Discussions over personal liberty and government intervention are as old as modern governments, as J.S. Mill’s writings show.

John Stuart Mill was among the many philosophers, both before and after, who attempted to determine when government intervention in the private lives of individuals was legitimate. The authoritarian regimes of 19^th century Europe triggered thinkers to study citizen’s rights and state powers. Mill attempted to regulate the actions of these authoritarian regimes by distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate government intervention in his book On Liberty. Mill’s ideas were one influence among many on the structure and laws of the modern nation state. Using his ideas on freedom and government as a starting point, we can discuss psychological harm, human fallibility, and social responsibilities.

Mill, in On Liberty, identifies two mechanisms for determining legitimate government intervention: the harm principle and utilitarianism. The harm principle states that government can only legitimately interfere with the actions of individuals if the actions of the individuals harm others against their will. Thus, if an action does not harm another against their will, the government cannot interfere. Notice that an individual can harm themselves or even other people with the appropriate consent. Effectively, the harm principle constitutes an absolute bar to government intervention on unharmful private action.

The second mechanism, utilitarianism, comes into play after government intervention is considered to be legitimate due to harmful consequences of private actions. At this point, the government must do a utility calculation, or a cost-benefit analysis, in which it must determine whether government intervention will result in more harm than the private action it will attempt to stop. If the analysis indicates that government intervention will result in more harm, government intervention would be considered illegitimate, and vice versa. Thus, while the harm principle constituted an absolute categorical bar, the utilitarianism mechanic requires a case-by-case determination of the legitimacy of government intervention.

In order to apply the harm principle it is important not only to know what the principle is, but also what constitutes harm. The broader the definition of harm becomes, the larger the pool of actions that the government can interfere with becomes. In general, the classification of physical damage to body and property as harm is generally accepted by society as well as by Mill. However, the definition of harm can include things other than just physical damage. In order to properly apply the harm principle, it must be determined whether psychological harm and failure to act can be classified as harm, warranting government intervention.

Psychological Harm

Can feeling distress, being upset, or experiencing psychological harm due to another individual’s actions be categorized as harm? If one were to accept distress as harm, then the definition of harm has effectively been broadened to include every instance in which one feels discomfort or is upset by another’s action, expanding the sphere of legitimate government intervention.

Mill does not determine distress or psychological harm to be harm. The distress or psychological harm Mill refers to is one originating from a disagreement of values between two individuals. For example, one individual may like the color blue while another dislikes it. The distress, anger, resentment, or any other negative feelings the other may feel when the first wears a blue shirt is the psychological harm that Mill refers to. A more consequential example would be the distress that a Democrat may feel about the ideas expressed at a Republican rally. The views expressed at the rally are clearly contrary to the individual’s beliefs, yet the distress originating from this ideological difference cannot be categorized as harm. If it was categorized as harm, then the government could intervene whenever actions or speech was contrary to the ideology and beliefs of the most powerful or the most vocal.

Mill, in On Liberty, states that “unless we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors, and to say that we may persecute others because we are right and they must not persecute us because they are wrong, we must beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice the application to ourselves” (1). Here he attempts to stop the use of the harm principle in attempts to impose beliefs or one’s own moral values on others. He argues that imposing views on another is wrong, because one would not want others to impose their views on them. Additionally, Mill emphasizes the fallibility of human reasoning and preferences, stating that despite one’s conviction in one’s own position in an argument, there is always the possibility of error.

Admittance of the fallibility is not only a sign of humility and recognition of possibilities, but also a very real demonstration of understanding one’s own limitations inherent in being human. This principle has been recognized and applied by many scholars and thinkers in addition to Mill, like Socrates and Said Nursi. For example, in The Republic, Plato quotes Socrates as exclaiming “[a]s for me, all I know is that I know nothing” (2).

Similarly, Said Nursi demonstrates the same recognition of the fallibility of human beings in his Risale-i Nur and attributes true knowledge only to God. This is clearly displayed in his use of text from the Quran at the beginning and ending of all the chapters in The Words. Thus, Nursi begins his work by drawing from what he considers the true source of knowledge and ends with that same infallible source.

