Muslim theologians who have been compelled to respond to such claims have also offered a number of philosophical and rational arguments to prove the existence of God. This paper aims to explore the arguments for the existence of God put forward by some of these Muslim theologians. Islamic Scholars such as Nursi (d. 1960), Al-Kindi (d. 870), Gulen (2000), and others have provided sound arguments based on theological, philosophical, and scientific reasoning that consists of comprehensive and valid premises, which taken together make a strong case for the existence of God.

The cosmological argument is one of the primary arguments of the kalam theology, which states that the initial point is existence, and thus the universe must have an origin. One of the original developments of the cosmological argument in Islamic tradition was formed by Al-Kindi (d. 870), who was one of the earliest Islamic philosophers to initiate an argument for the existence of God based upon purely empirical grounds (Nasr 1964). His main contribution is the cosmological argument (dalil al-huduth) for the existence of God, in his “On First Philosophy” (Nasr 1964). He provided four different variations of this theory, all of which state that a cause must be required.

Al-Kindi contends that the creation had a beginning in time and that the universe cannot bring itself into existence; thus, diversity in the universe must be caused by an external agent and the origin of variety within the universe indicates a creator. Ultimately, this creator is God (Ozalp, 2014, Slide 29). The cosmological argument had been rejected by some philosophers, because the notion of causality upon which it rests its foundations has been open to doubt since the commencement of Kalam (Fakhry, 1957). Al-Ghazali (d. 1111) however, rejected these doubts, on the basis that the requirement of this foundation is only a perception (Ghazali, 1997).

Taking this viewpoint into consideration, it is necessary to note that others still regard the cosmological argument highly, and it is still used by Muslim and western theologians today. In response to the claims about the universe being infinite in time, modern scholars use the following argument: if the universe was infinite in the past, there would be no such thing as the present. In other words, if there was no beginning in time, we would have never arrived at the present. This means that both time and space had a beginning and therefore need a (creative) cause. According to the cosmological argument, this cause is none other than God.

The default argument is another important argument for the existence of God, and it was first advanced by Nursi. He offered four possibilities for existence to come into being. He then claimed that if the first three are proven to be false and refuted through valid arguments, God’s existence will be proven by default. He argued that since creation exists; that every single being comes into existence in a necessary and great manner; and that all beings are finite and not eternal, they were either:

• Created by ordinary causes or formed through causes;
• Formed of their own power;
• Created by nature;
• Created by God.

According to Nursi (1995), human justification cannot find any other explanation apart from these four possibilities. Nursi then refuted the first three claims by using logical arguments.

In regards to the first three possibilities, Nursi’s refutations are based on the argument that causes do not possess intelligence. For example: the availability of ingredients are not enough to make a cake, hence a chef is required. If the universe was to occur by itself, then atoms and particles (which are the ingredients of the universe) require infinite knowledge to create something by themselves.

The following analogy may also shed some light onto the argument: If an architect is not accepted as the designer of a building, then each brick must possess complete knowledge of architecture. Furthermore, nature cannot cause the universe to come into being because nature, itself is a work of art; therefore, nature itself cannot be the artist. Nature is a set of laws, therefore it cannot be the lawgiver. Since the initial three theories are impossible, by default, God’s existence is proven. (Ozalp 2014, slide 20).

Nursi also provided another analogy in regards to the existence of God: a commander of an army can achieve many accomplishments by commanding a large quantity of soldiers. However, if the soldiers were required to perform these duties themselves, without guidance, it would result in disarray and have chaotic consequences. Similarly, assigning all astronomical occurrences to God develops a simple methodology to comprehend that God, Who through controlling astronomical circulations and orbits, and displaying art in the course of certain phases, proves there is Divine wisdom displayed in the universe. There is one Commander of the universe, and undoubtedly, that is God Almighty (Nursi 2001).

Nursi also explained the fact that God is the eternal one, without beginning or end. Non-existence is insubstantial to Him, for He does not require anything to exist, owing to the fact that life begins in His Essence. Without a creator, it is impossible for life to originate by itself, hence the only plausible and logical reasoning would be to accept a creator that has power over all things (Nursi 1993).

As we shift to a contemporary Muslim theologian, we first look at the idea of “Occam’s Razor,” a popular philosophical idea, which states that, “The simplest answer is usually right” (Clark, 2007). Supported by Occam’s Razor, Gulen appears to have a straightforward approach in regards to the existence of God. He argues that the existence of God is too obvious to require any arguments (Gulen 2000).

