Carbon atom, which composes nearly 0.2% of the earth’s crust, has a very special place among elements. All living beings are formed from carbon-based compounds. In addition, 94% percent of compounds—that is, more than 4 million—contain carbon atoms. Certain carbon compounds form nearly 18% of the matter in living beings. The rest is mostly water. These compounds are used as building blocks in cell formation. Only carbon has the ability of compounding with other elements in sufficient variety and complexities in order to carry out the main functions that life is based on. As carbon atoms easily form chains by making chemical bonds, no other element is given such a quality. These chains formed in a line can separate into branches and can connect to form rings. These rings are actually polygons formed by three, four, five, six, or more carbon atoms. Due to this quality, carbon is the element that forms the basis of many things from the foods we eat, to the clothes we wear, from the fuels we use, to the furniture we have.

The heat level that makes carbon compounds possible is between -20 and +120 0C. Carbon compounds begin freezing at -20 0C and they begin breaking at 120 0C. In space, where extreme heat and freezing cold exists, the only heat range that makes carbon compounds possible is found on earth and this is a very sensitive heat range. Temperatures in our neighboring planets give a better idea: as hot as 450 0C in Venus, and as cold as -53 0C in Mars. Under these temperatures, it is impossible for carbon element to form compounds and thus living beings. Therefore, the earth is the only planet created with the suitable conditions that make life possible.

Crystal structures of carbon atom

Particular repeating arrangement of atoms in three dimensional space to form a certain geometric shape is known as a crystal structure.

Different crystal structures of the same substance are named “allotrope.” Carbon has three different allotropes found in nature: amorphous carbon (coal), graphite, diamond. In addition to these, an artificially produced allotrope is fullerene.

Amorphous carbon (coal)

Amorphous structure is one without a definite crystal structure; that is, one where atoms take their places in free order. A mass of carbon atoms of amorphous structure is known as coal. After plants die, they undergo chemical transformation with the activities of microorganisms. If dead plants collect in a suitable wetland and are buried into the ground with a geological process, the carbon amount in their body increases and they begin transforming into coal. Types of coal are categorized according to the carbon percentage they contain. Geologically, this transformation process takes a period of 15 to 345 million years. Coal is one of the most commonly used forms of energy.

Graphite

In graphite, carbon atoms are found in a hexagonal crystal structure. These sheets, resembling the surface of a honeycomb, pile up and form graphite. As the sheets are not connected with firm bonds, they easily shift when some force is applied. This is why graphite is used for eliminating friction at machine industry. The black substance in pencils is graphite hardened by adding some clay. Graphite can resist very high temperatures. Therefore it is used within the steel industry and melting metals. In addition, it is a very good conductor of electricity. For this reason, the brushes of the electric engines in household machines such as a washing machine and a vacuum cleaner are made of graphite. In recent years, graphite has been used as heat shields of space shuttles.

Diamond

Diamond is the hardest natural substance we know. In spite of being a transparent substance and having no color of its own, it can be found in pastel colors such as yellow, brown, or even dim black, owing to being mixed with other minerals. Diamond is a perfect electric isolator and is the substance with highest heat conductivity. For this reason, it can be cut without being deformed. In diamond, carbon atoms are found in a pattern to form a cubical crystal structure. Extraordinary resistance of carbon-carbon bond and its hard and integrated structure prevents its reacting with other things around. It burns at a heat of 850 0C. In a piece of diamond, there can be other atoms that cause impurity and decrease the value. In good quality natural diamonds, there is only 1 alien atom versus 100,000 carbon atoms. In addition to jewelry, diamonds are widely used at industrial products such as drills, glass cutters and the like. 75-80 % of diamond production is used in this industry.