Lastly, English philosopher Thomas Hobbes seems to support Mill’s position against persecution by arguing in Leviathan that “do not that to another, which thou wouldst not have done to thyself” (3). Hobbes’ view is in effect a version of the golden rule, limiting social interaction to only actions one would deem acceptable if done to him/her. In congruence with Hobbes’s golden rule, Mill argues that imposing one’s views on others is wrong, and that feeling upset due to the failure of others to conform to those views is not harm. Thus, even if the actions of an individual upset or cause psychological harm to others, the government cannot legitimately interfere.

Failure to Act

Though Mill prevents distress or psychological harm from being used to legitimize government intervention over an individual’s actions, he permits failure to act to be classified as harm. In situations where a failure to act causes a negative or harmful outcome, government intervention would be legitimate. For example, the government may prosecute a firefighter if his negligence allowed a building to burn down. However, classifying failure to act or inaction as harm is dangerous, because people are not capable of infinite actions in a moment. The jurisdiction of government intervention is expanded tremendously by this classification. Why would Mill, who constructed a mechanism for limiting government intervention, expand government power in this way? And what restraints can be applied to the failure-to-act classification?

Socrates’ ideas, as expressed in The Republic by Plato, provide some insight into answering the previous questions. After examining Plato’s views in The Republic, it is possible to claim that Socrates would agree with Mill in including the failure-to-act as harm. His definition of a just society is a society in which everyone is doing their job or role in society (4). From this, one can assume that a just action within a society would be whatever action is in accordance with the job of the individual as determined by his soul and position in society. Thus, failure to perform one’s job would then be classified as an unjust action by Plato, open to government intervention for the restoration of social justice.

Socrates’ view seems to emphasize the nature of the action that the individual is failing to do. If the failure to act involved the failure to do one’s job in society, then the failure to act would be considered unjust. On the other hand, if the failure to act involved inaction about an issue that was not the individual’s responsibility, then it is possible to conclude that the failure to act in this instance is not an unjust action. Thus, this approach distinguishes between a firefighter who chooses not to stop a fire from a regular citizen who chooses not to stop a fire. The firefighter neglects his responsibility, opening him to criminal prosecution, while the regular citizen’s inaction is not open to prosecution. By allowing the failure to act to be considered as harm, Mill avoided conflicting with the conditional nature of determining whether the failure to act is just or unjust as extrapolated from Plato’s views.

Socrates’ and Mill’s analysis regarding the failure to act is based solely on the legal and formal responsibilities of the individual. The police have a responsibility to stop crime, and parents have a responsibility to take care of their children, etc. Each nation’s unique constitution and laws make legal responsibilities country-specific and unique. For example, many European states, like Germany and France, require citizens to provide assistance to persons in danger (5). However, the duty to rescue those in peril does not exist in other countries, like the United States (6). Of course, most people call the authorities for help and attempt to provide first-aid, but the fact remains that in most of the United States, there is no legal obligation to rescue. Each country determines the legal responsibilities of its citizens, some choosing to expand and some choosing to restrict the extent of responsibilities.

For many people, informal responsibilities extend beyond formal responsibilities; these are often based on the individual’s religion, culture, and ethics. While government intervention may not be legitimate for failures of informal responsibilities according to Mill, informal responsibilities constitute an important piece of the society. For example, children have an informal responsibility to care for their parents, especially during their old age. If children ignore this responsibility, the government cannot and should not intervene. After all, the government is not the ultimate solution for every social problem, and each member of the country may not believe in the same informal responsibilities due to different culture, religion, and ethics. Instead, the true solutions to failures in informal responsibilities are education in social values and decency, social structures, communities, and institutions.

Mill’s principles on government intervention in the lives of free people provided a platform to discuss psychological harm and social responsibilities. Government can provide solutions for certain social issues, but not for all. In recognition of this, Mill wrote of an alternative limited government to the authoritarian regimes of his time. In this alternative, conflicting and controversial ideologies could co-exist, and government would only regulate formal responsibilities. The burden rests on the society to care for the informal responsibilities.

