Kalam Cosmological Arguments of Huduth and Imkan in light of Modern Scientific Discoveries

Humankind has grappled with the questions surrounding God, life, and creation for as long as we can remember (Gülen 2006, 3-4). Historically, philosophers and theologians have sought to produce systematic and rigorous arguments to rationally prove the existence of the Divine through the means of logical deduction (Gök 2018, 10). One such argument that has been synthesized is that of the kalam (the Islamic theology), a cosmological argument which has provided a historical and modern basis for those seeking to validate the existence of God (Gök 2018, 10-13). This argument has come under particular examination in contemporary circles where modern scientific discoveries are seen to both challenge, and support, the existence of God and hence establish a valid basis upon which to argue either case. This essay will thus seek to discuss the validity of the kalam cosmological argument, and its subsets, in relation to two modern scientific discoveries: the Big Bang theory, and the concept of virtual particles.

The kalam cosmological argument consists of two subset arguments: the huduth (cosmological) argument and the imkan (contingency) argument (Craig & Moreland 2009, 101-102). Historically, notable Muslim theologians, such as Imam Al-Ghazali, utilized this argument as a testament to the proof of God’s existence (Copan & Craig 2017, 5-7). Within the modern Western philosophical and theological context, this theory has been refined by the works of William Lane Craig (Waters 2015). Regarding the huduth (cosmological) argument, Craig summarised the premise of the argument as follows: the universe either had, or did not have, a beginning; if the universe had a beginning then it was either caused or not caused; if there was a cause then this was because of an external and powerful being (Doko 2018). As can be inferred, the argument is based on a question of origins, causality, and in regard to the two preceding arguments, validating that the cause of the universe is external.

In assessing the validity of the huduth argument, the Big Bang theory can be utilized. In modern science, the Big Bang theory has been established as the leading paradigm for the origins of the universe (Paulson et al, 2015). The theory purports that the universe, and all that is contained within it, had a singular starting point whereby from this singularity, the universe has been inflating for what has been calculated as 13.8 billion years (Gonzalo 2008, 207-240). The first premise of the huduth argument is one of origins. The Big Bang postulates that the universe was derived from a singular starting point, with the key being that it indeed had a starting point. Scientists have been able to calculate the age of the universe through utilising data obtained through calculation and observation (Paulson et al, 2-3). In knowing that the universe has an age, and therefore a beginning, one can thus logically deduce that it must have had a point of origin. This complies with the first component of the huduth argument in that the universe indeed must have had a “beginning,” thus validating the first premise.

The Big Bang theory also complies with the second premise of causality. It is accepted by scientists and philosophers alike that in order for an effect to manifest itself within the natural world, there must be a cause to bring about the effect (Rabins 2013, 6-25). Upon accepting the first premise that the universe had a beginning, the universe itself must, therefore, be the manifestation or effect of a preceding cause. Though models such as Stephen Hawking’s “no-boundary-proposal” have been theorized to provide contradictory explanations for the causation of the universe, these have been later disproven by physicists (Wolchover 2019). In this regard, the notion that the universe came into existence without a cause is not logical, thus validating the second premise of the huduth argument.

The last premise argues that once it is accepted that the universe has a cause then this cause must be an external, all-powerful being. Studies into the observed universe are based largely on natural laws and observations that are measurable (Paulson et al, 2-3). Any cause beyond these natural laws of the known universe would thus be “unnatural” and potentially Divine (Ergi 2015). Though the multiverse theory has been proposed as an alternative to a transcendent, external being, the fact still remains that there logically must have been a first universe with an external cause that would then cause the proceeding universes that follow. As such, the third premise of the huduth argument proves itself to be valid, thus validating the argument as a whole.

In addition to the Big Bang, the theory of virtual particles can be used to attest to the validity of the huduth argument. Virtual particles are quantum fluctuations that shift between observed existence and non-existence (Daywitt 2009, 27-28). Historically thought to be empty and full of “nothing,” the vacuum of space has been theorised to contain these finite particles [16]. Through calculation, virtual particles come into existence with a measurable beginning and not out of what appears to be nothing (Jaeger 2009, 144). Physicists have conceived that the particles themselves are in fact not independent, rather that they rely on other quantum interactions and certain laws of physics in order to manifest (Falkenburg 2007, 258-260). In this regard, they have a beginning point of origin. As such, they can be seen to comply with the first premise of the huduth argument. Though virtual particles do appear to come in-and-out of existence there are a number of causal factors that must provide the right conditions for their appearance such as the vacuum-like conditions of interstellar space, the interactions of surrounding “real” particles as well as the mass of these “real” particles (Falkenburg 2007, 58). It is thus perceivable that the particles are caused by several factors and do not come into existence out of non-existence without a cause which adheres to the second premise. The third premise of the huduth argument points to an external cause or creator. As was argued above, virtual particles have a cause and this cause is external to themselves. They cannot create themselves from nothingness and manifest due to the interactions of the real particles around them, which give rise to conditions that are conducive to their appearance. As such, this complies with the logic of the third premise of the huduth argument, as virtual particles require external causes in order to come into existence. Thus, the validity of the huduth argument holds firm when applied to this concept.  

The example of the Big Bang Theory and the concept of virtual particles can also be used when assessing the validity of the imkan (contingency) argument. This argument posits that everything that exists is either necessary or contingent (Ergi, 9). When classified as contingent, it is postulated that something can either exist or not exist, and that if it does exist then this existence is dependent upon factors that are external to it (Gülen 2006, 3-4). The idea that creations within the known universe are contingent is logical, as it can be deemed that nothing exists without a cause (Doko 3-4). In this regard, it is possible to say that contingent items within the universe, including the universe itself, are dependent upon that which is “necessary” and outside of themselves (Yaran 2003, 181-187). The Big Bang Theory provides a solid basis on which to assess the validity of the imkan argument. Everything within the universe originated from that moment, thus the universe is perceivable as having temporal existence (Walles 2016). In being a temporal entity, it is thus contingent on a cause that is external to itself. It would seem illogical that time, space, energy, and matter created themselves as they are contingent elements devoid of consciousness and reliant on physical laws hence would not have been able to exist beyond the Big Bang prior to it occurring. As such, the universe, being contingent and unable to necessitate its own existence, must have been created by a necessary agent. Though this necessary agent has been speculated to be a preceding universe, such as in the multiverse theory, this would propel reality into an infinite regress, a chain of causes contingent on the one before it, a notion deemed to be implausible (Yaran, 181-183). Accordingly, these multiverses would also have to be temporal in disposition and hence the same issue of an eventual point of origin manifests. The logical conclusion is thus that the necessary agent must exist beyond what is known, namely a transcendent being that is beyond temporality and materiality, and thus the logic of the imkan argument is valid.

This principle is similarly seen within the example of virtual particles. These particles are observed to come in-an-out of existence within the vacuum of space (Jaeger, 144). However, this activity is contingent upon necessary conditions, such as the existence of the vacuum itself, quantum interactions based upon the uncertainty principle, as well as surrounding real particles (Greene, 424-425). If any of the aforementioned factors were not present then the existence of virtual particle would only be a probable outcome and not a necessary outcome, similar to that of the universe, in a way that these particles do not necessitate their own existence and are dependent on an external and necessary cause. In this regard, the concept of virtual particles demonstrates the validity in the logic of the imkan argument thus demonstrating the validity of the kalam cosmological argument.

