In recent years, attitudes and legislation have made life more difficult for oppressed peoples, including refugees, around the world. Many people believe their countries should accept fewer refugees. People believe that refugees are nothing but a burden to their countries, and that they will take away jobs and reduce the standards of living (Wike, Stokes, and Simmons, 2016). Tougher laws against refugees and asylum seekers have been passed in countries like Austria; these laws restrict access to protection for refugees. The law also restricts the rights of the asylum seekers, allowing authorities to turn away migrants at the border (Hume, 2016). Increased security concerns such as the belief that refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks and increase the crime rate in a country have been used to turn away these oppressed groups (Wike, Stokes, and Simmons, 2016).

Cases of increased racial discrimination towards members of other religions and races, as well as towards immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees, have increased where they are deprived of access to the most fundamental of human rights and protection. In such instances, minorities are left exposed to and unprotected from xenophobic attacks and discrimination. In such climates, media often plays a role in building a hostile environment of mistrust and misinformation.

Since the days of the famous economist Max Weber, religion has been viewed as both a cause and outcome of economic development, with the adoption of religious principles being a contributor to economic progress (Michalopoulos, Naghavi & Prarolo, 2014). For instance, the adoption of Muslim economic principles has a long term effect on the economic development of Muslim lands; the adoption of Christian principles, mainly Protestantism, had a significant effect on the economic prosperity of many individuals in the West; and a change in the Judaic religious doctrine in the second century improved Jewish human capital by increasing literacy (Michalopoulos et al., 2014).

 Different religions have different values and perspectives on how the issues of economic inequality, racial discrimination, and intolerance should be addressed. An understanding of Islamic, Christian, and Jewish values will lead to a deeper knowledge of the three Abrahamic faiths and an understanding of how to improve the common good.

The three religions agree that caring for others is essential and obedience to one’s faith will reduce negative attitudes towards vulnerable groups. People practicing the three Abrahamic religions can work together and condemn the individuals targeting minorities and newcomers, reducing the effects of intolerance and racism while also combatting economic inequality.

Islam

In Islam, economic inequality is considered as human condition only in the proportion of skill, initiative, and effort. Islam also teaches against extreme economic inequality, and it emphasizes that all resources are a gift from God, with Qur’an 2:29 stating that “It is He who created for you all of that which is on the earth…” People are entrusted with these gifts for a short time (Qur’an 57:7) (Christopher & Hayat, 2012).

The Islamic economic system is based on three divine principles which establish a “falahi” or an Islamic welfare economic system. The first principle is that man is not the absolute owner of resources because they are God’s and man is just a trustee. Second, economic activities should not be guided by self-interest only. And third, the religious aspect of earning and spending are as important as Islam’s other worship obligations and practices (Haq, 2013).

Haq (2013) identifies the systems of Ushr and Zakat, elements of the Islamic economic system which has significant implications on the distribution of income and wealth. Ushr is an obligatory payment from agricultural output, while Zakat is paid for accumulated wealth; Haq (2013) identifies the latter as a major instrument of restricting the excessive accumulation of wealth, as Zakat helps the poor and vulnerable members of society. The wealthy and the elite are warned that they will be hold accountable for disregarding vulnerable groups (Sahih Al-Bukhari, Volume 2, Book 24, Number 486).

Muslims are expected to value the poor, and they should spend from their wealth to help the poor: “God said, ‘O son of Adam! Spend, and I shall spend on you’” (Sahih-Al-Bukhari Volume 7, Book 64, Number 264). Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, reformed the value of taking care of the poor and treating everybody with respect as a way of addressing economic inequality.

Islam also teaches that there should be respect for people of other religions. Prophet Muhammad said, “Beware! Whoever is cruel and hard on a non-Muslim minority, or curtails their rights, or burdens them with more than they can bear, or takes anything from them against their free will; I (Prophet Muhammad) will complain against the person on the Day of Judgment.” Islam teaches that caring for others is not optional but a religious duty.

Islam is against any form of discrimination towards any one, and it teaches that differences in color, tribe, race, or tradition should not be taken as an excuse for unfair treatment. The Qur’an is against any form of racial discrimination, and it states, “O Mankind, we created you from a single pair of a male and a female, and made you into tribes and nations so that you may know each other (not that you despise each other). Verily, the most honored of you in the sight of God is he who is most righteous of you” (Al-Quran 49:13). Islam advocates for equality among all people as members of one human race.