Formation of coal, graphite, or diamond from carbon

Carbon based organic compounds were buried underground as a result of movements by the earth’s crust millions of years ago. Physical and chemical changes occurred with those organic masses through heat and pressure. Gradually, water, carbon dioxide, oxygen, and—in the highest phases—hydrogen leaves these masses. This organic matter called “turba” (first transforms into lignite, then to sub bituminous coal, then to bituminous coal, and then to anthracite). If the conditions allow, it transforms into graphite. Coal is the first type of substance formed by carbon atoms on their journey to become diamond. As lower values of heat, pressure, and time suffice for coal formation, graphite requires much higher values. Diamond is formed in the mantle layer of the earth at about 150-200 depth. This valuable substance is later carried to the surface of the earth by volcanic rocks such as lamproite and kimberlite. In order for diamond to form, an atmospheric pressure of 50,000 atm, 2,400 0C of heat, and a period of 3 billion years are required. Without this immense pressure and long time, the substance to be formed by carbon will simply be graphite. It is possible to transform graphite into diamond artificially; however, according to calculations, a minimum pressure of 10,000 atm is required. In 1955, for the first time artificial diamond was obtained under 100,000 atm, 2,500 0C heat, and by using chrome as catalyzer. However, the pieces of diamond obtained were small and black, most of them did not classify as jewels. In another attempt made in 1962, graphite turned into diamond under 200,000 atm, 5,000 0C heat, without using any catalyzer.

The similarity between carbon and human beings

As carbon atoms’ properties change according to the crystal structure, people’s lifestyle and view of life depends on the community they live in and their position in that community. In order to become diamond, the highest level of its kind, a person needs to undergo hard conditions. If carbon atoms were to say, “this is more than we can bear, we prefer easier conditions,” then they can be nothing more than graphite. If the conditions for graphite are avoided as well, then one cannot go beyond the level of coal. Diamonds are kept in safes and worn in most important occasions and graphite has different kinds of practical use as an industrial material. As for coal, it ends up in fire. The situation of human beings in a way resembles carbon atoms. Every person is made of the same elements biologically. Their value will naturally be different, according to the processes they underwent and the behaviors they presented. Some show patience in the face of misfortune, put their sincere trust in God, and become the diamonds of humanity. Some others, whom we can compare to graphite, attain a desirable level even if they cannot become diamonds. Those who choose to assume the lowliest form are likely to face a similar fate with the coal.

References

• H. W. Kroto, J. R. Heath, S. C. O’Brien, R. F. Curl ve R. E. Smalley. 1985. “C60: Buckminsterfullerene.” Nature 318. DOI:10.1038/318162a0.
• L. Vlasov, D. Trifonov. 2005. 107 Stories about Chemistry, TUBÝTAK., Ankara.

Qur’anic Perspective

At this point it would be interesting to look at what Ali Unal has to say as to why no past civilization could resist decadence and time’s corrosive power. His approach refers more to the individual and free will, rather than visible causes:1

. . . [C]ontrary to the fatalism of all other philosophies, including even Ibn Khaldun’s, the Qur’an stresses the individual’s free choice and moral conduct. Although the Divine Will, as emphasized in the Qur’an, could be regarded in some respects as the counterpart of Hegel’s Geist or as other philosophies’ absolute and irresistible laws of history, the Qur’an never denies human free will

. . . . Ibn Khaldun, Toynbee, Spengler, and other philosophers of history formed a mistaken conception of history because they did not try to discover the real dynamics of historical movements. Rather, they sought to explain the apparent causes behind a civilization’s establishment, flourishing, and decay. Whoever looks to the past will arrive at the same conclusions. But just because no community has remained at its peak this does not mean that this is an inevitable end or a determinist grip on the fate of each nation. Past civilizations collapsed because they did not heed the warnings of what had happened to earlier peoples. Accepting historical determinism causes us to nullify free will and consider the warnings and advice found in the Divine Scriptures and social sciences as useless and absurd.

