We perceive several problems related to the functions in many situations in life and develop solutions accordingly. The function shows the effect of one (or more) variable(s) on another variable. In simple terms, one factor can be called the transformation of another factor. When you send a piece of mail by cargo, you pay according to the weight of your cargo. Or imagine using an hourly Internet service in a library or airplane; the more hours you use the Internet, the more you pay.

A group of people want to rent a bus. The number of people does not affect the cost of rent for a bus. However, the cost per person could change depending on of the number of people. The more passengers, the less fee they pay for each passenger. Conversely, if the number of passengers is less, the cost of the bus fee could be more.

The examples are given above help to understand the mathematical function more easily. We perceive several problems related to the functions in many situations in life and develop solutions accordingly. The function shows the effect of one (or more) variable(s) on another variable. In simple terms, one factor can be called the transformation of another factor.

Consider shipping by mail. There are actually two situations here; the weight of the cargo sent and the amount of money paid based upon the cargo’s weight. This gives us a hint for the payable amount. For example, we may know how many pounds of cargo can be sent for $10. We also may calculate how much money is needed to ship 5 pounds of cargo. We can formulate this shipping problem:  Let x be the weight of the cargo and let y be the amount to be paid. In addition, for each parcel sent, including taxes, let us assume that it costs $3. In this case, we get an equation such as y = 2x + 3. Here, the number 2 given in front of the variable x is the money paid per pound. We calculate how many dollars we will pay for a 4-pound cargo: (2×4) + 3 = $11. If 2 dollars per pound is received, a 4-pound package shipping fee is 11 dollars.

Another example would be the use of the Internet. If 40 cents is requested per hour, $1.2 will be given for 3 hours of internet usage. Thus, the equation can be written as y=40x, where x is internet usage time per hour, y is amount to be paid.

The bus rental example is slightly different from the above two examples. Although this example specifies the function, this time there is a reverse situation. In the first two examples, like (x or) input increases, (y or) output will increase. In the case of bus rental, the bus rental fee is fixed and as the number of passengers increases, the payment per person will decrease. Let’s say $400 is required for the daily rental of a bus. 40 people pay $10 per person while 8 people pay $50 per each person.  This equation would be; y=400/x, where x is the number of people, y is the amount of money paid per person. Functions are important in understanding the relationship between two variables.

Life is a function. In mathematics first, what is the function in its simplest form? Let us give the known definition in schools.

Function: Let A and B be two sets different from the empty set and there is a relation f from set A to set B. If the relation f associates each element of the set A to one and only one element of the set B, this relation is called the function from set A to set B. It is shown as f: A→B or A→B. A is called the definition set of the function and B is called the set of values. A set of elements that match the elements of set A in set B is called the set of images of the function and is denoted by f (A).

In this case, if we clarify the definition a little, a relationship from A to B to be defined in order to function f; the following conditions must be met:

1. There should be no elements in the definition set that do not have an image. However, the element can remain exposed in the value set.
2. Each element in the definition set must not have more than one image.

Let us try to find the reflections of the definition in our lives. We assume that A is the world in which we live. If we say “World” for Set A (Definition Set), we would call Group B “the Afterlife” (Value Set). Because there is a connection from this world to the other world. We will see our values in the afterlife against what we do in this world. As someone who fits the definition of a “good” person will be of high value, the definition of a “bad” person will consequently result in a lower value. So, set A considers the world and its elements as ‘living people’. We can think of all the people in the world and include them in this group since life is finite for all of us. The mathematical meaning of this reality is the following:  all elements will be moved from set A to set B (Let A and B be two sets different from an empty set and a relation f from set A to set B.). There is such a connection (or relation) that one who leaves the world cannot go to two places at the same time. Destinations are clear: abode of reward or abode of punishment. We will all be eventually placed into one of these two groups. In some cases, the last stop of the people will be paradise, even if there are those who go to hell first and purify their sins. Consequently, in the last case, no one will be in two places at the same time (If the relation f associates each element of the set A to one and only one of the set B, this relation is called the function from the set A to the set B).

Just because everyone has one final destination does not mean that that destination can only hold one person. If the levels of Heaven and Hell are considered correctly, it is possible that there is more than one person for each level or that no one has come to that level. It is possible that there are those who have sinners at the same level. We can speculate that there may even be such a level that is inaccessible to all people. The Creator creates such places in order to show His grace, mercy, and power. (In the definition set, there should not be any elements without an image. But in the value set, there may be exposed elements.)

Life itself is a function. God created life according to certain rules. We should do our best to explore, find, and use these rules. Seeing the beauties of life and being amazed by the astonishment and capturing happiness in both worlds is achieved by seeing the manifestations of God everywhere.

In a time of darkness and ignorance, we must challenge our preconceived notions, seeking answers in education and trust.

It is another season of service. Our love-filled hearts are longing for Joseph but as desolate as Zaliha,^[1] and we are crying the lamentations of Jacob. Yet, we are waiting for glad tidings to arrive soon to open our eyes and lift our feelings.

It is impossible not to feel the pain of our people when we witness their heart-breaking state while being dragged along under the debris, destructions, and disasters of these dead, dark years.

Now please go! Go and visit all those countries that share a similar fate! I am sure you will not be able to come back without feeling painful sorrow for them! From the biggest cities to the smallest town centers; from the most crowded urban areas to the most remote villages; there are countless places that have been suffering under the dominance of ignorance and social problems. This combination is like a vortex that swallows whole communities – and sometimes whole countries. In these countries, you will witness such serious social, spiritual, and economic sicknesses. They were not healed in the first place and became chronic, and now they have become incurable.

Among all these, however, the most irremediable illness is ignorance. Ignorance is such a chronic disease that it corrodes an entire nation and gnaws away at our existence. Ignorance is the deprivation of knowledge; it is the inability to define proper goals in accordance with the acquired knowledge; it is a life deprived of Truth and righteous thinking. Ignorance has been a calamity that has existed in every time period. As has been the case with every nation, it is necessary to dry out this stagnant swamp, illuminate the minds of the masses with knowledge, guide young people to a proper and sound state of thinking and historical awareness, and prevent the negative trends that conflict with the quintessence of humanity; otherwise it will be impossible to remove ourselves from the crises this illness causes. We will find ourselves in a vicious circle.   

Was it not ignorance that caused us to fail to cultivate our fertile lands, to foster the growth of crops and fruits on our lush plains, to benefit from our gushing rivers? Was it not ignorance that turned our paradise-like world into ruin? We have lived completely unaware of our beauties and treasures, which are like the gardens of Eden; we have not been able to reap the benefits from our fields or from our minerals. Worst of all, by drowning ourselves in the illusion that we were not capable of doing anything with our own resources, we sacrificed our hope and willpower. And ignorance, which slowly ruined our people’s abilities, has reached its darkest depths today…

In this new era, at a time when scientific and technological thinking have rapidly developed and a flash of hope appeared, indicating that we could be pulled through these calamities, people have been drawn into another vortex: completely overwhelmed and dazzled with an inferiority complex, some assumed that crushing national awareness and conscience, destroying moral values, and shedding our high virtues was the only way to reach the level of developed civilizations. They’ve committed serious blows upon our national spirit and identity instead of embellishing the hearts with faith and equipping the minds with science and wisdom, which would bring prosperity to every corner of the world with art and trade.

In a way, this second type of ignorance has been even more destructive and caused greater danger. The previous ignorance melted away when confronted with knowledge and science, but this next-generation ignorance has been able to penetrate everywhere, purporting to spread in the name of knowledge and civilization. It has been approved and applauded by everyone. While the previous ignorance turned the world into ruins and brought joy only to those who like darkness, the ignorance that emerged later swept away all virtuous qualities, including spiritual nobleness, selflessness, and altruism. It left the masses dumbfounded.

Nevertheless, mentors and educators who have undertaken the role of building the future will wage war against these two types of ignorance. They will, and must, spare no effort and no legal means to elevate people to an era of enlightenment. In order to achieve this, it is essential to announce a mobilization of culture. We must turn all parts of our world – from homes to schools, coffeehouses to barracks – into learning centers. A general mobilization should be launched against ignorance, thoughtlessness, artificialness, and unawareness of national culture and merits; while decisions made under preconceived opinions should be criticized. Answers should be sought in science and scientific research; a new and fresh perception should be acquired.

There is no doubt that the forerunners of this blessed duty can only be teachers and educators – fortunate educators who treat their students in a wholesome manner, caring for both their physical and moral attributes. They must consider the human position and relations within the universe as a whole. They must inspire and invigorate their hearts in line with the purpose of their creation. They must be teachers who grasp the physical and metaphysical worlds as two sides of one reality!

Yes, denying the physical aspects of the human, as is the case in some monastic ways of life and some forms of mysticism, and considering the human with only his bodily and physical aspects, as in the case in some philosophical systems, has proved harmful to humankind.

Is it at all possible not to realize that humankind is an exceptional being, who holds a prominent position within the whole universe and is charged with very sublime missions, and hence, is a candidate for various ranks and positions?

