restructured into new relationships. In other words, meaningful learning takes place as new knowledge is integrated into the learner’s existing knowledge. There is no one-and-only methods (e.g. discovery learning) for making this happen. Any method, such as expository teaching, is appropriate if it ensures that new learning is linked to existing knowledge (Orton, 1987).

In rote learning generally, the schema remain fixed. What is learned remains closely tied to where it has been learned, therefore it cannot be generalised to other contexts. It stays the memory as isolated bits of information. The learning of bare facts and procedures falls in this category.

Despite having little effect on learning, repetition and drill may be useful for the acquisition of declarative knowledge (Mayer, 1983). Repetition influences not only how much is learned but also the structure of what is learned. In fact, there is a misunderstanding, says Von Glasersfeld (1990), about the role of rote learning and memorization. He states that, they are not unnecessary. There are matters that simply have to be learned in a direct mechanical way. Orton (1994) argues that rote-learning has unfairly been associated with behaviourism and is a necessary method for learning. It takes place in a natural way.

Discovery Learning

Students in discovery learning situations are led, with limited teacher support, to discover the abstract from the concrete, and encouraged to make connections from seemingly disconnected events. In other words, discovery learning transfers the burden from the teacher to the student (Corno and Snow, 1986).

Discovery learning is advocated by constructivism because of the opportunities for discussion, negotiation and the exchange of ideas (Orton, 1994). The teacher’s role here is to initiate students to make their own interpretations which makes it easier for them to learn. But case studies conducted in classrooms reveal that what the teachers claim to be discovery learning is not discovery learning in its fullest sense (Wood, et al., 1990). The teachers rather impose on students what they are supposed to discover.

IV. CONCLUSION

No two students are same. Hence, it is impossible to find two identical teaching experiences. That is, “there is no royal road to teaching and learning.” The suggestions for good teaching do not comprise a method but rather promote a perspective. The teacher cannot do the learning for any pupil (Mason, 1989). At the end of the day, the so called “transmission process” (Jaworski, 1989) depends on students’ own construction of what the teacher says. It, indeed, is not surprising that there frequently is a discrepancy between the two.

Finally, understanding is not the comprehension of an absolute reality but establishing a fit between the old and the new experience (Von Glasersfeld 1984 in Jaworski, 1994). To make students attain understanding, teachers should keep in mind that the teacher’s role is as a facilitator, setting up constructivist learning environments which provide useful experiences for students; there is no ready-made teaching strategy for facilitating understanding: a constructivist approach can use a repertoire of methods, the only thing excluded is passivity on the part of teachers or students; finally, teachers’ knowledge of what their students already know is the only source enabling them to plan their actions.

