On the basis of the omnipotence puzzle, one can reject the existence of God as an absolutely perfect, omnipotent and eternal being because the notion of such a being seems to be incoherent, thus it has no real referent. However, there are various theistic views that try to make sense of this puzzle by preserving omnipotence as an essential property of God. Let’s examine Aquinas’s and al-Ghazali’s views regarding omnipotence and see how an answer to such questions can be produced.

Aquinas

Aquinas was one of the most prominent figures of Christianity in the Middle Ages. He attempted to systematize the Christian faith within the framework of Aristotelian philosophy. His philosophy is known as Thomism and accepted as the official doctrine of the Catholic Church to this day. One of the central issues Aquinas dealt with was God’s nature and His omnipotence. Let us examine his ideas on this.

According to Aquinas, hypothetical cases such as God killing Himself or lying, imply contradictions in relation to God’s nature. God is eternal and truthful by nature. And in his terms, “anything that implies a contradiction does not fall within the power of God” (Aquinas, 1963, Q. 25, art. 3, p. 165). Contradictory cases are impossible; they could never happen. Since they are not genuine cases, divine power is not applicable to them. However, Aquinas did not carefully formulate the idea he proposed here. In expressing this intuition he used the modal verb “cannot” with the subject term “God” in most cases. Take into account the following of his remarks:

God cannot make yes and no true at the same time, not because of His lack of power, but because of the lack of possibility, such things are intrinsically impossible (Aquinas, 1952, I-18, 19).

Even though he did not think that the term “cannot” in the sentence above does not pose a limitation on divine power because the case in question is not a genuine case, the linguistic meaning of “cannot” implies that God’s power is applicable to such a case, and therefore He is unable to do it. Let’s continue with al-Ghazali’s view on omnipotence.

Al-Ghazali

Al-Ghazali can be regarded as one of the most influential Medieval theologians in the Islamic world. His criticisms directed to Avicenna’s or al-Farabi’s attempts to interpret Islam in terms of Aristotelian philosophy had a major influence on the formation of the Islamic world. He is usually considered to be a dogmatic theologian who attacked philosophy and prevented free thinking and intellectual progress in the Islamic world. However, if his criticisms are examined carefully, we see that his target was not the activity of philosophy but the false beliefs produced by certain philosophers. Avicenna and al-Farabi were critized by him on the grounds that their philosophies included some elements coming from Aristotelian philosophy, which is not accepted by Islam. It should be noted that his way of critizing them is not any less philosophical than his opponent’s way of arguing. He was certainly not dogmatic in rejecting them and engaged in philosophical activity in doing so. One of the most recurrent topics in his work was the omnipotence of God.

Like Aquinas, al-Ghazali excludes contradictions or impossibilities from the scope of divine power. That is to say, impossibilities are not objects of power. Let’s examine what he says exactly in his masterwork, Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers):

The impossible is not within the power [of being enacted]. The impossible consists in affirming a thing conjointly with denying it, affirming the more specific while denying the more general, or affirming two things while negating one [of them]. What does not reduce to this is not impossible, and what is not impossible is within [divine] power (al-Ghazali, 1997, 17th Discussion, 29th paragraph, 179).

However, al-Ghazali is more sensitive than Aquinas in expressing this idea. In his main works where he analyzes omnipotence, the Tahafut and al-Iqtisad, he never uses “cannot” as a modal verb in a sentence whose subject is God. I think this was a conscious decision, because the semantics or meaning of the term “can” or “cannot” includes the idea of ability or inability to do something, which is closely linked to the notion of power. The sentence “God cannot do x” presupposes that x is included in the extension to which divine power is applicable but God is unable to do it. To avoid this, al-Ghazali simply says “the impossible is not within divine power.” The idea assumed here by al-Ghazali is expressed by the notion of category mistakes in contemporary philosophy of language.

Category mistakes

When an expression systematically misleads us because of category confusion in representing a certain fact, then it is a “category mistake” (Ryle, 1949, 16). For example, referring to faculties, libraries, museums and scientific departments as being in the same category with universities is a category mistake. The university is not a member of the class of which the listed units are members of, but it is rather the way in which all of them are organized (Ryle, 1949, 16). We can give more examples. Predicating colors of numbers is another category mistake. For example, “Number 2 is yellow” is a sentence asserted as a result of category confusion. Numbers are not the things to which the color predicates apply. In other words, color-predicates have a certain range or extension of applicability, which excludes numbers. On the other hand, the properties of “being odd” or “being even” apply to numbers but not to material objects. To say that this chair is even is another category mistake.

So each predicate has a certain extension to which this predicate legitimately applies. Things or expressions that are not in the scope (extension) of a certain predicate lead to a category mistake if they are associated with this predicate. So the sentence “God cannot do x” includes a category mistake if x is a contradiction because contradictions are not within the scope of divine power.