The success of whether an argument is logically valid can be assessed based on the plausibility of the premise presented by the argument (Doko, 4). As is evident, the kalam cosmological argument has been examined with a discussion of its two subset arguments. These arguments have been contrasted against the two scientific discoveries of the Big Bang Theory as well as the concept of virtual particles. Evidently, by its very nature, the kalam cosmological argument is based on sound deductive logic where both its branches contain premises that reach their respective conclusions using logic and rationality. As such, the kalam cosmological argument proves itself to be valid and this has been exemplified by superimposing the matrix of this argument onto real, modern-day scientific discoveries.

REFERENCES

• Copan, Paul and Craig, William Lane. The Kalam Cosmological Argument: Philosophical Arguments for the Finitude of the Past. New York: Bloomsbury, 2017. https://books.google.com.au/books?id=LtI2DwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=The+Kalam+Cosmological+Argument:+Philosophical+Arguments+for+the+Finitude+of+the+Past&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjuxfDOt5fpAhU4lEsFHePeBNIQ6AEIKDAA#v=onepage&q&f=false
• Craig, William Lane and Moreland, James Porter. The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2009. https://www.difa3iat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/William_Lane_Craig__J._P._Moreland_The_BlackwellBookZZ.org_.pdf
• Daywitt, William. “The Source of the Quantum Vacuum.” Progress in Physics 2, 1 (2009): 27-28, http://www.ptep-online.com/.
• Doko, Enis. “Kalam Cosmological Argument and the Modern Science.” Kader 16, 1 (2018): 3, doi: 10.18317/kaderdergi.417640.
• Ergi, Omer Atilla. 2015. Is it Possible to Conclusively Prove the Existence of God? Melbourne: Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilization Charles Stuart University
• Falkenburg, Birgitte. Particle Metaphysics: A Critical Account of Subatomic Reality. Berlin: Springer, 2007.https://books.google.com.au/books?id=EbOz5I9RNrYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Particle+Metaphysics:+A+Critical+Account+of+Subatomic+Reality&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj7lt3f8JbpAhWKc30KHbIcDNwQ6AEIKDAA#v=onepage&q&f=false
• Gok, Hakan. Atheism or Theism? The Perspective of Said Nursi. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2018.
• Gonzalo, Julio. The intelligible universe: an overview of the last thirteen billion years. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co., 2008. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/csuau/reader.action?docID=1193384&ppg=222
• Greene, Brian. The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory Surrey: Vintage, 2000.
• Gulen, Fethullah. The Essentials of the Islamic Faith. Sommerset, New Jersey: The Light Inc., 2006.
• Jaeger, Gregg. “Are Virtual Particles Less Real?. ” Entropy 21, 2 (2009): 144, doi: 10.3390/e2102014.
• Paulson, Steve., Albert, David., Holt, Jim and Turok, Neil. “The origins of the universe: why there is something rather than nothing?,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 13611, 1 (December 2015): 2-17, doi: 10.1111/nyas.12859.
• Rabins, Peter. The Why of Things: Causality in Science, Medicine and Life. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/csuau/reader.action?docID=1103422
• Walles, Mathew. “The Existence of God- According to Muslim Theologians and Thinkers.” Fountain Magazine, 1 May, 2016. https://fountainmagazine.com/2016/issue-111-may-june-2016/the-existence-of-god-according-to-muslim-theologians-and-thinker
• Waters, Benjamin Victor. “Toward a new kalam cosmological argument.” Cogent Arts and Humanities 2, 1 (2015): 2, doi: 10.1080/23311983.2015.1062461.
• Wolchover, Natalie. “Physicists Debate Hawking’s Idea That the Universe Had No Beginning.” Quantamagazine, Jun 6, 2019. https://www.quantamagazine.org/physicists-debate-hawkings-idea-that-the-universe-had-no-beginning-20190606/.
• Yaran, Cafer S. Islamic Thought on the Existence of God. Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2003. https://fountainmagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/IIA-16-Contents-4f8.pdf

Atheism or Theism: The Perspective of Said Nursi, Wipf & Stocks
By Hakan Gok
2018
9781532646799

The existence of God has been long debated in philosophical circles. Mankind doesn’t seem to have settled the question yet. Although scientific circles almost all agree on the assumption that the universe is not eternal and has a beginning, there seems to be no clear scientific explanation of the Big Bang. What was there before it? How did it happen? Is there a divine force behind it? Although theories such as the expansion of the universe are commonly agreed upon, there is still a major gap between the views on how life as we see it came into its current form.

Philosophers have gathered around two philosophical positions to explain the universe and human existence. Those who argue that the universe began with the Big Bang and life has come into existence as a result of some random events without any divine intervention are considered to be atheists. Others, who argue that the universe is the product of an all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-loving deity, are called theists. Arguably almost all thinking human beings are inclined towards one of these two positions, although the degrees and the specific philosophical positions are varied. While atheism had never been a trend almost until the seventeenth century, the theistic view, which was the mainstream thought, did not really concern itself much to bring evidence for the existence of God. Although there has been a very dynamic discussion on this topic in the last three centuries, one tends to accept belief in the existence of God as a matter of personal conviction rather than a result of empirical evidence.

Hakan Gok’s recent book is another fresh contribution to this everlasting debate. Gok explains the scene to the layman in his fairly extended introduction. It is, in a way, an executive summary of what has been said since the time of the Ancient Greeks. The book gives a special emphasis on the kalam version of the argument for the existence of God, in particular the views of Al Kindi, Al Farabi, Ibn Sina, Al Ghazzali, and Ibn Rushd. Although the kalam arguments sound fairly similar to that of the Western tradition, the reader can feel the flavor of Islamization of these common arguments. It is clear in Gok’s writings that there is a close correlation between Western and Islamic ways of arguing in favor of theism. The book also shows how Muslim philosophers, particularly the ones mentioned above, were influenced by the Ancient Greek tradition.

What is unique in Gok’s book is the fact that it examines Said Nursi’s approach to atheism and theism, as Nursi extensively did in the Risale-i Nur (The Epistles of Light). Gok tries to demonstrate that, like many of his predecessors, Nursi employed main philosophical arguments to prove that there is God and the universe is not the product of chance. The teleological argument, or the argument from design, which is the offshoot of the cosmological argument, is Nursi’s main proof to demonstrate the existence of God. Gok breaks down Nursi’s design argument and scrutinizes it thoroughly. Arguments from religious experience and from revelation appear in two different chapters in Gok’s book. The book seems to be at pains to demonstrate how Nursi gives a twist to these two arguments by focusing intensely on Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, and the Quran.

Gok’s book doesn’t only focus on proving that these two arguments make a compelling argument for believing in God, but also studies how Nursi answers the skeptical questions posed over time by many thinkers. It feels more like a defense of Nursi’s position than a systematic presentation of them as they appear in William Lane Craig and the like.

The moral argument is another Nursian way of proving the existence of God, as Gok’s book shows. Human beings are the best judges of any given situation. If all the philosophical arguments fail to convince them, their primordial conscience (wijdan) can lead them into believing in a creator-maintainer God. This, Gok claims, is what makes Nursi’s Risale-i Nur unique among many pieces written on the subject.

