Despite advances in technology, computers still can’t come close to the power of the world’s most remarkable computer – the human brain.

Computing machines have seen three phases: the tabulating phase, the programmable phase, and now the new era of computing, the cognitive phase [1]. Tabulating machines performed a fixed task, whereas programmable machines could be reprogrammed to execute different tasks without any change in the hardware. Cognitive machines, however, promise learning and reasoning capabilities.

The possibility of such machines raises the question: is cognition the ultimate test for conscious existence? What do we know about cognition? How do we define intelligence? The questions go on and on. One thing, however, everyone seems to agree with is the fact that understanding the mechanism of human cognition is the key to developing advanced artificial intelligence, and cognitive machines.

Cognitive machines have the ability to learn, and they employ artificial intelligence to “reason.” Artificial intelligence is defined as, “The science of making machines do things that would require intelligence if done by men” [2]. The good news is that cognitive computing is no longer an esoteric pursuit of some futurists. It is, and has been, essential for the operation of many big-data driven processes. The 21st century has been flooded with data coming from almost every aspect of our lives. Technology has made it possible to generate data at an exponential rate. Temperature distribution throughout our buildings, the number of people diagnosed with cancer in the last six months, real-time changes in customer preferences, ethnic profiles of college applicants, and the top three words trending in online conversations at this very moment, are some examples of the kind of data available today.

As the amount of data generated increases, it also becomes harder and harder to process and make sense of the data collected. Our “greedy and ambitious” human nature does not want to waste, and it wants to use every bit of available data. This is where it becomes imperative to have a computing machine that goes beyond performing pre-programmed tasks and learns as it goes, without human interference. For this kind of computing, we need cognition.

The biggest challenge in imitating human cognition is to understand how cognition happens in the brain. It is obviously beyond our ability to monitor such activity that is constantly taking place in our brains, let alone recreating such marvels in the first place. Nevertheless, it will be a great achievement if we can manage to somewhat imitate human cognition, even partially. It would open a whole new era in terms of what can be achieved from a computing standpoint. For instance, the entire curriculum of a college degree can be processed by a cognitive machine in a fraction of a second; such machine can digest the whole of medical literature in a short period of time, provide human doctors with second opinions on their diagnoses [3].

Despite the fact that there have been substantial improvements in designing “intelligent” computing machines, mimicking the hardware of the human brain and simulating its decision-making processes, have posed three fundamental challenges: a hardware with comparable processing power and memory, a software algorithm to implement intelligent behavior, and the necessity of both being self-adapting and self-improving.

First of all, human intelligence has not been fully characterized – its capabilities and limitations are still unknown. This lack of knowledge makes it difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to reduce such intelligence to smaller, or simpler, modules. Therefore, we don’t have a good handle on how to mimic the human brain in a behavioral sense.

The second major problem is that we are still far away from having the hardware on which our “intelligence” software could run. Implementing intelligence in conventional computing machines, evidently, seems to be a futile undertaking. Programmable machines are no match for human brains; even the fastest supercomputers, taking advantage of thousands of processors, is able to mimic just one percent of one second worth of human brain activity-and even that takes 40 minutes [4]. Therefore, cognitive computing machines must incorporate different hardware architecture from conventional computers to achieve cognition comparable to humans. IBM’s SyNAPSE chip is one example of hardware inspired by the brain, and it has the potential to carry out the required, intense computations.

Lastly, the human brain and its cognitive power are constantly changing. Depending on various factors and experiences, our brains can improve or deteriorate; this is also true of our cognitive power. However, such improvement or deterioration could be in the form of a change in the physical structure or the amount of capacity utilized [5]. Such dynamic flexibility, also called Brain Plasticity [6], is essential to our intelligence. At this time, no self-evolving computing hardware has been worked out. However, promising developments have been reported with respect to cognitive computing machines that can learn – that is, they can make deductions and reach conclusions that are not preprogrammed.

Along the way, human supervision will be the ultimate guide in perfecting such imitation. Therefore, human cognition, taken for granted in our daily lives, remains to be the final frontier for our thousands-years long technological journey. Once again, the creation set the boundaries for human development.

Adem G. Aydin holds a Phd degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering. He works as an engineer scientist at IBM.

References

[1] Virginia Rometty, 2013, http://smarterplanet.tumblr.com/post/32816006311/i-b-m-chief-on-watson-cognitive-computing-and-her

[2] Marvin Minsky, 1968, http://www.akri.org/ai/defs.htm

[3] “WellPoint and IBM Announce Agreement to Put Watson to Work in Health Care”, http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/35402.wss

[4] “Largest neuronal network simulation achieved using K computer” http://www.riken.jp/en/pr/press/2013/20130802_1/

[5] William James, The Principles of Psychology

[6] Bryan Kolb and Ian Q. Whishaw, Brain Plasticity and Behavior, Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 49: 43-64

Multiple factors shape thought, but communication is especially heavy-handed. Communication not only restructures the contents of the mind,; it re-configures the brain’s very neurological patterns (Rotman 2008: 51-52). Brian Rotman explains four ways people communicate selfhood: self-pointing, a spoken “I,” an alphabetically written “I,” and “self-enunciation within contemporary media” (Rotman 2008: xxxiii). The written “I” is the only disembodied method, but this separation subliminally trickles beneath conscious awareness. Writing has been a major component of communicating theological concepts because writing has been the easiest form of mass communication for centuries. Theologians 1,000 years ago probably did not ponder the disembodiment of writing any more than landing spaceships on the moon. Television – which mediates communication through bodies – was not on their radar. But contemporary theologians have options. Gunther Kress is clear that, “The former constellation of medium of book and mode of writing is giving way… to the new constellation of medium of screen and mode of image” (Kress 2003: 9). These moving constellations have forced a fundamental shift in the way social brains engage thought. Theology that fails to take this into account will find itself hopelessly outmoded and no longer equipped to engage the study of God in fresh situations.

This article addresses the cognitive and neurological effects stemming from shifts in “culturally mediated systems of external memory” (Rotman 52) – such as writing and images – and how theological communication could expand in response. Writing reinforces left-brain, systematic, and linear thought (Armstrong 1995: 115). Images, on the other hand, encourage more right-brain, intuitive, and spatial reasoning. It would be simplistic to hold that writing is only mediated through the right hemisphere and images only through the left, but communicative modes create lateral biases. Theological minds emerge, – not only from the “linear, logical, detail-oriented left hemisphere”, – but from embodied, whole brains. The first section of this paper shows writing’s left-brain bias. The second section turns a corner by examining emotion as altered body states and how this leads to a right-brain bias. Visual mediums are the most direct way to communicate right-brain thoughts, so the last step is to show how visual mediums could add a holistic, embodied element to theology.

WRITING AND A DISEMBODIED, LEFT-BRAIN BIAS

Writing forces neurons to march in line with time (Kress 2003: 2). The left hemisphere attributes meaning to words and strings those words together to form sentences, paragraphs, and full discourses (Hogue 2003: 87). In a sentence, one… word… follows… another, so the brain follows a preset “reading path” (Kress 2003: 3). A dog bit Karen means something entirely different than Karen bit a dog. Reading paths necessitate choices about which words make the most sense in which temporal order (Kress 2003: 3), so writing creates “the subliminal appeal of reducing wholes to constituent parts” (Jahandarie 1999: 57-58). It entrenches linear (temporal) neurological patterns through the repetitive, reductive decision-making (Jahandarie 1999: 54).

This leads to what could be called: alphabetic reasoning. Daniel Siegel explains that the left hemisphere is responsible for “more slowly acting, linear, sequentially active, temporal (time-dependent) processes. Verbal meanings of words… are a primary mode of processing for the left side” (Siegel 2001: 179). The left-brain deals in “monosemantic ‘packets’… which are then processed in a slower, linear mode” (Siegel 179). Writing strengthens linear thought patterns in the left hemisphere. Siegel holds that, “Repeated activation of specific neuronal pathways reinforces the strength of connections between groups of neurons” (p. 194), so neurons fire in similar patterns in the future (p. 24). The brain functions like a malleable muscle, but writing only exercises the left-brain. The brain is sculpted like a bodybuilder who only lifts with one arm. That arm ripples, but the other atrophies. Plastic makes perfect.

The “linear, logical,” and “linguistically-based” left-hemisphere (p. 161) evaluates the contents of written words through syllogistic reasoning (p. 197), prejudicing the brain to evaluate their contents through the brain’s semantic operator. The semantic operator deals with “propositional representations – symbols of external or internal facts that can be… assessed as ‘true’ or ‘false’” (p. 35 [emphasis mine]). In alphabetic reasoning, ideas are filtered into categories of: right or wrong, – fact or fiction. Then, alphabetic reasoning reinforces the brain’s quest for causation through sequencing. Reading paths communicate meaning through cause-effect relationships, so the ensuing left-brain thought patterns in the semantic operator create a syllogistic lens. Wholes are eliminated in the effort to snap details into linear, cause-effect relationships. Meaning is confined to these necessary but limited ways of processing information.

THEOLOGY AND LEFT-BRAIN BIAS

As writing has become increasingly more accessible in punctuated bursts over the past few millennia, theologians have become more and more linear and syllogistic in thought. But neurons fire in strikingly complex and highly plastic patterns (Bennett and Hacker 2008: 137). Linear rules for systematic theology are only engrained through repetition. The dark side of alphabetic reasoning is that it can produce theologians who tend to exercise linearity while alternative methods atrophy. Recall that the semantic operator can only qualify concepts as right or wrong. Linear patterns do not leave cognitive space for multiple details to be processed simultaneously. In the study of God, this cognitive capacity is absolutely necessary.

So far, I have examined several important consequences of alphabetic writing: it is inherently linear; in committing to using particular words in particular sequences it automatically eliminates other options; it coerces thought into cause-effect analysis, and it externalizes, or disembodies, thought. Of these consequences, the disembodied nature of theological writing is the most problematic.

EMOTION AS ALTERED BODY STATES

Emotions are physiological changes in a person’s body. These are mediated through combinations of gestures, postures, and behaviors (Damasio 2003: 63). External images – or stimuli – are mediated to the brain through the senses, and internal body and brain states refract the external world (Damasio 195). Marshall McLuhan writes, “The use of any medium or extension of hu/man/ity alters the patterns of interdependence among people, as it alters the ratios among our senses” (Jahandarie 51). The higher cognitive processes involved in developing theological concepts are pushed and pulled by the body’s constant emoting (Siegel 143).