This is strongly confirmed by the Qur’an in the following verses:

. . . surely God does not change the condition of a people until they change their own condition. (Rad 13:11)

. . . God never changes the grace He has bestowed on any people until they first change that which is in their hearts. (Anfal 8:53)

Theories concerning the collapse of civilizations

There are many theories concerning the collapse of civilizations, but of course, if a theory does not conform to reality, it is worth nothing. In this article, I will first give a brief account of widely held beliefs about the collapse of civilizations, explain the weaknesses of these theories, and then give a rationale that I believe better explains the historical data we have. As for most social problems, we will perhaps never know the truth about why societies collapse. However, the stakes at hand are so high that we must make every effort to understand, and to an extent, solve this problem.

The most common explanation for such collapses is some insurmountable natural disaster, like an epidemic, hurricane, drought, or earthquake that leads to the demise of a civilization by killing the population and crippling the economy. Widely-cited examples are the eruption of the volcano in Thera that preceded the collapse of the Minoan civilization, the malaria epidemic in the Roman Empire or earthquakes in Mesoamerican societies. These arguments, which are very appealing to our human nature, that desires simple explanations for all questions, are in fact very unsound. Societies constantly experience such disasters, yet survive them. The potato blight in Ireland in 1845 halved the island’s population but there was no cease of sociopolitical complexity as a result of the disaster. It is strange to think that the Roman Empire, which survived many disasters before, including the eruption of Pompei in AD 79, fell to malaria. We should consider that complex civilizations are designed to absorb such disasters, and they do. Just recalling the constant earthquakes in Japan added to the loss of a world war with two nuclear bombs exploding in the heart of two large cities will sufficiently prove this notion. Japanese civilization did not collapse. On the contrary, it is one of the strongest economies in today’s international arena. It is peculiar then that some civilizations are no longer able to fight such disasters. However, an act of God can certainly collectively destroy any civilization, as it did in the past like Sodom and Gomorrah. This is clearly narrated in the divine scriptures.

The other common explanations for such collapses are intruders and competition with other civilizations. The barbarian tribes, which brought the end of Rome in the fifth century, and the Mongolians that invaded Baghdad in the thirteenth century are clear examples of the intruder argument. This argument suffers from the realization that civilizations are attacked by outsiders throughout their existence, yet for some reason they cannot defend themselves near the time of their collapse. Competition with other societies however, is in principle expected to lead to growth and expansion instead of collapse. There is no end to the examples from this category too, like the competition of the Ottoman Empire with Persia, which indirectly weakened its western front. But the competition argument is both intuitively confusing and it fails to account for major cases, like the fall of the Roman Empire.

Another widely held belief about such collapses is that at a certain point in the life of a civilization a resource is depleted and the civilization that depends on this resource is prone to collapse. The Romans and the Ottomans both depended on military expansion for their economy, and when the relatively weak nations around them were engulfed or when they were barred from further expansion by geographical limitations, such as seas or large mountains, they were no longer able to use this resource. There seems to be some truth and lessons in this argument. To the uninformed, it is a very curious fact that the cradle of civilization was Mesopotamia, where modern day Iraq is. How is it possible that the superpowers of that era, the Sumerians (~3000 BC) and the Babylonians (~1000 BC) chose to live in these deserts? How is it possible that they irrigated the land, raised armies, and built world wonders in these sand dunes? These questions actually are easily answered when we realize that Mesopotamia was not a dessert in that era after all. It is now a generally accepted theory that this place had a fragile ecosystem, which was destroyed after thousands of years of environmental pressure. The potential for these lands to accommodate great civilizations was lost after this fragile ecosystem was slowly destroyed by its inhabitants.

However, the argument of resource depletion inherently asserts that the elite of a civilization facing resource depletion passively waits for the predictable demise. I will argue below that this case, although strange, is true. Another difficulty of the resource depletion argument is that in some instances of collapse resources were never depleted. The fertile lands of Mesopotamia still remained green until later than 1000 AD, while many civilizations experienced collapses. The Romans, who used irrigation as a resource, kept farming till the very end. Finally, one may wonder why societies aim at possessing a higher amount of resources all the time. Population increase is only a partial answer to this question. We can easily imagine a society whose population stays the same; it is not a far-fetched hypothesis that this society will naturally also try to increase its resources to fend off a variety of calamities it may experience, such as intruders and catastrophes. I believe herein lies an interesting rationale that brings together the mentioned theories that are flawed. To understand this, we first have to appreciate a law in economics, called the “law of diminishing returns.”