Notes

1. Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty, 155
2. Plato, The Republic, (Plato 354c, book 1)
3. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Pt. 1, Ch. 15, para. 35
4. Kara, Mahmut. “Rethinking Plato: Philosophical Idealism and Political Totalitarianism.” Fountain Magazine, April-June 2001.
5. Weinrib, Ernest J. “The Case for a Duty to Rescue.” The Yale Law Journal , Vol. 90, No. 2 (Dec., 1980), pp. 247-293 Published by: The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc. URL:<http://www.jstor.org/stable/795987>.
6. Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959)

This world and its pleasures are a heavy burden. No one (except the corrupt in spirit) is contented with it. Rather than suffering from dependence on almost the whole universe, being needy of all means and causes, and appealing to contending deaf, dumb, and blind masters, people should seek refuge in a single, All-Hearing, and All-Seeing Master. If they place their trust in Him, He is enough for them.

Fourth truth

Know, O ego, that the scientific inventions woven around your head, the lines of conscious artistry connected to you, and the things put in your hands stretched out in neediness all demonstrate that your Creator, Maker, and Helper hears your sighs of destitution and your cries for help. Having mercy on you, He gratifies all your needs. Seeing that the Creator and Maker answers your tiniest cells’ calls for help, why should He ”the All-Hearing, All-Seeing” not answer your call for help?¹

Know, O spacious cell called ego or selfhood and built up of lesser cells. Say: O God! O Lord! O my Creator! O my Fashioner! O my Owner! O my Master! O my Guardian! Yours is the dominion (of all things) and to You is all praise! I am a guest in this body, Your property that You have entrusted to me.

O selfhood! Why do you claim to own that which you will never own? Give up this false claim that throws you into acute pain. Consider the emotions of pity and affection, which are among the spirit’s exhilarating embellishments: If they were left to your pretended ownership, they would harm and torment the spirit.

For example, the misfortune and calamities striking you or others would cause you to remain in continual pain and go so far as to blame Destiny for them. However, when you see a soldier who has lost his horse or whose residence has been burnt down by mistake working directly under a king, you do not feel much pity for the soldier. If you consider that both the horse and residence belong to the king, you will see that their disappearance does not cause a significant decrease in his property. Nor does the soldier worry about it”indeed, inasmuch as he is poor, it is highly probable that out of pity the king will compensate his losses with something better. In the same way, God is the All-Compassionate and always treats His servants with utmost compassion.² Therefore, compassion for creatures as creatures of God exhilarates the spirit. By contrast, pity arising from supposing that everything owns itself continually suffocates and distresses the spirit.

One with a sound viewpoint based on belief in Divine Unity sees every living being’s body as resembling a hired captain on a king’s ship being controlled by that king, who controls his property as he wills. This viewpoint does not allow one to see an ant or a honeybee as contending with attacking causes. Rather, according to it, the ant controls an earthly vehicle while the other controls an aircraft, the reins of which are in the hands of the Power of an All-Powerful One. Causes do not have much weight in the sight of either animal, which depend on the True Owner (of all things).

By saying: Surely we are God’s and surely we are returning to Him (2:156), when struck by misfortune, one means: All property is God’s and I am under His command, journeying to Him. My relation with my body, which is His property, is like that of a soldier holding something belonging to the king. When robbers attack him, he states: I am responsible for guarding this property entrusted to me. However, I am unable to guard it now. Like this property, I also belong to the king and am going to him. When those with such a viewpoint see a fellow struck with misfortune or suffer personal misfortune, they are relieved of continual distress. Otherwise, they are constantly weighed down with pain and distress.

Footnotes

1. For example, a person equipped with the limited powers of sight, hearing, and learning may conclude that the Creator must be All-Seeing, All-Hearing, and All-Knowing. One’s poverty, helplessness, and mortality may lead one to discover that the Creator is Absolutely Wealthy, Powerful, and Permanent. (Tr.)
2. The best analogy applicable to certain aspects of the relation with God and the creation is that between a monarch and his subjects. Since many immaterial truths, especially those pertaining to the Divine Being, are abstract and difficult to understand, Divine Scriptures usually use parables, metaphors, similes, and analogies. For example, God is sometimes introduced like a monarch or king, having a throne and armies. Another reason why Said Nursi used such analogies may be that he wrote this book in the 1910s, when there was still a sultanate in Anatolia. (Tr.)

Adapted from Bediuzzaman’s Epitomes of Light (Mathnawi al-Nuriya)

English converts have been the topic of a recent research. The research was based on formal interviews with 70 converts; 50 males and 20 females. Their ages range from 17 to 66 years. The major objective of this research was to observe and record the conversion phenomenon of English converts to Islam and to provide the reasons underlying them. The research endeavoured to understand the psychological and sociological roots of conversion, to find out converts’ background, and the conversion processes they went through. For this end the whole lifespan of the converts was examined.