The signals passing in and out of bodies generate emotion, so change signals can make emotions contagious (Siegel 143, 50). Siegel explains that, “Complex neural/bodily aspects of emotional processes are not easily translated into words. Nonverbal expressions, including those of the face, tone of voice and gestures, can transfer information about internal states more fully to the outside world than words can do” (Siegel 150). When it comes to altering the emotions correlated with belief – belief that can override higher cognitive functions – bodily gesture trumps writing.

Because this emotional processing is primarily non-conscious, people do not qualify intuition as true or false by sequencing details into rational arguments. For example, anger is typified by “dilated pupils, widened orbital area, raised eyebrows, furrowed brow, and pursed lips” (Siegel 128). The brain absorbs all of these signals at once when someone unexpectedly sees this:

Through non-conscious processing, faces can change emotions and minds in a flash.

Intuition of other people’s emotions occurs within the Mirror Neuron System (MNS). This system draws most heavily from facial expressions (Siegel 290), and it tells the viewer’s brain to respond to the viewed face in kind (Siegel 129). The MNS non-consciously indicates: whatever is happening in that person is also happening in me. This is why people constantly imitate the “motor acts, postures, and gaze of their co-citizens” (Kanwisher and Duncan 2004: 463-64). When people talk, their body language loops without their awareness as emotions harmonize. Yawning becomes contagious. When the MNS causes altered body states and facial expressions, people influence each other’s emotional-cognitive looping, and thought itself is steered.

There is scientific evidence that the entire body is engaged in understanding and remembering. James McGaugh demonstrated that the Vagus nerve – which connects the brain stem to the stomach – directly unites visceral and emotional experience with mental processing. McGaugh presented subjects with two stories containing similar amounts of data. One story had high emotional content and the other had low emotional content. People with functioning Vagus nerves recalled more data from the stories with high emotional content than from the stories with low emotional content. People with damaged Vagus nerves had identical recall from both stories. This suggests that certain types of thought are crippled by the absence of full-bodied emotion. Siegel explains that, “conceptual representations are nonverbal. They form the fundamental building blocks of our thoughts, beliefs, intentions, and aspects of our explicit memories” (Damasio 167). Written theological method is often left wanting embodied communication to close the cognitive loop.

EMBODIED COMMUNICATION AND RIGHT-BRAIN BIAS

The body’s indicators of emotion – somatic markers¬ – interface with the right hemisphere more than the left (Damasio 144, 82). The right-brain simultaneously correlates multiple details rather than sequencing them in cause-effect relationships. Siegel describes how the right-brain deals with nonverbal communications through “fast-acting, parallel (simultaneously active), holistic processes” (Damasio 179). This means that the right-brain is the default processor of metaphor and paradox. Imagistic representations in the mind do not force choice, categorization, or analysis. They exist simultaneously without being truncated by “top-down” processing as emotions ebb and flow (Siegel 165).

Kress calls this type of right-brain embodied thought “spatial reasoning,” and he places it in opposition to the “temporal reasoning” sublimated by alphabetic thought (Kress 45). Spatial reasoning portrays multiple details simultaneously, so spatial reasoning is correlational rather than sequential. This opens up possibilities for theologians by beginning with building blocks of thought before they are sequenced into categories of justified and true, fact or fiction.

The right-brain is functionally nonverbal, so its contents have to be externalized in “non-word-based ways, such as drawing a picture or pointing to a pictorial set of options” (Siegel 327). Alternative mediums, such as video and visual art, could generate entirely new forms of theological thought.

MEDIA’S ROLE IN SPATIAL REASONING

Video and visual art are viable possibilities for developing a right-brain, spatial reasoning into theological method. Jahandarie poetically explains, “Electric media are extensions of our central nervous systems and thus put us in touch with the totality of experience” (Jahandarie 99). Jahandarie overstates his case; – for example, video does not communicate through odors, for example, – but his intended meaning is helpful. New technologies make it possible to create right-brain mass communication. The MNS is 80-85% as effective at influencing emotion through video as it is in person (Kanwisher and Duncan 469), so gestures captured on video have a startlingly high ability to steer the emotional side of the cognitive loop. Emotions can be altered and details can be expressed simultaneously if theologians were to use a wider set of cognitive and communicative tools.

Rotman explains that people listen, “not to speech sounds as such… but to the movements of the body causing them; we focus on what happens between the sounds, to the dynamics of their preparatory phases, pauses, holds, accelerations, fallings away, and completions” (Rotman 23). Through the MNS, we get hunches, – not only about what another person is thinking, – but how the person is thinking and feeling. The dynamics of gesture in film add an intuitive, interpretive element to its communicative ability. In split-brain studies, the left-brain cannot even register facial expressions or emotional states (Rotman 151). While the left-brain might be incredible at reading and writing books, it is inept at spatial reasoning. Siegel writes that the left-brain’s “monosemantic ‘packets’” operate through neurological patterns and processes “quite distinct from the analogic representations seen, for example, in an artist’s painting or in a photograph,” so “the right hemisphere more fully ‘sees the world for what it is,’ whereas the left hemisphere must reduce the world much more into mentally defined, often socially constructed chunks of information” (Rotman 179). The right-brain’s holism and simultaneity could be invaluable to theologians, but it is too often dampened by the limitations of past technologies.

WHEN THEOLOGY IS EMBODIED

Siegel mentions the “theory of nonlinear dynamics of complex systems” in regard to personhood (Siegel 7). The firing of every synapse in every thought exponentially complexifies what it means to be human. Perhaps God is not only linear, either. Images are not filtered through the linear critiques applied to writing because they function differently in the brain. This does not make imagistic, spatial reasoning irrational. It makes spatial reasoning non-rational, and theologians desperately need non-rational ways to discuss a nonlinear God. Spatial mediums are not able to comprehensively encapsulate God’s personhood any more than writing, but they could generate new perspectives to better triangulate theological depth in conjunction with it.

In the syllogistic line that runs from rational to irrational, the concept of a trinity is inherently problematic. The semantic operator only deals with logical, sequential coherence, so the multiple, simultaneously existing details involved in conceptualizing the trinity do not get cognitive space. In this case, it might be advantageous to take a right-brain, imagistic approach to theology.

Depictions allow for multiple details to coexist without sequence. Images can be worth far more than 1,000 words. Imagistic reasoning allows space for entire persons to subject themselves to concepts. The “events and actions” lost in writing’s “principles and concepts” could be filled out through images (Jahandarie 17). Instead of only understanding theology in terms of right and wrong, the theologian could also trust a Vagus nerve when it communicates that an image or gesture is good or bad. The details could remain simultaneous in the right-brain without being sorted, and persons could experience theologies to a fuller degree in addition to critically evaluating them.

CONCLUSION

As neurological patterns become more spatial and less linear, theologians have the opportunity to construct new theological paradigms by diversifying their communicative tools. Creating theology through imagistic mediums would be bounded by its own “epistemological commitments,” (Kress 57) though. Critical thought is a crucial element in theological conversations, for example. This suggests that – when used in isolation – either alphabetic or imagistic methods are reductionistic. Theology has to be alphabetic, linear, and critical to be constructive, but it also needs to be imagistic, embodied, and holistic to avoid reductionistic sequencing of nonlinear concepts. The multiple natures of cognition cannot be mixed or separated. Language and experience, left-brain and right-brain thinking, knowledge and belief, are locked into cognitive loops (Eichenbaum and Bodkin 179), and it is impossible to have a one-sided loop.

The advent of new mediums makes the creation of an embodied theological method – complete with shifting neurological patterns – a mandatory opportunity. The next step is to synthesize multimodal theologies with alphabetic reasoning. A critically holistic methodology would emerge as gestalt. Full-blown theological paradigms could materialize if both hemispheres were used in conjunction. However progressive, however gestalt, and however critically holistic theological method becomes, it can never be comprehensive or complete. Theologians must do theology at all times. When necessary, they should use words.

Jonathan Camery-Hoggatt is a freelance writer in Seattle. He has MA in divinity from Princeton Theological Seminary.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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• Barth, Karl, Geoffrey William Bromiley, and Thomas F. Torrance. “Barth’s Church Dogmatics (14 Volumes).” In Logos Bible Software series 3. [Bellingham, WA]: Logos Bible Software ; Libronix Corp., 2008.
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• Cone, James H. God of the Oppressed. Rev. ed. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1997.
• Damasio, Antonio R. Looking for Spinoza : Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain. 1st ed. Orlando, Fla.: Harcourt, 2003.
• ———. The Feeling of What Happens : Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. 1st ed. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999.
• ———. Thinking About Belief. Edited by Daniel L. Schacter and Elaine Scarry, Memory, Brain, and Belief. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000.
• Deacon, Terrence William. The Symbolic Species : The Co-Evolution of Language and the Brain. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997.
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• Hodgson, Peter Crafts. Liberal Theology : A Radical Vision. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007.
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In a study conducted by social psychologists Tversky and Kahneman, people were asked to guess the percentage of African nations that were members of the United Nations. Two groups were first asked to estimate whether this number was lower or higher than a threshold: the first group was asked whether it is more or less than 45 percent and the second group was asked whether it is more or less than 65 percent. Then both groups were asked to give their estimates of the actual percentage. The researchers demonstrated that the group that was given the lower threshold estimated a lower value for the actual percentage of African nations that are members of the United Nations. The group that was given the higher threshold estimated a higher percentage. The pattern has held in other experiments for a wide variety of different subjects of estimation. A bias in the estimation of African members of the United Nations may not sound like a big deal, but how about decisions that affect people’s lives seriously?

Consider sentencing in court trials. Social psychologist Mussweiler and colleagues asked trial judges with more than 15 years of experience to consider sentencing demands made by non-experts in a legal crime case before issuing a final sentence. The two sentencing demands were 34 months and 12 months. The judges, despite their experience and despite the fact that the crime was the same, were influenced by the demands. Judges who considered the high demand of 34 months prior to their decision gave final sentences that were almost 8 months longer than judges who considered a low demand of 12 months initially. If prior exposure to a piece of information can make a difference as much as 8 more months in prison, then we ought to know what is going on. The examples above illustrate a psychological heuristic known as “anchoring and adjustment.” The heuristic suggests that when faced with a decision-making or estimation situation, people start with an anchor, or a reference point, and make adjustments to it to reach their final estimate. The anchor serves as a first approximation and then the person makes adjustments to it to reach a final estimate or decision. Why does the human mind utilize this heuristic? The answer is simple—we do not always have a whole lot of information to reach an accurate estimate or best decision.