The Qur’an teaches that all people were created by God, and it states in Surah 30:22 that, “of His Signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the diversity of your tongues and colors.” Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, also taught that all people are to be treated equally; in his last sermon, he stated that, “All mankind is descended from Adam and Eve, an Arab is not better than a non-Arab and a non-Arab is not better than an Arab; a white person is not better than a black person, nor is a black person better than a white person except by piety and good actions. Learn that every Muslim is the brother of every other Muslim and that Muslims form one brotherhood.” Muslims are encouraged to stand up and challenge racism and intolerance whenever they see the laws of God being broken.

Christianity

Christianity teaches that all wealth comes from God, and He is in complete ownership and control of all things. Deuteronomy 10:14 (New International Version) states, “Behold, to the Lord your God belong heaven and the heaven of heavens, the earth with all that is in it.” Christianity holds the view that all the riches and wealth that man possess are a gift from God: “Moreover, when God gives someone wealth and possessions, and the ability to enjoy them, to accept their lot and be happy in their toil-this is a gift of God” (Ecclesiastes 5:19, New International version). Christianity acknowledges the fact that some people will be more economically able compared to others, but this should not make such individuals reject the most vulnerable members of society.

Christianity also teaches that people should care for the oppressed and the poor. Deuteronomy 15:7-8 (New International Version) states that, “If anyone is poor among your fellow Israelites in any of the towns of the land the Lord your God is giving you, do not be hardhearted or tightfisted toward them. Rather, be openhanded and freely lend them whatever they need.”

The apostle Paul teaches the Corinthians that there should be a fair balance so that a person does not have too much or too little. Christianity emphasizes that the immigrant and refugee crisis experienced so far could be solved by reducing economic inequality in the world.

 “Our desire is not that others might be relieved while you are hard pressed, but that there might be equality. At present your plenty will supply what they need so that in turn their plenty will supply what you need. The goal is equality, as it is written: ‘The one who gathered much did not have too much, and the one who gathered little did not have too little’” (2 Corinthians 8:13-15, New International version). 

Christianity calls for its followers to show “agape” love, where individuals care for those in need. Agape love would reduce the negative attitudes towards members of other religions and races, and people would not practice discrimination or attack vulnerable groups.

The gap between the rich and the poor is increasing drastically in the world we live in. Jesus Christ discouraged the accumulation of wealth, and He gave the parable of the rich man and Lazarus (Luke 19:16-31, New International Version) to warn people against accumulating wealth without caring for those in need. Jesus also gave the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37, New International Version) who helped a stranger. Christianity extols individuals to care and welcome the vulnerable people in society.

Therefore, Christianity instills the values of love for one another and having compassion for another person. If individuals followed such values, practices like racism, intolerance, and violence against other people would end.

Judaism

According to Sauer & Sauer (2016), Judaism puts forward two axioms of the Jewish economic theory which have a significant effect on the matter of economic inequality. The first axiom is that God is the creator of the world (Genesis 1:1, New International Version) and man was created in God’s image. Man was then given the world and complete dominion over it, and he should help perfect it through the utilization of resources, work, and innovation (Sauer & Sauer 2016). The second axiom is that man is required and obligated to care for the needy, and the Torah has moral principles which should guide how a man treats others. The Torah, in Leviticus 25:10 (New International Version), states, “proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof,” and this means that foreigners, newcomers, and minorities were to be set free (Sacks, 2015).

The Torah imposed certain infringements on personal property which were designed to ensure that the gap between the economic classes was reduced, avoiding instances of extreme wealth or poverty (Sicker, 2001). There was the law of the sabbatical year, which required that the land should rest and lay fallow in the seventh year, letting the poor people eat (Exodus 23:10-11, New International Version). The law also required that all debts in the seventh year should be forgiven, and every creditor should release that which the neighbor owes. Such laws had a significant effect on reducing the economic inequalities between people.

Judaism removes the system of human and economic freedom from the hands of human legislators. The Torah states that, “Because the Israelites are my servants, whom I brought out of Egypt, they must not be sold as slaves” (Leviticus 25:42, New International Version), and this means that personal liberty is not opened up for any political negotiations. Contemporary political and media discourses have made it difficult to integrate oppressed people, but Judaism promotes the values that will see such violence and intolerance reduced.