How can a creature, who possesses an ability to benefit from all kinds of science and knowledge, who is granted the capability of intervening in events, who is equipped with skills to perceive, comprehend, and accept all types of beauty, who can distinguish many types of delights and pleasures, and who is insistently longing for “eternity,” be without a duty and ongoing future? Regarding the human as a being who is without any duty or responsibility, and thereby deprived of an endlessly long and happy future, means to lower this estimable being to the level of most primitive creatures; to deny all their physical and mental abilities and emotions; and to push him or her to the most bitter and stressful path and turn their world into misery. I do not know whether any other cruelty or grievance could be bigger than this!

A real teacher and a true mentor is the fortunate person who teaches his or her students – who have been sent to the world with limitless possibilities – the righteousness and unerring ways of thinking. A real teacher invigorates their emotions, triggers their eagerness and willpower, and elates their spirits. A real teacher wipes out all darkness and iniquities that block students’ ways, and delivers them towards luminescent sources. In due time, everything touched by these blessed, trustworthy, and truthful teachers will gain the highest value; things regarded worthless will become like gold; the most darkened souls will reach the dawn; individuals who are completely bound to serve their carnal desires will explore and discover their own souls and become kings of their selves.

How blessed are those teachers who devote themselves to guiding, certifying, declaring, and manifesting the truth through all disciplines of science! Who follow their pupils in every stage of their development and always carry the vigor of elevating their students to the level of real humanity! Who sometimes become tense as a lightning bolt, but soften and calm down into gentle beams of light, illuminating the hearts and minds of their students!

^[1] Zaliha is the wife of the prominent person in Egypt who bought the Prophet Joseph (pbuh) as a slave. According to the story, both in the Qur’an and the Bible, she fell desperately in love with Joseph and tried to seduce him, yet Joseph rejected her at the cost of being imprisoned for many years. Her name is not recorded in the scriptures; however, she is popularly called as Zaliha in Islamic sources.

I’m calling you friend, oh friend.

Thousand pieces torn apart

I’m calling you friend, oh friend.

I’m filled with the love of thee

Mistaken my piety,

Lost my mind in ecstasy

I’m calling you friend, oh friend.

On the road and on the lane,

In the sacred or profane

Among pious with the vain

I’m calling you friend, oh friend

In the river, I’m a haze

Through mountains, I will gaze

For all the world, to amaze

I’m calling you friend, oh friend.

A bird in deserted land

Found comfort at roses’ hand.

So my bleeding heart will stand

I’m calling you friend, oh friend

Passing the world of worry

Flapping wings in the empty.

Your love and joy lifted me

I’m calling you friend, oh friend

Timeless feelings unspeakable

A condition incurable

On a canyon unbridgeable.

I’m calling you friend, oh friend

All I see is my friend’s face.

Towards you I have to pace.

Hope has never lost a case,

I’m calling you friend, oh friend

Seas and Oceans become breath.

Lungs shatter calling your path.

Till the day this voice be death,

I’m calling you friend, oh friend

I’m not sick or healthy,

Not heavenly or earthly.

But everywhere, constantly,

I’m calling you friend, oh friend

Walking behind my friend’s ways,

Smelling rosebud through the hays,

Saying what Niyazi’s says,

I’m calling you friend, oh friend.

Translated by Mustafa Tabanli

Sarahsi’s commentary on this incident is quite thoughtful: “The judge must pay extreme attention to this matter because of the following saying of the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him: ‘The noble one should not be hopeful for your favor, nor should the weaker despair of your unfair treatment.’ If the noble one is positioned in the front, he or she may raise hopes for the judge’s favoring them, which will dishearten the weaker who will be concerned of a possible injustice incurred on them.” (Sarahsi 1983, 61)

Let us consider this incident. An ordinary citizen, who happens to be a Christian, complains and files a case against the Muslim President of the country without any concern of the consequences. The Chief Justice of the fantastic Abbasid Empire is Imam Abu Yusuf, the great jurist of the Hanafi school of thought, second only to Imam Azam. He hears both parties without being able to bring them to the same level of seating, for he is too shy to ask the Caliph to rise up from where he is and stand next to the plaintiff. This would normally be perceived as a minor, even insignificant lapse; but the judge never forgets this for his entire life, and considers it his most grievous error. In fact, it so grieves him, it is the one lapse he asks God to forgive him for. On the other hand, Sarahsi’s comment is also worth analysis, as he does not deem this incident an insignificant one, but takes a very meticulous approach when he says, “The judge must pay extreme attention to this matter.” We should also keep in mind that this incident is not narrated in a fictional work of stories or legends, but in one of the fundamental sources of Hanafi jurisprudence, and this makes the incident even more significant and makes it sufficient to reflect, singlehandedly, Islam’s very accommodating and tolerant policy towards non-Muslims.

Forbearance, or tolerance, is kindheartedness without expecting anything in return, and it is more comprehensive than a mere word or slogan in Islamic terminology. It is an injunction in the religion, as it is firmly established by Divine revelation and explained by the Prophet. This duty upon believers has taken a material form in the Age of Happiness, during the reign of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, and throughout fourteen centuries of Islamic civilization. It is a product of the eternal and universal faith of Islam.

The Qur’an raised the columns of forbearance upon the Islamic foundations of life, universe, and mankind. Oneness is an attribute to God, and God alone; whereas all of creation is a manifestation of multiplicity, diversity, and differences. The basis of Islamic tolerance is that justice is obligatory. The Qur’anic description of God is “the Lord of the worlds,” the Lord of all mankind (Fatiha 1:1). As a result of this rationale, Islam embraces all the heritages of prophethood sent to all nations.

The Qur’an confirms the truthful acts of those who followed past prophets, corrects their faults or introduces new commandments (Maidah 5:48; Al Imran 3:3-4; A’raf 7:157-158).

Tolerant and just conduct towards non-Muslims was not only observed in the early days of Islam, but also in the following centuries. The Ottomans, from their onset in the late thirteenth century, particularly stand out for their political character. They prioritized avoiding internal conflicts with other principalities in Asia minor, and focused more on expanding westward to annex Byzantine towns. Their engagements with the non-Muslim people of these towns were never solely based on warfare and military power; instead, they cultivated relations based on fair treatment and tolerance. This diplomacy of fairness and forbearance paved the way for Orhan Bey (d. 1362) to have the gates of Bursa opened to him in peace in 1326 (Neşri 1983, 67; Akgündüz 1999, 430; Ihsanoğlu 1999, 422).

There is an overwhelming consensus among historians that the Ottomans were able to expand their territories in Asia Minor and the Balkans not only through military means but also through many social and ethical factors. Otherwise it is impossible to hold so many different ethnicities, with different faiths and languages, united (Eryılmaz 1990, 24). Sultan Mehmed II’s declaration on non-Muslims following the conquest of Istanbul is exemplary in terms of religious liberties, as he recognized the people’s freedom to worship in their own tradition; to conduct ceremonies as they did before; to travel freely; that their properties, shops, groves, farms, families, servants, and slaves were inviolable; that there was going to be no forced conversion to Islam; that their boys would not be conscripted; that they could choose their own community leaders; and that they would not be forced to work without compensation (Akgündüz 1999, 430; Ihsanoğlu 1999, 422-3).

The Ottoman policy on non-Muslims was mostly inspired from a judgment derived from a saying of the Prophet: “They (non-Muslims) have the same rights as we Muslims do; they are liable to the same duties as we Muslims are” (lahum ma lana wa alayhim ma alayna).

These rights and liberties the Ottomans recognized for the non-Muslim community become even more meaningful when compared with the situation in Europe during the same period of history. Bernard Lewis was visiting Turkey in the 1990s. In an interview for TRT (Turkish national network), the reporter asked him to comment on why, in the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries, there is almost no record of Turkish travelers in Europe, whereas there were quite a number of European travelers who travelled across the Ottoman territories. I am summarizing Lewis’ answer as follows: “In those centuries there was no obstacle for Europeans to travel in the Ottoman land, for the Ottoman government was a state of rule and law. Europeans could visit the country on a visa (musta’man), travel, and follow up on their business freely. The travelers were of different religions, but they could freely gather with their co-believers or the locals who spoke their own language and hold services in their places of worship. They did not feel homesick or alienated. On the other hand, however, a Muslim could no way dare to visit a European country in those centuries without forsaking his life. Fanaticism was at its peak in Europe.”

The Ottomans had almost no competition in championing the freedom of religious belief and practice as a cornerstone of social order. The Ottomans also had non-Muslim groups represented in the parliament as ministers and at other senior levels; there were sometimes almost as many as fifty non-Muslim members of parliament, especially in the nineteenth century.

A more recent event was when Assyrian Christians, in the city of Mardin, had to confront the Ottoman state in 1915. Following the internal conflicts between Muslims and Armenians during World War I, in which the Tashnak and Hinchak groups of Armenians massacred Turkish villages, the Union and Progress government of the Ottoman state passed a decision to send all Armenian citizens – with the exception of those residing in Istanbul – into exile. Despite the fact that Assyrian Christians were not involved in any of those incidents, state officers in Mardin wanted to send them into exile too, simply because they were also Christians. In the chaotic environment of war, murder and violence followed this decision, and Assyrians from Midyat armed themselves and gathered in the village of Aynverd (Gulgozu). They did not obey calls to concede their weapons, for they did not trust the state’s army. Shaikh Fethullah Hamidi, of the Mardin region, announced a religious ruling that it would not be lawful according to Islam to harm Assyrians, and that their lives, properties, and honor were inviolable. He further communicated with state officers and, after three months of persistent efforts, secured a warrant of safety for the Assyrians. Assyrians never forgot his selfless stance and hard work, and as a sign of appreciation, they hang his picture next to their patriarch in the Mardin Deyruzzaferan Patriarchate.