Therefore, the mind sometimes needs shortcuts, especially under pressing circumstances. To understand this process, let’s have a look at the limitations of human cognition. Models of human cognition Cognitive psychologists and sociologists have worked to develop models of human social cognition. These models emphasize four aspects of our social cognition, which is the way we perceive others. The first is the role of prior knowledge versus information immediately available. For example, when we see a policeman directing the traffic, we use our prior knowledge in our perception. We may assume that he is carrying a gun and he has communications equipment to talk with his station. We deduce these features from our prior knowledge about the traffic police, even if we may not be in a position to observe that particular policeman’s gun or communications device. Relying on prior information in our judgments is called “top-down” processing as opposed to “bottom-up” or data-driven processing. Typically, relying on top-down processing, such as relying on stereotypes, requires fewer processing resources.

The second aspect is the limitation of our cognitive processing capacity. The human cognitive system is modeled to consist of our sensory organs, a sensory register (memory) that temporarily stores our perceptions of external stimuli, a short-term memory, a long-term memory, attention resources and executive control processes. When we receive information in the form of audio-visual or other sensory stimuli, they are processed by our cognitive system and transferred to our short-term memory. Through a process of encoding and categorization, the information is organized and stored in the long-term memory. A part of the long-term memory is “active” or readily accessible. Our further use of information in our long-term memory activates the information, and the lack of use deactivates it, making it less readily accessible. Our behavioral response results from our processing of information. According to this information-processing model of human cognition, the amount of information that can be processed by our cognitive system is restricted in terms of storage, flow and inference (Huitt, 2003).

The third aspect is the amount of cognitive processing that is determined by capacity (amount of free resources) and motivation. Factors such as interest, importance, and relevance determine the motivation to allocate more cognitive resources. We are more likely to devote more cognitive processing resources to subjects that are more interesting, important or relevant in our judgment. The fourth aspect is the interplay between automatic and controlled processing. Automatic processes require fewer resources. Given our limited processing capacity, time and other types of constraints have consequences for our cognitive processing. Under constraints, most individuals tend to simplify their processing by relying on less information, relying on automatic cognitive processes as opposed to conscious ones, or relying on prior information as opposed to information available in the circumstances. Anchoring is one such a simplification. The nature of the situation we are facing will determine which of these mechanisms will be selected. They will be reused or abandoned depending on whether they provide a sound basis for our responses to the social environment. If the simplifications lead to interpretations that harm us, we are likely to abandon them. If, on the other hand, there is no harm or there is a benefit, then we are likely to reuse those simplifications.

Anchoring effect Anchoring is defined as the effect of a prior judgment of an object, the anchor, on our future judgments regarding another object. These judgments may be about a numerical value, a probability, or even a moral or legal judgment. As an example, consider the situation where people are asked whether the population of a city is greater than or smaller than a value. Let’s say two groups of people are asked the same question with two anchors: Group A is asked whether the population of Houston is more than or less than 500,000. Group B is asked whether the population of Houston more than or less than 2,000,000. In this example, the values of 500,000 and 2,000,000 serve as anchors. Both groups are then asked: What is your estimate of the population of Houston? Experiments indicate that the people who were given the lower anchor on average give a lower estimate for the population and vice versa. How does anchoring happen? Cognitive psychologists tell us that human judgment is essentially relative or comparison based, even if we are not asked to make a comparison explicitly. So, in evaluating the present object or person, our minds search for an anchor. A particular anchor may be selected because it is readily accessible, because it is suggested to us, or “self-generated via an insufficient adjustment process” (Mussweiler et al). Our prior cognitive processing of the anchor increases the accessibility of anchor-consistent knowledge, which influences our subsequent judgments. For example, when we meet a person from a country, the first person we met from that country may become our anchor. If we had a positive experience with the first person, we are likely to interpret the actions of this new person with a positive light. While cognitive heuristics such as anchoring help us make quick decisions under constraints, they may also lead to errors. The price we pay for the economy provided by the heuristics is “systematically biased judgments under certain conditions.” (Bless et al., p. 24). For instance, a car dealer may offer you a very high price as an anchor and ask you to make a counter offer. Experiments have demonstrated that under such circumstances, the value of the initial offer has a significant effect on what people will be willing to pay for the final price of the car. If the initial offer is very high, the customer is likely to accept a higher negotiated price and vice versa. The anchoring effect can also be observed when we take a few characteristics of a person and consciously or subconsciously fit them to a stereotype.

In such cases, we may misperceive their motivations or misunderstand their circumstances. Sometimes the anchor can be manipulated by some person other than ourselves, as in the case of the car dealer. Sometimes, we may pick the anchor unintentionally based on information obtained from the mass media. As the mass media tend to focus on rare events that tend to be negative, the stereotypes formed based on information solely derived from the mass media may be misleading (Said, 1997). What are some of the lessons we can derive from our discussion of the anchoring effect? For one, we need to point the mirror at ourselves and ask: Are we forming stereotypes of others that may be inaccurate? Are we influenced by the anchoring effect in our judgment of other people? To see whether we may have anchors for evaluating people of different backgrounds consider your initial thoughts about Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Americans, Russians, Asians, Africans, Mexicans, etc. Are these anchors based on scientific data or news media coverage of events or personal encounters with one or more individuals? It may be infeasible to try to collect encyclopedic information about every nationality, religion, or culture that we encounter. But in matters that impact our society we ought to do a better job of researching a diversity of resources. But perhaps a more important lesson is this—the anchoring effect is here to stay as part of the reality of human cognition. If we would like to provide accurate, reliable information to people about ourselves, our culture and values, we should reach them before they form a negative anchor or stereotype. If we would like our cultural background, religion, or values to be understood without distortion, we need to reach out to as many people as possible around us and interact with them. We need to hold conversations, and share meaningful experiences with them to anchor their future judgments in an accurate reference point. The anchoring effect is demonstrated to be pervasive and robust in psychology. It is not likely to disappear in the foreseeable future. However, we do have the opportunity to reach out and help form positive anchors for better human relationships.

Further reading

• Bless, H., Fiedler, K., Strack, F. 2004. Social Cognition, New York: Taylor and Francis.
• Huitt, W. 2003. The Information Processing Approach to Cognition. Educational Psychology Interactive. Valdosta, GA: Valdosta State University.
• Mussweiler, T., & Strack, F. 2001. The Semantics of Anchoring. Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, 86, 234–255.
• Said, E. 1997. Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, New York: Random House.

The example given above-not stealing customers’ money versus not being a rich person-is just one possible case among others which human beings feel tension because of conflicting cognitions. Most people have personal beliefs, principles, and values shaping their lives fundamentally. Psychologists use the concept of cognition to imply all of these factors that guide our choices. Cognitions regulate our lives at any moment regardless of our consciousness of them. For instance, some people could venture everything to have more money because they have a cognition whispering “money, money, money,” or others can sacrifice everything for the sake of beliefs because of their cognition, “I believe therefore I am.” Even though human beings feel good when these cognitions drive us to success, good decisions, and a satisfying life, they turn out to be a source of frustration when a certain cognition conflicts with another one. In such cases, what we usually do is to find a way to resolve the conflict because we do not like to live with this tension. How then can we cope with this conflict?

The most common attitude under such circumstances is “self-justification.” If we turn to our example, Peter chose one of the two alternatives: continue to steal his customers’ money in order to become a rich person. Now he must find a good reason to justify himself and reduce his inner conflict:

“Not stealing is not the only way of being an honest person. You cannot be a bad guy just because of one unique behavior in your life, given that other people are also committing such sins, even worse sometimes.”

“My customers are the richest people in the State; it is not greed if I want them to share some of their money. Actually, they do not deserve it at all.”

“I did that to ensure the future happiness of my family; I know that making your family happy is more important than being honest.”

There can be many other reasons or justifications for such a behavior. The truth is that, Peter is trying to convince himself about his behavior. Although people’s attempts to convince themselves are not necessarily rational, they try to rationalize their behaviors by changing their cognitions or adding new ones.

All of the above are in the simple processes of Leon Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance. He contends that when an individual has two or more cognitions (beliefs, opinions, ideas etc.) which are inconsistent with each other, then tension emerges and people attempt to reduce this tension. How can the tension be reduced? The answer is through changing one or both cognitions or by adding new cognitions to alleviate discrepancies between cognitions. Our behaviors in such situations will determine the way we behave the next time we encounter a similar situation. Our ultimate behavior will depend on the strength of one’s cognitions (Aronson, 2004). If being a rich person is more important than not being greedy, a person is more likely to choose to steal money.

It is critical that the choice does not have to be right or rational. Let’s remember Peter’s excuses for stealing. He tended to believe that stealing was not as bad as he thought before because he found some justifications. Now he seems to feel better, but what about the next step? Most probably, he will continue to steal. As one can easily see, dissonance reduction is mostly an irrational behavior. Apparently, these irrational behaviors help people to defend their “self” or “ego.” Through the help of these irrational beliefs, people continue to define themselves as if they are good, smart, decent, or generous people. The underlying motive is the need for self-justification.

Cognitive dissonance from the perspective of religion

There are many musts and must-nots in a believer’s mind. One common practice of dissonance reduction appears at a point where one must choose between committing a sin or making a righteous decision. While preaching or reading holy books nurtures spiritual “cognitions” in a religious mind, obeying concupiscence and chasing essentially worldly goals will weaken this. After every sin that a believer committed, the battle of the cognitions starts between “I am a religious guy” and “I committed a sin, therefore I am not a decent person.” Since these cognitions cannot live peacefully together in a religious mind, one of the conflicting cognitions will grow out of this battle.

This process meshes with a religious idea that “Within each sin is a path leading to unbelief” (Nursi, The Second Gleam). If a person insists on performing a sinful act, he starts to disdain his sin. After a while, as he keeps behaving in the same manner, he becomes addicted to the sin and tends to see it as a normal act. Instead of acknowledging that the sins are witnessed by the angels and seen by God, an unrighteous man may like the idea that they may not exist at all, which is again comforting. With that idea, the cognition of “I am a religious person” is surpassed by a new cognition, “Maybe the religion that I accepted has some flaws” or “is questionable” which were added to relieve the pain arising from the cognition “I am not a good person.” From this point of view, people’s preferences about their beliefs are not independent of their behaviors which foster or challenge their religious cognitions.