Gulen (2000) contends that it is impossible to prove the non-existence of God. In relation to creation, Gulen (2000) argues that anything can exist, at any time or at any place, and in any form. Therefore, everything is contingent, meaning it is possible that things can exist or not exist. As Gulen (2000) contends, things that are isolated are able to receive different qualities. The reality is that living and non-living things are provided with particular chosen forms; therefore, these chosen forms that exist require one who determined them to exist. Nothing can dictate how something will come into existence, except an infinite power behind all things, and possessing infinite will and knowledge over all things – and that power is God. Furthermore, Gulen argues that everything changes and thus everything has a beginning and an end. Therefore, whatever had a beginning requires something that has no beginning. Moreover, since physical agents cannot originate themselves, and since infinite regression is not possible, reason states that a creator is necessary, and this necessary creator is God Almighty.

Gulen (2001) also responds to the question of “Who created God?”, put forward by those who make a counter-argument to the causation argument for God. He (2001) states that the causation argument is not valid for God because if this criteria is applied to God, there will then be a never ending chain of creators. This is also elaborated on by Ergi (2013), who offers an analogy of a train and its carriages, and asks: what pulls the last carriage? The answer is the one in front, and then the one in front again; however, when arriving at the locomotive, it is utterly nonsensical to repeat the same question again, since the locomotive is self-powered and does not require an external power. Thus, the same question cannot be asked when reaching God in the chain of creation of matter. Taking this into consideration, this argument unequivocally proves the existence of God, since it would be logical to accept one creator who has no beginning than to enter into the impossible argument of infinite regress.

Can the life be self-originated? Is life a process that uncoiled corresponding with laws that could be comprehended by mankind? Natural laws do not have a real existence. Natural laws and causes draw the inference from the connections of events seen in the universe. This being the case, as they are dependent upon exterior components, they are not self-existent. Furthermore the universe is contingent.

As Gulen (2000) argues, two types of existence are reality: there are those things that exist necessarily and those existing on a conditional level. Those that exist incontrovertibly, exist only by a perquisite of their individual characteristics and attributes. Thus, nothing in it must exist, since it is not necessary for it to exist. Anything whose existence is conditional and contingent is not infinite. For that reason, life cannot be self-originated, because someone has to have preference over its non-existence or its possible existence. Anything that begins, will definitely end, so the idea of eternal creation is deemed to be false. Everything is dependent on something, so when tracing this chain as far back as possible, it is beyond reasonable to accept the fact that it is God who has no beginning and is the creator of all things. Taking these irrefutable arguments into deep contemplation and examination, it is logical and plausible to accept the fact that God is the only reasonable explanation for the origin of the universe and all of existence.

Through the thoughts and explanations of rational arguments regarding the proofs of God’s existence, it is evident that Muslim theologians have aspired to provide a sturdy and forceful structure to Islamic theology. After deep reflection, thought, and consideration surrounding the arguments that were provided by Muslim theologians, in this respect, it is clear that the evidence put forth unambiguously demonstrates that God exists and is the creator of all things. It is useful to ponder over analogies and to exercise scientific and rational reasoning as these scholars have put forward, so that we can have a better understanding of our existence.

Before the emergence of theories proposed by disbelievers, it was unnecessary to even engage in proving God’s existence. Obstacles like these theories are still being debated over, but via irrefutable analogies, scientific and rational reasoning, the existence of God is evident.