Gok’s book puts all the main theistic arguments, kalam arguments, and the atheist’s arguments into the same frame. Readers can clearly see all three positions and where Nursi sits on this spectrum. Gok does not only look at the historic arguments, but also analyzes recent ones. Specifically, he compares Nursi’s views in the Risale-i Nur with Richard Dawkins’s views in The God Delusion, Christopher Hitchens’s in God Is Not Great, and Daniel C Dennetts’s assessments in Consciousness Explained: Darwin’s Dangerous Idea and Breaking the Spell. In a well-balanced and fairly objective way, Gok puts the arguments against each other and encourages the reader to form their own judgement.

Atheism and theism are two colossal schools of thought. One should not expect Gok to settle all the scores in 270 pages. His work is easy to read and easy to understand; it merely rekindles one’s interest in independently reading and scrutinizing these thoughts while also making the subject more digestible for those who have an interest in them. Gok sums up Nursi’s position in the Risale-i Nur with a degree of critical analysis.

Each of the Nursian arguments certainly deserve further scrutiny. Yet Gok works to avoid bogging readers down with too many specific philosophical details. Among many books which have been published on the subject, Gok’s makes the subject more enjoyable and digestible for the general readership. It is a fresh contribution to the literature written on Said Nursi’s Risale-i Nur and the subject of theism and atheism.

In his book, Flew states, “I should point out, moreover, that this is not the first time I changed my mind on a fundamental issue. Among other things, readers who are familiar with my vigorous defense of free markets may be surprised to learn that I was once a Marxist …” Flew in fact consistently mentions throughout his book that it is not actually the first time he changed his mind. These statements may disappoint those readers who want to hear more reliable arguments on the question of God. However, as a philosopher, Flew is confident in his decision and leaves it to readers to decide how to deal with his reasons for changing his mind. Given the possibility of progress in philosophy, Flew considers it a principle to follow the argument wherever it may lead him. Therefore, before reading this book, one should keep in mind that the book has a philosophical perspective rather than a religious one. Philosophical thought is inherently unbiased (or unguided) and quite evolutionary as opposed to any given religion (say Christianity, Islam or Judaism), which usually has its own well-defined and self-consistent structure.

It is not possible in this short article to summarize all of the reasons which led Flew to believe in God in the later stage of his life. Below, we mainly discuss how Flew’s decision was influenced by the origin of the laws of physics. We also show how his final thoughts compare with modern Muslim scholars Nursi and Gülen, who have roots in revelations rather than philosophy. Then we explain why we believe Flew’s methodology is not safe as long as it stays within the territories of traditional philosophy.

Laws of physics and “mind of God”

When Flew discusses the origin of the laws of physics (or undeniable design in the universe), he gives statements from the founders of quantum physics, all of whom connect the laws of nature with the “Mind of God,” as described by Einstein. He refers to Max Planck, Werner Heisenberg, Erwin Schrodinger, and Paul Dirac. Below, we only quote Schrodinger’s statement:

“The scientific picture of the world around me is very deficient. It gives me a lot of factual information, puts our experience in a magnificently consistent order, but is ghastly silent about all that is really near to our heart, that really matters to us. It cannot tell a word about the sensation of red and blue, bitter and sweet, feelings of delight and sorrow. It knows nothing of beauty and ugly, good or bad, God and eternity. Science sometimes pretends to answer questions in these domains, but the answers are very often so silly that we are not inclined to take them seriously.

Science is reticent too when it is a question of the great Unity of which we somehow form a part, to which we belong. The most popular name for it in our time is God, with a capital ‘G.’ Science is, very usually, branded as being atheistic. After what we have said this is not astonishing. If its world picture does not even contain beauty, delight, sorrow, if personally cut out of it by agreement, how should it contain the most sublime idea that presents itself to the human mind?”

Nursi and Gülen, two great scholars of our modern times, have the following views on this. According to Nursi [2,3], only through the light of faith in God and His Divine Revelation, can humans understand their true essence, the universe that they reside within, their past, present, and their future. Otherwise, things and events surrounding them would be highly difficult to comprehend, because the only mechanism that would remain to interpret the purpose behind would be the ego equipped with limited knowledge and experience, which is too subjective to rely on and far from being convincing. Most of the time, the ego misguides people into the darkness and heedlessness. However, with the light of faith, believers do not fall into such catastrophes. Believers better understand and appreciate the universe and do not suffer as unbelievers do; rather they enjoy the whispering galleries in the universe and beyond.

Gülen’s perspective [2,4,5] is similar to Nursi. Although it might be possible for some brilliant scientists to discover how things work at the most fundamental levels of particles, it is impossible to fully comprehend how these particles actually constitute the whole in such a perfect harmony. This is because there is infinite knowledge of the Omniscient behind the scenes. Those who deny the existence of the Omniscient are shocked by the incredible harmony in nature and yet attribute it all to the creatures themselves. These limited, shortsighted perspectives and prejudices leave so many gaps in the quest for existence that the systems developed based on them cannot convince anyone, but rather open up greater questions in the heart, mind, and soul, all waiting to be answered. However, a person equipped with the former perspective can reach more conclusive results in very short times with much less efforts compared to those unbelievers who consume their lives to understand existence. Believers feel the signs of God in everything they explore and live their days as if in the avenues of Paradise. If the reason is integrated with the revelation, only then can it elevate us to the realms of the unreachable. It opens the doors to the true universe, which is otherwise hidden in darkness and chaos. With revelation, the universe turns into a great book of existence, telling about its Creator on every page. Then those struggling in emptiness and tyranny are awakened to humanistic ideals and the truth.

On the different pages of his book, Flew reminds the reader that scientists like Paul Davies and John Barrow have received the Templeton Prize for further developing the insights of Einstein, Heisenberg, and other scientists into theories of the relationship between the rationality of nature and the Mind of God. Flew draws attention to the existence of natural laws and cites Paul Davies, who says, “even the most atheistic scientist accepts as an act of faith the existence of a law-like order in nature that is at least in part comprehensible to us.” The critical question Flew asks is, “whose laws?”

Flew thinks, no matter what, we still have to come to terms with the origin of the laws of nature. He says, “the only viable explanation here is the divine Mind.” Once the physical laws are set correctly, one can think of our resultant universe; however, the question that needs to be answered is ‘who set the laws and why did they set them this way?'”

Flew also reminds the reader of the following question related to the origin of life, a question that has not been answered: “How can a universe of mindless matter produce beings with intrinsic ends, self-replication capabilities, and coded chemistry?” He quotes from Paul Davies again, “The problem of how meaningful or semantic information can emerge spontaneously from a collection of mindless molecules subject to blind and purposeless forces presents a deep conceptual challenge.” Flew makes an important distinction between this question and what is being addressed by “evolution.” He says that the latter is dealing with the interaction of chemicals, whereas the above question is interrogating how something (chemicals) can be intrinsically purpose driven.