Judaism takes a positive approach towards all people and teaches that everyone is equal in the eyes of the Creator, and, therefore, all individuals should be treated well. Strangers, refugees, and foreigners are supposed to be treated fairly, as recorded in Leviticus 19:33-34 (New International Version) which states that, “When an alien lives with you in your land, do not ill-treat him. The alien living with you must be treated as one of your native-born. Love him as yourself, for you were aliens in Egypt. I am the Lord your God.”

The three Abrahamic religions promote values that seek to address the issue of economic inequality and the effects of it, such as discrimination and rejection of vulnerable groups. The core values of the three Abrahamic religions are equality among all member of human family, because God is the creator of all; care for those in need; and the need to show love to vulnerable groups. Therefore, religion has a significant role to play at reducing economic inequality in society, and it is crucial that people take their religious values with more seriousness.

References

• Al-Quran 2:29, 57:7, 49:13,30:22
• Christopher, C. & Hayat, A. (2012). Equitable Distribution of Wealth: The Economic System of Islam. Inside Islam. Retrieved 14 September 2016, from http://insideislam.wisc.edu/2012/05/equitable-distribution-of-wealth-the-economic-system-of-islam/
• Deuteronomy (10:14, 15:7-8), Ecclesiastes 5:19, Leviticus (19:33-34, 25:10, 25:42), Genesis 1:1, Luke (10:25-37, Luke 19:16-31), 2 Corinthians 8:13-15 (New International Version).
• Di Matteo, L. (2014). All Equal in the Sight of God: Economic Inequality and Religion in the Early Twentieth Century. Lakehead University.
• Haq, G. (2013). Distribution of wealth and Income in Islam. South East Journal of Contemporary Business, Economics and Law, 2(2).
• Hume, T. (2016). “Austria passes tough new asylum laws.” CNN. Retrieved 18 September 2016, from http://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/28/europe/austria-tough-migrant-laws/
• Michalopoulos, S., Naghavi, A., & Prarolo, G. (2014). Islam, Inequality, and Pre-Industrial Comparative Development. Harvard Business School.
• Sacks, J. (2015). Judaism Was First in Fight Against Income Inequality. Algemeiner.com. Retrieved 14 September 2016, from http://www.algemeiner.com/2015/05/07/judaism-was-first-in-fight-against-income-inequality/#
• Sahih Al-Bukhari (Volume 2 Book 24 Number 486, Volume 7 Book 54 Number 264).
• Sauer, C. & Sauer, R. (2016). Jewish Theology and Economic Theory. Journal Of Markets And Morality, 17(1). Retrieved from http://www.acton.org/pub/religion-liberty/volume-17-number-1/jewish-theology-and-economic-theory
• Sicker, M. (2001). The Political Culture of Judaism (p. 99). Praeger Publishers.
• Wike, R., Stokes, B., & Simmons, K. (2016). Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs. Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. Retrieved 18 September 2016, from http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-more-terrorism-fewer-jobs/

he debate over religion’s role in social change has been raging for centuries.

The interpretation and perception of even just a single social action is multi-layered, multi-faceted, complex, and sophisticated. It almost seems impossible to explain a social action entirely through any of our sciences; in fact, it seems unlikely that any science will be developed that fully encompasses all of humanity’s problems.

As human beings our needs, conscious or unconscious, stretch from a tiny atomic particle to nearly the whole universe. It sometimes seems that the whole universe and all that within it are not good enough to satisfy even the smallest need of our unlimited desire. Some have asserted that one day human beings are going to play the role of God. They do this because of their strong and persistent belief that we are merely the product of material existence and it is therefore the material realm that makes us who we are. As such, they believe we will eventually rule over the things that created us.

Others would undoubtedly take a whole different direction and argue that our nature is a complex, interwoven tapestry of the material and immaterial realms; it is imprecise to contend that it is only economic conditions or conditioning that beget all the other elements of our social and individual lives, which includes things such as literature, the fine arts, religion, and the like. Hence, I intend to examine the notions of two influential intellectuals of the recent past: Karl Marx and Max Weber, particularly their notions as to religion.

To begin with, the history of humanity has seen a lot of wars, but the intellectual war that we have experienced over the past two centuries, which split the entire world into two blocks of countries (until recently they were communist and capitalist), should be of the greatest interest to almost everyone; it has been a one-of-a-kind struggle.

Marx, a reductionist, framed his argument as such:

“…the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a single word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.”