One’s tendency to justify himself is usual but may not be what ought-to-be from the moral point of view. As people justify themselves, they will ignore whatever is wrong with their behaviors or cognitions, which will make them insensitive. Going beyond psychology’s objective description of human beings as rationalizing or justifying beings, religious sources suggest rejecting self-justification in most of cases. The Qur’an quotes the Prophet Joseph: “Yet I do not claim my self free of error, for assuredly the human carnal soul always commands evil, except that my Lord has mercy. Surely my Lord is All-Forgiving, All-Compassionate” (Yusuf 12:53). This means, self-awareness about the conflicting cognitions is critical for human beings. When the person has inconsistent cognitions, choosing the option that does not solely serve to justify himself will prevent the person from going toward unbelief. Christianity also pointed to the importance of facing up to our sins: “I acknowledged my sin to You, and in my iniquity I have not hidden. I said, ‘I will confess my transgressions to the Lord,’ and You forgave the iniquity of my sin” (Psalms 32:5).

Between the good and bad

Human cognitions determine their choices and actions, which in turn nurture, shape or weaken our cognitions. Repeating a sin a second time is easier than the first time, and we feel less dissonance because cognitions creating dissonance are replaced by those that bring inner comfort. People who exhibit extremely deviant and sociopathic behaviors should be reconsidered from this point of view. Extremely deviant behaviors should be considered a series of earlier choices which gradually led to the ultimate misconduct rather than the consequence of a unique decision made at a specific time.

Another possible implication of the theory of cognitive dissonance is the difficulty with judging absolute good or bad. Given the fact that cognitions may become weaker or stronger, personal views on the appropriateness of behaviors are subject to change. Human cognitions are potential mechanisms that lead one to behave in a certain way. Therefore, deviant behaviors might have a long history fed by the cognitions which turn out to be one’s rationale for inappropriate behaviors. As a result, cognitive dissonance uncovers the gray area between the continuum of good and bad through which human beings swing all the time.

Conclusion

Cognitive dissonance theory provides convincing explanations about how human beings make their decisions and behave in a moral or immoral manner. Also, it brings a resourceful perspective to illuminate spiritual experiences. It successfully explains how people swing on the path from good to bad and vice versa instead of considering them as dwelling on two discrete entities. Awareness of the above-mentioned processes is critical to increase self-awareness.

One last comment should be made about the role of conscience in cognitive dissonance. Although cognitive dissonance theory successfully explains many cognitive processes, a mental faculty that is responsible for recognizing the discrepancy in our cognitions and regulating the balance between them is conscience. However, psychology’s account of conscience is rather limited and inconclusive. Psychology offers evidence of the way human beings behave in dissonant situations. Religious resources, however, provide prescriptive guidelines to remain on the right track. As in the case of this unique theory, understanding the theories of psychology as well as making sense of them in the light of religious texts provides individuals with a heightened self-awareness.

References

• Aronson, E. 2004. The Social Animal, 9th edition, Worth Publishers: New York, NY
• Festinger, L. 1957. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.

The specific neurobiological processes, brain structures, genes, and other factors involved in human intelligence are still largely unknown. Current research on brain anatomy and physiology suggests that various levels of intelligence may be associated with such things as the number of connections between neurons or the degree of branching in cortical neurons. Important factors may include brain metabolism and how fast nerves conduct signals.

Types of intelligence

Measuring intelligence depends on which of the three intelligences one relies on and uses the most. For example:

Static Intelligence: The accumulated knowledge measured by IQ (Intelligence Quotient) tests. Psychologists call it cognitive content. Standard IQ tests have changed very little since their first appearance over 100 years ago, while cognitive psychology’s understanding of how the brain and mind function has made great progress over that same time period.

Fluid Intelligence: How quickly the mind learns and adapts to new problems and conditions. Also known as practical or dynamic intelligence, this important aspect is hardly ever measured.

Brain Intelligence: Also known as BrainQ or cognitive capacity, this is the speed and efficiency at which the brain processes information. In electronics, Q is how efficient and well-tuned the circuit or system is. So BrainQ is how tuned the brain is, which is reflected in mental quickness, memory, and concentration powers. It is fluid and variable, as it is e very sensitive to environmental and lifestyle conditions.

Both static and fluid intelligence depend on BrainQ. Academic, professional, and even personal success depends mostly on BrainQ. In fact, studies have shown very little correlation between one’s IQ score and monetary success. Most importantly, BrainQ (also known as brainpower) is highly trainable (improvable) with the appropriate type of exercise.

Emotional Intelligence (E-IQ) and BrainQ are correlated. According to Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey, emotional intelligence is composed of being able to identify, perceive, express, and understand emotions in different contexts; emotional understanding; and emotional management.

Measuring intelligence

Abundant research proves that thinking about and testing for human intelligence is no small matter. Yet, Robert J. Sternberg, professor of psychology at Yale University, says that, in many ways, we have it all wrong: There are major problems with conventional thinking about intelligence at best, our notions are incomplete, and at worst, simply wrong.

The dominant psychometric approach to studying intelligence claims to measure intelligence through IQ tests. One’s IQ is the result of dividing a person’s mental age by his/her actual age. This procedure has been dropped, but IQ is still used to refer to the scores obtained on intelligence tests and to the tests themselves. Such scores are normally scaled so that the mean is 100 and standard deviation is 15. Ninety-five percent of the population scores within two standard deviations around the mean (between 70-130).

Many IQ tests exist to measure verbal, spatial, mathematical, and analytical skills, while others depend on reaction or recognition time to a visual stimulus. Several IQ tests combine multiple subtests, each testing a specific skill. Regardless of the test’s nature, many researchers believe that factor analysis can extract a general statistical factor (g) from thes results of to obtain a general measurement of intelligence. There is evidence suggesting that g correlates with academic success and, to some extent, with measuring non-school accomplishments.

Despite its wide acceptance, not all researchers agree with the concept of a general, measurable intelligence factor. Some experts believe that g measures some types of intelligence (e.g., analytical problem solving) but not others (e.g., creativity and practical intelligence). Other theorists have abandoned the idea of accurately measuring intelligence, saying that there are multiple kinds of intelligence that cannot be measured with pen-and-paper tests.

Sternberg has proposed a new definition of intelligence that includes analytical skills (the ability to analyze and judge, compare and contrast) and creative and practical abilities. He adds the second and third factors to make the definition of intelligence more meaningful, although he acknowledges that analytical intelligence is an important component of intelligence. Creative intelligence is measured by problems assessing how well an individual copes with relative novelty and can create or invent new products, while practical intelligence measures the ability to handle daily problems.

Increasing IQ?

Some studies have shown that young children exposed to stimulation-rich environments in kindergarten had higher IQ scores than their non-exposed classmates. However, such increases were mostly gone upon graduating from elementary school. Despite this temporary improvement, evidence suggests that the exposed children tended to perform better in school, were less likely to need special education, and were more likely to finish school. Thus, some cognitive functions as well as one’s quality of life were enhanced.

The results of such test suggest that stimulation is a key factor in increasing cognitive performance. Could this positive effect be prolonged by continued exposure to enriched environments? Recent studies in neuroscience show that neuronal synapses in a highly stimulated environment tend to grow and expand, at least in the visual system, compared to those that receive only background static (white noise) input. Also, synapses tend to grow stronger with regular stimulation, which suggests that cognitive function may be improved by a variety-rich environment, stimulation, and activity.

Another suggestive study is the Mozart effect. Researchers picked his Sonata for Two Pianos in D Major for its complexity, and showed that college students who listened to it before taking a spatial-temporal reasoning test performed better than control subjects. However, the effect only lasted 15 minutes and seems to be specific to the piece of music and to experimental conditions.

Although these results are limited to specific circumstances, they still have promise. The results are temporary, but one can make an analogy between these effects and those of physical exercise, which are also usually temporary. The key in maintaining and potentially improving cognitive function may be the forms of mental exercise. Solving puzzles, reading, learning new language or a musical instrument may have positive effects. Again, the important point may be in optimizing overall cognitive function rather than in increasing measured IQ scores, which research shows to be relatively stable after childhood.

Physical exercise clearly provides optimal results when combined with a proper diet. The same is likely to hold for mental exercises. Severe malnutrition while a child can have negative effects on intelligence, and the brain requires nutrients to function properly on a daily basis. Also, physical exercise seems to have a positive effect on mental performance. For example, aerobic exercise appears to increase memory retention, improve some types of creative problem solving, and has positive effects on general well-being. Also, exercise can help relieve stress, which has a negative impact on learning and memory. Various relaxation techniques are also beneficial.

Overall, it does not seem likely that measured IQ can be increased permanently. But other supporting factors of cognitive function might be enhanced, thereby optimizing overall mental performance. The best ways to do this seem to be combining physical and mental activities to create a stimulating environment, and to get enough nourishment.

Sternberg’s theory of intelligence

Sternberg has made some interesting points that have been borne out by research results. For example, he has demonstrated that people can handle cognitive challenges in real-life situations. For example, housewives and Brazilian street children have difficulty calculating in a classroom, but not in a supermarket or while making a deal on the street, respectively.

Another consideration is the importance of family expectations on children’s learning. For example, Kenyan families typically do not value formal Western, but do value knowledge of the indigenous environment. He found that when Kenyan children were tested on their knowledge of the indigenous environment, those who scored high on the indigenous tests scored low on conventional IQ tests.

Sternberg also has shown, in a study of Yale students, that students in the high-analytical group were much less diverse in terms of racial, ethnic, socioeconomic and educational backgrounds than those in the high-creative and high-practical groups.

Sternberg’s research has critical impacts on teaching. He asserts: First of all, it is important to note that all three abilities analytical, creative, and practical can be taught. When students are taught in a way that best fits how they think, they do better in school. Children with high levels of creative and practical abilities, who are almost never taught or assessed in a way that matches their pattern of abilities, may be at a disadvantage in course after course, year after year.

Abusing IQ test scores

However, Sternberg is aware that resistance to change in measuring intelligence is great and widespread. He adds: The U.S. has developed a multi-million dollar testing industry whose tests are based on conventional notions of intelligence. The modern version of the Stanford-Binet Intelligence tests or the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales have not evolved much over the years. Whereas old computers and old VCRs and old telephones rapidly go out of date, old tests never seem to die, except for updating of norms and cosmetic changes.