It is very rare in economics and in general social sciences that some series of observations can be identified as a “law.” However, the “law of diminishing returns,” first put forward in 1965 by Ester Boserup, is so comprehensive in its nature and explains such a variety of trends that it is now universally accepted. It goes: The return for an investment in a particular activity is great at the beginning, and then it gradually decreases. At a point, further investment brings no further benefits. At this point, the facility (a person, a group, a society, a factory) can no longer increase its returns, however much they would invest in that activity.

A simple example will clarify the law. Suppose we have a piece of land that we want to use for irrigation. In the beginning, we would just disperse seeds and wait for the crops to grow. Notice that our investment is minimal (say 1 unit of investment), and we get some food for our investment (again define this to be 1 unit of return). Then, if we want to increase the amount of crops we have, we may dig some canals for watering. It is straightforward to recognize that the canal digging is a lot harder than just dispersing seeds (say 5 times harder). However, it is again straightforward to recognize that although now we make 6 times more investment, we probably will not get 6 times the crop. Nevertheless, we want to maximize our return, so we still dig the canals. The next step would be to use motorized vehicles, which is maybe a 10 times increase in investment, but everybody will surely accept that it is not possible to get a crop that is 16 times greater than our original from the same plot of land. (Readers who may object that once the investments of canals and vehicles are made they will provide constant returns are reminded of the maintenance costs of these investments.) A further increase in returns may require genetically engineered crops that will require years of expensive research (more investment). The return per investment will always decrease for a certain type of activity, in this case irrigation.

This law is everywhere in life: If one week of studying suffices a result of 80 on one exam, in order to get 90, you need to study two more weeks. Most healthy people can run 100m in 20 seconds; to run it in 10 seconds you need years of exercising. Depending on one’s abilities (which determine an individual’s possible investment) these may even be impossible for many people. A vivid example is the heating problem in England during the nineteenth century. Heating, which was primarily carried out by burning wood from forests, with the increase in population had to be switched over to the burning of coal. The mining and distribution of coal, which is much more difficult than simply getting some wood from a nearby forest, was made even more difficult when the easily mined surface coal was rapidly depleted and deeper tunnels with lighting and airing problems had to be developed. It is intuitive why this law is in effect: Obviously, always, the easier solutions are adapted first, then the harder ones. Mining coal when you have easily available and plentiful wood is not reasonable. Consequently, we have a decline for our returns per investment.

The resources that civilizations use are no exception. A civilization that uses irrigation as a resource is bound to be limited by a certain level of return. Resource does not have to be depleted; it just cannot produce a return more than at a certain level. Another civilization that is dependent on taxation, mercenary or military expansion can achieve no more return after a certain level, no matter what adjustments it makes to its existing policy. Having said this, we can understand why a civilization that depends on a certain type of energy or resource cannot expand its influence beyond a certain level. Moreover, when energy becomes scarce, the civilization can become less agile in terms of trying new resources and new ways to produce returns, since agility and innovation mostly depend on using some of the surplus resources on strategies that will most probably yield no returns. Hence the rise of large architectural structures and many inefficient military operations are carried out during the ascent of a young civilization. These activities, which are easily buffered by the large returns that come from initial investment on the main resource of a civilization become impossibly costly later when the returns from the same investment is declining.