He wrote this about the sorry state of the working class, especially in the nineteenth century, when workers were treated almost like machines or animals. This was particularly true in Western Europe. Even from just these few lines, one could easily grasp the sympathy of Marx for the working class of his time, what he called the oppressed, and his animosity and utter disgust toward the elite class, what he called the oppressor. It is no surprise then to see him portray a system in which the rights of the oppressed to a happy life could not be realized as needing to be overthrown through a social upheaval or revolution against the oppressors. For Marx, everything was crystal clear: it was the economic system which made the elites oppress their workers (please see “Karl Marx: the Prophet of Materialism” article in this issue).

Marx frequently turned to the then recent revolutions occurring in Western Europe: the English Civil War of the 1600s and the French Revolution. These struggles cost many lives and were for him just a new chapter in the ever-repeating class struggle between the oppressor and the oppressed.

On the surface, the apparent causes of the infamous conflict could be identified as politics and religion, which were quite intertwined then. A thorough analysis of Marx’s society enabled him to discover the subtle connection between the social class divisions and the stages of economic development, and allowed him to postulate his version of human salvation: communism, in which the superstructure, with all its elements including religion, would perish eternally in the name of a utopian, classless society. He prophesied a future in which the communal life of people would be shaped by a new idealized economic system that negated all private ownership of property, monopolized the political structure, and left no room for religion in social and individual life. As a matter of fact, most of his writings reflect his reactive response to the perceived evils or fatal flaws of capitalism. For instance, while some people enjoyed luxurious lives because of the fact that they were born to a rich family, many others endured the severest conditions just to survive. Witnessing this, one cannot help but wonder, “Is the economic system to be blamed for this?” Or even, “Are the ill-perception, misuse, and exploitation of the system the culprit?” I am completely sure that every sensible human being would appreciate the diagnosis of the diseases of class struggle and the oppression of the poor, but I also think it is hasty to reflexively blame the system – capitalism – as being solely to blame for the wretched conditions of the oppressed. According to Marx, religion was the opiate fed by the oppressors to the oppressed to keep them in line. To realize the revolution that Marx felt was necessary, this opiate had to be eliminated.

His approach to religion was always contemptuous and very similar to the functional and reductionist theories of Freud and Durkheim. In his view, religion is nothing more than a pure illusion – in other words, an entity that has no real existence. Therefore, he did not heed what religious beliefs or holy books taught; rather, he emphasized the function that religion and its fundamental elements played in social life. Even though his portrayal of religion was reduced to a social function, he still maintained that we should discover why people insist on this illusion, arguably since the beginning of human life.

As depicted above, Marx left no room for religion in his imagined world after the envisaged revolution against the oppressor. He saw it as an effect, an expression or a symptom of a deeper reality: material facts of the class struggle and alienation. Religion was the culprit to be annihilated in the name of real human bliss.

On the other hand, almost a half century later, a young and bright social scientist would dare to hold a completely different account of religion and argue that though the economic conditions of an individual or a society could determine the tone of some religious beliefs or practices, history would bear witness otherwise. He stated:

“…the side of the problem which is generally most difficult to grasp: the influence of certain religious ideas on the development of an economic spirit, or the ethos of an economic system. In this case we are dealing with the connection of the spirit of the modern economic life with the rational ethics of ascetic Protestantism. Thus we treat here only one side of the causal chain.”

In “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,” Max Weber diligently outlined a delicate connection between an attitudinal and doctrinal change in the framework of a religious group of Protestantism and the economic development that followed. Throughout his scholarly treatise, he gave an exquisitely drawn picture of the early Protestants, particularly the pioneers of Protestantism: Martin Luther and John Calvin. In fact, he claimed that the self-constraining ethic of Protestantism that stemmed from the inner-worldly asceticism fostered with frugality, personal discipline, solemnity, thrift, self-denial, hard work, investment, and making the best use of one’s time and resources was the spirit of capitalism. There was, he explained, a sharp difference between the adherents of the then Catholic Church, which regarded the daily chores and business enterprises as petty issues compared to the religious works of monks, nuns, and priests (other-worldly asceticism), and the followers of early Protestantism, who praised any effort to please God, including daily chores and especially the acquisition of wealth (inner-world asceticism).