Inspired by these ideas, Fethullah Gülen, one of Time Magazine’s “100 Most Influential People in 2013,” and the Hizmet Movement, which has developed around this thought and guidance, are trying to reflect the same spirit of dialogue among different nations, religions, and cultures around the world. Born out of Turkey, this movement is now active in around 140 countries. Their outreach extends to all walks of life, regardless of differences, and their achievements raise our hopes that the world can once more experience a time of tolerance and coexistence, at least to the same degree, if not higher, as in the historical examples described in this article.

Dr. Yildirim is a professor of Qur’anic exegesis in the School of Divinity, Fatih University, Istanbul.

References

• Akgündüz, Ahmet, Said Öztürk. 1999. Bilinmeyen Osmanlı, Istanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı Yayınları.
• Eryılmaz, Bilal. 1990. Osmanlı Devletinde Gayrimüslim Tebaanın Yönetimi, Istanbul: Risale Yayınları.
• Gibbons, Herbert Adams. 1998. Osmanlı imparatorluğunun Kuruluşu, Translated by R. Hulusi (Özdem), Istanbul: 21.Yüzyıl Yay.
• Hamidi, Muhammed Sadık. 2002. Mardini Es-Seyyid Eş-Şeyh Hamid Evlad ve Torunları, Istanbul,.
• Ihsanoğlu, Ekmeleddin. 1999. Osmanlı Devleti Tarihi I-II, Istanbul: Zaman Gazetesi Yayınları.
• Serahsî, Şemsu’l-eimme. 1983. el-Mebsut, Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınevi.

A consocational democracy is a type of democracy which emphasizes the importance of power-sharing and decision-making among different segments in society. But is consociational democracy the most suitable form of democracy when it comes to establishing lasting peace in post-conflict societies?

Consocational democracy addresses problems in democratic state building that result from deep segmentation. These divisions as a result are easily defined and measured where real boundaries (political or otherwise) exist. As a result of these environmental and social conditions there exists a natural tendency for competition and the supporting of ethnically-based parties (Andeweg 2000).

The consocational framework is dependent on elite cooperation. This is the centerpiece of the model and is based on the premise that communal violence between groups is often exacerbated by elites so that when these elites have a voice in government, they have a vested interest in maintaining its integrity. Although elite meddling in conflict is the most potent, it is not the only incendiary in inter-group relations (Andeweg 2000).

Under the current model where a society has the characteristics necessitating a consocational framework, the sub-groups have two choices: to remain a part of the country or to separate. These two forces pull on individuals of each group in which decisions are often based on various factors. Those societies that do not cooperate are termed “centrifugal.” In this case, the sub-groups emphasize separation over integration. Consocationalism is a top-down integration/cooperation mechanism that seeks to overcome centrifugal forces (Andeweg 2000).

Loyaltiyes and state building

One of the forces that create these centrifugal tendencies is also one of the characteristics that make communal life possible i.e. group loyalty. According to A.A.M. Kinneging (2004) loyalty, “pertains to a bond that withstands the passing of time and the winds of change: a bond that is conceived of as lasting, permanent, unbreakable, even holy” (Kinneging 2004, 68). This definition of loyalty indicates how intractable it is when integrating many different groups with different loyalties under one government. In this case, as Kinneging points out, the community is higher than the individual. In ethnically homogenous countries this presents no problem and allows democracy to flourish at all levels. Often times this is not the case in heterogeneous societies where either the state enforces a loyalty to its institutions, such as in the republican liberal democracy model, while still maintaining individual rights or enforces it in such a way that violates individual rights in an undemocratic manner.

Loyalties typically follow racial or religious lines. They can even be more fragmented such as loyalty to one’s town or city. Evidence can be seen in the sport’s world. Loyalty is typically to a person or an institution (Healy 2007). Loyalty to the nation-state has been somewhat of a recent phenomenon. The lack of loyalty can be detrimental to state integrity when it is towards another group. The lack of loyalty between sub-groups is something that consocationalism does not address as it represents an administrative/electoral solution to a heavily divided society. It does not address the psychological/emotional element that loyalty forms a part of and which in essence is the backbone of society.

Lijphart envisioned consocationalism as a temporary solution in which it was only meant as a transitory phase to greater levels of democratic cooperation (Andeweg 2000). This of course assumes that through elite cooperation and living peacefully alongside each other under one roof, it is possible that these groups would eventually reconcile their differences and move to greater integration. Unfortunately, there is the other direction such as entrenched differences that only get worse with time that may stalemate/postpone the conflict i.e. not resolving the conflicts (Fox & Miller 2007). Still, consocational democracy is considered the best option for deeply stratified societies because it recognizes, among other things, that some sub-groups have a complete way of life that requires a certain level of autonomy from the state.

The risk in this approach is that these sub-groups may look at the government as a burden or unnecessary overhang on complete control of their affairs. In response, the state may have a few choices at its disposal that may either create incentives such as the consocational framework or force a state identity upon all sub-groups, essentially eliminating them.

Bosnia: Adversarial communities under one roof

Bosnia is composed of three adversarial communities that have existed since the 15th century. Primarily, these communities came into existence around a particular religion. These religions of interest in the Bosnian case are Orthodox Christianity, Catholic Christianity and Islam. The Serbian people primarily follow Orthodox Christianity, the Croatians follow Catholic Christianity, and the Bosniacs follow Islam. These communities erupted into full-fledged war in the early 90’s when the Orthodox Serbs engaged in genocide against the Muslim Bosniacs (Kasapovic 2005).

These people were subject to the first consocational system of the world, the millet system which was implemented by the Ottoman Empire shortly after conquering the area that is now the former Yugoslavia. The millet system, which has roots in the religion of Islam, gave different religious communities their own autonomy headed by an elite (millet bashi) who was responsible for different religious and civil areas. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the various nation-states that emerged did not act so kindly on the remaining Muslim groups and either forced them to leave or massacred them. The Bosniacs represented a unique example as well as other indigenous ethnic groups who converted to Islam during Ottoman rule (Katsikas 2009).

These communities have historical differences that cannot disappear overnight. The Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croatians owe their divide to the Great Schism in the 11th century between Constantinople and Rome (Norwich 1999). The Muslim Bosniacs and Orthodox Serbs owe their divide to Serb defeat at the hands of the Ottomans in the 14th century (Kinross 2003). Although present-day communities probably give little thought to these events, the mimetic transmission of hatred means that these communities are seemingly locked in an adversarial relationship.

After the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord, a consocational-type government was established. Kasapovic described it as an “asymmetrical confederation” in which the country is divided into two parts with one part being more consocational between Bosniacs and Croatians and the other representing a more homogenous state of Serbs. At the national level equal representation is given to the three groups, mutual veto exists, autonomy is given to each group, and consensus is maintained (Kasapovic 2005).

More than fifteen years after the Dayton Peace Accord there is peace, but as Kasapovic pointed out, this is only because all groups consented to peace. Kasapovic notes that the state is still highly unstable because there is no consensus on its organization and there are continuing external threats that may tear the country apart (Kasapovic 2005). This instability means that these groups, by and large, have not resolved their differences.

He argues that there are three reasons for this inefficiency of the model of consocational democracy, one “at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state, and one more at the level of the Federation as a state sub-entity: no consensus on the state, no consensus on the political system, no consistent strategy of international actors in establishing a democratic state, and the unfavorable two-segmental structure of the Federation with one segment outnumbering the other” (Kasapovic 2005, 9).

The fact remains that despite living in a consocational-type system for six centuries, the different groups that compose Bosnia’s adversarial groups have not cooperated at any level that would have caused them to avoid the deluge in the early 90’s. This indicates that although these people are living together under one country, they harbor distrust or hatred of those who compose the other group. The fact that they are all part of one country appears to have no influence on the perceptions towards the other group.

Considering that this conflict has been ongoing at varying intensities for several hundred years, an unfreezing process is needed. The concept of unfreezing has its roots with the organization theorist Kurt Lewin who proposed an unfreezing, moving/changing, and re-freezing process. In the process, values are changed and thus can be labeled change management. The re-freezing may have more clout with individual organizations, but the re-freezing creates an organized way of thinking akin to concepts of efficiency i.e. an established uniform identity (Levasseur 2001).

The involvement of religious leaders has importance in this case. Since these conflicts involved Christian and Muslim communities which are international religions, and since these conflicts also involved an international response, these local conflicts have implications that are not only local. International religious leaders should remember to be sensitive to religious sentiments despite their distance from Bosnia.