Religion of Upbringing

English converts seem to have come from families where there was no strong identification with any religion. They mostly come from families that did not belong to a church, or, were not active participants in a church. Most describe their parents’ connection with the church in terms of ceremonial attendance like weddings and funerals. When classified according to religion of upbringing 51(73%) of the 70 were Church of England; 12 (17%) were Catholics; 3 (4%) were Methodists; 4 (6%) were Jews. Significantly, 17 (24.3%) had parents religiously heterogeneous such as mother being Church of England and father Agnostic, or mother being Catholic and father Church of England. And 5 (7%) described one parent being atheist or agnostic. 36 (51.4%) said that they had ‘no’ or ‘weak’ religious upbringing. 20 (28.6%) answered ‘normal’ while only 14 (20%) described it as ‘strong’.

Religious Affiliation Prior to Conversion

Converts were quite explicit concerning their general dissatisfaction with their previous religious beliefs. Only 8 (11%) mentioned that they were practising their religion of origin prior to conversion. 32 (46%) reported being nominal, weak or disillusioned with their old religion. 16 (23%) had no religion or were not interested in religion at all. And 14 (20%) were involved with a religious movement, such as Hare Krishna and Divine Light Mission, prior to conversion. As for ‘belief in God’, 58 (83%) reported that they believed in God, 9 (13%) lost their belief in God, while 3 (4%) were not sure if they believed or not.

As the above figures illustrate, it is interesting that for a significant number of converts’ rejection of the faith of their parents or culture did not imply a rejection of religion in general or loss of belief in God. 14 (20%) proceeded to explore other religious alternatives following their initial rejection of a particular faith. As for religious affiliations and belief in God prior to conversion, and what conversion meant for these people in terms of these areas, they may be classified into three groups:

1) Those who had no religious commitment for a long time or described themselves as nominal in their religion of origin. People who fall into this group form the vast majority (75%). For them conversion meant a religious intensification, not through the religion of childhood, but through a different religion.

2) Those who described themselves as religious for a long period of time, but became disillusioned later on and were on the brink of losing their belief in their religion prior to conversion. Around 12% fall into this group.

3) Those who lost belief in God after rejecting their religion. For them, conversion meant rediscovering belief in God and returning to the way of God. Around 13% fall into this category.

Wilson (1976: 19-21), in discussing the effects of secularization on modern society illustrates how moral control by religion gave way to modern society’s mechanical and bureaucratic devices, and how everyday life has been demoralized as human involvement in many areas of activity was replaced by technical controls. Arguing the decreasing role of the church in England, Wilson asserts that ‘people have what might be called an ‘office’ conception of the Church, a service facility that is well distributed over the land area of the country to be available when needed.’ The converts’ accounts confirm that over-secularization led them to seek an alternative way of life. They believe that Islam gave them a practical means of getting closer to God living a good life, and getting peace in ‘this secular environment’. They became interested in Islam in the first place because they felt that Islam has strong clear values on things they feel concerned about, not just the abuse of environment, but even things like homosexuality. Their revolt is not always directed against religious beliefs but against certain practices legitimized by Christianity and its Church. While giving their accounts on their previous life, the converts emphasized that they felt a need for a religion whereby they could orient their everyday life and they preferred Islam because it is a complete way of life not a compartmentalized religion confined to certain areas, as Sarah pointed out: ‘As an ex-Christian I now see Christianity as just a religion, but Islam, as I understand, is the way you live. It is a different approach. For instance, you can be a Christian and you can do almost everything, and you can say you are a Christian happily. But if you are Muslim, it is different, you are restricted in that matter.’

They felt that something was missing, and that was the influence of religion in their lives. Before coming to Islam they started criticising the existing religion and its culture and began having certain affinities and world views closer to that of Islam which eventually made a possible correlation between their views and Islam.

Some of those who were involved or became interested in new religions were in search of an alternative to the secular way of life with a strong reaction to the materialistic and secular perspective of the society. Garry, for example, became a Zen-Buddhist in a university when he came to believe that spirituality was lacking in the teaching system. Yet Garry found Zen-Buddhism monastic, not encompassing the social dimension of life. He said: ‘It could answer personal questions, but it couldn’t answer global questions.’