One last piece of the puzzle completes the rationale as to why civilizations collapse, and this piece is an easily accepted assumption: A civilization is like a dinosaur. It is large and strong, but it is adapted to the conditions into which it was born. The conditions change, however, the dinosaur cannot change its behavior. It helplessly tries to maximize the returns for the type of resource that it is adapted to use, and after a point, it simply cannot, thanks to the universal and unforgiving law of diminishing returns. At this point, another civilization, that primarily uses another superior resource, will have larger returns, build a larger army to invade the former civilization, build larger ships to cut off the trade routes, and produce goods to cripple its economy… This is just a matter of time, and it is unavoidable (see Figure 1b). The strength of the civilization in its golden age is now its weakness. In such a weakness, since there is no extra resource to fight new problems-all resource is either used up by the population, or goes toward defense costs-even a natural disaster can bring an end to a civilization that once seemed to be indestructible.

The Ottoman Empire’s strength in its rise was its perfect hierarchical organization which led to the accumulation of all power under the Sultan. Its main resource was military expansion and taxation of trade. These adaptations, which were ideal for the time between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, led to one of the most powerful empires that have ever reigned. However, by the sixteenth century, these strategies had become burdens: Due to the strong hierarchy, an intelligentsia that supported science and art as in the West could never develop. Military expansion had to stop. Taxation could no longer work since the Mediterranean Sea was no longer used for trade. The strategies were not abandoned though, instead, more investments were made in order to increase the returns, which as we saw above is a nonviable alternative. Eventually, other civilizations that used better resources brought about the end of the Empire. A similar order of events can be observed for other civilizations that collapsed. The great Arab historian Ibn Khaldun of the fourteenth century likens the lives of civilizations to the natural lifespan of individuals. They are born, they grow old, and they die. In my view, a civilization does not die because it gets old; it dies because it cannot compete with a stronger civilization.

The natural question to ask is if our current civilization will collapse. From the analysis above, we can conclude that there are two reasons for the collapse of a civilization: 1) Dependence on a certain type of investment and failing to adapt to the new conditions. 2) The invention by another competitor civilization of a new type of investment with higher returns. In today’s world, both of these reasons are in some ways different than those that existed in the past. First, with the advancement of science, the current civilizations are flexible in the resources they utilize, the options are constantly evaluated, the heating in United Kingdom does not collapse when wood is depleted; instead, coal, then gas, then nuclear power is used. The return for the investment made for some utility is similar to the curve shown in Figure 1c: whenever the return for a type of investment declines, we can shift to the next resource. Second, by the immense advancement in information processing and communication, the whole world is aware of the types of investments other societies are using, and a leading civilization that follows the developments in other countries is very unlikely to be threatened by a sudden development in a rival civilization. Third, because of progress in international trade, the old sense that any other civilization is an enemy has lost its significance.

Notwithstanding these reasons, only a few decades ago, at the height of the cold war, we witnessed the possibility of the immediate collapse of our civilization. Global warming and the depletion of petrol reserves were only two of the many alarming cues that we may have turned to declining returns for our investment curve. It is imperative to remember again that the stakes are very high. The next civilization to fall may bring about the fall of the human species.

Notes

1. Tainter, J. (1988). The Collapse of Complex Societies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1988.
2. Grigg D. Ester Boserup’s theory of agrarian change: a critical review. Prog Hum Geogr. 1979; 3 (1): 64-84.
3. Unal, Ali, Islam Addresses Contemporary Issues, Kaynak, Izmir:1998, p. 142.

Enviromnental damage ramains a growing concern. Despite rigorous energy efficiency programs and research and development (R&D) efforts on cleaner energy technologies in most developed countries, no developing country views these as priorities. And they have a case: Developed countries, which enjoyed high economic growth for decades by ignoring the environmental consequences, are hindering developing countries’ economic growth. On the other hand, representatives from developed countries say that we are all in the same boat and will sink together if developing countries do not pay attention to environmental consequences.

In December 1997, world leaders gathered in Kyoto to address the problem of global warming and to decide which countries should cut emissions and to what extent. Not surprisingly, developing countries objected to any restriction that might limit their economic growth. Such discussions will become more intense in the aftermath of the Kyoto Protocol.