REFERENCES

• Clark, J. (2004). How Occam’s Razor Works. Retrieved from: http://science.howstuffworks.com/innovation/scientific-experiments/occams-razor.htm
• Ergi, O. 2013. Can a bridge build itself: essays on belief and moral values. [S.l.]: Ipg-Academic.
• Fakhry, M. (1957). The Classical Islamic Arguments for the Existence of God. The Muslim World, 47, 2.
• Ghazzālī, ., & Marmura, M. E. (1997). The incoherence of the philosophers =: Tahāfut al-falāsifah: a parallel English-Arabic text. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press.
• Gülen, F. (2000). Essentials of the Islamic faith. Fairfax, Va: The Fountain.
• Gulen, F. (2001). Who created God?. Retrieved from: https://fgulen.com/en/fethullah-gulens-works/1363-questions-and-answers/24495-who-created-god
• Nasr, S. H. (1964). An introduction to Islamic cosmological doctrines: Conceptions of nature and methods used for its study by the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʼ, al-Bīrūnī, and Ibn Sīnā. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
• Nursi, S., & Vahide, S.. (1993). The Words. Istanbul, Turkey: Sozler Publications.
• Nursi, S. (1995). The Flashes collection. Istanbul, Turkey: Sozler Nesriyat A.S.
• Nursi, S., & Vahide, S. (2001). Letters. Istanbul: Sozler Nesriyat.
• Ozalp, M. (2014). Lecture 2: Existence of God (World view and Faith Essentials). [PowerPoint Slides]. Retrieved January 8, 2015, from Charles Sturt University website. (Link no longer available)
• Ozalp, M. (2014). Lecture 4: Proof of God’s Existence. [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from Charles Sturt University website: http://interact.csu.edu.au/access/content/group/ISL202_201490_UC_D/Lectures/Lecture%204%20-%20Proofs%20of%20God_s%20Existence.pdf

However, a recent book, Islamic Science and Making of the European Renaissance, by George Saliba calls these arguments into question. This book prompted me to think more critically about this long, accepted argument. Can this prominent scholar of Islam or his famous book, Tahafut al-Falasifah, be held responsible, single handedly, for causing an age of decline in the scientific activities in the Muslim World?

Many orientalists argue that Ghazali’s Tahafut is responsible for the age of decline in science in the Muslim World. This is their key thesis as they attempt to explain the scientific and intellectual history of the Islamic world. It seems to be the most widely accepted view on the matter not only in the Western world but in the Muslim world as well. George Saliba, a Professor of Arabic and Islamic Science at Columbia University who specializes in the development of astronomy within Islamic civilization, calls this view the “classical narrative” (Saliba, 2007). However, interesting discoveries in the second half of the twentieth century by historians of science challenged many of the assertions of this classical narrative. An example of such discoveries is the strong connections between Ibn al-Shatir, a famous Damascene astronomer of the fourteenth century, and the Renaissance astronomer Copernicus (Roberts, 1957). If Ghazali had killed science in Islam in the twelfth century, then al-Shatir’s work from the fourteenth century could not have been so influential on Copernicus’s work. Saliba challenges almost all of the major tenets of the classical narrative on the basis of (1) a critical examination of historical evidence, some of which is quite recent, and (2) the results of his own long-term research in Islamic astronomy.

Saliba’s response to the question

In making his argument, Saliba first notes that most of the orientalists operate under the assumption that there must be a sharp conflict between religion and science. This paradigm is probably based on their European experience. To them, al-Ghazali represents the orthodox tradition in Islam and with Tahafut, written in the late eleventh century (between 1091 and 1095), they assume that orthodox religious thought won a decisive victory over rational, scientific thought. From that point on they assume that science in Islam declined, and the Islamic world did not produce anything significant in terms of scientific advancements.

Saliba argues that both of these assumptions are false. First, the European paradigm of conflict between religion and science does not really apply to the Islamic world. The religion of Islam encourages rational and scientific inquiry. Therefore, Muslims see no insurmountable contradictions between their faith and natural laws. Hence, studying religion and studying natural sciences does not create a conflict for Muslims.

Secondly, many of the scientists in the Islamic world were also religious authorities at the same time. A few examples among such scholars are Ibn al-Nafis, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi ,and Ibn al-Shatir who lived in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and made important contributions to such diverse scientific disciplines as mathematics, astronomy, medicine, physics and philosophy. In fact, these scholars were regarded primarily as religious figures by the general public with side interests in sciences. Early Muslim scholars did not hesitate to acquire scientific knowledge wherever they could find it, whether it be in Indian civilization, in Greek civilization, or in Persian civilization. Not only did they acquire these sciences through translation, but they also critically examined them in a comprehensive way. Making corrections and improvements and even introducing new disciplines, they showed a high degree of ownership and maturity. This led to a remarkable period of creativity and rapid advancements in many scientific disciplines in the Islamic world beginning as early as the eighth century (Saliba, 2007).