He aptly placed this sharp change of attitude in the disciples of Calvin towards the acquisition of wealth at the very center of the eventual rise of the capitalist economy and the birth of a new civilization. Some monumental maxims like, “A penny saved is a penny earned…”, “Time is money; sloth is sin…”; “Even the humblest tasks are solemn duties assigned by God Himself…”; “All work, not just religious work, was a calling from God; it should not be done but done well, as a faithful service carried out under the great Taskmaster’s eye…” reflect this spirit of capitalism in Protestant countries like the United States and England. For Weber, “an idea in the mind of one human agent (or shared by a group of agents) is as much a real cause of human action as the application of heat to water is the real cause of steam.” Therefore, the backbone of the current capitalism originates in the very change in the belief system of a group of religious people. Such a claim is a consistent proof for social scientists like Weber to argue against the extremely reductionist notions of religion like that of Marx.

The two contrasting views of religion are significantly worth studying. While Marx, with his infamous animosity towards religion, divorced it from his utopian communist society and sentenced it to death forever, he adamantly upheld the necessities of human nature and pointed out the fact that negligence of the material aspect of life would result in absurdities in the name of human salvation. Moreover, his emphasis that history had become an arena of social class struggle urged humans to find lasting resolutions in order to establish projections of heavenly bliss on earth. Humanity undoubtedly owes him a round of applause due to his incessant efforts to vocalize the rights of the oppressed to life, dignity, and freedom. However, it is truly heartbreaking to see that he could not apprehend the real core of religion, which is pure devotion, compassion, self-denial, and other humble traits. If only he had chosen a different path that appreciated the diverse nature of humanity, of which religion is a distinguished component. I have never understood why Marx negated the fact that as material conditions shape ideas, ideas also cause material beings to change. Hence, unlike Marx, Weber approved of the fact that the key cause of the capitalist revolution was not some material circumstance, but a new form of economic behavior that followed logically from a new religious idea: “the self-constraining ethic of Protestantism was the animating spirit of capitalism.”

Has the battle come to an end yet? Honestly, I would assert it is an ongoing process. As we progress in light of the more inspiring notions of contemporary social scientists, we come to realize how wrong it is to reduce a very deeply embedded part of human social and individual life -religion- to something superficial or hypothetical. It is rather to be understood as something “sui generis” and a multi-faceted reality – a reality in and of itself. It is unquestionably inspiring to see several people search for an answer to what religion is and at the same time quite overwhelming to know that a great number of things in religion need an unbiased, pure, and sophisticated mind supported with the sublime emotions or faculties of the (metaphorical) heart. Furthermore, it is absolutely necessary to devise a new, multicolored approach to religious studies that embrace not only the fine-tuned minds but also the purified hearts. It would be wise to heed Kant’s argument against pure reason: “The ultimate truth can never be known through the theoretical mind. Only then can it be perceived partially via the practical mind.” Finally, it wouldn’t be a mere exaggeration to assert that what religion is or what role it plays in social and individual lives is a question of life and death to a certain degree. Hence, is religion a cause, an effect – or both? While many would say it is just an effect, several others would sail to the shore of “a cause”; still others, like me, agree that religion is both, and that every thought or emotion should get the benefit of the doubt.

References

1. Anatomy of the Sacred, an introduction to religion, 5th Ed. by James C. Livingston
2. Introducing Religion, readings from the classic theorist, by Daniel L. Pals
3. Eight Theories of Religion, 2nd Ed., by Daniel L. Pals
4. Gale Encyclopedia of Religion, 2nd Ed.
5. Encyclopedia of Quran by Jane Dammen McAuliffe

Scientific psychology corroborates these truths and lays bare the inescapable responsibility to know and manage the self (C.G. Jung, 1957). Knowing and accepting realities about ourselves positively offers a platform for personal growth and development, and further permits cathartic motivations for transcending flaws. While religions approach the path to transcendence differently (e.g. based on organic time and place), each testifies to human dignity that is capable of finding safe passage through the contradictions of life without compromising the safety of others.

Religious and secular histories reveal tragic outcomes for humanity when these responsibilities are ignored. The current neoliberal, capitalist ideology, which was systemized by economic theorist Milton Friedman, externalizes, or factors out, human and environmental damage, for these interfere with the profit principle. His open defiance of social responsibility not only shows a separation between the rational mind and rational heart, but clears the way for nullification of the universal human rights principle and bows to nefarious economic warfare waged between groups.