Haynes pointed out that one of the problems of the roles religious leaders face is that they lack the capacity to build a strategy for peace (Haynes 2009). As members of an international faith, these leaders would have access to a large network of resources that would facilitate them in their role as peace-makers. One of the aspects that may be appropriately addressed in Bosnia is training these leaders to both acquire these resources as well as use them appropriately. This would make their role far more influential than the elites.

The side effect is that many of these religious leaders may have instigated violence against the other or continue to preach hatred towards the other. These leaders need to either be isolated by the national government or reprimanded severely by those leaders of international representation. The globalized world makes all this possible. The world in this essence can either be a harbinger of peace or a catalyst for war at the local level.

Religious leaders should be engaged in dialog with each other as much as other community members are engaged in workshops both inventing solutions and implementing them. Once a healthy environment of dialog is fostered, then either naturally or through planned social action, inclusive networks should be developed. These networks can create cooperation and community.

Lastly, the existence of these networks means that the state as a reactionary entity becomes a mirror of that society. In this case, the consocational model of governance might work and if possible a more unified democratic format may be chosen. The result would be a multi-group democratic state with shared loyalties to the state, one’s own group, and to another group. This does not guarantee continued peace, but at least secures it much more tightly than as proposed under the consocational framework alone.

Hummel is a doctoral candidate at the School of Public Administration, Florida Atlantic University.

References

• Andeweg, Ruby B. 2000. “Consociational democracy,” Annual Review of Political Science 3, no. 1: 509-536.
• Fox, Charles & Hugh Miller. 2007. Postmodern Public Administration, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe.
• Haynes, Jeffrey. 2009. “Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 47, no.1: 52-75.
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On the basis of the omnipotence puzzle, one can reject the existence of God as an absolutely perfect, omnipotent and eternal being because the notion of such a being seems to be incoherent, thus it has no real referent. However, there are various theistic views that try to make sense of this puzzle by preserving omnipotence as an essential property of God. Let’s examine Aquinas’s and al-Ghazali’s views regarding omnipotence and see how an answer to such questions can be produced.

Aquinas

Aquinas was one of the most prominent figures of Christianity in the Middle Ages. He attempted to systematize the Christian faith within the framework of Aristotelian philosophy. His philosophy is known as Thomism and accepted as the official doctrine of the Catholic Church to this day. One of the central issues Aquinas dealt with was God’s nature and His omnipotence. Let us examine his ideas on this.

According to Aquinas, hypothetical cases such as God killing Himself or lying, imply contradictions in relation to God’s nature. God is eternal and truthful by nature. And in his terms, “anything that implies a contradiction does not fall within the power of God” (Aquinas, 1963, Q. 25, art. 3, p. 165). Contradictory cases are impossible; they could never happen. Since they are not genuine cases, divine power is not applicable to them. However, Aquinas did not carefully formulate the idea he proposed here. In expressing this intuition he used the modal verb “cannot” with the subject term “God” in most cases. Take into account the following of his remarks:

God cannot make yes and no true at the same time, not because of His lack of power, but because of the lack of possibility, such things are intrinsically impossible (Aquinas, 1952, I-18, 19).

Even though he did not think that the term “cannot” in the sentence above does not pose a limitation on divine power because the case in question is not a genuine case, the linguistic meaning of “cannot” implies that God’s power is applicable to such a case, and therefore He is unable to do it. Let’s continue with al-Ghazali’s view on omnipotence.

Al-Ghazali

Al-Ghazali can be regarded as one of the most influential Medieval theologians in the Islamic world. His criticisms directed to Avicenna’s or al-Farabi’s attempts to interpret Islam in terms of Aristotelian philosophy had a major influence on the formation of the Islamic world. He is usually considered to be a dogmatic theologian who attacked philosophy and prevented free thinking and intellectual progress in the Islamic world. However, if his criticisms are examined carefully, we see that his target was not the activity of philosophy but the false beliefs produced by certain philosophers. Avicenna and al-Farabi were critized by him on the grounds that their philosophies included some elements coming from Aristotelian philosophy, which is not accepted by Islam. It should be noted that his way of critizing them is not any less philosophical than his opponent’s way of arguing. He was certainly not dogmatic in rejecting them and engaged in philosophical activity in doing so. One of the most recurrent topics in his work was the omnipotence of God.

Like Aquinas, al-Ghazali excludes contradictions or impossibilities from the scope of divine power. That is to say, impossibilities are not objects of power. Let’s examine what he says exactly in his masterwork, Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers):

The impossible is not within the power [of being enacted]. The impossible consists in affirming a thing conjointly with denying it, affirming the more specific while denying the more general, or affirming two things while negating one [of them]. What does not reduce to this is not impossible, and what is not impossible is within [divine] power (al-Ghazali, 1997, 17th Discussion, 29th paragraph, 179).

However, al-Ghazali is more sensitive than Aquinas in expressing this idea. In his main works where he analyzes omnipotence, the Tahafut and al-Iqtisad, he never uses “cannot” as a modal verb in a sentence whose subject is God. I think this was a conscious decision, because the semantics or meaning of the term “can” or “cannot” includes the idea of ability or inability to do something, which is closely linked to the notion of power. The sentence “God cannot do x” presupposes that x is included in the extension to which divine power is applicable but God is unable to do it. To avoid this, al-Ghazali simply says “the impossible is not within divine power.” The idea assumed here by al-Ghazali is expressed by the notion of category mistakes in contemporary philosophy of language.

Category mistakes

When an expression systematically misleads us because of category confusion in representing a certain fact, then it is a “category mistake” (Ryle, 1949, 16). For example, referring to faculties, libraries, museums and scientific departments as being in the same category with universities is a category mistake. The university is not a member of the class of which the listed units are members of, but it is rather the way in which all of them are organized (Ryle, 1949, 16). We can give more examples. Predicating colors of numbers is another category mistake. For example, “Number 2 is yellow” is a sentence asserted as a result of category confusion. Numbers are not the things to which the color predicates apply. In other words, color-predicates have a certain range or extension of applicability, which excludes numbers. On the other hand, the properties of “being odd” or “being even” apply to numbers but not to material objects. To say that this chair is even is another category mistake.

So each predicate has a certain extension to which this predicate legitimately applies. Things or expressions that are not in the scope (extension) of a certain predicate lead to a category mistake if they are associated with this predicate. So the sentence “God cannot do x” includes a category mistake if x is a contradiction because contradictions are not within the scope of divine power.

As a result, the question of whether or not God can kill Himself can be answered in the following way by supporting al-Ghazali’s unnamed intuition of category mistakes: this question presupposes that divine power is applicable to such a case, but this is a category mistake. Because of that, this is an illegitimate question that can be answered neither by “yes” nor by “no.” It is like the following question: How many times did you kick your dog? Assume that you don’t have a dog. If you do not have a dog, then there is no point in asking the number of times you kicked the dog that you do not even have. Considering the reality, it is an absurd question.

The notion of Omnipotence

An answer formulated in this way, in response to the puzzle, treats the notion of power as a crucial element in understanding the relation between God and the universe. It also allows us to understand the meaning of omnipotence clearly. An omnipotent agent is an agent who can perform everything that falls under the scope of the notion of divine power. An omnipotent agent cannot be characterized as a being that is able to do anything unqualifiedly. Cases that do not fall under the scope of power are not legitimate cases to which divine power is applicable. The classical criticism of this view is that God is limited by proposing such a scope of limitation. However, what is limited is not an agent, namely God, but a notion, which is divine power. Contradictions are used in determining the notion of divine power. So they put a limitation on the definition or meaning of “divine power,” rather than on the agent who is powerful. By excluding these contradictions from the scope of power and including things that are within this scope, the notion is defined. In this sense, defining is putting limitations on the notion of power. God conceptualized in this way has infinite power, i.e. He can create everything that falls under the scope of power. Otherwise, allowing such contradictions within the scope of divine power will undermine of the very concept of God. Then, for instance, we should have said that God can kill Himself. If God can kill Himself, then He could not be accepted as God anymore because God is essentially eternal by definition. In order to have an intelligible idea of God, the scope of divine power must exclude such absurdities.

Conclusion

As it is shown in the sample case of omnipotence, the apparently theological problem has logical and linguistic aspects. This puzzle can be handled by some clarification of the meanings of crucial terms regarding this puzzle. Both Aquinas and al-Ghazali were aware of this aspect of the problem even though they did not clearly express the intuition, which we call “category mistakes,” in contemporary philosophy of language. Much confusion is encountered in daily life, especially in the topic of religion, that stems from the misuse of language. If we want to get rid of such confusion and be clear in our thinking, then we should seriously ponder on the use of language.

Bibliography

• Al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid. Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers). Michael E. Marmura (tr.), Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1997.
• Al-Iqtisad fi al-Itiqad. Ibrahim Agah Cubukcu and Huseyin Atay (ed.s), Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Ilahiyat Fakultesi Yayinlari, 1962.
• Aquinas, Thomas. On the Power of God (Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei). Lawrence Shapcote. Trans. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1952.
• Summa Theologiae. Latin text and English Translation. T. Gilby. (ed). 60 vols. London, 1963.
• Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. London: Taylor and Francis Books. 1949.