Contrary to the classical narrative, scientific advancements in the Islamic world did not stop or even slow down after Ghazali. Saliba gives many examples of sophisticated scientific achievements in the Islamic world well after Ghazali. Based on his life-long research in the area, he concludes that the golden age of Islamic astronomy was in the post-Ghazali period from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. Discoveries by Western historians of science in the second half of the twentieth century show that there are surprisingly strong connections between Copernicus (sixteenth century) and Muslim astronomers from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, such as Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and Ibn al-Shatir (Roberts, 1957; Saliba, 2007). These discoveries were shocking to many in the scholarly community who did not expect to find any transfer of knowledge from the Islamic civilization to Europe in the post-Ghazali period. Unfortunately, this new information has not been sufficiently digested by today’s scholars and does not yet generally appear in secondary sources.

Saliba also provides examples from other disciplines, such as medicine, that show that a high level of scientific production took place in more than one discipline in the Islamic world in the post-Ghazali period. How is it that such important scientific materials could have been overlooked by the experts? According to Saliba a major reason for modern historians of science to have missed the large amount of scientific production in Islamic world in the post-Ghazali period is the damage caused by the classical narrative. Most historians simply weren’t looking for it because the classic narrative stipulated that science in Islam was dead after Ghazali. Even though some new discoveries have been made, there are still many scientific works waiting to be studied from that period. As an example of these omissions, Berggren, the author of Episodes in the Mathematics of Medieval Islam, says that he used this title for his book as opposed to The History of Mathematics in Medieval Islam simply because “Such a book could not be written yet, for so much material remains unstudied that we do not know enough of the whole story” (Berggren, 1986).

The Content and the Method of the Tahafut

Even though Saliba’s arguments and evidence are quite convincing to doubt or reject the common narrative, I wanted to go straight to the source-the Tahafut-and have a closer look to see if it might be a book that can be held responsible for killing the science or scientific thought in Islamic civilization.

In Tahafut, Ghazali refutes twenty philosophical doctrines. Using a scientific, or in this context philosophical, method, he first explains those philosophical doctrines before criticizing them. His explanations were so comprehensive and so clear that he made them accessible to non-philosophers, and thus, his ideas became generally better known in the Islamic world. Next, he gave arguments to refute those doctrines. In doing so, he used the very same logical and philosophical principles and arguments that philosophers used in the first place to support their claims. Ghazali mainly argues that the philosophers who proposed the doctrines that conflict with religious principles failed to provide valid and rigorous proofs for their propositions. Hence, he attacked their methodologies using their own tools and principles.

An important point Ghazali makes in Tahafut is that he has no problems with the philosophers’ mathematics, astronomical sciences, or logic. He says (Marmura 2000, p. 11):

Regarding mathematical sciences, there is no sense in denying them or disagreeing with them. For these reduce in the final analysis to arithmetic and geometry. As regards to logical sciences, these are concerned with examining the instrument of thought in intelligible things. There is no significant disagreement encountered in these.

Therefore, it is clear that his views could not be used to justify a position against the study of mathematical sciences.

To give the reader a sense of what kinds of philosophical doctrines the Tahafut is concerned with and aims to refute, a selected few out of the twenty are listed below (Marmura 2000, p. 10, 11). The list shows that the questions discussed in Tahafut concern some of the most fundamental issues in theology, particularly in the Islamic theology.

The first problem: On refuting their doctrine of the world’s pre-eternity.

The sixth: On refuting their doctrine denying the divine attributes.

The tenth: On showing that upholding a materialist doctrine and the denial of the Maker is a necessary consequence [of what they hold].

The twentieth: On refuting their denial of bodily resurrection and the accompanying bodily pleasures and pains in paradise and hell.

Concluding Remarks

When I discuss the question given in the title of this article with my colleagues, and I argue that it would be unfair to hold Ghazali or Tahafut responsible for the decline of science in Islam, I sometimes hear the objection that “perhaps the content or the method of Tahafut may not justify this conclusion, but this is not how people understood it.” But then, one must consider the evidence given by Saliba that there is a large amount of sophisticated scientific production in the Islamic world well after Ghazali, and there is still much more to be discovered. Considering the content of Tahafut and the scientific advances in post-Ghazali period, I have a hard time convincing myself that the classical narrative is the ultimate truth on the matter. This position is supported by the fact that it is usually not realistic to try to explain most major social and historical transformations in terms of a single person, a book, an event, or the like. According to Saliba, the decline in Islamic science was the result of a combination of many internal and external reasons that took place several centuries after Ghazali.