Within earlier historical memory, power’s unwillingness to analyze the subjective and blame the objective played-out on the global stage with catastrophic consequences. Between 1914 and 1945, the world was at war with itself. Yet, national leaders and their people denied their own failed-policies, and chose to violently project responsibility onto others (Fromm’s, 1973). Analyses of Europe’s part in the atrocities of WWII illuminate a reoccurring historical fact: non-defensive wars are often complicated and motivated by un-dealt with personal projections of a nation’s leaders and its peoples. At the heart of humanity’s violent history lie legions of self-denials and self-failures, too colossal to list. Perhaps more ironic than the irresponsible projections themselves is the denial of responsibility, as expressed in the question: where was God?

With the beginning of the West’s wars in the Middle East, in 2003, human rights experts recognized that the topic of human rights was off the table, a frightening but conscious decision that reconfirms the warnings of sages and prophets: human history is a history of choice.

A catharsis for the events of 1914 – 1945 was the establishment of the Bretton Accords, which established international institutions aiming to prevent future crimes against humanity. The sets of principles laid out in the accords sought to mandate individual rights of vital protections, by humanizing finances, employment, and governance. Rights of human security were embedded within a constellation of personal, social, economic, and political rights. The United Nations, which signed the 1948 Convention on The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, agreed to this universal principle, and applied it clearly to the subjugated children and women of the global patriarchy by creating the special conventions: Rights of the Child and The Elimination of Discrimination against Women.

While many nation-states embrace moral responsibility to ratify conventions for universal human rights, many UN representatives continue to face non-ratification resistance at home. While the new, global power-brokers of trade and finance systemically and tactically block universal human rights, the global under-privileged are taking their arguments to the streets. Taking responsibility to occupy their own policies is a response validated by scholar Noam Chomsky (Occupy, 2012, p.89) and reflects the Jeffersonian idea of democratic action. Taking possession of rights far exceeds passive verbalization.

A watershed of responsible self-action is being witnessed around the globe: workers are organizing to buy-back their closed factories; students organize to undermine dictatorships and corrupt governments; sexually exploited children are naming criminal-priests; women are fighting the slave-trade; independent journalists air photos of government backed genocides and externally organized coups; neighbors take video of real-time police brutality; independent filmmakers document corporate damages; veterans bow to their own shame and expose military atrocities; whistle-blowers expose mass government fraud; and high-ranking bank officials make tragic, but telling testimonies against system-exploitation by committing suicide. While these examples reflect an existing depth of global darkness, self-responsible action affirms our awareness of our right to live change and change living.

Considering our ever changing universe and the human capacity to re-imagine new life, it is possible to more clearly understand the discreteness of the great religions which direct responsibility to each individual. By means of self-awareness, self-responsibility and self-regulation, we each hold the best possibilities for peaceful co-existence and the preservation of human rights.

June Dayle Jelm, PhD in International Relations, is a Professional Mediator specializing in Domestic Violence in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Consanguinity itself does not make an individual “sick,” but it affects the probability of an autosomal recessive disorder (which requires two copies of the same mutation) if there is such a mutation which runs within the family (with the word “if” emphasized). Consanguinity should be regarded as a complex issue due to socio-economic factors and health concerns.

In clinical genetics, unions between individuals who are second cousins or closer are considered “consanguineous” (inbreeding coefficient, F 0.0156). Incestuous unions (e.g. brother-sister, father-daughter) will not be included in the description of consanguinity in this article, and are obviously outlawed in every society and faith.

Speaking from a statistical geneticist’s perspective, consanguinity affects the probabilities of certain genotypes occurring in offspring. For example, approximately 6.25% (F = 0.0625) of the alleles (a variation at a particular location in the genome) are expected to be homozygous in the offspring of first cousins; and 12.5% (F = 0.125) in the offspring of double first cousins. See Figure 1 for different types of consanguineous unions.

Historically speaking, consanguinity must have been unavoidable during the initial stages of mankind. However, even when human population sizes reached considerable figures, there is a great deal of evidence that consanguineous unions/marriages were widely practiced in ancient societies, especially amongst the ruling and/or land owning elite. For example, many Egyptian Pharaohs, Holy Roman Emperors, and members of the Spanish Habsburg dynasty used within-family unions as a way to keep the wealth, “royal blood,” and/or “edification” within the family. 1-3 However, this is not to say taboos did not exist in other populations.