Nursi explains this as follows [6]:

“If you do not accept that the particles in your body are tiny officials in motion in accordance with the law of the Pre-Eternal and All-Powerful One, or that they are an army, or the nibs of the pen of Divine Determining, with each particle as the nib of a pen, or that they are points inscribed by the pen of Power with each particle being a point, then in every particle working in your eye there would have to be an eye such as could see every limb and part of your body as well as the entire universe, with which you are connected. In addition to this, you would have to ascribe to each particle an intelligence equivalent to that of a hundred geniuses, sufficient to know and recognize all your past and your future, and your forbears and descendants, the origins of all the elements of your being, and the sources of all your sustenance. To attribute the knowledge and consciousness of a thousand Plato’s to a single particle of one such as you who does not possess even a particle’s worth of intelligence in matters of this kind is a crazy superstition a thousand times over!”

Here Nursi argues that the intelligence and consciousness that are exhibited in the universe can only be understood by the existence of the Pre-Eternal and All-Powerful One. He guides these mindless particles toward a Divine Determining and in accordance with the law. Nursi also draws attention to a subtle point which is missing in the philosophers’ question above. The particles and the law they are bound to are created so intelligently and consciously that they do not only give rise to the sustenance of the current universe, but we can tailor them for our future sustenance and well being. To give an example, consider a 10 billion year old particle, an electron. How did this particle lead to today’s electronic revolution? How did it know it could function one day as part of a flowing current in a computer chip?

Pilgrimage of reason is not safe

In his book, Flew considers three evidences which require an Intelligence explaining not only its own existence but also that of the world. These are the laws of nature, life, and the existence of the universe. Flew admits that the journey to his discovery of God has so far been a pilgrimage of reason. He has followed the argument where it has led him. The arguments led him to accept the existence of a self-existent, immutable, immaterial, omnipotent, and omniscient being.

Although it’s quite impressive what Flew has gone through and he put forward reasonable arguments, no one can actually guarantee that his arguments will ultimately lead to Truth, since they can be neither proved nor disproved. Worse, a smarter philosopher or scientist may well appear in the future and challenge him. Then, how can we actually make sure that Flew is actually right in his arguments?

The answer is, “we can never be.” There is a need for a strong “point of support,” since science and philosophy alone, by definition, as admitted in Schrodinger’s statement above, cannot provide absolutely convincing arguments. If God exists and wants man to know Him, there is a need for a clear message immune from any kind of ambiguity and understandable by virtually anyone. Nothing would be clearer than direct revelations from God. Interestingly, there are, in fact, many verses in the Quran [7], for example, which draw attention to such clarity in God’s messages:

• “A.L.R. These are the Ayats of Revelation, of a Quran that makes things clear.” (The Rocky Tract 1)
• “We have already sent down to you verses making things clear, an illustration from (the story of) people who passed away before you, and an admonition for those who fear (Allah).” (The Light 34)
• “Thus we have sent down Clear Signs; and verily Allah guides whom He will!” (The Pilgrimage 16)
• “We have sent down to you Manifest Signs; and none reject them but those who are perverse.” (The Heifer 99)
• “A.L.R. (This is) a Book, with verses basic or fundamental (of established meaning), further explained in detail, from One Who is Wise and Well-Acquainted (with all things):” (The Prophet Hud 1)
• “A Sura which we have sent down and which We have ordained: in it We have sent down Clear Signs, in order that you may receive admonition.” (The Light 1)
• “This is the Way of your Lord, leading straight: We have detailed the Signs for those who receive admonition.” (The Cattle 126)

Revealing the Message of God

Flew finishes his book with a very beautiful analogy of a satellite phone discovered by an island tribe. The sage in the tribe suggests that the phone is a medium of contact with other humans. After some investigation, the tribe confirms that the phone is connected to a network which transmits the voices of intelligent beings that exist. They go even further and decipher the patterns and rhythms and their whole world changes. Similarly the discovery of phenomena like the laws of nature-the communications network in this parable–has led the thinkers to accept the existence of an infinitely intelligent Mind. Although Flew summarizes his pilgrimage in a very beautiful fashion with such a parable, we should agree, however, that the direct revelation of God through his messengers is the integral part of this communication network. Even Flew subconsciously acknowledges the role of the “sage” in his parable.

Acknowledgment: This article was produced in Mergeous [8], an online article and project development service for authors and publishers dedicated to the advancement of technologies in the merging realms of science and spiritual thought. The longer and live version of the article [9] is also available in Mergeous for interested readers.

References

1. A. Flew, “There is a God: How the World’s Most Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind,” HarperCollins Publishers (New York, 2007).

2. Kainata Imanla Bakis, http://www.mergeous.com/projectcon.asp?aid=21

3. Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, Sozler, Sayfa 281-299 (risaleinurenstitusu.org).

4. M. F. Gülen, “Islam’in engin ufku,” Yagmur, Sayi 30, Ocak-Mart 2006.

5. M. F. Gülen, “Marifet, Muhabbet ve Medyuniyet,” Kirik Testi, http://www.herkul.org/kiriktesti/?article_id=7978

6. Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, The Flashes, pg. 237 (translated by Sukran Vahide).

7. A. Y. Ali, The Qur’an Translation, Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, Inc. (New York 2004).

8. Mergeous, Online article and project development service, mergeous.com

9. There is a God: How the world’s most notorious atheist changed his mind, by Antony Flew (Review), http://www.mergeous.com/articlecon.asp?aid=16

However, a recent book, Islamic Science and Making of the European Renaissance, by George Saliba calls these arguments into question. This book prompted me to think more critically about this long, accepted argument. Can this prominent scholar of Islam or his famous book, Tahafut al-Falasifah, be held responsible, single handedly, for causing an age of decline in the scientific activities in the Muslim World?

Many orientalists argue that Ghazali’s Tahafut is responsible for the age of decline in science in the Muslim World. This is their key thesis as they attempt to explain the scientific and intellectual history of the Islamic world. It seems to be the most widely accepted view on the matter not only in the Western world but in the Muslim world as well. George Saliba, a Professor of Arabic and Islamic Science at Columbia University who specializes in the development of astronomy within Islamic civilization, calls this view the “classical narrative” (Saliba, 2007). However, interesting discoveries in the second half of the twentieth century by historians of science challenged many of the assertions of this classical narrative. An example of such discoveries is the strong connections between Ibn al-Shatir, a famous Damascene astronomer of the fourteenth century, and the Renaissance astronomer Copernicus (Roberts, 1957). If Ghazali had killed science in Islam in the twelfth century, then al-Shatir’s work from the fourteenth century could not have been so influential on Copernicus’s work. Saliba challenges almost all of the major tenets of the classical narrative on the basis of (1) a critical examination of historical evidence, some of which is quite recent, and (2) the results of his own long-term research in Islamic astronomy.

Saliba’s response to the question

In making his argument, Saliba first notes that most of the orientalists operate under the assumption that there must be a sharp conflict between religion and science. This paradigm is probably based on their European experience. To them, al-Ghazali represents the orthodox tradition in Islam and with Tahafut, written in the late eleventh century (between 1091 and 1095), they assume that orthodox religious thought won a decisive victory over rational, scientific thought. From that point on they assume that science in Islam declined, and the Islamic world did not produce anything significant in terms of scientific advancements.

Saliba argues that both of these assumptions are false. First, the European paradigm of conflict between religion and science does not really apply to the Islamic world. The religion of Islam encourages rational and scientific inquiry. Therefore, Muslims see no insurmountable contradictions between their faith and natural laws. Hence, studying religion and studying natural sciences does not create a conflict for Muslims.