But if you look at nature more carefully, you will find that it does not always seem that way. You may see animals that are strikingly unselfish, most of the time for their own species, such as giving a warning of approaching predators, sharing food, licking others to remove parasites, adopting orphans. And occasionally they are unselfish to other species as well. They fight without killing or even injuring their enemies. Such behavior poses a problem for the Darwinian view of nature; this behavior is known as altruism. But is there really a problem?

Yes, there is!

One of Darwin’s greatest challenges was explaining how altruism could have evolved. For example, consider how a single bird within a flock might act as an emergency alarm, giving a warning call when a predator approaches. By receiving advance warning, the other birds in the flock have a better chance of escaping from the predator. But this comes at a price to the bird that guards the flock. A warning call attracts a lot of attention, making the guard an easier target for the predator.

How could a character for such altruism be passed on from generation to generation if it is the altruists who are more easily eliminated, and should there not be some kind of reward or motivation for this self-sacrifice? At first glance, it seems that if altruistic birds are more likely to be preyed upon, then fewer altruists would survive to reproduce. Eventually, altruism should die out. In fact, it should have died out before we discovered it.

Altruistic behavior

How can we explain this behavior? It is not possible to do so from an organism-centered view. So, let’s imagine a gene that causes the organism containing that gene to behave in such a way that copies of it are made in other organisms. In other words, a bird is only helping the other birds if they have the same type of gene. A gene that makes its owner behave in this particular way, all other things being equal, is likely to survive. But then the natural question is that altruism is only directed to those with the altruistic gene. If the birds without the altruistic gene benefit from the help as much as those with it then how does the survival of the fittest theory favor this gene? It is not easy for a gene to recognize other such genes in other individuals. There must be another solution.

Sharing the same gene

One way of increasing the likelihood for altruism to reach its true target is to keep it within the “family.” If there is a gene for behaving altruistically, then the members of the family are more likely to inherit the same gene than a random member of the population. The closer the family member, the greater the possibility of sharing the gene.

If, for example, an individual had the choice of saving his own life or the lives of two sisters or eight cousins then the survival of the fittest theory should be indifferent about the choice as they will save the same number of genes. But on the other hand if I could save three sisters instead or nine of my cousins then the theory would favor the self-sacrificial act, “saving my kin rather than saving my skin!” Hmm, what do we know, maybe indeed there is a way to be both Darwinist and altruist.

The idea of the “fittest” in Darwin’s theory is the ability of an individual to survive and reproduce and therefore to pass on some of their genes. If a mother gives up her life for her offspring, the mother ceases to exist. But, from another point of view, the mother continues to live on in her child genetically. Although the mother as an individual has not benefited from her altruism, half of her genetic code survives.

This new definition of fitness shifts the focus from individual fitness to family fitness, which takes into account the survival of an individual’s relatives. Evolution is no longer seen simply to be a process of individual selection, but also one of family selection.

Although this selection based on family seems to be a good explanation for our puzzle, at least in theory, there are many immediate questions that spring to mind. Assisting one’s kin often goes in one direction, although one would expect it to be a two-way process as there is symmetry between the genes. And how practical is the process of selecting one’s relatives? How would you differentiate the members of the same flock as to whether they are family or not, the ones that are getting the help secretly “connected”!?

Mathematics and game theory

At this point at least we have arrived at the conclusion that it is quite difficult to explain altruistic behavior in all circumstances. Maybe there is a solution to be found in mathematics, which has solved so many abstract problems.

It would be useful to take a different point of view for the entire matter. Maybe what looks like altruism is indeed to the advantage of the altruist. Two parties could be exchanging altruistic favors and in the end they both are better off. Another question that comes to mind is “Even when everybody knows that cooperation is good for all, why shouldn’t one cheat as this is more beneficial from a selfish point of view?” If everyone were to cooperate, everyone would be better off; but the best for an individual is to pursue their own self-interest, in which case therefore everybody ends up worse off.

A similar change of understanding also happened in economic theory in the 1950’s when the game theory was first introduced into economics. Initially, this theory was intended to deal with the problem of providing a theory for economic and strategic behavior where people interact directly, rather than through the market. Here, games are only used as a metaphor for more serious interactions in a general ecosystem. But the game theory addresses the serious interactions using the metaphor of a game: in these serious interactions, as in games, the individual’s choice is essentially a choice of a strategy, and the outcome of the interaction depends on the strategies chosen by each of the participants. On this interpretation, a study of games may indeed tell us something about serious interactions.

In neoclassical economic theory, to choose rationally is to maximize the rewards for the individual. From one point of view, this is a problem in mathematics: choose the activity that maximizes rewards in any given circumstances. Thus, we may think of rational economic choices as the solution to a mathematical problem. But in the game theory, the case is more complex, since the outcome depends not only on one’s own strategies but also directly on the strategies that have been chosen by other individuals; we can still think of the rational choice of strategies as a mathematical problem – and maximize the rewards of a group of interacting decision makers (Nash equilibrium).

Now that we have realized that we have to move in a somewhat similar direction to the economists, maybe we should consult the experts of the game theory at this point. In the 1980’s Axelrod and Hamilton worked on a famous problem in the game theory, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, exactly because it deals with this problem. The rational pursuit of individual self-interest drives everybody into an outcome that is not favored by anybody. Imagine two partners in a crime being interrogated at the same time. Each one has two options, cooperate with the other and keep quiet or betray the other and confess. Case C, we can say, is if both cooperate then the police cannot get much out of them and they will both get a light sentence (2 years); if one defects and the other keeps quiet then the traitor will get an even lighter sentence (1 year) – this is case B. If the one who cooperates gets the longest sentence (10 years), this is the worst end of the deal and we can call this case S. In a case when both betray one another they will both get a sentence (6 years) longer than if they had cooperated but lighter than if one had kept quiet and the other spoke, and this is case D.

Out of the four outcomes, B is the best and S is the worst from an individualistic point of view, while the order of preference is B, C, S, D. We should realize that this is a non-zero sum game. In a zero-sum game, my loss is your gain; for example, if we are trying to divide a certain amount of money in the bank into two, anything over fifty percent for me is a loss for you. On the other hand, in a non-zero sum game I can actually win without you losing. Each suspect has to make their decision without knowing what the other has done. What would a rational suspect do?

The answer is simple; he would betray his partner in crime! Regardless of what the other suspect does, betrayal always pays better than cooperating. Here is the simple reasoning one would follow. Suppose my partner in crime cooperates. I could do quite well by also cooperating, I would get 2 years, (C). But it is even better to betray him, since I would then get 1 year instead of 2, (B). What if he betrays me? If I keep quiet then the worst is going to happen and I will get 10 years, (S), therefore I should defect and get 6 years, (D). In summary, all we are saying is that the second row in the chart is always more favorable than the first row, hence no matter what, a rational prisoner would always betray his partner!

“And here comes the dilemma: it pays each of them to defect, whatever the other one does, yet if both defect, each does less well than if both had cooperated. What is best for each individual leads to a mutual defection, while everybody would be better off with mutual cooperation.”

Fortunately, the dilemma has a solution in our case. So far, we have only played the game once. What happens if the parties play the game repeatedly and for an indefinite number of times? After every single time they play they know that they are likely to meet again later. Under such conditions there is actually a cooperative strategy for the players that could be successful; this is a somewhat twisted version of the cooperation defined earlier in the prisoner’s dilemma case. First of all, we immediately realize that always defecting is clearly not the smartest strategy, knowing that you will meet the other individual again in the future. Instead, consider this natural strategy, called Tit for Tat, which is never to be the first to defect, always imitate the other from his previous move and retaliate only when you have been betrayed. It turns out that this highly cooperative strategy can survive, even though initially it withstands the challenges of readily defecting strategies. And it can be stable against diminishing altogether.

In order for this Tit for Tat strategy to have a chance to work, a critical proportion of the individuals have to cooperate. Otherwise the readily defective strategies would simply destroy the cooperative ones and dominate the whole system. But once the number of individuals who adopt a Tit for Tat strategy exceeds a critical ratio in the population then it survives and reaches a stable ratio able to withstand any other strategy.

Axelrod’s theory is nice and easy to understand, but once again it prompts all sorts of other issues. How frequently the population is able to reach that critical level in the first place? On the other hand, what kind of a memory do individuals need in order to be able to execute a Tit for Tat strategy?

What do we make of it?

We could keep working on expanding these explanations and models, or at least the biologists should. But in any case, in order for any of these models to apply in what we see in nature we have to be demanding of the individuals who form the population. Every single time we come up with a new approach or an extended model it is difficult to explain many of the characteristics of altruistic behavior, even in idealized cases. Either there must be altruistic genes that can recognize the other altruistic genes carried in other individuals, or we all individuals have a well-developed memory that actually remembers all the moves that have been made by other individuals in the population, or one starts from an idealistic state in order to maintain the stability of the system without knowing how we are able to get there in the first place.

It seems that the smarter we get, the better our theories are developed, and the more flawless our models become, the more we realize that all the individuals in the great ecosystem of nature that show some kind of altruistic behavior must have a great deal of knowledge and power over the rest, they must have eyes that see many things about the whole picture and they must have an authority that has a great impact on others, on and on and on.