Though now taboo in Western countries, first cousin marriages were not uncommon in Europe and North America until the mid-19th century, again especially among individuals with high socio-economic status 7. For instance, Darwin married his first cousin, Emma (Wedgwood), in 1839. Yet, in the later half of the 19th century, scientific debates led to marriage between cousins being banned in 12 US states. 7,8

Consanguineous unions occur very rarely in Western countries for a variety of sociological (e.g. cultural) and statistical reasons, but the complete opposite is true in certain regions of the world where union of kin is seen as the default choice, for a variety of socio-economic reasons. Analysis of currently available data suggests that over one-tenth of the world’s current population is composed of families where the parents are related as second cousins or closer 7.

Although a great majority of consanguineous families do not produce deficient offspring, it is still true that there is a risk of unions with close relatives.

The genetic risk comes from the fact that union of kin results in an increase of homozygosity (or more correctly autozygosity) in the offspring, which translates into a higher chance of being homozygous for any allele within the family gene pool. If any of these alleles are autosomal recessive mutations, this increase in probability applies to these alleles also. This simple fact is the main difference between union of kin and union of unrelated individuals (coined the name “inbreeding depression”); as there are many disease causal mutations out there in outbreeding populations (e.g. in Western populations), 21 but because they are very rare, they do not get to meet their counterpart in the union of unrelated individuals, thus their homozygous effects are never seen. This is why extremely rare autosomal recessive disorders are mostly seen in regions where consanguinity levels are high.

Despite the risk of heritable disease (albeit small, as discussed above), why are consanguineous marriages still common in many populations? There are many factors including socio-economic, ethno-cultural, religious and geographical; however the former duo (i.e. social and economic factors) seems to be key.17 Sociological studies in communities with high consanguinity rates show that the relationship between the husband and wife was found to be stable due to higher compatibility of life style, social relationships, and the family members from both sides. It is believed that consanguinity can also result in more female autonomy4 through better relationships with her in-laws as they can support her in times of need,17,22 Families concerned with the transmission of cultural values may also seem to practice it more. Consanguinity is a social reality of many communities. It relates to a number of social dynamics in respective cultural habitats with quite a number communal and health consequences. It is significant to be aware of these dynamics and consequences to be able to make a fair analysis on cultures and lifestyles unknown to us.

References

1. Alvarez, G., Ceballos, F.C. & Quinteiro, C. The role of inbreeding in the extinction of a European royal dynasty. PLoS One 4, e5174 (2009).

2. Ceballos, F.C. & Alvarez, G. Royal dynasties as human inbreeding laboratories: the Habsburgs. Heredity (Edinb) 111, 114-21 (2013).

3. Paul, D.B. & Spencer, H.G. “It’s Ok, We’re Not Cousins by Blood”: The Cousin Marriage Controversy in Historical Perspective. PLoS Biol 6, e320 (2008).

4. Bittles, A.H. A Background Summary of Consanguineous Marriages. Available online: http://consang.net/images/d/dd/01AHBWeb3.pdf (2001).

5. Tadmouri, G.O. et al. Consanguinity and reproductive health among Arabs. Reprod Health 6, 17 (2009).

6. Bittles, A.H., Mason, W.M., Greene, J. & Rao, N.A. Reproductive behavior and health in consanguineous marriages. Science 252, 789-94 (1991).

7. Bittles, A.H. & Black, M.L. Consanguinity, human evolution, and complex diseases. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107, 1779-1786 (2010).

8. Ottenheimer, M. Forbidden relatives: the American myth of cousin marriage, (University of Illinois Press, 1996).

9. Imaizumi, Y. A recent survey of consanguineous marriages in Japan. Clin Genet 30, 230-3 (1986).

10. Bener, A. & Alali, K.A. Consanguineous marriage in a newly developed country: the Qatari population. J Biosoc Sci 38, 239-46 (2006).

11. al-Gazali, L.I. et al. Consanguineous marriages in the United Arab Emirates. J Biosoc Sci 29, 491-7 (1997).

12. Jurdi, R. & Saxena, P.C. The prevalence and correlates of consanguineous marriages in Yemen: similarities and contrasts with other Arab countries. J Biosoc Sci 35, 1-13 (2003).

13. Hamamy, H. et al. Consanguineous marriages, pearls and perils: Geneva International Consanguinity Workshop Report. Genet Med 13, 841-7 (2011).

14. BITTLES, A.H. WHEN COUSINS MARRY: A REVIEW OF CONSANGUINITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. in Perspectives in Human Biology 71-83 (1995).

15. Tuncbilek, E. & Koc, I. Consanguineous marriage in Turkey and its impact on fertility and mortality. Ann Hum Genet 58, 321-9 (1994).