Sternberg is confident that conventional notions of intelligence can be surpassed, despite the reluctance and opposition to change, and that doing so will benefit everyone. He concludes: In fact, the most important abilities for science are creative abilities, and if we continue to measure students with conventional tests and do not value creative abilities in training, the result may be that we are picking the wrong people. People who are highly creative may be denied the opportunity to go into science, and science may lose its best potential to advance.

The current misuse of IQ or similar tests is not as problematic as the ones in past. Murray and Herrnstein’s controversial The Bell Curve summarizes research allegedly purporting that blacks are innately less intelligent than whites. This conclusion depends on culturally biased IQ tests or content-oriented SAT tests. However, these conclusions neglect the social limitations, unequal conditions, underprivileged situations, low-quality education, malnutrition, and poverty. The famous Milwaukee Project of the 1970s showed that nurturing plays a vital role in a child’s intelligence. And Goddard’s results, obtained in the early 1900s and based tests given to newly arriving immigrants who had spent months on a boat, who were mainly laypeople, and often had little if any grasp of English, has been disproven by those very people and their descendants, many of whom went on to build quite successful careers in America.

IQ tests are culturally biased. However as Reynolds points out: The argument is whether the brain’s processing speed determines how well one can do in an IQ test. The IQ tests and SATs are very content-oriented. If you weren’t taught some important element, you’d be at a disadvantage (Report From Biomedical). Rather than this, an IQ test should check how quickly one’s brain can process information.

Conclusion

In conclusion, intelligence depends on many things: daily diet, physical and mental exercise, emotional state, stress, and so on. It is not fixed or static, so one can improve it by a combination of techniques that suit the individual. In spite of the developments in cognitive science and medicine, measuring intelligence is still in its crawling stage and open for research. One can be filled only with awe before such a vital yet mostly unknown organ, whose functions have tantalized humanity for centuries. Thus, each person should appreciate having such a distinguishing feature and thank the Creator.

References

• Herrnstein, Richard J. and Charles Murray. The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life. Free Press: 1996.
• Mayer, J. D., D. Caruso, and P. Salovey. Selecting a Measure of Emotional Intelligence: The Case for Ability Scales. (Second submission version), 11 January 2000. Chapter in: R. Bar-On and J. D. A. Parker (eds.), The Handbook of Emotional Intelligence. Jossey Bass: 2000.
• NIH Behavioral and Social Sciences, NIH Behavioral and Social Sciences Research Seminar Series, 1999.

These special functions are responsible for analyzing sensory data, performing memory functions, learning new information, forming thoughts, and making decisions. Given this, cognitive science deals primarily with the functioning of the brains frontal lobe, which is responsible for cognition (the act or process of knowing, including both awareness and judgment) and memory. The brains prefrontal area enables concentration, attention, and the elaboration of thought. As the brains gatekeeper (judgment and inhibition), it also is responsible for personality and emotional traits. One of the frontal lobes main functions is memory, a very important topic in cognitive science.

Memory

Memory is defined as the power or process of reproducing or recalling what has been learned and retained, especially through associative mechanisms. It is also the store of things learned and retained from an organisms activity or experience, as evidenced by structure or behavior modification as well as recall and recognition.

Just like any other human trait, memory can be empowered and improved. How this is accomplished usually depends upon the individual. Many such techniques and tricks are advertised and marketed in daily life. While some actually work, most are like overloading our already full memory files. Eventually, it comes down to tricks vs. power, just like in sports. Consider the following analogy: If an Olympic boxer wants to improve his skills, should he watch pro-boxing matches on TV or punch a vinyl speed bag to train the muscles he needs to overpower his opponent?

This example might seem a little strange, for it depends heavily upon muscles. But, surprisingly, it really is relevant to the brains memory center, for recent developments in cognitive science show that a specific area behind the forehead (in the pre-frontal cortex) houses the brains memory muscle (1) ”the working memory. The discovery was made possible by advances in such brain-imaging technologies as PET and MRI scans.(2) Suppose you are studying for an exam and have to wade through a mound of reading material, or have to make a 10-digit phone call without the aid of a phone book, or are under a lot of pressure to answer questions rapidly or to make a snap decision. It is your working memory that decides what is relevant and where to best store such data for quick retrieval upon demand.

Developing our memory muscle

Pharmaceuticals, memory books, mnemonic tricks, seminars, and mental chronometrics (3) say that we develop our memory muscle and thereby improve our memory power. In reality, our memory muscle is our heads chief executive, for it is in charge of receiving, organizing, encoding, filing, and retrieving just about anything we learn, as well as for all planning and decision-making activity.

This activity is also known as psycho-interactive intelligence, for such tasks challenge all of the powers of working memory, including short-term memory, concentration, and mental speed. Computer-based exercises (CBEs) function in the same way. And, since they are psycho-interactive, they customize new challenges via simultaneous analysis and measurement. In addition, they usually are far more entertaining.

In fact, our memory muscle actually determines how quick, sharp, and focused our thinking is. According to Life magazine (July 1994): Evidence is accumulating that the brain works a lot like a muscle”the more you use it the more it grows. Although scientists had long ascertained that the brains chemistry was hard-wired by adolescence and inflexible in adulthood, its newly discovered ability to change, grow, and adapt is apparently with us well into old age.

NASA continues to make extensive use of training exercises to improve the brainpower of astronauts and pilots. Computer models of the brains functioning also are used in determining how to improve brainpower. Due to such research, they have been able to tap and train the brains memory muscle.

Mind Machines and Pharmatronics

The term mind machines refers to a large variety of technologies that affect ones brain: HemiSynch tapes, light and sound machines, cranial electrical simulation (CES) devices, biofeedback, biocircuits, lucid dreaming tapes and machines, consciousness alteration software, and sensory deprivation tanks. They are designed to transform the users brain waves into a wide variety of new patterns: from focused and alert to creative and ultra-relaxed, meditative to twilight receptive/learning state, or to different states of sleep. It is like instant brainwaves–ready in seconds on demand.

Bio-entrainment is the process of causing neurons to function in a desired manner. For example, a person with attention deficit disorder (ADD) cannot focus due to slow theta rhythms and desynchronous beta waves. Mind machines, especially light/sound and biofeedback, can help break these brain waves out of their scattered gridlock and drive them into open focus (theta) or closed focus (beta) patterns. Bio-entrainment also can enable people to focus better, relax or dive into deep meditation, induce creative or intuitive states, or to enter a deep sleep state quickly.

Encouraged by mind machines, pharmatronics (neuroscience) has induced researchers to postulate the psycho-physiological principle: Every psychological state has a corresponding measurable physiological (i.e., physical, electrical, and biochemical) state, and vice versa. For instance, using biofeedback to reach a state of deep relaxation and serenity (i.e., meditation) may cause the pituitary gland to produce endorphins that make you feel real good. This electronic-to-pharmacological effect, known as pharmatronics, is like an electronic drug or a device (e.g., a computer, game player, biofeedback device, or even software), for it alters the brains electrical (brain wave) pattern and, hence, its biochemical (pharmacological) profile.

One of the first notable pharmatronic agents was Tetris, a computerized puzzle game. Using PET scans, Dr. R. Haier discovered that first-time Tetris players experienced a significant increase in their cerebral glucose metabolic rate (GMR), indicating that their basic brain energy consumption was soaring.(4)

Computer-based exercises (CBEs)

Psycho-interactivity is not the same as interactivity. Clicking on a hyperlinked button to go to another page is interactive, whereas a psycho-interactive activity involves a computer taking the user through a series of mental challenges. But it does not stop there, for it also analyses the individuals reactions and then adjusts the level of complexity in subsequent challenges to ascertain the full potential of the players memory recall, thinking, and decision-making speed. Thus it renders a dynamic brainpower analysis, whereas most mental ability tests are static.

Since the brain is like a muscle, it must be challenged with the appropriate kind of resistance if it is to develop and grow. To develop any muscle, one has to engage in anaerobic exercises that feature a resistance or load that is very difficult to lift more than 10 to15 times (reps). Aerobic exercises (e.g., using a weight that you can lift 100 times), will not develop the muscles power. This is also true with the brain, for it will not develop only by thinking harder (an aerobic activity). What it requires is an anaerobic-like challenge, such as learning a new skill. Playing chess or mastering a new judo move can stimulate the brains neural dendrites to grow. However, the best anaerobic exercise is one that challenges the person to exert maximum mental energy, like running the 100-meter dash instead of a mile. This is what CBEs do.

CBEs also lower the noise in the brain, which leads to a more accurate reading and processing of information. The brains learning and testing is much like computers”its power is indicated by its speed, efficiency, and capacity for reading, filing, and recalling information.

CBEs are a synthesis of cognitive science, educational psychology, computer science, biofeedback, and psychophysiology. In addition to psycho-interactivity, add the law of psycho-physiology: If you can receive immediate on-line measurement of anything, whether it is your heart rate or brain waves, you can control it.(5)

In one experiment, astronauts used cognitive challenges every day and reported back to Houston so that their brains functioning could be recorded for that day. Subtle changes in cabin CO2, CO, ionization, and so on were found to have measurable effects on their brainpower and performance. CBEs do something like this, but their interactivity makes them more challenging and allows researchers to determine good or bad days in terms of brainpower.

Physical, perceptual, and cognitive reflexes are important in athletics. Contrary to common belief, reflexes can be trained and improved. There is plenty of research on how diet and nutritional supplements effects mental and physical performance. But training can sharpen and hone all of three reflexes. Psychology and physiology books say there is a limit to how fast one reacts to a simple stimulus, such as a car suddenly stopping in front of you on the freeway. The limit is assumed to be 150 milliseconds. But CBEs have reduced this to 100 milliseconds.

CBEs can improve perceptual reflexes (seeing speed). Moreover, some cognitive reflexes, strangely enough, are not highly correlated with physical reflexes. Just because an athlete has good hand-eye coordination and reflexes does not guarantee athletic success when the reaction is based on making a split-second cognitive choice or decision. Cognitive reflexes also can be improved.

Brain software in clinical studies

CBEs that analyze the brain and compute the users IQ may have an important role in studying and detecting Alzheimers, a progressive brain disorder. Josh Reynolds points out that while Alzheimers only affects 4 to 5 million people in the US, PMI (Premature Mental Impairment) is estimated to afflict over 50 million Americans. PMI typically manifests itself as loss of sustained concentration, memory, and mental quickness. It has many causes, such as undetected strokes, poor nutrition, head injury, alcohol and tobacco abuse, and depression.