Socio-demographic Factors

Contrary to the assumption that most of the people who join an alien religion or so-called new religious movement are dropouts from society, converts to Islam can in no way be seen as such. On the contrary, their educational and work careers are quite normal. They achieved significantly higher levels of education than those typical for their population as a whole. 60 percent had at least a bachelor’s degree. Indeed, 20 percent had advanced graduate degrees. Converts to Islam tend to come from the middle class section of the society. 46 (66%) associated themselves with the middle class, while 24 (34%) identified with the working class. They seem to have a wide range of occupations which vary from taxi drivers to university lecturers. As for marital status, 40 people were single at the time of conversion. 23 were married or engaged (14 to Muslims, and 9 to non-Muslims), and 7 were divorcees.

Emotional and Cognitive Concerns

A significant number of the testimonials covered accounts on troubled lives before entrance into Islam. The pre-conversion life of nearly half of the converts (48.6%) was judged to contain emotional distress. For them this period of their lives seems to have led them to look for something. For one fifth of the sample the emotional turmoil that characterized their descriptions of their childhood and adolescence was also apparent in the immediate antecedents to the conversion experience. Their unhappiness was, in most cases, caused by parental marriages which either ended up in divorce or nearly broke up, and they described it as the major trauma of their lives. 13 (18.6%) divorced or had a broken relationship before conversion and this caused long-term emotional turmoil and anxiety. Some converts said that they were grateful to God to have experienced such distressful incidents because it was these events that sparked them into thinking about religion.

The conversion experience may be related to emotional turmoil or personal distress experienced in the immediate preconversion period. However, the accounts of the converts to Islam suggest that conversions did not occur as a direct result of the emotional turmoil or personal distress, although 34 (48.6%) reported emotional distress prior to conversion. It may be associated with conversion, but it is not necessarily a predisposing condition. In the preconvert there may be an unconscious conflict, and a psychological set, but these factors, alone, in many cases, are not enough. There must be a current force which lights the fuse. That fuse took the form of cognitive and existential questions. The course that the pre-conversion period takes in many cases is that the emotional turmoil or personal distress of the individual leads him to a stage where he develops cognitive concerns.

Cognitive quest, for the converts to Islam, contained concerns or preoccupation with political, social, and moral issues, and religious doubts. Existential concerns cover questions like ‘What is the meaning and purpose of my life?’, ‘How does one deal with the fact that he is going to die?’, and ‘What should one do about his shortcomings?’. 33 (47.1%) reported preoccupation with cognitive concerns. They reported feelings of aimlessness, lack of purpose or direction and meaning, and of incompleteness, which mainly arose out of cognitive and existential concerns. These people believe that the cognitive problems that used to bother them are met by conversion to Islam because it offered them a complete philosophy of life; it proclaimed the responsibility of man, a future life, and a day of judgement. It answered their questions like ‘What is man’s place in the universe?’, and ‘What is his relationship with the world around him.’ Cognitive quests also revealed ambiguities in one’s belief system. These ambiguities were anchored during adolescence, but revived later in life when one became actively involved in life situations and felt an urge to have a faith, or a need to return to religion. Until this stage of their life these people seemed not to have bothered about religion, but at this stage when these needs became more manifest they re-questioned their previous beliefs and as a result they either felt confused or they decided to give them up entirely. The ambiguities with regard to their previous religious beliefs, namely Christianity, centred around some basic concepts of Christianity and its theological implications such as Trinity, Jesus being the Son of God, original sin, atonement theory, and the intercession of the clergy. Some criticisms also focused on perceived hypocrisy in mainstream churches and their incapacity to lead the people in moral issues.

(to be continued)

References

• BALL, H. (1987) Why British Women Embrace Islam?, Leicester: Muslim Youth Educational Council.
• JOHNSTONE, P. (1981) ‘Christians and Muslims in Britain’, Islamochristiana, No.7, pp.67-99.
• MCHUGH, F. (1990) ‘Allah’s English Daughters’, Telegraph Weekend Magazine, 31 March, pp.34-S.
• WILSON, B. (1976) Contemporary Transformation of Religion, Oxford: Clerandon.