The way scientific prediction generally tends to approach matters is as follows: “do this and you’ll see that”. The discovery of the planet Neptune in 1846, one of the early successes of physics, still remaining fresh even today, is a particularly nice example: In the nineteenth century, by observing the trajectories of the planetary motion of Uranus, the most remote planet in the Solar system at that time, astronomers discovered that its trajectory was not exactly the way it should have been. Taking into account the gravitational action of nearby planets did not help either. By that time, however, Newtonian mechanics had already gained enough authority so as not to be immediately abandoned. To circumvent the problem, instead of abandoning gravity altogether, scientists proposed that there must be a celestial body, hitherto unseen, that was disturbing the trajectory. After elaborate calculations were made, the astronomers were told to direct their telescopes at a specific time at a specific region of the sky and they would see a shiny dot. They did as instructed, and the dot was present exactly as calculated. Significantly, it does not matter who was actually sitting by the telescope. Under the same conditions, a famous scientist or a lay person should be able to see the same. This is an example of what is called “objective reality,” the shining star in this case. In general, objective reality may be defined as anything which exists independent of the observer, implying that if something objectively real is encountered by observer 1, then reproducing the conditions of the first experiment, observer 2 should see it as well.

“Objective reality” is the scope of science and the science is unbelievably successful when dealing with it. The agreement between theory and experiment in the case of the so-called “anomalous magnetic moment of the electron,” for instance, is to the order of 1 to 100,000,000,000. To give a sense of this truly mind-blowing degree of precision, one can say that it is like sending a rocket to the Moon and predicting its landing coordinates up to the nearest millimeter.

This shows us the might of science, but what makes science so effective also sets the limits for the range of its applicability. The key factor for the conventional scientific method is the reproducibility or the regularity of the event. Whatever does not fit this condition finds itself outside the circle of phenomena that are conventionally called “scientific.” For example, ghosts are not scientific, although there are many more people who claim to have seen them than there are those who routinely observe, for example, the fractional quantum Hall effect, which is absolutely real, despite its exoticism. The number does not matter in this case. There is a certain prescription of how the quantum Hall effect should be observed, whereas there is no such thing for spiritual contacts. One has to be careful to distinguish non-scientific phenomena from non-existent phenomena. The concept of reality and existence itself is a subtle question and has traditionally been a philosophical battlefield that is heavily dependent on definitions; in any case, whatever the truth is, the fact that there is no 100% guaranteed technique of, for instance, summoning the spirit of the long-deceased Genghis Khan does not present sufficient evidence to rule out its possibility.

To illustrate what has been said up to this point, and to look on the subject from a different perspective, the following story might be of some use.

The pond story

Imagine Mr. Smith is sitting by the pond. To study its content our researcher has a sieve that he can use to scoop the water and see what is left inside. After some time he is certain that there is ooze in the pond. Later that evening, by the fireplace, he tells his wife, Mrs. Smith, about what he’d seen during the day at the pond. On the next day, to make sure her husband had actually spent his day the way he said he had, she takes the sieve and goes to the pond. With the first scoop, she gets some ooze and on the evening of the second day the ooze is elevated to the level of an objective reality. It is unimportant who is scooping the water, Mr. or Mrs. Smith. From now on whenever they want to watch the ooze, they just scoop the water with the sieve, and they are guaranteed to get some. In addition to this important discovery, Mrs. Smith also tells Mr. Smith about some rapidly moving shiny longish objects that she saw from time to time in the muddy waters of the pond. However, none of these, unfortunately, have ever made their way into the colander. That evening Mr. Smith has trouble believing the confusing story of his wife, as she doesn’t have much evidence to support it. At the end of the day, the self-confident ooze pioneer has convinced the excessively susceptible scooper that she has had a hard day, and shiny objects won’t bother her anymore. And so they lived a long and happy life. Actually long after, Mr. and Mrs. Smith Jr. discovered that the silver objects also existed objectively, for that, however, a sieve had to be upgraded to a net. These are called fish. But that’s a whole other story.

The moral is obvious: the fish here symbolizes some phenomena that are unobservable with the available accessible technology, but which do actually exist in the pond, which represents the universe; it is solely the problem of the master of the colander, who is of course identified with a researcher, that his gear is not advanced enough. At this point, one should avoid falling into another extremity, that is, denying science altogether, for Mr. Smith was right to a certain extent. At that point the fish, or to be more precise, a fish dinner which would be the manifestation of the fish, was not real for him at all. And this being so there wasn’t much point in talking about it. He preferred to talk constructively of what he could do at anytime with, to some extent, guaranteed success, that is, of what was real for him. Though, again, one should keep in mind that they should not be so opinionated to deny the existence of anything they cannot trap or measure. These ideas should always be kept in mind when thinking about the compatibility of metaphysics with the conventional, quantifiable material world.

The fact that science is based on positive knowledge is very inconvenient for proving the absence of something as opposed to proving the existence of it. To perform the latter involves locating the object or giving a concrete example of it. On the contrary, to prove the absence of something, the whole range of possibilities must be exposed. The task grows ever more difficult as the generality of the statement grows, ultimately becoming impossible.

While thinking of the universe and the role of science which is so successful in understanding it, one should be aware of the fact that science deals with the idealized models of phenomena, describing them with a certain degree of success, not the phenomena themselves. A good model has a small error, poor ones have greater error. A nice example illustrating this matter is the electrical model of a mechanical oscillator. For those who are not familiar with electronics, we can say that the capacitor and the coil act as a spring and the mass, respectively. The charge is to be associated with the expansion of the spring, the electrical current with the velocity of the block.

In the first approximation everything goes well: if we want to determine what the position of the block of the oscillator would be after 3 seconds, instead of oscillating the whole system, we can build a model circuit with the capacitance and inductance adjusted properly, and measure the charge accumulated on the capacitor after 3 seconds. However, once we begin to demand higher precision, we begin to encounter one problem after another. The capacitor might be leaking, hence it no longer ideally represents the spring; the coil has resistance and so on. Even if we somehow get ideal electronics, the oscillator has some air drag, and the spring does not ideally follow Hook’s law) [Hook’s law states that the force the spring produces is directly proportional to the degree it was stretched or compressed to]. Therefore, it is absolutely impossible to determine what the oscillator would do exactly without letting it run. However, there is no reason to fall into despair: generally we don’t need to know what it does exactly; depending on the particular case, a fairly good approximation is fine for most of the applications we might ever encounter.

This is how science works. No one has ever observed the “free bodies” moving on a “straight line with constant velocity” that are mentioned in Newton’s first law, the so-called “law of inertia.” What we actually do encounter are the almost free bodies, moving on an almost straight line, with almost constant velocity. But that doesn’t mean, of course, that Newton was wrong: as long as we don’t force his laws into the subatomic region where quantum physics dominates or try to use them nearby the black holes where Einstein’s general relativity takes over, they work unbelievably fine. The rockets we send using these very laws make it quite well to the Moon.

There is an interesting aphorism which is ascribed to Sir Arthur Eddington, a prominent British astronomer: “The law of inertia is true as long as we believe in it.” Newtonian mechanics states that “An object at rest will remain at rest unless acted upon by an external and unbalanced force. An object in motion will remain in motion unless acted upon by an external and unbalanced force.” However, since no one has ever seen bodies that are totally isolated from “an external and unbalanced force,” we just believe in this law. Now imagine that someone has nevertheless succeeded in shielding away all the external forces. Being given an initial velocity it is expected to maintain this; but what a disaster: the body doesn’t do so! What should be done in this case? One choice is to renounce Newton’s first law altogether, the other is to say “Hey, what if I did not eliminate the forces completely, what if there is some other force, unknown to me? Both ways are good, but in the latter one you save the ability to describe the world, whereas in the first you are left with nothing. We assume the law of inertia is true and the world becomes describable. Actually, this is what one has to do to understand anything. You have to begin somewhere. State an axiom and assume it is true. Infinite skepticism just doesn’t work. “Cogito ergo sum” was Descartes’ axiom which he had to accept to begin with.

This being so, modern science in the way it exists now does not provide the only model for the Universe; instead, it just realizes one of the possibilities. In the same way that one can use either electrical circuits or a special computer program to model a mechanical oscillator, there is more than one way to deal with the Universe. For example, how can we explain that the parameters of the planet Earth happened to meet the criteria needed to support organic life so ideally? One can say it just happened to be this way by coincidence and we are very lucky. We are very lucky, for instance, that the magnetic field of the Earth stops deadly solar winds, that the ozone layer stops destructive ultraviolet radiation, that the atmosphere is the most transparent for radiation in the yellow-green part of the spectrum, which just miraculously happens to coincide with the intensity peak of the Sun spectrum, which, in turn is the spectrum part plants use for photosynthesis and that to which the human eye is the most sensitive, etc, etc, etc. And though the probability is ridiculously low, low enough to rule it out in normal practice, it is still not impossible, although it is extremely improbable. Or one can say it was God Almighty who created the planet this way so that we can live here. And if it was God Who created the Sun, the Earth, the human eye and the plants then this set of coincidences does not seem so improbable any more. Is there a way to find out which approach is the truth? As long as both are self-consistent internally and do not contradict physical observations, the answer is no. There is no way to choose one version over the other using pure logic alone. However, there is an empirical rule usually called “Occam’s Razor” which states that in case there is more than one explanation for some phenomenon, the one which is the simplest is the true one. Well, the Universe with God in it is the simplest, isn’t it? 