However, the most prevalent cause of potentially serious brain deterioration may be cortisol, an adrenal hormone produced as a byproduct of stress. Recent research suggests that cortisol may actually kill brain cells and even lead to Alzheimers if the stress is not detected and treated. Ironically, the very medications used to treat stress (e.g., Valium) temporarily impair physical and cognitive reflexes, especially when dosages are too high or mixed with other drugs or alcohol.

CBEs can show the subtle early stages of stress-related memory loss, and can be used to titrate the dosage levels of anti-anxiety and anti-depressant drugs. Thus, they can minimize the temporary impairment mentioned above while maintaining the medications therapeutic efficacy. CBEs are developed on a computer science platform and thorough research into cognitive chronometrics, defined as the direct active computer-assisted measurement of the brains function. CBEs also can diagnose the early stages of a brain disorder before the onset of clinical symptoms. In addition to Alzheimers, CBEs are used to study and detect ADD and head trauma recovery.

The early stages of dementia, especially Alzheimers, are typically characterized by a breakdown in short-term memory. The primary breakdown is believed not to be in memory retrieval, but in the memory consolidation and storage phase, which are believed to be delegated to the hippocampus. According to CDI president Josh Reynolds, one of the earliest markers of Alzheimers is in the cholnergic system in the hippocampus.

PMI is characterized by a loss of sustained concentration, memory, and mental quickness. CBEs assess six areas of neuro-cognitive functions: physical reflexes, perceptual reflexes and thresholds, cognitive reflexes, working memory capacity (short-term memory), neuro-cognitive processing efficiency (concentration/attention), and neuro-cognitive processing speed (mental quickness). This is accomplished by measuring cognitive states (or status) and subtle changes in cognitive states.

CBEs also provide a reflective measure of neural noise, which is measured by analyzing, among other proprietary variables, the standard deviation (consistency) of the subjects intra-trial reaction times.

Conclusion

As in any field of science and life, computers are becoming a ubiquitous element in cognitive science. With its potential prospects and uses, the computer continues to offer many opportunities to improve our life. This article focused on some of the ways in which a computer can be used to aid the brains memory function. However this is just a crawling stage, and the field essentially remains wide open for researchers.

Footnotes

1. The term memory muscle is used here for the resemblance of this area of brain to a muscle in terms of functioning.
2. PET (Positron Emission Tomography) involves producing a computer-generated image of a biological activity within the body by detecting gamma rays emitted when introduced radionuclides decay and release positrons. MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) involves using a nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometer to produce electronic images of specific atoms and molecular structures in solids, especially human cells, tissues, and organs. Cognitive scientist Dr. Richard Heier of the University of California, Irvine, is a prominent figure in this area.
3. Mental Chronometrics: A field within cognitive science that uses computer assisted brain exercises to interactively isolate, challenge, and develop working memory.
4. Phil Sater is a pioneer in neuro-technology and light and sound Personal Relaxers. He also is involved in developing an L/S TurboCharger. See www.mindgear.com.

5 Josh Reynolds is the founder of www.brain.com.

References

• http://at-advocacy.phillynews.com/data/brain.html.
• McCrene, John. New Scientist. Apr. 1996.
• Quarterly Report. The Long Beach Business Journal. Nov. 1997.
• www.brain.com.
• www.mindgear.com.

“Any people who would like to secure their futures should apply as much energy to the upbringing of children as they devote to other problems. The energy devoted to many other things may go in vain, but whatever is spent for the upbringing of young generations to elevate them to the rank of humanity will be like an inexhaustible source of income.”
M. Fethullah GULEN

In thousands of American classrooms, early childhood educators and caregivers are faced with the dilemma of meeting the needs of an ever-changing population. As the population becomes more diverse, classrooms are beginning to reflect the larger population. In response to the expanding needs of young students, instructors and caregivers increasingly are trying to incorporate multiculturalism into their class curricula. This article will explore how diversity, inclusion, and multiculturalism have impacted the early childhood classroom.

EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

The concept of early childhood education, which originated in the 1800s with the formation of kindergartens, focuses upon children between 3 and 8 years of age. In many arenas, early childhood education theories center on encouraging and supporting the educational needs of young children.

The North Central Regional Educational Laboratory (NCREL) position statement on “Critical Issue : Promoting Children’s Readiness to Learn” states: “In most instances, children come to school ready to learn but with different cultural, educational, and environmental experiences to draw from. It is the responsibility of the educational system to meet children where they are and encourage and support their development from that point” (1999, p. 1).

The Educational Excellence for All Children Act of 1999 echoes NCREL’s position: “Consistently poor early education programs hinder children’s cognitive and language development. As a result, some children are unprepared to attend school and learn to read, the foundation of nearly all later learning” (Title II, Part C, “Early Childhood Educator Professional Development,” 1999, p. 1). Both NCREL and The Educational Excellence for All Children Act of 1999 touch upon the concepts of cognitive development and school readiness.

School readiness, as defined by Kagen et al., encompasses two points: readiness to learn, and readiness for school. Specifically, “… readiness to learn … involves a level of development at which the child has the capacity to learn specific materials…” (Kagen, 1990; Crnic & Lamberty, 1994; Lewit & Baker, 1995). On the other hand, readiness for school is defined as “… a specific set of cognitive, linguistic, social and motor skills that enables a child to assimilate the school’s curriculum” (Kagen, 1990; Crnic & Lamberty, 1994; Lewit & Baker, 1995). Hence, there is a possibility that a child may have a readiness to learn but lack a readiness for school. For example, a 3-year-old girl could have the ability to recognize colors; however, she may not have the ability to participate appropriately in a school setting.

On June 8, 1999, U.S. Secretary of Education Richard W. Riley gave an address to the National Press Club. Entitled “Cost, Quality and Child Outcomes’ Study,” it emphasized the following points: “What we know can be summarized this way: the quality of experiences in the years matters, and there appear to be critical periods in the first few years of life for acquiring certain language and cognitive skills. Therefore, the stakes are highest in the earliest years-the stage in life when children are their most vulnerable, and a stage when it has been proven difficult to build support for public investment” (1999).

The preceding excerpt alludes to a connection between language and cognitive skills. The emphasis on developing language and decision-making skills has resonated among early childhood educators for decades. Language development and cognitive development is important, because if children learn how to express themselves effectively, their cognitive abilities may grow exponentially. Furthermore, if children’s cognitive abilities become sharp, they may develop a better understanding of those who are different and make decisions accordingly.

It is well documented that many children become aware of differences among people before they enter a kindergarten classroom. Maritza Macdonald, contributing author of “Explorations with Young Children: A Curriculum Guide from the Bank Street College of Education” writes that children “… between the ages of 2 and 5 … become aware of gender, race, ethnicity, disabilities and other differences among people” (1999, p. 5). In “‘Do You See What I See?’ Appreciating Diversity in Early Childhood Settings” by Dr. Barbara Kupetz, it is stated that “children are around two or three when they begin to notice physical differences among people-some are short and others tall, some have blue eyes and others brown, and some have dark skin while others have light skin.” Both Macdonald and Kupetz point out that most children can discern differences among individuals at an early age. Hence, early childhood educators are not simply charged with teaching “empty vessels.” On the contrary, many educators are faced with the task of educating individuals who already may have formed negative perceptions of people who look different.

DIVERSITY AND THE EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION CLASROOM

Diversity means different things to different people. Webster’s New World Dictionary defines it as: “1. Quality, state, fact, or instance of being diverse; difference 2. Variety.”(2) While this definition touches upon the point of difference, it does not convey various perspectives that make up the concept of diversity.

Macdonald states: “The concept of diversity includes the perspectives of multiculturalism and nonsexist and antibias education. Diversity encompasses children’s individual interests and capabilities, racial and cultural differences, age and gender difference and language differences” (1999, p. 5). Her definition incorporates the range of differences that teachers and caregivers face everyday. Macdonald completes her definition by adding: “It also includes the social realities that affect children and communities, including availability of economic resources, access to technology, health and safety concerns, demographic make-up and locale” (1999, p. 5), Here she addresses social factors that can make a child seem different. Thus this definition can be applied to a child who is part of a racial minority, has a learning disability, does not share the majority’s native language, is homeless, or has a chronic illness. In other words’ the needs of a multitude of children are included.

Inclusion, which falls under the umbrella of diversity, is becoming another growing concern of early childhood educators. The Early Childhood Research Institute on Inclusion (ECRI) released the following statement on inclusion: “Early childhood inclusion, formerly known as ‘mainstreaming’ or ‘integration,’ refers to the full and active participation of young children with disabilities in programs with typically developing children. In principle, including children with disabilities in early childhood classes and community settings is a well-accepted practice”(1998, p. 4). This position adds an all-too-often ignored segment of an already diverse population: children with disabilities.

Deanna Jordon’s “Inclusion in the Preschool Setting” illustrates the challenges of seeing to the needs of special children in the early childhood classroom: “In many preschools and daycares today you can find a growing number of special needs children. These children have disabilities ranging from hyperactivity, attention deficit disorder, speech and language difficulties, blindness, deafness, mental retardation, and physical impairments. Thanks to the Americans with Disabilities Act, our society is becoming better equipped to meet the needs and challenges of these special children. Unfortunately, many daycare providers have little to no special training to deal with these children.”

Although the Americans with Disabilities Act was passed in 1990, many school districts remain ill-prepared to educate this special population.(3) Part of the challenge of implementing change within the early childhood school setting lies in the fact that many school administrators and teachers encounter financial, cultural, and social obstacles that prevent a fully inclusive atmosphere. ECRI supports the concern of inclusion by stating: “… family members, teachers, and administrators often encounter practical problems and policy barriers when they try to include young children with disabilities. Such barriers may prevent inclusion from occurring or may affect the quality of the experience for all children.”

When a person looks at all the problems faced by early childhood educators, it is not difficult to see why many teachers feel overwhelmed. Alison Levy, author of “Culture in the Classroom,” succinctly puts the point of view of early childhood educators into perspective: “In a field where burnout is common and salaries are low, there is not sufficient respect and appreciation for what teachers accomplish. It is often hard to accept this added challenge of continued learning” (p. 10). Although Levy acknowledges that educators face a number of barriers, she goes on to say that children who participate in multicultural settings gain valuable experiences. Hence, despite the obstacles that come with diversity and inclusion, both concepts are worth pursuing in multicultural classrooms.