As a result, the question of whether or not God can kill Himself can be answered in the following way by supporting al-Ghazali’s unnamed intuition of category mistakes: this question presupposes that divine power is applicable to such a case, but this is a category mistake. Because of that, this is an illegitimate question that can be answered neither by “yes” nor by “no.” It is like the following question: How many times did you kick your dog? Assume that you don’t have a dog. If you do not have a dog, then there is no point in asking the number of times you kicked the dog that you do not even have. Considering the reality, it is an absurd question.

The notion of Omnipotence

An answer formulated in this way, in response to the puzzle, treats the notion of power as a crucial element in understanding the relation between God and the universe. It also allows us to understand the meaning of omnipotence clearly. An omnipotent agent is an agent who can perform everything that falls under the scope of the notion of divine power. An omnipotent agent cannot be characterized as a being that is able to do anything unqualifiedly. Cases that do not fall under the scope of power are not legitimate cases to which divine power is applicable. The classical criticism of this view is that God is limited by proposing such a scope of limitation. However, what is limited is not an agent, namely God, but a notion, which is divine power. Contradictions are used in determining the notion of divine power. So they put a limitation on the definition or meaning of “divine power,” rather than on the agent who is powerful. By excluding these contradictions from the scope of power and including things that are within this scope, the notion is defined. In this sense, defining is putting limitations on the notion of power. God conceptualized in this way has infinite power, i.e. He can create everything that falls under the scope of power. Otherwise, allowing such contradictions within the scope of divine power will undermine of the very concept of God. Then, for instance, we should have said that God can kill Himself. If God can kill Himself, then He could not be accepted as God anymore because God is essentially eternal by definition. In order to have an intelligible idea of God, the scope of divine power must exclude such absurdities.

Conclusion

As it is shown in the sample case of omnipotence, the apparently theological problem has logical and linguistic aspects. This puzzle can be handled by some clarification of the meanings of crucial terms regarding this puzzle. Both Aquinas and al-Ghazali were aware of this aspect of the problem even though they did not clearly express the intuition, which we call “category mistakes,” in contemporary philosophy of language. Much confusion is encountered in daily life, especially in the topic of religion, that stems from the misuse of language. If we want to get rid of such confusion and be clear in our thinking, then we should seriously ponder on the use of language.

Bibliography

• Al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid. Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers). Michael E. Marmura (tr.), Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1997.
• Al-Iqtisad fi al-Itiqad. Ibrahim Agah Cubukcu and Huseyin Atay (ed.s), Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Ilahiyat Fakultesi Yayinlari, 1962.
• Aquinas, Thomas. On the Power of God (Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei). Lawrence Shapcote. Trans. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1952.
• Summa Theologiae. Latin text and English Translation. T. Gilby. (ed). 60 vols. London, 1963.
• Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. London: Taylor and Francis Books. 1949.

Abu Hamid al-Ghazali was born in the city of Tus, northern Persia (Iran), in the year 450t-i/1058.

His father prayed that his two Sons would become great scholars. Al-Ghazali became ‘the most scholarly person of his generation and the imam of his time’ and his brother Ahmed ‘an awe-inspiring preacher’ (A1-Sabki, p.94). Through them, their father’s prayers were answered.

Al-Ghazali studied in Jurjan and Naisapur and became the head of the Nizamiya school in Baghdad, where he was involved in the political and religious issues of his time. He gave up his position of influence to take up devotional retreat in Damascus. From this important period of his life came the masterpiece Ihya Ulum al-Deen, The Revivification of the Religious Sciences. This, along with his other distinguished works, Ayuhal Walad and Bidayatul Hidayah made a great contribution to the development of educational philosophy.

Al-Ghazali died in the town of his birth in 505H/1113.

Zakariya al-Ansari was born in Sunaika in the Egyptian province of Sharqiyya in 824H/1449. His teachers include the great scholar of hadith Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani (died 852n/1449) and the jurist Jalal al-Din al-Mahali (d. 871H/1466). He rose to the position of Qadi, a position he held for twenty years. He lived through the end of the Mamluk reign and saw Egypt conquered by the Turkish Sultan Salim I. (1517). Al-Sha’rani describing the twenty years he spent with al-Ansari, said that he was ‘never inattentive and never missed even a supererogatory prayer’. He quoted his sheikh as saying: ‘I do not want to accustom myself to laziness’. Al-Ansari continued in this state of vigilance over religious matters until his death at the age of one hundred.

He wrote several books on jurisprudence including Manhaj altullab and commentaries on a variety of early texts including Ibn Malik’s famous poem containing the rules of Arabic grammar.

The references in this article are taken from a short treatise entitled al lu’lu’ al-Nazim fi Rum al-ta’alum wa ta‘lim, which explains his view of the curriculum.