This article will not address the issue of environmental reparations. Rather, it will discuss the energy markets’ current situation and short-term future trends.

Basic Properties of the Energy Systems

Present-day energy systems have several basic characteristics. All policy makers dealing with energy systems should know these basics by heart.

First, energy systems develop slowly because they require significant capital and infrastructure that can be replaced only gradually. There are two important consequences resulting from this fact:

•Intense capital requirements are a strong barrier to average-sized firms. Thus, energy systems are seldom run by private enterprises. In most countries they are constructed and run by the state, and a separate government body deals with energy issues. Energy systems have been dominated by heavy regulations even in most market-oriented economies. The recent trend of deregulation is an exception rather than the norm.

•Even if a state realizes that current energy systems can be improved significantly (e.g., switching to other fuel types or deregulating the market), making changes to a huge, functioning infrastructure is a slow and painful process. It is relatively easy to make changes during the initial stages of an energy system. But as time passes, this becomes more difficult.

As in most cases, good planning is essential. A state must be very careful when building its energy systems, and should pay attention to underlying energy market trends. Important lessons can be learned from the long history of mistakes committed by developing countries. And if a developing country fails to keep up with recent trends, it may find itself trapped by its own hands in an inherently inefficient system for decades.

Second, energy systems are heavily reliant on fossil fuels. Historically, coal has been a prominent energy resource in most countries. Despite its widely acknowledged negative impact on human health and the environment, it still dominates energy systems in such developing countries as India and China. In most countries, oil is the primary energy source.

Oil was one of the most influential key factors of the twentieth century. Just by looking at the traffic on our teeming highways or the modern political landscape, we can understand how profoundly oil has changed the way we live and handle international politics. In the light of the oil crises of 1973 and 1980, the reverse-shock of 1986, and another crisis during the Gulf War of 1990, the need to diversify away from oil becomes abundantly clear.

Environmental concerns also support the case against oil. This is how natural gas, a slightly cleaner fossil fuel, gradually entered the picture. Given the current energy systems’ dependence on these fossil fuels and the fact that energy systems change slowly, oil, coal and natural gas will continue to be dominant for years.

Third, the driving force behind the dynamic of switching from one fuel type to another is economics. Fuel types with smaller unit costs survive in the long run. Oil, for example, now has the lowest unit cost (cost per unit of energy) in most regions of the world.1

Given this, cleaner fuel (e.g., solar energy) still have a long way to go before becoming economically viable. Why would you pay $5 for what you can get for $3? Countries that use non-oil energy resources do this for a number of reasons, such as they do not have natural resources and so transporting oil ends up costing more, or they have abundant natural energy resources of other types. But, in general, economics is the most important issue here.

Introducing New Fuels

What trajectory does the unit cost follow when a new fuel is introduced? Consider photovoltaic (PV) cells. The term photovoltaic refers to a family of technologies that convert light directly into electricity. PV technology is an appealing alternative-it is a renewable, environmentally benign, and domestically secure energy source. It is modular and can be scaled up to meet demand.2 However, unit cost is currently high compared to fossil fuels.

A new technology’s unit cost is believed to follow a learning (or experience) curve as a function of installed capacity. As shown in Figure 1, technologies may experience declining costs due to their increasing adoption by society. This decline may be attributed to several factors:

• Technology innovation and manufacturing improvements: Costs may decline due to a better understanding of the underlying science, progress in related fields, or via learning by doing as well as learning by using.

• Economies of scale: Unit cost is a function of total production. Products produced in large quantities have lower unit costs. Most new fuel types have high unit costs, and demand is too low to encourage large-scale production. It almost seems paradoxical. But there are ways to break this cycle. Regulations encouraging usage of new fuel types may be enforced, consumers who have priorities other than cost may be targeted to expand the current market, or the cost may drop low enough for the technology to become attractive even for low production levels.