Secondly, many of the scientists in the Islamic world were also religious authorities at the same time. A few examples among such scholars are Ibn al-Nafis, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi ,and Ibn al-Shatir who lived in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and made important contributions to such diverse scientific disciplines as mathematics, astronomy, medicine, physics and philosophy. In fact, these scholars were regarded primarily as religious figures by the general public with side interests in sciences. Early Muslim scholars did not hesitate to acquire scientific knowledge wherever they could find it, whether it be in Indian civilization, in Greek civilization, or in Persian civilization. Not only did they acquire these sciences through translation, but they also critically examined them in a comprehensive way. Making corrections and improvements and even introducing new disciplines, they showed a high degree of ownership and maturity. This led to a remarkable period of creativity and rapid advancements in many scientific disciplines in the Islamic world beginning as early as the eighth century (Saliba, 2007).

Contrary to the classical narrative, scientific advancements in the Islamic world did not stop or even slow down after Ghazali. Saliba gives many examples of sophisticated scientific achievements in the Islamic world well after Ghazali. Based on his life-long research in the area, he concludes that the golden age of Islamic astronomy was in the post-Ghazali period from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. Discoveries by Western historians of science in the second half of the twentieth century show that there are surprisingly strong connections between Copernicus (sixteenth century) and Muslim astronomers from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, such as Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and Ibn al-Shatir (Roberts, 1957; Saliba, 2007). These discoveries were shocking to many in the scholarly community who did not expect to find any transfer of knowledge from the Islamic civilization to Europe in the post-Ghazali period. Unfortunately, this new information has not been sufficiently digested by today’s scholars and does not yet generally appear in secondary sources.

Saliba also provides examples from other disciplines, such as medicine, that show that a high level of scientific production took place in more than one discipline in the Islamic world in the post-Ghazali period. How is it that such important scientific materials could have been overlooked by the experts? According to Saliba a major reason for modern historians of science to have missed the large amount of scientific production in Islamic world in the post-Ghazali period is the damage caused by the classical narrative. Most historians simply weren’t looking for it because the classic narrative stipulated that science in Islam was dead after Ghazali. Even though some new discoveries have been made, there are still many scientific works waiting to be studied from that period. As an example of these omissions, Berggren, the author of Episodes in the Mathematics of Medieval Islam, says that he used this title for his book as opposed to The History of Mathematics in Medieval Islam simply because “Such a book could not be written yet, for so much material remains unstudied that we do not know enough of the whole story” (Berggren, 1986).

The Content and the Method of the Tahafut

Even though Saliba’s arguments and evidence are quite convincing to doubt or reject the common narrative, I wanted to go straight to the source-the Tahafut-and have a closer look to see if it might be a book that can be held responsible for killing the science or scientific thought in Islamic civilization.

In Tahafut, Ghazali refutes twenty philosophical doctrines. Using a scientific, or in this context philosophical, method, he first explains those philosophical doctrines before criticizing them. His explanations were so comprehensive and so clear that he made them accessible to non-philosophers, and thus, his ideas became generally better known in the Islamic world. Next, he gave arguments to refute those doctrines. In doing so, he used the very same logical and philosophical principles and arguments that philosophers used in the first place to support their claims. Ghazali mainly argues that the philosophers who proposed the doctrines that conflict with religious principles failed to provide valid and rigorous proofs for their propositions. Hence, he attacked their methodologies using their own tools and principles.

An important point Ghazali makes in Tahafut is that he has no problems with the philosophers’ mathematics, astronomical sciences, or logic. He says (Marmura 2000, p. 11):

Regarding mathematical sciences, there is no sense in denying them or disagreeing with them. For these reduce in the final analysis to arithmetic and geometry. As regards to logical sciences, these are concerned with examining the instrument of thought in intelligible things. There is no significant disagreement encountered in these.

Therefore, it is clear that his views could not be used to justify a position against the study of mathematical sciences.

To give the reader a sense of what kinds of philosophical doctrines the Tahafut is concerned with and aims to refute, a selected few out of the twenty are listed below (Marmura 2000, p. 10, 11). The list shows that the questions discussed in Tahafut concern some of the most fundamental issues in theology, particularly in the Islamic theology.

The first problem: On refuting their doctrine of the world’s pre-eternity.

The sixth: On refuting their doctrine denying the divine attributes.

The tenth: On showing that upholding a materialist doctrine and the denial of the Maker is a necessary consequence [of what they hold].

The twentieth: On refuting their denial of bodily resurrection and the accompanying bodily pleasures and pains in paradise and hell.

Concluding Remarks

When I discuss the question given in the title of this article with my colleagues, and I argue that it would be unfair to hold Ghazali or Tahafut responsible for the decline of science in Islam, I sometimes hear the objection that “perhaps the content or the method of Tahafut may not justify this conclusion, but this is not how people understood it.” But then, one must consider the evidence given by Saliba that there is a large amount of sophisticated scientific production in the Islamic world well after Ghazali, and there is still much more to be discovered. Considering the content of Tahafut and the scientific advances in post-Ghazali period, I have a hard time convincing myself that the classical narrative is the ultimate truth on the matter. This position is supported by the fact that it is usually not realistic to try to explain most major social and historical transformations in terms of a single person, a book, an event, or the like. According to Saliba, the decline in Islamic science was the result of a combination of many internal and external reasons that took place several centuries after Ghazali.

Finally, one may wonder why this question is important or relevant. After all, these things happened a long time ago, and we have to deal with the current realities. One answer would be that there are many lessons to be learned from the history. And of course if the correct version of the history is not available, conclusions will be flawed. If anybody is interested in reviving science and scientific activities in a society, there is much that can be learned from the early Islamic period when there was a remarkable rapid and widespread rise in science, as well as lessons from the later periods of Islamic history when the Islamic world fell behind in scientific production. Some researchers are beginning to realize how much damage the classical narrative has caused in understanding the general history and the development of the modern science. It is always useful to have a critical mind to question and reevaluate assumptions when they do not conform to the evidence.

References

• Berggren, J. L. 1986. Episodes in the Mathematics of Medieval Islam, New York: Springer-Verlag.
• Marmura, Michael E. (translator). 2000. Al-Ghazali The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahafut al-Falasifah) Provo: Brigham Young University Press.
• Roberts, Victor . 1957. “The Solar and Lunar Theory of Ibn al-Shatir: A pre-Copernican Copernican Model,” Isis 48:428-432.
• Saliba, George. 2007. Islamic Science and Making of the European Renaissance, Cambridge: MIT Press.

Optimality is defined as the “most favorable condition or greatest degree or amount possible under given circumstances.”¹ It denotes a general equilibrium in which no improvement in one part of a system is possible without a larger sacrifice in another part. Thus, optimality is not mere order; rather, it is the highest state of it. Every optimal state is also orderly, but every orderly situation does not have to be optimal. The houses that we live in are examples of this. It is quite clear that our houses are not the optimal design for a house, but they are still orderly, hence the result of intention and intelligence.