Education and Ideology

Educational ideology, in the words of Scrimshaw (1983) is ‘that system of beliefs which gives the general direction to the educational policies of those who hold those beliefs’. The educational philosophy of Islam develops from the beliefs found in the Qur’an and Sunna. In the early days of Islam, Muslims’ approach to these beliefs were straightforward and uncontroversial. There were no differences of opinion regarding the beliefs and practices of the Prophet, upon him be peace. His companions constituted clear examples of his educational ideology wherever they settled. However, as Islam spread, it faced new problems and had to deal with differing ideologies and belief systems that had crept into the body of the Muslim community. The need to determine educational practice became increasingly important. The first books collecting the beliefs and practices that ‘gave the general direction of education’ were written in the third century. These included Adab al-Mu’alimeen by Muhammad bin Sahnun.

Educational beliefs address four main questions. They are:

• How is knowledge defined and how should it be classified?
• What is the role of the teacher?
• What is the role of the learner?
• What happens when learning takes place?

The definition and classification of knowledge

Al-Ghazali’s division of knowledge has sometimes been misunderstood. He has been accused of advocating a secular view of the curriculum. This misunderstanding has been compounded by the translation of his two main classifications of knowledge as ‘sacred and ‘profane’². A more accurate translation would be ‘revealed’ and ‘non-revealed’ knowledge. The first category covers ‘that which came from the prophets’. The second category includes ‘all knowledge obtained through the use of the intellect, experimentation or hearing’.

A full understanding of these two categories can only be understood by examining the relationship of the temporal world and the everlasting Hereafter. The two are intrinsically connected. Knowledge of the Hereafter is gained by examining the temporal world. The temporal world gives us signs and proofs of the existence of a Greater Existence and leads us to worship Him. Knowledge of the Hereafter teaches us how to live our temporal lives. All knowledge belongs to God. The two categories differ only in their means of acquisition.

Al-Ghazali also applies legalistic criteria. Knowledge may be fard, compulsory, or not. The fard knowledge is further divided into fard alayn, compulsory on every individual and fard al-kifaya, a compulsion on the community at large. The latter is fulfilled if at least one person learns it.

An example is the studying of medicine. –

Revealed knowledge may be of the fard al-ayn category i.e. the basic beliefs or fard al-kifaya i.e. principles of jurisprudence.

Non-revealed knowledge falls into three categories. The first is fard al-kifaya which therefore ranks among some of the types of revealed knowledge. These are connected to what al -Ghazali calls the four fundamental activities, without which human activities, including spiritual affairs, cannot be organized. They are –

i. agriculture

ii. cloth manufacture

iii. building

iv. politics.

Any activity auxiliary or subsidiary to any of the above is also fard-al kifaya. Iron production is auxiliary to agriculture. Milling and bread making is subsidiary to it. Both are compulsions on the community.

Compulsions fall on the individual or society according to specific situations. For example, one who enters Islam is not expected to know about fasting until the month of fasting arrives. Likewise, the compulsions on a community depend on how the society has developed with regards the four fundamental activities.

Another category is ‘praiseworthy’, which is not compulsory, knowledge. An example is the study of the intricacies of medicine or arithmetic. A basic understanding is supplementary to the fundamentals mentioned above and is therefore compulsory, but this is not true of its intricacies and detailed theories.

The other two categories are ‘blameworthy’ knowledge which includes magic and ‘neutral’ knowledge which includes poetry.

Al-Ansari’s classification of knowledge

Al-Ansari uses a slightly different classification. He identifies four categories.

1. Shariah studies

2. Literary studies

3. Studies based on exercise

4. Intellectual studies

The first category is similar to al Ghazali’s ‘revealed knowledge’. He includes three areas. They are Fiqh (jurisprudence), Tafsir (exegesis) and Hadith (traditions of the Messenger).

The second category includes fourteen branches of language including etymology, grammar, the study of metaphors, rhyme and speech making. The variations of Qur’anic reading are part of this category.

The third category presents the most radical alternative to the approach found in ‘modern’ school systems. Among the skills and studies that are developed through exercise are tasawuf (Islamic mysticism), engineering, music, politics, character building and domestic sciences.

The intellectual studies include areas such as logic, the principles of jurisprudence, medicine, the study of time and astronomy.

Although it is unlikely that any school would want to return purely to the syllabus of al-Ghazali or al-Ansari, their approach can help us to identify priorities in schools. They can also help us to break away from what is becoming a uniformly Western approach to knowledge. Islam has contributed greatly to education and educational theory. By looking at great thinkers like al-Ghazali and al-Ansari, Muslims and non-Muslims alike can consider alternative approaches to syllabus organization.

In our next article we will examine the role of the teacher and the student.