MULTICULTURAL CLASSROOMS

Very few individuals can deny the importance of building strong communities within classrooms. Many teachers “… have become more interested in multicultural education, with the assumption that such approaches help children feel more welcomed, validated, integrated, and able to cooperate with others in their classroom” (Allen, McNeill, & Schmidt 1992; Brendenkamp, 1986; Byrnes & Kiger, 1992, Gollnick & Chin, 1994).

Levy concurs with the preceding statement by speaking to educators directly: “… if your class includes a variety of cultures or abilities, the group spends more time learning about and cultivating an understanding of those unique features.” Validation, integration, cooperation, and cultivation of ideas and experiences are of vital importance. Consequently, if educators ease this process for young students, they will impact the futures of their students. Macdonald emphasizes the impact of diversity on decision making: “… when you include diversity in your work with children, you are preparing them for citizenship in a society where people speak different languages, practice different customs and embrace different values. By starting in early childhood, you will be helping individuals learn to work together, communicate across differences, and value just and fair treatment for all” (1999, p. 10). Both Levy and Macdonald encourage educators to remain aware the impact teachers have on the well-being of future societies and generations.

M. Fethullah Gulen, a noted scholar who has been molding the minds of students for close to four decades, maintains that there is a direct relationship between a community and its young people. In his Towards the Lost Paradise, Gulen explains: “A community maintains its liveliness through the spirit of its young, and flourishes through it. When a community loses this spirit, it fades and withers away, like a flower whose veins have been cut, and it is finally crushed under foot.”(4) His comparison of a flower to a child is all the more poignant when we look at the loss of innocence thousands of children have experienced due to violence in schools.

CONCLUSION

Diversity and multiculturalism may seem like concepts that are not age-appropriate for young children. However, I contend that issues of diversity must have a place in the early childhood curriculum. Although children may have difficulties articulating the differences they see around them, they are aware of the concept of difference. Just as classroom populations are changing, the face of early childhood curriculum also must expand and grow to meet the needs of the twenty-first century.

FOOTNOTES

1. M. Fethullah Giilen, Criteria or The Lights of the Way -1 (Izmir, Turkey: Kaynak A.S., 1998), 55.
2. Webster’s New World Collegiate Dictionary, 3d ed., (N.p., n.d.)
3. Americans with Disabilities Web site: www.usdoj.gov/crt/ ada/adahoml.htm.
4. M. Fethullah Giilen, Towards the Lost Paradise (London: Truestai, 1996), 25.

REFERENCES

• Americans with Disabilities Act. www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/adahoml.htm.
• Early Childhood Research Institute on Inclusion. “What is Inclusion?” www.inform.umd.edu/EDUC/Depts/ecrii/inclu.html
• The Educational Excellence for All Children Act of 1999. “Title II, Part C, Early Childhood Educator Professional Development.” (4 pp.). www.ed.gov. offices/OESE/ESEA/prospectus/title2-c.html
• Gulen, Fethullah M. Criteria or the Lights of the Way -1 (Izmir, Turkey: Kaynak A.S., 1998)
• . Towards the Lost Paradise. London: Truestar, 1996.
• Jordon, Deanna. “Inclusion in the Preschool Setting.” www.earlychildhood.com.” Informative Articles from earlychildhood.com.
• Kupetz, Barbara. ‘”Do You See What I See?’ Appreciating Diversity in Early Childhood Settings.” Early Childhood News (Jul.-Aug. 1998): 1-5.
• Levy, Alison. “Culture in the Classroom.” Early Childhood News (Jan.-Feb. 1997): 1-9.
• Macdonald, Maritza. “Valuing Diversity: An Excerpt from Explorations with Young Children, A Curriculum Guide from the Banks Street College of Education.” www.early-childhood.com.
• North Central Regional Educational Labor. “Critical Issues: Promoting Children’s Readiness to Learn.” www.ncrel.org/ncrel/sdrs/areas/issues/students/earlycld/ea700.htm.
• Riley, Richard W. “‘Cost, Quality and Child Outcomes’ Study.”8 June 1999. (Speech).

A more systematic approach to language and cognition began in the 1920s. During the 20s and 30s Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf separately claimed that language is the main factor in the constructive process, that, in effect, language determines thought. Whorf claimed in his Collected Papers on Metalinguitics that language is the prime factor in objectification of reality. Language determines thought and certain aspects of it restrict our view of the world. A weaker form of the ‘language hypothesis’ does not insist that language determines thought, but that language predisposes the way people think.

During the 50s, when behaviourism was the intellectual fashion, there were not many studies on language and cognition. The stimulus-response-reinforcement model favoured by the behaviourists was applied to language acquisition by Skinner in his book Verbal Behaviour. According to Skinner, verbal behaviour can be acquired if the set of appropriate responses is frequently followed by reinforcement. Reinforcement, he claimed, is equally important after language has been acquired. The purpose and function of reinforcement is to maintain the strength of the response. Language acquisition and verbal behaviour are regarded as mechanical processes. Verbal behaviour can only develop in a social context, with the participation of another person or audience. The speaker learns to speak eventually only in the presence of a listener; the reinforcement that a speaker needs is absent or present when a listener is absent or present. This view treats language as a learning behaviour that can be changed or manipulated with the help of reinforcement, or deprivation, in other words ‘a specific controlling condition … control of verbal stimuli.’

Skinner presents three different types of behaviour which control the verbal stimuli: the echoic, the textual and the intraverbal. ‘Echoic’ behaviour is when the response consists of a sound pattern reproducing something very similar to the stimulus. It is established in the child through the special reinforcement that Skinner calls ‘educational’. Educational reinforcement is provided by institutions whose behaviour is influenced by economic reinforcement: for example, when a teacher gets some financial (or other) rewards for teaching the child how to acquire language effectively. ‘Textual’ behaviour relates to learning how to read. It too is established through educational reinforcement. The stimulus in this case is a text which may be in the form of pictures, formalised pictographs, characters or (more commonly) letters or symbols of an alphabet. ‘Textual’ behaviour describes the way people acquire the skill of writing. Writing behaviour has all the characteristics of ‘echoic’ behaviour, but expressed in visual rather than auditory terms. Three stages are distinguished: the stage of producing the necessary materials, the stage of making differentiated marks, and the stage of transmitting these marks to the reader.

In the case of intraverbal behaviour there is no correspondence between stimulus and response-produced, as in echoic behaviour or as in the correspondence between different dimensional systems as in the textual behaviour. This allows the consideration of all types of vocal and textual stimuli and responses in all combinations at the same time. Interestingly, Skinner regards translation as a ‘special case of intraverbal behaviour’.

Skinner’s approach to thought was abstract, not empirically based. His view was that the results of human thought can be most unpredictable and are therefore severely difficult to explain. So, the simplest and most satisfactory way of explaining thought is to consider it as a behaviour. Thought is not a secretive way of influencing the behaviour, but it is behaviour itself, the ‘sum total’ of the responses to the world and the environment the behaviour ‘lives’ in. He concludes: ‘When we study human thought we study behaviour.’

In the 60s the debate about language was between two conflicting positions. The behaviourist accounts of language and language-acquisition in terms of association, and the approach of Chomsky and his colleagues who presented a linguistic analysis strongly linked with psychology. Their basic argument was that the stimuli-response theory was highly irrelevant with respect to language acquisition. Being mainly interested in the syntactic forms of language they believed that the deep structures of sentences are abstract and inexplicable by the simplistic arguments put forward by the behaviourists. Their debate with the behaviourists, and the theoretical papers in which they criticized and cast doubt on their views, did not leave much room for attention to childhood development and how the processes of that development affect their language acquisition.

Piaget, although not a psychologist by profession (he started out as a biologist), showed a great interest in the way children think. He believed, in contradistinction to Sapir-Whorf, that thought determines language, a position since known as the ‘cognition hypothesis’. The basic difference between language studies in the 60s and Piaget’s approach was that Piaget’s interest was in children aged six and above, and investigated the first structured language during and shortly after the stage of two-word utterance. He discussed language and the thinking of the child, the language function, the questions that children put, and understanding between children.

Piaget and Chomsky came to be the most recognised and respected representatives of the cognitive movement; their work has inspired and influenced so many and to such an extent, that one can rightly speak of a school of thought within the field of cognitive studies. Chomsky had revolutionary and controversial views about language and thought sharply contrasted with anything that had come before. He claimed that every child has an innate knowledge system that contains abstract linguistic structures that are not taught rather, they are already part of the child’s system from birth. He hypothesized that under those circumstances, there must exist a set of grammatical rules that would produce syntactic descriptions for any sentence in any given language. Piaget on the other hand believed that a child must go through several stages to acquire an adult level of logical thought. The effect of the environment on a child’s thought and language is, for Piaget, crucial. Language is an extremely broad set of human capacities. Identical mental operations underlie one’s encounters with a wide range of materials and topics such as space, time, casualty and morality. So the later forms of thought can be located in earlier forms. Piaget examined the child and his mind as an active and constructive agent, that slowly gains knowledge and logic through developing cognitive processes. Chomsky’s view was different; he saw the mind as a set of pre-programmed units fully equipped, that need only a modest trigger from the environment to function. In other words Piaget considered human linguistic capacities as a product of a general ‘constructed’ intellectual development, whereas Chomsky insisted that they are a highly specialised part of the human genetic inheritance, largely separate from any other human faculty. They are, Chomsky said, a kind of an innate knowledge that has only to unfold. The Piagetian cognitive hypothesis claims that language derives from thought. Chomsky takes a radically different view, arguing that language is divorced from thinking. He claims that each human intellectual faculty is located in different areas of the brain, maturing at its own rate and through distinct processes. To make this statement more comprehensible, Chomsky used the analogy of bodily organs: he regarded the mind as a set of organs, like the liver or the lungs or the heart. A heart is not taught to beat, but matures according to its own genetic timetable. The same is true of ‘language’ as well as to other ‘organs of the mind’, that are programmed to function over time according to a genetic timetable.

Although both used and developed models provided by biology and logic, they showed interest in very different kinds of examples and explanations. Piaget tried to give a rich description of the stages that children pass through to achieve a higher level of knowledge. So he developed an elaborate technical vocabulary, rooted in biology, and he based his conclusions upon errors that children made when he gave them his famous challenging puzzles to solve. His ability to give convincing answers to the problems of the development of knowledge, and his hard work in collecting and synthesizing an enormous amount of data, are his big contribution to this field.