Janibek Alpishev is PhD candidate at Stanford University.

The earliest records belong to ancient China. In 1235 Sung Tz’u, a Chinese “death investigator,” wrote a book entitled The Washing Away of Wrongs (translated by McKnight, 1981) in which what was known in forensic science at that time was detailed. In this text, an actual forensic entomology case was recounted, with the best known historic case being given. A murder had been committed in a little village in China. A man had been hacked to death with a rice-harvesting sickle. Because the village was one where rice was grown, everyone possessed a sickle, which meant that there were therefore many suspects. A professor at UC Davis, Robert Kimsey, explains how the murderer was caught; “The local magistrate very cleverly lined up every one of the farmers with their sickles out in the field. He walked up and down the line and pointed to the man who had committed the murder. The evidence he used to identify this man as a murderer-who later confessed, by the way-was the fact that green bottle flies were attracted to this man’s sickle. And nobody else, of course, had green bottle flies on their sickle because the flies were only attracted to a surface that had blood on it. No matter how rigorously you cleaned your sickle, you would still have remnants which these flies would be able to detect.”

Since those times, forensic entomology has made great progress. The way insect evidence helps justice works through the successive colonization of a corpse by a predictable succession of arthropod species. Different types of insects start coming right after death occurs. Organic remains, like flesh, blood, waste material, bone marrow, and hairs all attract certain types of insects. Owing to the time difference between the decaying body parts, the flies arrive at different times. They consume the parts that are nutritious for them and leave the body for another group.

As a manifestation of the divine name Quddus (the All-Holy), dead bodies decompose and nature is kept clean. Thus, the process started by microorganisms is made faster by the insects. Blow flies are among the first group of workers in this respect, whereas the dermestids, for instance, do their duty in the later stages of decomposition. The larvae of dermestids are not found before the body dry outs. The larvae and adults feed on dry skin and hair, as well as other dry dead organic animal matter. Dermestids are a common pest in homes, as well as being undesirable in insect collections and taxidermists collections at museums.

The first month after death is the most effective time for the application of forensic entomology. When death takes place, the insects start to arrive within minutes. However, it should be noted that insect evidence does not always tell us about the exact time of death. But at least we can infer that death occurred at a time that is greater than the age of the larvae that are developed in the body. If we have sound knowledge about the life cycles of the relevant insects, we can make more accurate predictions.

Another thing entomology helps us find out is the location of a murder. Sometimes a victim is moved after a murder in order to get rid of important evidence. For instance, a victim can be taken to a mountainous area after being killed in a town at low altitude. Entomologists can tell you about the habitat of the insects found on the body and give one a good idea about where the murder took place. Many insects live in very special geographical conditions. The altitude, temperature, and vegetation all affect the types of insects that live in the area. Furthermore, a meticulous entomological study will tell you whether the body has been, moved, the season in which it was killed, and whether the murder was committed indoors or outdoors.

Entomologists even help forensic experts with the cause of death. Particularly when the body has already decayed, it can be difficult for the police to determine the cause of death. In normal conditions, insects lay their eggs in certain parts of a body. If there are open wounds however, they will also lay their eggs there. So, if any eggs are found in unusual spots they indicate a probable wound.

When a murder or suicide is suspected to have resulted due to poisoning and if the body is decomposed, toxicological analyses that are made on the insects or the larvae taken from the body can help.

Bergeret (1855), who resided near Paris was the first westerner to use insects as forensic indicators. The body of a baby was found behind the plaster mantle in a house, and an investigation was begun. Bergeret determined that the assemblage of insects associated with the corpse pointed to a state of decay that dated back several years; consequently, the question of guilt was thrown upon the earlier occupants of the house, and not upon the current ones.

Case histories have documented the utility of medicocriminal entomology and point out the unique contributions that this field of science has made. Nuorteva et al. (1967, 1974) presented a series of cases from Finland in which blow flies were used as indicators for indoor as well as outdoor death scenes, and where the immature (larval) or adult stages were used for identification. Leclercq (1969) provided a typical case scenario and outlined how insect data were used to corroborate information obtained from other sources. Bernard Greenberg (1985) outlined several cases, including a description of how laboratory fly-rearing data were used to calculate the number of accumulated degree hours (ADH) required for certain blow fly species to develop, and how such data were applied to the solution of a murder case in Illinois. In another recent case, Greenberg described how the absence of insects in a seemingly straightforward death scene led to a killer’s confession. A window next to the victim had been open when the body was found, thus giving the impression that the murderer had forced entry into the room the night before. However, the air conditioned room was cool, even though it was very hot outdoors. In reality, the killer was known to the victim, had a key, and had returned to “set the stage,” opening the window just prior to feigning discovery of the corpse. The insects thus had insufficient time to colonize the body as the window had been closed prior to the return of the killer. When confronted by this biological reality as pointed out by medicocriminal entomology, the killer confessed.

A Hungarian ferry skipper had been condemned to life imprisonment for the murder of a postmaster, whose stabbed body had been found one evening in September on the ferry. The ferry skipper had arrived at 18:00 that day, and the body of the murdered postmaster had been found some hours later. The autopsy was performed the next day at 16:00. Masses of yellowish fly eggs and numerous newly hatched larvae of 1 to 2 mm in length were present, and the findings were recorded in the autopsy report. No attention was paid to this observation at the trial, however. On assumed evidence, the ferry skipper was condemned to life imprisonment in spite of his swearing that he was innocent. Eight years later the case was reopened. At the new trial, Dr. Mihalyi pointed out that no sarcophagous flies are active in Hungary after 18:00 in the month of September. He also recalled some of his experiments indicating that, at a temperature of 26 degrees Celsius, the yellowish eggs of Lucilia caesar (L.) hatch after 13 hours, those of L. sericata (Meigen) hatch after 10-11 hours, and those of Phormia terranovae Robineau-Desvoidy 14-16 hours after oviposition. These data, when applied to the case of the ferry skipper, led to the conclusion that it was not possible for the eggs to have hatched if they had been laid during the day the autopsy was performed, and that they must have been laid during the previous day before 18:00, since the flies are not active after this time. Dr. Mihalyi’s data on oviposition was verified and, on the basis of this and other evidence, the ferry skipper was released from prison.

Entomology, along with other sciences whisper in our ear that in “the Book of the Universe” there are different signs that lead us to the truth; they are there for us to use if we search for them and fulfill the requirement of causes. This is when the world will open its mysteries to us.

Reference

• http://www.ucdmag.ucdavis.edu/su99/Feature_Bugs.html
• http://www.research.missouri.edu/entomology/chapter1.html#history
• http://folk.uio.no/mostarke/forens_ent/casehistories/ferry_skipper.html
• The illustration is taken from the poster of the annual Insect Fear Film Festival at the University of Illinois, Feb. 2005.

My aim here is to describe the legal instruments under international laws and conventions, to see how far they do secure protection of individuals’ rights, and to compare them with corresponding Islamic notions which have been around for 14 centuries. I will focus mainly on the rights and protection available in Europe. Finally, I will compare the different perspectives of an Islamic approach and of modern international law on protecting individuals’ rights from abuse’ by police authorities and agencies. Some of the legal instruments mentioned are non-binding in character -they are nonetheless relevant in establishing the perspective of modern international law.

The Declaration on the Police affirms the necessity of rules of conduct for the police (Preamble para. 2) and condemns any police officers who have violated human rights as unfit to be police officers (Preamble para. 3). The commentary accompanying Article 2 of The Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1979) clarifies the phrase ‘human rights’ as meaning those rights protected by national and international law. Article 3 provides that: ‘Law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty.’ Article 5 prohibits the use of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Another instrument, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (adopted by the 7th Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders) recognizes that ‘law enforcement officials’ must include all officials, whether appointed or elected, who exercise police powers (specially powers of arrest and detention), and regardless of whether a country is under civil or military rule. It is obvious from all of these declarations that effective limitations must be placed on arbitrary, lawless behaviour by the police, and that appropriate rules and training procedures be adopted to ensure that police behave professionally and protect individual rights and liberties. They are more likely to do so if the police are themselves well-versed in those basic rights and liberties.

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) seeks to balance individual rights and the public interest. In their case law, the Commission and the Court have sought to define the public interest and indicate the limits which authorities such as the police should not transgress even when obliged to restrict the individual’s rights and liberties. ECHR Article 2 addresses the question of what circumstances justify the use of force, and how much, by law enforcement officials.

In the Stewart case, the Commission stated that the principle that ‘everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law’ obliges governments not merely to refrain from taking life intentionally but also to safeguard life. The Commission further stated that ‘the use of force must be shown to have been absolutely necessary’ and to be ‘reasonable’ in the circumstances. But what is ‘reasonable’? The Commission, though avoiding any statement on the meaning of ‘reasonable’ force in the Stewart case, made it clear that the standard is to be rigorous: an assessment must be made as to whether the interference with the right is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.