Finally, one may wonder why this question is important or relevant. After all, these things happened a long time ago, and we have to deal with the current realities. One answer would be that there are many lessons to be learned from the history. And of course if the correct version of the history is not available, conclusions will be flawed. If anybody is interested in reviving science and scientific activities in a society, there is much that can be learned from the early Islamic period when there was a remarkable rapid and widespread rise in science, as well as lessons from the later periods of Islamic history when the Islamic world fell behind in scientific production. Some researchers are beginning to realize how much damage the classical narrative has caused in understanding the general history and the development of the modern science. It is always useful to have a critical mind to question and reevaluate assumptions when they do not conform to the evidence.

References

• Berggren, J. L. 1986. Episodes in the Mathematics of Medieval Islam, New York: Springer-Verlag.
• Marmura, Michael E. (translator). 2000. Al-Ghazali The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahafut al-Falasifah) Provo: Brigham Young University Press.
• Roberts, Victor . 1957. “The Solar and Lunar Theory of Ibn al-Shatir: A pre-Copernican Copernican Model,” Isis 48:428-432.
• Saliba, George. 2007. Islamic Science and Making of the European Renaissance, Cambridge: MIT Press.

On the basis of the omnipotence puzzle, one can reject the existence of God as an absolutely perfect, omnipotent and eternal being because the notion of such a being seems to be incoherent, thus it has no real referent. However, there are various theistic views that try to make sense of this puzzle by preserving omnipotence as an essential property of God. Let’s examine Aquinas’s and al-Ghazali’s views regarding omnipotence and see how an answer to such questions can be produced.

Aquinas

Aquinas was one of the most prominent figures of Christianity in the Middle Ages. He attempted to systematize the Christian faith within the framework of Aristotelian philosophy. His philosophy is known as Thomism and accepted as the official doctrine of the Catholic Church to this day. One of the central issues Aquinas dealt with was God’s nature and His omnipotence. Let us examine his ideas on this.

According to Aquinas, hypothetical cases such as God killing Himself or lying, imply contradictions in relation to God’s nature. God is eternal and truthful by nature. And in his terms, “anything that implies a contradiction does not fall within the power of God” (Aquinas, 1963, Q. 25, art. 3, p. 165). Contradictory cases are impossible; they could never happen. Since they are not genuine cases, divine power is not applicable to them. However, Aquinas did not carefully formulate the idea he proposed here. In expressing this intuition he used the modal verb “cannot” with the subject term “God” in most cases. Take into account the following of his remarks:

God cannot make yes and no true at the same time, not because of His lack of power, but because of the lack of possibility, such things are intrinsically impossible (Aquinas, 1952, I-18, 19).

Even though he did not think that the term “cannot” in the sentence above does not pose a limitation on divine power because the case in question is not a genuine case, the linguistic meaning of “cannot” implies that God’s power is applicable to such a case, and therefore He is unable to do it. Let’s continue with al-Ghazali’s view on omnipotence.

Al-Ghazali

Al-Ghazali can be regarded as one of the most influential Medieval theologians in the Islamic world. His criticisms directed to Avicenna’s or al-Farabi’s attempts to interpret Islam in terms of Aristotelian philosophy had a major influence on the formation of the Islamic world. He is usually considered to be a dogmatic theologian who attacked philosophy and prevented free thinking and intellectual progress in the Islamic world. However, if his criticisms are examined carefully, we see that his target was not the activity of philosophy but the false beliefs produced by certain philosophers. Avicenna and al-Farabi were critized by him on the grounds that their philosophies included some elements coming from Aristotelian philosophy, which is not accepted by Islam. It should be noted that his way of critizing them is not any less philosophical than his opponent’s way of arguing. He was certainly not dogmatic in rejecting them and engaged in philosophical activity in doing so. One of the most recurrent topics in his work was the omnipotence of God.

Like Aquinas, al-Ghazali excludes contradictions or impossibilities from the scope of divine power. That is to say, impossibilities are not objects of power. Let’s examine what he says exactly in his masterwork, Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers):

The impossible is not within the power [of being enacted]. The impossible consists in affirming a thing conjointly with denying it, affirming the more specific while denying the more general, or affirming two things while negating one [of them]. What does not reduce to this is not impossible, and what is not impossible is within [divine] power (al-Ghazali, 1997, 17th Discussion, 29th paragraph, 179).