References 

• Caprio, (1995) in Constructivism in Education, Steffe, L.P. & Gale, J, (eds), Lawrence Erlbaum.
• rno, I. & Snow, R.E. (1986) ‘Adapting teaching to indiviual differences among learners’ in Wittrock, M.C. (ed.) Handbook of Research on Teaching, New York & London, Macmillan Publishing Co, pp.605-29.
• Jaworski, B. (1989) ‘Mathematics teaching; belief and practice’ in Ernest, P. (ed), Teaching Mathematics; The State of the Art, New York & London, Falmer Press.
• Jaworski, B. (1994) Investigating Mathematics Teaching; A Constructivist lnquiry London, Falmer Press.
• Lerman, S. (1994) ‘Metaphors for mind and metaphors for teaching and learning mathematics’, Proceedings of the 18th International Conference for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, vol. 3, Lisbon, Portugal.
• Mason, J. (1989) ‘Teaching (pupils to make sense) and assessing (the sense they make)’ in Ernest, P. (ed), Teaching Mathematics; The State of the Art, New York & London, Falmer Press.
• Mayer, R.E. (1983) ‘Can you repeat that? Qualitative effects of repetitions and advance organisation learning from Science prose’, Journal of Educational Psychology, 75(1), pp.40-9.
• Mousley, J. (1993) ‘Constructivism; epistemology to pratice’, Proceedings of the 18th International Conference for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, vol. 3, Lisbon, Portugal.
• Orton, A (1987) Learning Mathematics: Issues, Theory and Classroom, London, Cassell.
• Orton, A. (1994) ‘Learning mathematics: implications for teaching’ in Orton, A. & Wain, G. (eds)., Issues in Teaching Mathematics, London, Cassell.
• Orton, A. & Frobisher, L. (1996) Insights into Teaching Mathematics, London, Cassell.
• Pateman N.A. & Johnson DC (1990) ‘Curriculum and co structivism in early childhood mathematics’ in Steffe L.P. & Wood T. (eds) Transforming Children’s mathematical Education; International Perspectives, New York, Macmillan, pp. 346-56.
• Selinger, M. (1994) ‘Understanding’ in Selinger, M (ed.) Teaching Matheniatics, London & New York, Routledge. Skemp, R.R. (1989) Mathematics in the Primary School, London, Routledge.
• Threlfall. J. (1990) ‘An exploration of the way in which children and adults understand the mathematical concept of addition’. Unpublished doctoral thesis, Leeds, U.K.
• Von Glaserfeld (1987) Constructioism, in Husen T. & Postlethwaite N. (eds) International Encyclopedia of Education, vol. 1, Oxford, Pergamon.
• Wood, T. (1995) ‘From alternative epistemologies to practice in education; Rethinking what it means to teach and learn’ in Steffe, L.P. & Gale, J. (eds) Constructioism in Education, Lawrence Erlbaum.
• Wood, T.; Cobb, P. & Yackel, E. (1995) ‘Reflections on learning and teaching mathematics in Elementary School’ in Steffe, L.P. & Gale, J. (eds) Constructioism in Education, Lawrence Erlbaum.

Before discussing this further, it will be useful to define our terms. By ‘creation theory’ is meant something like this: the Creator, by an act of will which occurred outside of the cosmos, directly willed into being the first plant and animal species, separately and independently of each other. Any subsequent changes or mutations were accomplished only within the species boundaries. No essential modifications or evolution (such as of more complicated species from simpler ones) occurred after that. In the past the earth was at least once flooded extensively. Geological investigations show clearly that this extensive flooding led to the destruction and extinction of a large number of living creatures.

According to the modern ‘evolution theory’, all life evolved from one simple primitive cell, which came out of dead, lifeless matter by chance, then hit upon a method of replication and adaptation which (again by random trial and error over vast periods of time) led to the many varieties of living species each fitted for competitive survival in its particular niche in the environment. The whole process of evolution took several hundred million years. Large geological events are explained as natural phenomena occurring in specific periods of time and without a world-wide destruction of the earth by flood.

The first creation of man was not observed by man; it is an unrepeatable historical event, unsuited to ‘testing by experiment’, the standard procedure in modern science. Further, creation cannot be disproved: it is impossible to devise or conduct an experiment that could falsify the claim put forward by the creation theory. It is for that reason unacceptable as a scientific theory. That does not mean it is false; nor does it mean it is true. However, it is clear that the creation theory shows good correlations with the results of fossil investigation. To some extent, it can be tested in the same way as other historical claims are matched and tested with appropriately corroborative historical documents.

Evolution theory likewise does not fulfil all the criteria which would justify calling it a scientific theory. The great modifications of evolution were never observed; the claims of the theory fall outside of experimental and scientific methods. Nobody has ever observed or could ever observe how a fish became a frog or a monkey became a human; no human witnessed or could ever witness the origin of the cosmos or of life.

A well-known bit of evidence often used to argue for evolution theory is the case of the moth Biston betularia. The moths of this species found in England before the industrial revolution were predominantly white. The effects of industrial pollution blackened rocks and tree-bark. The number of white moths in the population, now fatally exposed to their predators, fell drastically, while the number of black moths rose. Today in the industrialized regions of England, 95% of the moths are black: they had better camouflage and therefore a higher survival rate, eventually dominating the population. Thus, the environment ‘selected’ or favoured the black over the white variety.