A common trend among today’s evolutionists is to consider apparent sub-optimality (or “poor design” as some put it) sufficient proof for the nonexistence of a designer (hence, God). Biologist Richard Dawkins, for example, contends that “evidence of telling imperfections” in design is important evidence that “no designer exists.”² However, there are serious problems with this argument. First, judgments about optimality require knowledge of the entire set of objectives and available means, whereas we have no complete knowledge of divine objectives as to the creation of anything. The Bible refers to this point in Job 38:4, “Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth?” Similarly, the Qur’an states, “I did not make them witnesses of the creation of the heavens and the earth, nor of the creation of their own selfs” (Kahf 18:51). As we were not witnesses to the creation of the universe and human beings, we can never confidently say that something is “sub-optimal.” As one political scientist, George Tsebelis, has noted, cases of apparent sub-optimality are in fact cases of disagreement between “the actor” and “the observer”: “while the observer focuses attention on only one game, the actor is involved in a whole network of games”-what he calls nested games.³ What appears sub-optimal from the perspective of only one game is in fact optimal when the whole network of games is considered. Consequently, all conclusions about sub-optimality in the universe are unwarranted because as observers we have no comprehensive vision and understanding regarding God’s plans and objectives, which relate to multiple issues and platforms. Indeed, most sub-optimality arguments regarding creation are based on the assumed objectives of scientists, which do not necessarily correspond with the more complex and comprehensive objectives of God.

The sub-optimality arguments of evolutionists come in two forms: biological and theological. A famous example of the former is the “poor design” argument regarding the “inverted” arrangement of the vertebrate retina.⁴ Several neo-Darwinians have taken issue with the way retina is typically situated in vertebrates. The vertebrate retina is inverted in the sense that the photoreceptors sit at the back of the retina, so that light has to pass through a layer of neurons before it reaches them. Evolutionists have argued that this invertedness results in inefficiency in vertebrate vision, which is sufficient for them to conclude for the nonexistence of an all-knowing and all-powerful God. Yet, later research proved that in return for the above-mentioned negligible loss in vision, the current structure of the vertebrate retina is found to make possible better absorption of excess light⁵ and superior supply of blood to photoreceptors,⁶ both of which are essential for healthy vision. They are so essential that “[i]f the human retina were ‘wired’ the other way around,” concludes Peter Gurney, “the photoreceptors would be left in darkness.”⁷ This brings us to a verse in the Qur’an: “Were the truth to follow their lusts and fancies, the heavens and the earth and all those who live in them would certainly have gone to ruin” (Muminun 23:71).

A prominent example of the theological sub-optimality arguments of the evolutionists is the so-called “problem of evil,” which goes back to Darwin himself in the evolutionist tradition; Darwin had troubles with the apparently cruel acts in the animal world. Some of Darwin’s famous contemporary followers also take “the existence of human evil as well as of natural catastrophes and diseases” to mean that a benevolent God does not exist.⁸ For these evolutionists, the coexistence of evil and good is a sub-optimal situation and this is sufficient proof to reject the idea of a benevolent God. This argument suffers two ailments, though. The first and most ironic one is that the argument itself is more theology than science. From a scientific point of view, the question for which an answer is sought is whether the universe and everything inside it could have come into being by chance or not. The nature of God and how He ought to act are not questions that science seeks answers for. Second, these arguments stem from evolutionists’ own expectations regarding how the things should be, which are bounded by their strictly earthly considerations. When transcendental and other-worldly considerations are also taken into account, the problem almost evaporates into thin air. Throughout history the “problem of evil” (or theodicy) has been debated by hundreds of scholars in almost all religions. The reconciliation of worldly pains and sorrows with the mercy of a benevolent God has been one of the most challenging topics in the history of religion. Scholars of many religions have offered diverging explanations with varying degrees of consistency and persuasiveness. Some Christian explanations for human evil, for example, have rested on God’s wish to love and be loved out of free will. From this point of view, a genuine love requires a genuine free will, which results in evil actions as well good ones.⁹ Muslim scholars have also developed explanations that would account for all types of “evils.” First, similar to the previous Christian argument, human evil is argued to have been allowed for the realization of a genuine relationship between God and human beings. As for other “evils” such as natural catastrophes or diseases, most Muslim scholars do not view them as evils to start with. In the Muslim faith, everything that takes place happens out of a divine wisdom, which ultimately aims at the well-being of a believer in the afterlife. In this line of thinking, an adversity such as a disease can play three main possible divine roles. It is either a punishment for a believer’s sins or misbehavior in this world, which would replace a harsher punishment in the hereafter; or a test to be passed for spiritual development; or a tool to make a believer approach God by increasing his or her supplications meanwhile.¹⁰In each of these cases, the disease is given to the believer with a benevolent wisdom on the part of God. Moreover, some Muslim scholars have pointed out that sick people also remind other healthy people to give many thanks to God for their health, thereby channeling the whole community to the path of God. As such, what evolutionists claim as sub-optimalities are indeed essential parts of the divine plan, and they collectively function for the realization of the ultimate goal of creation. Thus, for Muslims, a disease is a gift of God with an evil face. As the Qur’an states, “it may well be that you dislike something while God has set in it much good” (Nisa 4:19). Again, a holistic view renders sub-optimality arguments unwarranted.

What these examples suggest is that most sub-optimality arguments are premature and assumptive. Proving a “poor design” argument requires more work than many evolutionists believe. Given our lack of comprehensive knowledge regarding the universe, it is safe to believe that we can never be sure whether something is ultimately sub-optimal. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily doom the study of optimality to a state of impasse. Although it is almost impossible to prove the theoretical optimality of things, we can assume tentative practical optimality in cases where we cannot suggest some practical means to improve on existing things. Thus, a practical test of optimality can be replacement of any purportedly sub-optimal thing in the universe with its artificial counterpart that is produced by human beings. If we can manage to replace any sub-optimal part with a better alternative without introducing new sub-optimalities elsewhere, then we might have a right to a tentative claim for sub-optimality. What is interesting is that all human attempts to improve on natural goods have failed so far. A prominent example to these failures is sugar substitutes. After the scientific discovery of the relationship between sugar consumption and certain health problems such as obesity and tooth decay, several scientists have advised that certain, if not all, people should refrain from or minimize sugar consumption. This resulted in a scientific interest in as well as a popular demand for sugar substitutes (or artificial sweeteners) that would give us the same sweet taste without sugar’s adverse effects. Surprisingly though, recent studies have demonstrated that sugar substitutes create more problems than they solve. Sugar-free sweeteners like aspartame and saccharin come with dozens of side effects, some of which are lethal.¹¹ Consequently, an increasing number of dietary experts advise us today to refrain from “diet” products, most of which include artificial sweeteners.¹² Thus, here we might be justified in claiming that natural sugar has practical optimality because it is proven to be superior to all other alternative sweeteners so far. Another prominent example is baby formulas. Despite all improvements in biochemistry, all baby formulas continue to come second after breast milk. Until human beings succeed in producing an infant formula that is overall more nutritious than breast milk and that is inexpensive enough to be produced in mass quantities, we are safe in saying that breast milk has practical optimality.