Chomsky’s contribution is no less important. His difference from Piaget is that he was not concerned to describe behavioural phenomena; his concern was the development of linguistic science and how its approach and methods could carry into the social sciences. His views of language as a part of an innate and universal system of knowledge and language are the same, had huge influence, although it is an hypothesis impossible to prove.

In October 1975, Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky were invited to express their ideas and present their theories in a meeting which took place at the Abbaye de Royaumont in France. The historical importance of this ‘rendezvous’ was noted by the psychology and linguistic community all over the world and even scientists from behavioural and empirical areas attended the occasion. Piaget and Chomsky exchanged views about language and cognition, but, as people who attended the Royaumont meeting commented, there was no agreed conclusion, only exploration of issues.

It is hardly surprising that no firm conclusions were reached at that meeting. The study of cognition is not an empirical study of given data or facts susceptible to quantitative measurement or experimentation. The subject-matter has to do with human psychology, where different views, theories, methods and experiments are used, different schools are created and several disciplines such as anthology, biology, philosophy etc. are involved together. Without ignoring the important contribution of schools such as behaviourism, psychoanalysis etc., only the further development of the cognitive movement appears likely to give satisfactory answers to issues that arise everyday about language and thought. The charm of uncertainty will draw the passion for further research that will lead from mere confusion to a new theory, a new argument for appraisal or debate.

Useful reading 

• Appel, M,H. (1977) Topics in Cognitive Development.
• Drorni, E. (1993) Language and Cognition: A Developmental Perspective.
• Massimo, P. (1979) Language and Learning.
• Skinner, B. (1957) Verbal Behaviour.
• Vasniadou, S. (1993) Language and Thought.
• Vhorf B.L. (1952) Collected Papers on Metalinguitics. 

English converts have been the topic of a recent research. The research was based on formal interviews with 70 converts; 50 males and 20 females. Their ages range from 17 to 66 years. The major objective of this research was to observe and record the conversion phenomenon of English converts to Islam and to provide the reasons underlying them. The research endeavoured to understand the psychological and sociological roots of conversion, to find out converts’ background, and the conversion processes they went through. For this end the whole lifespan of the converts was examined.

Religion of Upbringing

English converts seem to have come from families where there was no strong identification with any religion. They mostly come from families that did not belong to a church, or, were not active participants in a church. Most describe their parents’ connection with the church in terms of ceremonial attendance like weddings and funerals. When classified according to religion of upbringing 51(73%) of the 70 were Church of England; 12 (17%) were Catholics; 3 (4%) were Methodists; 4 (6%) were Jews. Significantly, 17 (24.3%) had parents religiously heterogeneous such as mother being Church of England and father Agnostic, or mother being Catholic and father Church of England. And 5 (7%) described one parent being atheist or agnostic. 36 (51.4%) said that they had ‘no’ or ‘weak’ religious upbringing. 20 (28.6%) answered ‘normal’ while only 14 (20%) described it as ‘strong’.

Religious Affiliation Prior to Conversion

Converts were quite explicit concerning their general dissatisfaction with their previous religious beliefs. Only 8 (11%) mentioned that they were practising their religion of origin prior to conversion. 32 (46%) reported being nominal, weak or disillusioned with their old religion. 16 (23%) had no religion or were not interested in religion at all. And 14 (20%) were involved with a religious movement, such as Hare Krishna and Divine Light Mission, prior to conversion. As for ‘belief in God’, 58 (83%) reported that they believed in God, 9 (13%) lost their belief in God, while 3 (4%) were not sure if they believed or not.

As the above figures illustrate, it is interesting that for a significant number of converts’ rejection of the faith of their parents or culture did not imply a rejection of religion in general or loss of belief in God. 14 (20%) proceeded to explore other religious alternatives following their initial rejection of a particular faith. As for religious affiliations and belief in God prior to conversion, and what conversion meant for these people in terms of these areas, they may be classified into three groups:

1) Those who had no religious commitment for a long time or described themselves as nominal in their religion of origin. People who fall into this group form the vast majority (75%). For them conversion meant a religious intensification, not through the religion of childhood, but through a different religion.

2) Those who described themselves as religious for a long period of time, but became disillusioned later on and were on the brink of losing their belief in their religion prior to conversion. Around 12% fall into this group.

3) Those who lost belief in God after rejecting their religion. For them, conversion meant rediscovering belief in God and returning to the way of God. Around 13% fall into this category.

Wilson (1976: 19-21), in discussing the effects of secularization on modern society illustrates how moral control by religion gave way to modern society’s mechanical and bureaucratic devices, and how everyday life has been demoralized as human involvement in many areas of activity was replaced by technical controls. Arguing the decreasing role of the church in England, Wilson asserts that ‘people have what might be called an ‘office’ conception of the Church, a service facility that is well distributed over the land area of the country to be available when needed.’ The converts’ accounts confirm that over-secularization led them to seek an alternative way of life. They believe that Islam gave them a practical means of getting closer to God living a good life, and getting peace in ‘this secular environment’. They became interested in Islam in the first place because they felt that Islam has strong clear values on things they feel concerned about, not just the abuse of environment, but even things like homosexuality. Their revolt is not always directed against religious beliefs but against certain practices legitimized by Christianity and its Church. While giving their accounts on their previous life, the converts emphasized that they felt a need for a religion whereby they could orient their everyday life and they preferred Islam because it is a complete way of life not a compartmentalized religion confined to certain areas, as Sarah pointed out: ‘As an ex-Christian I now see Christianity as just a religion, but Islam, as I understand, is the way you live. It is a different approach. For instance, you can be a Christian and you can do almost everything, and you can say you are a Christian happily. But if you are Muslim, it is different, you are restricted in that matter.’

They felt that something was missing, and that was the influence of religion in their lives. Before coming to Islam they started criticising the existing religion and its culture and began having certain affinities and world views closer to that of Islam which eventually made a possible correlation between their views and Islam.

Some of those who were involved or became interested in new religions were in search of an alternative to the secular way of life with a strong reaction to the materialistic and secular perspective of the society. Garry, for example, became a Zen-Buddhist in a university when he came to believe that spirituality was lacking in the teaching system. Yet Garry found Zen-Buddhism monastic, not encompassing the social dimension of life. He said: ‘It could answer personal questions, but it couldn’t answer global questions.’

Socio-demographic Factors

Contrary to the assumption that most of the people who join an alien religion or so-called new religious movement are dropouts from society, converts to Islam can in no way be seen as such. On the contrary, their educational and work careers are quite normal. They achieved significantly higher levels of education than those typical for their population as a whole. 60 percent had at least a bachelor’s degree. Indeed, 20 percent had advanced graduate degrees. Converts to Islam tend to come from the middle class section of the society. 46 (66%) associated themselves with the middle class, while 24 (34%) identified with the working class. They seem to have a wide range of occupations which vary from taxi drivers to university lecturers. As for marital status, 40 people were single at the time of conversion. 23 were married or engaged (14 to Muslims, and 9 to non-Muslims), and 7 were divorcees.

Emotional and Cognitive Concerns

A significant number of the testimonials covered accounts on troubled lives before entrance into Islam. The pre-conversion life of nearly half of the converts (48.6%) was judged to contain emotional distress. For them this period of their lives seems to have led them to look for something. For one fifth of the sample the emotional turmoil that characterized their descriptions of their childhood and adolescence was also apparent in the immediate antecedents to the conversion experience. Their unhappiness was, in most cases, caused by parental marriages which either ended up in divorce or nearly broke up, and they described it as the major trauma of their lives. 13 (18.6%) divorced or had a broken relationship before conversion and this caused long-term emotional turmoil and anxiety. Some converts said that they were grateful to God to have experienced such distressful incidents because it was these events that sparked them into thinking about religion.

The conversion experience may be related to emotional turmoil or personal distress experienced in the immediate preconversion period. However, the accounts of the converts to Islam suggest that conversions did not occur as a direct result of the emotional turmoil or personal distress, although 34 (48.6%) reported emotional distress prior to conversion. It may be associated with conversion, but it is not necessarily a predisposing condition. In the preconvert there may be an unconscious conflict, and a psychological set, but these factors, alone, in many cases, are not enough. There must be a current force which lights the fuse. That fuse took the form of cognitive and existential questions. The course that the pre-conversion period takes in many cases is that the emotional turmoil or personal distress of the individual leads him to a stage where he develops cognitive concerns.

Cognitive quest, for the converts to Islam, contained concerns or preoccupation with political, social, and moral issues, and religious doubts. Existential concerns cover questions like ‘What is the meaning and purpose of my life?’, ‘How does one deal with the fact that he is going to die?’, and ‘What should one do about his shortcomings?’. 33 (47.1%) reported preoccupation with cognitive concerns. They reported feelings of aimlessness, lack of purpose or direction and meaning, and of incompleteness, which mainly arose out of cognitive and existential concerns. These people believe that the cognitive problems that used to bother them are met by conversion to Islam because it offered them a complete philosophy of life; it proclaimed the responsibility of man, a future life, and a day of judgement. It answered their questions like ‘What is man’s place in the universe?’, and ‘What is his relationship with the world around him.’ Cognitive quests also revealed ambiguities in one’s belief system. These ambiguities were anchored during adolescence, but revived later in life when one became actively involved in life situations and felt an urge to have a faith, or a need to return to religion. Until this stage of their life these people seemed not to have bothered about religion, but at this stage when these needs became more manifest they re-questioned their previous beliefs and as a result they either felt confused or they decided to give them up entirely. The ambiguities with regard to their previous religious beliefs, namely Christianity, centred around some basic concepts of Christianity and its theological implications such as Trinity, Jesus being the Son of God, original sin, atonement theory, and the intercession of the clergy. Some criticisms also focused on perceived hypocrisy in mainstream churches and their incapacity to lead the people in moral issues.

(to be continued)

References

• BALL, H. (1987) Why British Women Embrace Islam?, Leicester: Muslim Youth Educational Council.
• JOHNSTONE, P. (1981) ‘Christians and Muslims in Britain’, Islamochristiana, No.7, pp.67-99.
• MCHUGH, F. (1990) ‘Allah’s English Daughters’, Telegraph Weekend Magazine, 31 March, pp.34-S.
• WILSON, B. (1976) Contemporary Transformation of Religion, Oxford: Clerandon.