In achieving economies of scale, consumer demand should he considered. A major concern for the end-use consumer is convenience. The value of oil would be much lower if gas stations were not located all over the country. The same issue applies to fuel cells and electric cars. They will not be as convenient as conventional cars until the proper infrastructure exists.

Since 1960s, cooperative investments by manufacturers and governments have resulted in the accumulation of experience within the solar industry and the subsequent cost reduction of PV systems. Significant cost reductions have occurred in both the PV modules that house the solar cells, and the ancillary components (known as balance-of-system). Between 1968 and 1998, the global cumulative installed capacity of PV modules doubled more than thirteen times, from 95 kW to 950 MW, while costs ($/Wp) were reduced by an average of 20.2% for each doubling.4

Trends for Different Fuel Types

After this overview of energy systems, lets look at the trends for specific fuel types. Figure 2 is taken from International Energy Outlook 2000 (IEO2000), an annual report published by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).5 It displays projections of energy usage by fuel type up to 2020. The highlights following the figure are summarized from the reports contents.

Coal: Carbon dioxide is a very effective greenhouse gas and contributes significantly to global warming. Since coal is the most carbon-intensive fuel, global climate change debates focus on reducing its use. Coal use also has significant public health consequences, due to particulate matter emissions. Historically, coal has been a major source of energy. Although it has lost market share to petroleum products, natural gas, and nuclear power in the last decades, it remains a key source of energy, especially for generating electricity. In the IEO2000 reference case, coals share of total energy consumption falls only slightly, from 24 percent in 1997 to 22 percent in 2020 (Figure 3). Its historical share is nearly maintained, because large increases in energy use are projected for developing Asian countries, where coal continues to dominate many national fuel markets. China and India are projected to account for 97 percent of the worlds total increase in coal use.

Oil: Oil use will grow in absolute terms, but even optimistic oil supply scenarios predict that its share in the fuel mix will decline gradually. Despite efforts to reduce reliance on Middle Eastern oil, as well as advances in technical capability, new oil reserves are not compensating for depleted ones. The experts estimates of vast oil reserves in the Caspian and Tarim basins proved to be somewhat high, and the latest probes have been partially disappointing. According to EIA estimates, the share of the Persian Culf supplies is likely to increase in the coming years. Economic theory says that prices rise as supply declines. Oil prices have been quite volatile and can be expected to remain so in the future, principally as the result of unforeseen political and social circumstances. Without attempting to predict any crisis, the IEO2000 forecast shows a gradual rise in world oil prices. Oil currently provides a larger share of world energy consumption than any other energy source and is expected to remain in that position throughout the forecast period. Its share of total energy consumption declines slightly, however, from 39 percent in 1997 to 38 percent in 2020, as countries in many parts of the world switch to natural gas and other fuels, particularly for electricity generation. World oil consumption is projected to increase by 1.9 percent annually over projection period. Most of the growth in oil use is projected for the transportation sector, where few alternatives are currently economical.

Natural Gas: Natural gas remains the fastest growing component of global energy consumption. Over the IEO2000 forecast period, its use is projected to more than double in the reference case, reaching 167 trillion cubic feet. The natural gas share of total energy consumption increases from 22 percent in 1997 to 29 percent in 2020. It also accounts for the largest increment in electricity generation. Combined-cycle gas turbine power plants offer some of the highest commercially available plant efficiencies, and natural gas is environmentally attractive because it emits less sulfur dioxide, carbon dioxide, and particulate matter than either oil or coal.

World Energy Consumption Shares Type: 1970-2000

In the industrialized world, natural gas consumption has the largest projected increase among the major fuels, increasingly becoming the choice for new power generation because of its environmental and economic advantages. Its incremental use in developing countries is expected to supply both power generation and other uses, such as town gas and fuel for industry. Despite concerns about the extent of natural gas reserves worldwide, current proven reserves suffice for this markets steady development without a substantial price increase.