Finally, I should note that even if any sub-optimality does exist in the universe, it does not by itself provide any evidence for the absence of an all-powerful Creator. True, most believers believe in a God who is perfect in its self or essence and in its creation. Yet, this does not come to mean that any sub-optimality in the universe would necessarily negate the idea of God. From an Islamic point of view, for example, as everything in this life is part of a test, negligible sub-optimality might have also been purposefully included in God’s “design” as a test for human beings. If everything in the observed world was as perfect as each and every one of us would like it to be, there would be little room for disbelieving in God. However, the Qur’an states that this is not something God wished for human beings. Faith requires a struggle; and minimal sub-optimalities (if there are any) might be part of that struggle as well. If one in a thousand parts comes in seemingly sub-optimal character, it is not rational to conclude for the absence of intelligence or design.

Kaan Kerem has a PhD in Political science. He is freelance writer on philosophy and scientific thought.

1. Wordnet Online dictionary: http://dict.die.net/

2. Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (New York: Norton, 1986), p. 91.

3. George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (University of California Press, 1991), pp: 6-7.

4. Dawkins, pp. 93-4.

5. Juan Ramon Martinez-Morales, Isabel Rodrigo, and Paola Bovolenta, “Eye Development: A View from the Retina Pigmented Epithelium.” BioEssays. 26:766-777, 2003.

6. Helga Kolb, “How the Retina Works,” American Scientist, 91:28–35, 2003. 7. Peter W.V. Gurney, Technical Journal, 13(1):37–44, 1999.

8. Massimo Pigliucci, “Design Yes, Intelligent No.” Skeptical Inquirer, September 2001.

9. Richard Swinburne, Is There a God? (Oxford University Press, 1996). Also see, Casey Luskin, Good Theology and Bad Design or Bad Theology and Good Design? http://www.ideacenter.org/contentmgr/showdetails.php/id/722

10. Said Nursi, The Flashes, trans. S. Vahide (Istanbul: Sozler Publications, 1996), pp: 26, 28, 334–336.

11. Janet Starr Hull, Sweet Poison (New Horizon Press, 1998). Visit author’s website www.sweetpoison.com for detailed information.

12. Michael F. Roizen and Mehmet Oz, You: The Owner’s Manual (Collins, 2005).

In this issue we discuss not the theological arguments concerning the Day of Judgment, but some scientific speculations on how it might happen. Some say global warming followed by an ice age will bring life on Earth to an end and may trigger the Apocalypse. Expounding on some Qur’anic verses, Dr. Cakmak speculates on how Divine Predestination could operate on the physical world in the folding and collection of light. He suggests, “The events depicted in the verses, by the will of the Creator, may be dependent on the gravitational power of black holes.” Dr. Polatoz argues that apocalyptic events will take place within the sphere of physical laws which will destroy the world, but these laws will not apply after a certain stage following resurrection. These arguments are certainly personal deductions and only God knows what is to come. Dr. Kurtoglu reminds us about the perfect balance established in our universe with a fascinating article on phytoplankton and the critical role these microorganisms hold in the food chain. He makes us realize the horrible destruction we cause in our beautiful world. So, now the question is: Are we preparing our own end?

The Reverend Kip Gilts’ article on “Levels of Tolerance” provides inspirational guidelines for volunteers in interfaith dialogue on how to promote understanding of others who are not like “us.” We learn from his short essay that tolerance is not a compromise, but a love-filled path of sharing the same world.

The Fountain

The author, one of Turkeys most respected Islamic scholars, discusses Islams core beliefs. After giving brief summaries of traditional arguments for Gods Existence and Unity, Gulen analyzes modern theories related to nature, natural laws, and causes, as well as matter and chance. Supporting his arguments with accounts of scientific experiments, he also appeals to common sense by asking if any person or thing can be created without an author or by itself.

The second chapter analyzes angels, jinn, the spirit, death, Satan, and other spiritual topics. The third chapter, dealing with Destiny and free will, refutes the idea that Islam teaches predestination. According to Gulen, we œreap what we sow, for we have been given the Truth and told that we will be rewarded or punished according to how much we live our lives by it. Besides, fatalism is based upon a mistaken belief: that our human and therefore artificial division of time into past, present, and future somehow affects God. It does not.

The fourth chapter provides the Quranic and general arguments for the resurrection and the afterlife, while the fifth chapter discusses how Muslims understand Prophethood and Muhammads Prophethood. Gulen presents both sides of the Prophets life: spiritual and material. He also mentions the Bibles references to Muhammad, and deals with his miracles and polygamy. The final chapter presents the Quranic view of Prophet Muhammad and why the Quran and science are compatible.

The author is to be commended for relying upon Muslim sources, as well as his own practice and study. He presents Islam as devout and practicing Muslims understand it. It is a refreshing break from books by scholars who seek to explain a religion that they do not follow, and whose sacred language they often do not know, to others who want to learn about it.

This book should be read by all those who want to understand how Muslims understand Islam and view themselves.

To begin with, we can agree, as pointed out by Mason and McCall Smith (1984, p.107), that what constitutes the state of being a person, or personhood, is a matter of moral decisions, not of scientific facts. The relevant arguments are therefore primarily based on some moral, philosophical and theological hypotheses. However, even these arguments are informed by the scientific knowledge we have recently obtained about the condition and development of the human embryo. Insofar as the question is a moral one, arguments fall broadly into two groups, those that follow a secular approach, and those that follow a theological approach.

According to the secular approach, the basic condition for being a person is being capable of valuing one’s own existence. And the moral difference between a person and non-person lies in the value that persons can give to their own lives. Through language a person can comment on and declare awareness of awareness or fully developed self-consciousness (ibid. pp.l9, 21). Command of human language is thus offered as the decisive criterion. On this argument, pre-embryos, embryos, fetuses and very young infants are living beings, even living human beings, but they are not human persons. So, morally, we owe them nothing.

In his widely read article ‘A defence for abortion and infanticide’, Tooley (1973) observed that it is important to be very clear about what makes an entity a person, what gives that entity a right to life. He went on to define five necessary properties: 1) the capacity to envisage a future state for oneself, and to have desires about it; 2) the capacity to have a concept of a self; 3) being a self; 4); the capacity for self-consciousness; and 5) self-consciousness. As unborn babies, very young infants and PVS patients do not fulfil these requirements; they would not qualify as human persons. Singer (1993, p.87), in a forceful line on personhood, made a point of comparing human ‘animals’ with non-human animals, arguing that there could be a person who is not a member of our species and, conversely, there could also be members of our species who are not persons.

Those writers who, by contrast, accept the spiritual side of being a human person, have used different arguments to define personhood but, generally, link it with the human embryological state. Keith L. Moore, one of the foremost embryologists of our time, answered the question ‘When does the embryo become human?’ as follows: ‘The scientific answer is that the embryo always had human potential, and no other, from the time of fertilization, because of its human chromosome constitution. Two things are definite: (1) human development begins at fertilization, and (2) the zygote and early embryo are living organisms. My personal view is that the embryo becomes human being during the eighth week when it acquires distinctive human characteristics’ (Moore, 1989, p.72). 

Most of the writers who think that human personhood begins at some stage of embryological development base their view on various theological arguments. Before explaining these arguments it will be useful to give some historical background.

Aristotle (d. 322 BC), considered the first thinker to speak explicitly of human life as beginning in the womb, wrote: ‘the soul is the cause and the first principle of the living body’ (1957 edn. p.4l5b). He suggested that, when first formed, the embryo would have a nutritive or vegetative soul, replaced in due time, as a result of the causal influence of the particular semen’s pneuma, by the sensitive soul. Finally, in the case of a human, the rational soul would emerge to complete the generation of a human offspring. Aristotle associated quickening and differentiation into distinct stages of 40 days for the male and 90 days for the female, and so has been traditionally interpreted as placing the beginning of the individual boy and girl at those times respectively.