The Camargo and De Guerrero case is a clear cut instance of disproportionate force. The case was decided under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) by the Human Rights Committee. The Committee found no evidence that the action of the police was necessary in their own defence or that of others, nor that it was necessary in order to effect the arrest or prevent the escape of the persons concerned.

The doctrine of necessity (which can be likened to the concept of the ‘public interest’ in Islamic Law) is of central importance. It sees the restriction of individuals liberties as exceptional, as only justifiable in the wider interest: ‘If the necessity of uncovering the truth and of doing justice requires limiting some or all of these rights, an exception will be recognized to the principle but only if it does not go beyond the dictates of necessity’ (Bassiouni, 1982, p.100). Restriction of individual liberties is checked by restrictions on the authority of those investigating a particular case. Islamic Law does not set out a specific list of rights that may be restricted if necessary nor how far and under what conditions. It delegates the decision to those in government who may decide according to their perception of the public interest (Bassiouni, 1982, p.100).

The United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984 is binding on the signatories to it. The Convention provides that the signatories shall outlaw torture in their internal laws and explicitly prohibits using ‘higher orders’ or ‘exceptional circumstances’ as excuses for acts of torture (Article 2(2) and 2(3)). The Convention has two new elements. Firstly, it provides for extradition of alleged torturers for trial in any of the signatory states. Secondly, it provides for an international investigation in the state concerned of reports of alleged torture by a Committee against Torture to be established under the Convention. However, the fact that the signatories may withdraw from this latter provision is a weakness.

The Convention requires prohibition of torture to be part of the training of all personnel involved in law enforcement, detention, interrogation or general handling of prisoners or detainees (Article 10(1)). It also provides that the signatories shall ensure legal measures for protection and compensation of torture victims. Individuals are further protected against other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as defined under the Convention.

The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment is, by contrast, an instrument of a more preventive nature. It supplements the protection already given by Article 3 of the ECHR, by providing a non-judicial mechanism to investigate the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty in order to secure or reinforce the proper protection of their rights. A committee is established under the Convention for this purpose (Article 1).

Articles 3 and 5 of the ECHR impose particularly rigorous restrictions. Article 3 puts an absolute prohibition on torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by the police forces, terms defined in the judgement in the Ireland v UK case. Also, the conduct of the victim is not accepted as a justification for derogating from Article 3, however heinous it may be alleged to be.

Islamic Law explicitly outlaws torture, beating, and other cruel and inhumane treatment. The Prophet, upon him be peace, said: ‘God shall torture on the Day of Recompense those who inflict torture on people in this life’. The prohibition can be deduced also from practice of the early Caliphs and other Muslim rulers. Most jurists agree that no prisoner should be insulted, humiliated, beaten, tortured or chained, regardless of the offence. Islamic Law affirms that any confession obtained by coercion, torture or unlawful detention cannot be used to sustain a conviction. The Prophet set a practical example for treating the accused humanely and so enabling him to speak freely, when he addressed a defendant in these gentle words: ‘I do not think you stole. Did you?’

Article 5 of the ECHR, designed to protect individuals against arbitrary treatment, has generated a substantial body of case law. Anyone apprehending or arresting another person must respect due process of law. Not only compliance with national law, but also compliance with the principles of the Convention, as defined in the case law of the Commission and the Court, must be observed. Under Article 5(l), Suspicion must be reasonable to permit an arrest (Article 5(1)); the arrested persons must be told why they have been arrested (5(2)); detention should be of strictly fixed duration (5(3)) and, the detainee brought before a judge or other officer promptly and without having to ask. These provisions obviously have to do with police powers exercised under legal authority. In the Bozana case, the Court concluded that the expulsion of Bozana had turned into a ‘disguised extradition’ measure, designed to circumvent an appeal, and was therefore unlawful within the meaning of Article 5(1).

In the Brogan case, the Commission took the view that the struggle against terrorism may require some sacrifice of individual liberty for collective security ad so justify a flexible approach to the period of detention. The Court did not agree with this line of reasoning. It allowed that bringing to trial ‘promptly’ might be flexibly construed but insisted that there is a maximum period of detention compatible with the Convention. Tanca commented: ‘admitting longer police custody for those suspected of terrorist offences would alter the balance in favour of the police authorities, conferring on them more sweeping powers and the authority to decide when to use them’. The Convention also clearly requires that any officials with power to hold someone in remand must have judicial authority to do so. This position was further clarified in the Schiesser case in which the Court held that those officials must be independent of government and political parties.

Under Islamic Law, preventive detention is considered a serious restrictionof personal liberty and an exception to the general rule that no-one shall be deprived of their liberty except for the enforcement of a lawful sentence. Some Islamic jurists including Abu Yusuf opposed preventive detention on the grounds that neither the Prophet nor his immediate successors maintained a prison. One school of Islamic jurists, however, is of the opinion that it is permissible, under the proper conditions and with safeguards to balance the interests of the defendants and law enforcement authorities. (These jurists base their position on the teaching of the Prophet who detained a man accused of a crime.) But in any case, Islamic jurists were very cautious in its application and laid down very strict conditions as to duration, those authorized to impose detention and in what circumstances (Al-Saleh, 1982, pp.74-5).

Another police activity which infringes fundamental human rights is the search of private premises. Article 8 of the Convention guarantees the right to privacy of family life, of home and of correspondence. Any interference with this right must be ‘in accordance with the law’ and ‘necessary in a democratic society’. In an emergency, additional measures derogating from Article 8 may be taken, provided these are strictly required and respect the other procedural and substantive requirements of Article 15.

An individual’s home and private life are regarded as inviolable in Islamic Law, in accordance with the Qur’an (24.27-8) and the instruction of the Prophet, upon him be peace, in his ‘Farewell Sermon’. But that right is conditional on the absence of reasons requiring its restriction or suspension. It is significant that Islamic Law prohibits the search of person or home, and the invasion of privacy for the purpose of verifying the occurrence of a crime unless there is independent corroboration thereof. Any restriction of the right to privacy may not exceed the limits as determined by the purpose for which the exception is being permitted, namely to uncover the truth.

The Islamic perspective

The Qur’anic verse O mankind, worship your Lord who created you from a single soul … (4.1) is the ground rule which determines the Islamic perspective on this issue. It gives ‘Muslims a consciousness of their belonging to a broader, larger and all-encompassing universe, rather than to consider themselves a parochial subdivision of a greater part with which no intercourse is invited’. However, the development of international law remained totally alien to the Islamic Law of nations which preserved the ethical basis and moral source of its norms and statutes. In Europe, as a result of religious wars and distrust of the clergy, religion and morality were replaced by more pragmatic powers and necessities of state, though Christian concepts remained influential. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 was based on the concept of cuius regio, eius religio, which sealed the separation further. The Western view is that mechanical conformity to the pattern of conduct, prescribed by the law of the state or by international law, is sufficient to secure public order and universal peace. Western law aims ‘to proceed to influence from outside the inner condition of man and somehow it believes that institutions, social, economic, political etc., have a way of influencing the individual character… Islam, on the other hand, begins by inviting man to accept the paramountcy of the power of the Lord, his own servitude and bondage to the will of his Master who is the Sovereign Ruler of the universe; in the last resort it redeems him by prescribing upon him norms of behaviour by which he is to regulate his life’. The only real sanction for the moral law is, in the last resort, the authority of religion. Morality cannot be effective without religion. Morality tells us what is right and proper to do, while the law enforces those moral principles as have a direct bearing on the regulation of the individual vis A vis his fellow human beings. If the law is secular the enforcement of it can only be on the secular plane, whereas, if the law is religious, its enforcement takes note of deleterious consequences of criminal acts not only in this life but also in the life to come. International law may have come a considerable way towards urging the protection of individual human rights against abuse general. But the reality is that these instruments and mechanisms have not been successful on their own. Therefore, we tend to argue that any attempt or any solution on the protection of the individual against such abuses will only be successful, if there is a religious dimension to it. That is the function of the morality.

Sources

• AL-SALEH, Osman Abd-eI-Malek (1982) ‘The rights of the individual to personal security in Islam’. in Bassioni. M. C. The Islamic Criminal Justice System. Edited by Bassioni, M. C. London: Ocean. Publication, London.
• AWAD, A. M. (1982) ‘The rights of the accused under Islamic criminal procedure’, in The Islamic Criminal Justice System.
• BASSIOUNI, M. C. (1982) ’The rights of the accused under Islamic criminal procedure’, in The Islamic Criminal Justice System. Edited by Bassioni, M.C. London: Ocean. Publication, London.
• BASSIOUNI, M. C. (1982) ‘The Sources of Islamic Law and the Protection of Human Rights’ in The Islamic Criminal Justice System.
• BROHI, A. K. (1982) ‘The Nature of Islamic Law and the concept human rights’, in Human Rights in Islam, International Commission of Justice, Geneva, pp. 55-56.
• ICJ (1982) Human Rights in Islam, International Commission of Justice, Geneva.
• TANCA, A. (1990) “Human rights, terrorism and police custody: the Brogan case”, European Journal of International Law, 1, pp.269-77