Nuclear Power: The prospects for nuclear power are uncertain, despite a projected growth rate of 2.5 percent per year in total electricty demand through 2020. In the IEO2000 reference case, global nuclear capacity is projected to increase to 368 gigawatts in 2010 and then gradually fall to 303 gigawatts in 2020. Aggressive plans to expand nuclear capacity, mainly in Asia, lead to a near-term increase. However, plant retirements in America and other countries exceed total new additions worldwide, and produce a decline later in the forecast. The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis [IIASA] is one of the authorities on energy issues.

IIASA projections [which extend until 2100] hold a slightly pessimistic view of nuclear energy. Nuclear energy production has stagnated for several decades, and IIASA suggests that this will continue. Currently, nuclear energy is prominent in only a handful of countries. Not many nuclear plants are being built, and existing ones are being dismantled. With large up-front capital costs, plant safety, and recycling nuclear material after dismantling issues, this option is becoming less and less attractive. Public opposition, already strong in the US and Europe, is growing in Asia. Nuclear safety issues moved to the forefront in Asia in 1999 after several leaks at nuclear power plants in South Korea and China, and the serious accident in a reprocessing facility in Tokaimura, Japan. Such events are likely to raise concerns about Asias aggressive plans for nuclear capacity expansion. IIASA predicts that if a safer and cheaper new generatinn of nuclear plants is introduced, nuclear powers ultimate share in fuel mix will grow. Otherwise, it eventually will come to an end.

Renewables: The development of renewable resources is constrained in the IEO2000 reference case projections by expectations that fossil fuel prices will remain relatively low, and that, as a result, renewables will have a difficult time competing. Failing a strong global commitment to environmental programs, such as the limitation and reduction of greenhouse gases outlined in the Kyotu Protocol, it is difficult to foresee significant and widespread increases in renewable energy use. Modest growth in renewabte energy is projected to continue, maintaining an 8 percent share of total energy consumption. Nevertheless, in the long run, as other fossil fuel types become more expensive due to depletion and R&D efforts push the unit cost further down, new opportunities will emerge. Even conservative estimates predict that the worlds energy will rely considerably on renewables before 2100.7

Conclusion

In this article,we highlighted several basic characteristics of energy systems, and drew attention to some underlying trends for particular fuel types. Based on this information, we can say that:Energy systems are capital-intensive and hard to change once they have been built. Therefore, developing countries should track energy system trends closely and build their energy systems according to their future needs. The most important factor influencing the decision of which energy source to use is economics. Until a resources unit cost is competitive with others, it will not enjoy widespread acceptance and usage. Fossil fuels will dominate energy markets in the short run. The shares of coal and oil in the fuel mix will remain relatively constant until 2020, while the market for natural gas will expand rapidly. Nuclear power will survive only if a new generation of safer and cheaper reactors is introduced. Renewables will be the ultimate choice of the future. Currently, however, they cannot compete successfully on cost with conventional fuels.

Footnotes

1. Although the cost of extraction rises as the amount of oil remaining underground decreases, extraction technology also advances and pushes the cost down. Transporting oil from the field to the marketplace is added to the extraction (or purchasing) cost.
2. Christopher Harmon, Experience Curves of Photovoltaic Technology (March 2000). The entire report is available on IIASA web site: http: www.iiasa.ac.at/Publications/Documents lR-00-014.pdf
3. Netherlands Energy Research Foundation (ECN at Petten), “Endogenous Technological Change in Energy System Models.” Paper presented at the 1999 IIASA conference.
4. IIASA-WEC. 1998.
5. International Energy Outlook 2000 is available on the EIAs Web site: http: www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html.
6. N. Nakicenovic, A. Gruebler, and A. McDonald, Global Energy Perspectives (Cambridge. UK: 1998).
7. Experts differ over what exactly is included in this category. For practical purposes, renewables cover all energy sources except coal, oil, natural gas, and nuclear. Therefore this group includes, but is not limited to, hydroelectricity, wave, wind, biomass, and solar energy.