However, al-Ghazali is more sensitive than Aquinas in expressing this idea. In his main works where he analyzes omnipotence, the Tahafut and al-Iqtisad, he never uses “cannot” as a modal verb in a sentence whose subject is God. I think this was a conscious decision, because the semantics or meaning of the term “can” or “cannot” includes the idea of ability or inability to do something, which is closely linked to the notion of power. The sentence “God cannot do x” presupposes that x is included in the extension to which divine power is applicable but God is unable to do it. To avoid this, al-Ghazali simply says “the impossible is not within divine power.” The idea assumed here by al-Ghazali is expressed by the notion of category mistakes in contemporary philosophy of language.

Category mistakes

When an expression systematically misleads us because of category confusion in representing a certain fact, then it is a “category mistake” (Ryle, 1949, 16). For example, referring to faculties, libraries, museums and scientific departments as being in the same category with universities is a category mistake. The university is not a member of the class of which the listed units are members of, but it is rather the way in which all of them are organized (Ryle, 1949, 16). We can give more examples. Predicating colors of numbers is another category mistake. For example, “Number 2 is yellow” is a sentence asserted as a result of category confusion. Numbers are not the things to which the color predicates apply. In other words, color-predicates have a certain range or extension of applicability, which excludes numbers. On the other hand, the properties of “being odd” or “being even” apply to numbers but not to material objects. To say that this chair is even is another category mistake.

So each predicate has a certain extension to which this predicate legitimately applies. Things or expressions that are not in the scope (extension) of a certain predicate lead to a category mistake if they are associated with this predicate. So the sentence “God cannot do x” includes a category mistake if x is a contradiction because contradictions are not within the scope of divine power.

As a result, the question of whether or not God can kill Himself can be answered in the following way by supporting al-Ghazali’s unnamed intuition of category mistakes: this question presupposes that divine power is applicable to such a case, but this is a category mistake. Because of that, this is an illegitimate question that can be answered neither by “yes” nor by “no.” It is like the following question: How many times did you kick your dog? Assume that you don’t have a dog. If you do not have a dog, then there is no point in asking the number of times you kicked the dog that you do not even have. Considering the reality, it is an absurd question.

The notion of Omnipotence

An answer formulated in this way, in response to the puzzle, treats the notion of power as a crucial element in understanding the relation between God and the universe. It also allows us to understand the meaning of omnipotence clearly. An omnipotent agent is an agent who can perform everything that falls under the scope of the notion of divine power. An omnipotent agent cannot be characterized as a being that is able to do anything unqualifiedly. Cases that do not fall under the scope of power are not legitimate cases to which divine power is applicable. The classical criticism of this view is that God is limited by proposing such a scope of limitation. However, what is limited is not an agent, namely God, but a notion, which is divine power. Contradictions are used in determining the notion of divine power. So they put a limitation on the definition or meaning of “divine power,” rather than on the agent who is powerful. By excluding these contradictions from the scope of power and including things that are within this scope, the notion is defined. In this sense, defining is putting limitations on the notion of power. God conceptualized in this way has infinite power, i.e. He can create everything that falls under the scope of power. Otherwise, allowing such contradictions within the scope of divine power will undermine of the very concept of God. Then, for instance, we should have said that God can kill Himself. If God can kill Himself, then He could not be accepted as God anymore because God is essentially eternal by definition. In order to have an intelligible idea of God, the scope of divine power must exclude such absurdities.

Conclusion

As it is shown in the sample case of omnipotence, the apparently theological problem has logical and linguistic aspects. This puzzle can be handled by some clarification of the meanings of crucial terms regarding this puzzle. Both Aquinas and al-Ghazali were aware of this aspect of the problem even though they did not clearly express the intuition, which we call “category mistakes,” in contemporary philosophy of language. Much confusion is encountered in daily life, especially in the topic of religion, that stems from the misuse of language. If we want to get rid of such confusion and be clear in our thinking, then we should seriously ponder on the use of language.

Bibliography

• Al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid. Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers). Michael E. Marmura (tr.), Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1997.
• Al-Iqtisad fi al-Itiqad. Ibrahim Agah Cubukcu and Huseyin Atay (ed.s), Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Ilahiyat Fakultesi Yayinlari, 1962.
• Aquinas, Thomas. On the Power of God (Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei). Lawrence Shapcote. Trans. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1952.
• Summa Theologiae. Latin text and English Translation. T. Gilby. (ed). 60 vols. London, 1963.
• Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. London: Taylor and Francis Books. 1949.