While this case clearly illustrates adaptive evolution within a species or, more precisely, the adaptation capacity to certain conditions with which all living beings are endowed by creation, it equally clearly does not illustrate evolution from one species to another. The latter kind of change or ‘macro-evolution’ is never observable. As a famous supporter of evolution, Dobzhansky, put it-evolution can never be repeated or reversed (no life-form ever evolves back to what it allegedly had once been); the time periods reckoned for major changes to occur exceed by far the life-span of mankind as a whole; it is impossible to test the theory scientifically and therefore it cannot be presented to anti-evolutionists in a way that would force them to change their position.

Some evolutionist scientists are objective and honest enough to accept that evolution theory is no more scientific than the creation theory. For example, providing a short list of the theory’s weaknesses, Harris pointed out that creationists demand from the evolutionists an explanation of (a) how random mutations led to adaptations, (b) why natural selection acts only for the benefit of some species, (c) why natural selection allowed the survival of organs which are obviously not used. We now understand, Harris maintains, that neither theory is rational, that both depend on axioms.

In the Preface of the 1971 edition of Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species, Mathews, pointing out that the evolution of the animals has never been demonstrated, asks: Is biology now a science or a belief system?

It does not follow from the fact that neither theory is ‘scientific’ according to the strict criteria, that either is necessarily wrong. However, since evolution theory claims that evolution occurred according to natural laws, these laws must be valid at the present time (as in the past), and the theory may not contradict those laws. But the evolutionists insist that the non-demonstrability of evolution, its central weakness as a scientific theory, must be accepted as a consequence of the enormous slowness of evolutionary processes. They further insist that creation theory should be removed from scientific textbooks, it should not be investigated scientifically, and certainly not presented as an alternative to evolution. But their argument that creation theory cannot be scientifically tested applies equally to evolution theory. Similarly, their objection that creation theory promotes religion and belief in supernatural agency, applies equally to evolution theory which promotes atheism as a belief system and accords to random ‘natural’ processes the role of supernatural agency. If it is wrong or improper to teach the former, it must be wrong or improper to teach the latter also.

In practice, evolution theory has become an unofficial state-supported religion sponsored directly by its exclusive place on all curricula; a dogma that binds students of biology to the closed horizons of evolution theory in schools, colleges and universities. However, more and more scientists are finding the courage to assert that grave inconsistencies between evolutionary theory and scientific laws or experimental results exist. Also, many scientists are arguing that the creation model is free from such inconsistencies and offers a better explanation of the established facts about the origin of living organisms. Even some followers of evolutionary theory are admitting to being dissatisfied with it and to seeking a ‘better’ theory that fits and explains the known facts in a properly scientific way.

The essential claim of modern evolutionary theory is that the processes of evolution resulted from natural selection of the coincidental mutational modifications in the genetic code. This selection was realized in relation to modifications of the environment. Natural selection is an agent, acting through coincidences and working in mutated genes. But that does not explain (as it was once thought and hoped it would) very much at all. There is a fatal circularity, a fatal self-validation, in the theory of selection. Which living creatures survived? Answer: those that adapted to the changes in their environment. Which living creatures adapted? Answer: those that survived. There is no explanatory effectiveness in this kind of reasoning.

It is impossible to explain, why some species only live until they produce the next generation. We only know that because they were created in that way. Scientists who support the creation model believe that natural selection leads to species extending modifications towards ever-increasing complexity. Natural selection has the merely negative function of eventually removing from the environment species that have failed to realize their potential to adapt.

According to modern evolutionary theory, all processes of change are initiated by mutations. Mutations are random, heritable modifications in the chromosomes or genes, which are complete functioning elements. Whatever happens randomly can nevertheless be calculated according to known and established mathematical principles. Therefore, it should be possible to calculate and predict the numbers of mutations necessary to effect a change in the organism. In short, if we really believe that evolution resulted through coincidence, then the time period needed for the transformation of a protozoon to a human can be worked out. One group of mathematicians who support the evolution theory did compute the time needed. The results of their calculations were that it would take one billion times longer than the five billion of years that the world has existed. In sum, it is impossible for evolution to have happened by chance. Why then do we allow that impossibility to be taught in schools presented in textbooks as if it were truth? It is impossible to justify.