Aristotle’s ideas on this subject influenced many philosophers and scientists from prior to Christian times right through to the Middle Ages, notably Thomas Aquinas (d.1274), and for several centuries afterwards. His ideas also shaped the views of philosophers and scientists from the Islamic world and the East. For example, according to Musallam (1990), the method of lbn Sina (Avicenna, d. 1037) consisted of bringing Aristotle’s facts up to date, then re-stating the original Aristotelian arguments on the basis of the new facts.

Aristotle’s concept of the soul as the cause and first principle of the living body is confirmed by all monotheistic religions with little divergence. Despite significant differences on other points, these religions share the concept of life as sacred because given by God, and therefore forbid the termination of an innocent human life after it has been given its soul. However, they differ in their understanding of when this happens and what it means. Christian theology is definite that ‘immediate animation’ or ‘ensoulment’ is the instant at which our humanity is determined, but is uncertain when that instant occurs. Mahoney sums up the Christian theological position on the beginning of a human life as follows: In point of fact, current Roman Catholic teaching on the time of human ensoulment is one of uncertainty. Official Roman Catholic teaching is that we cannot be absolutely certain when animation takes place, or when the conceptus or the fetus is a human person; but it may well be precisely at the moment of conception’ (Mahoney 1984, pp. 6 7-9).

Evidently, in the monotheistic religions, certain topics can only he discussed knowledgeably after clear Divine guidance or Revelation. Without such guidance, human beings simply cannot know when ensoulment takes place. Because this information is not disclosed in the Christian scriptures, there is uncertainty on the subject among Christian authorities.

In the case of Islam, the situation is quite different. The creation of the human individual, fetal development and ensoulment are referred to in several dozen verses of the Qur’an in various contexts (32:8-9, 23:13-14, 71:14, 16:4, 75:37-9, 86:6, 77:20-1, 76:2, 22:5, 96:1-2, 40:67, 39:6, 53:45-6, 35 11, 3:6). Also, in the second source of knowledge after the Qur’an, namely the Hadith, there are a number of sayings of the Prophet, upon him be peace, which specifically address the subject of the embryological stages of a human being and the time of ensoulment.

From these texts, the great majority of Muslim scholars have understood that ensoulment takes place 120 days after conception (al-Nawawi, 1965 edn, p.189). However, when the relevant verses and ahadith are considered more carefully, the time for ensoulment should be put at between 40 and 45 days after implantation (the detailed textual discussion to support this view cannot be given here; see Aksoy, 199-) This means that. 49 or 55 days after conception, a human individual, with all the attendant rights, can be considered to exist, due to ensoulment having taken place.

Aristotle’s argument that ‘the soul is the cause and the first principle of the living body’ should not be dismissed as a religious myth. Something important is lacking in all our reflections on the subject if we take into account only the material existence of living beings. Although life is a continuous process, the physical existence of living beings is finite. If a human is taken as an example, every single cell in a human body has a limited (and programmed) lifespan. Some cells live a couple of hours, others a couple of days, weeks or months. After that they die and are shed. It is now known as incontrovertible fact that, with the exception of certain brain cells, all the cells in a human body are replaced with new cells every two years. Thus, in two years time, as regards my physical and material existence, I will be a completely different being from the one I am today. So, if I murder someone today and am caught after two years, I might say: ‘It was not me who did the crime. It was not exactly ‘this brain’ that planned it, not ‘these feet’ that walked to the scene, not ‘this finger’ which pulled the trigger’. This defence is logical and must be acceptable if I am only a material being. Of course, our current legal systems are not based upon the (false) assumption that a person is a merely physical being and therefore I would be unable deny responsibility on these grounds.

There should be something beyond merely physical existence that makes me me. Parfit (1984, Part 3) has discussed the nature of a person and sought answers to such questions as: What makes a person at two different times one and the same’? and What is necessarily involved in the continued existence of a person over time? He defines two kinds of sameness or identity: qualitative identicalness (or exact alikeness), and numerical identicalness (or one-and-the-sameness). He writes: ‘Two white billiard balls are not numerically but may be qualitatively identical. If I paint one of these balls red, it will cease to be qualitatively identical with itself as it was. But the red ball that I later see and the white ball that I painted red are numerically identical. They are one and the same ball’ (ibid., p.20l). According to Parfit, a person is a separately existing entity, distinct from his brain and body, and his experiences. What makes an individual at two different times one and the same person is psychological connectedness and/or continuity, with the right kind of cause. The psychological connectedness is the holding of particular direct psychological connections. And the psychological continuity is the holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness. Parfit addresses these and similar matters extensively and intelligently in his Reasons and Persons (ibid.).

All the Divine religions and some philosophers name that which provides the necessary continuity to make a person as soul. According to the authority of religion, a living human being consists of body and soul. Soul cannot manifest its existence without a body, and a body cannot be animate and survive without a soul. They are like glove and hand: just as the glove is an inanimate piece of cloth until the hand enters it, so the body becomes a human person only when the soul enters it. Likewise, just as when the hand is removed, the glove reverts to a piece of cloth, so too the human body ceases to be identifiable as a human person when the soul departs. Aristotle expresses the soul in this famous, graphic image: ‘For if the eye was an animal, then sight would be its soul…. so that when sight leaves it is no longer an eye except homonymously, much as we might say of a dead body that it is our friend; in one sense it is but in a very different sense it is not’ (Aristotle, 1957 edn, p.412b).

In sum: when the body meets with the soul it comes to be a human person, with all the attendant rights, especially the right to life.

References

• AKSOY, S. (199-) ‘When does a human individual begin to be?: A philosophical, embryological and theological perspective’. (Unpublished paper)
• AL -NAWAWI. (1965 edn) Sahih-i Muslim Bi-Sharh-i Nawawi, Kitab al Qadar, vol.16, Matbaa-i Misri. Egypt.
• ARISTOTLE (1957 edn), On the Soul (De Anima), trans. W.S. Hett. W. Heinemann, London and Cambridge, Mass.
• MAHONEY, J. (1984) Bio-ethics and Belief Sheed & Ward, London.
• MASON, J.K.& McCAll. Smith, R.A. (1984) Law and Medical Ethics, Butterworths, London.
• MOORE, K,L..(1989)Before We Are Born, W. B. Saunders Company, Philadelphia.
• MUSALLAM, B. (1990) ‘The human embryo in Arabic scientific and religious thought’ in G.R. Dunstan, (ed.) 7 ‘The Human Embryo: Aristotle and the Arabic and European Traditions, University of Exeter Press, Exeter. pp.32-46.
• PARFIT. D. (1984) Reasons and Persons, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
• RISPLER-CHAIM, V. (1993) Islamic Medical Ethics in the Twentieth Century, E.J. Brill, Leiden.
• SINGER, P. (1993) Practical Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
• TOOLEY, M. (1973) ‘A defence of abortion and infanticide’ in J. Feinberg (ed.) The Problem of Abortion’, Wadsworth Publication Company, California, pp. 51-91.