16. de Costa, C. Pregnancy outcomes in Lebanese-born women in western Sydney. Med J Aust 149, 457-60 (1988).

17. Darr, A. & Modell, B. The frequency of consanguineous marriage among British Pakistanis. J Med Genet 25, 186-90 (1988).

18. Hoodfar, E. & Teebi, A.S. Genetic referrals of Middle Eastern origin in a western city: inbreeding and disease profile. J Med Genet 33, 212-5 (1996).

19. Wikipedia.org. Cousin marriage law in the United States by state. Vol. 2013 (2013). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cousin_marriage_law_in_the_United_States_by_state

20. Hashmi, M.A. Frequency of consanguinity and its effect on congenital malformation–a hospital based study. J Pak Med Assoc 47, 75-8 (1997).

21. Ng, S.B. Targeted capture and massively parallel sequencing of 12 human exomes. Nature 461, 272-276 (2009).

22. Hussain, R. & Bittles, A.H. The prevalence and demographic characteristics of consanguineous marriages in Pakistan. J Biosoc Sci 30, 261-75 (1998).

23. Bittles, A.H. et al. Consanguineous marriage, a familiar story full of surprises. in Health and Ethnicity (eds. Macbeth, H. & Shetty, P.) 68-78 (Taylor & Francis, 2001).

24. Clark, C.J., Hill, A., Jabbar, K. & Silverman, J.G. Violence during pregnancy in Jordan: its prevalence and associated risk and protective factors. Violence Against Women 15, 720-35 (2009).

25. Assaf, S. & Khawaja, M. Consanguinity trends and correlates in the Palestinian Territories. J Biosoc Sci 41, 107-24 (2009).

26. Ober, C., Hyslop, T. & Hauck, W.W. Inbreeding effects on fertility in humans: evidence for reproductive compensation. Am J Hum Genet 64, 225-31 (1999).

27. Bittles, A. Consanguinity and its relevance to clinical genetics. Clin Genet 60, 89-98 (2001).

28. Dyer, O. MP is criticised for saying that marriage of first cousins is a health problem. BMJ 331, 1292 (2005).

It is also important to comprehend benefits brought by perpetuation of this institution, since the waqf system could successfully survive for centuries. Some preventive measures to ensure longevity were finding new sources of income, establishing new auxiliary endowments, deploying tax exemptions, protection of property from natural deterioration, and establishing a skillful management.3 Even when the governments suffered from crisis, these critical installments have served to lighten fiscal burden on the government and operated without an interruption in their service to community, as a result of being funded by endowments. For example, since the beginning of Islam, the madrasahs functioned depending on the income of the estates assigned, and hence the central government hardly spared any budget for education.5 More outstandingly, as an independent source of finance, waqf provided a class of religious notables and scholars with an economic base independent of political authorities, enabling them to take positions unreservedly.3

Agricultural revenues were channeled into urban services through awqaf which also played a role in activating economic growth, expansion, diversification, and development. For instance, housing units, service facilities and/or shops bequeathed onto a school, a hospital or a comprehensive mosque around which they were established; the core project progressively became a nucleus for a commercial center, even gradually growing into a town center. Added to all these kinds of direct participation, there are other indirect kinds of contributions of awqaf in the economic growth6 as they have helped reduce government expenditure and consequently paving the way for growth.7

“As an institutionalization of Islamic values, waqf system presents good lessons in dealing with poverty and income inequality.”8 Having taken the Prophetic saying “One who sleeps while his/her neighbor is hungry is not one of us” and many other hadith in the similar context as a reference point, Ottoman society presented exemplary behavior in interpersonal relationships.9 In addition to the strong family bonds, this compassionate approach is among one of the main factors that prevented homelessness, a major contemporary social problem in the West, to appear in Ottoman society. Without any personal interest, people founded thousands of institutions allocating some or all of their private properties such as farms, houses, enterprises, and savings as revenue sources to these institutions to ensure their continuity in the service of public.10

According to Islam, everything besides God is transitory and perishable.11 Stemming from the belief that any charitable action does not expire, awqaf have functioned as nongovernmental institutions throughout the Islamic world in various fields. In the 11th century, every Islamic city had at least several hospitals funded by awqaf for various expenses, including the wages of doctors, ophthalmologists, surgeons, chemists, pharmacists, domestics and all other staff; the purchase of foods and medicines; hospital equipment such as beds, mattresses, bowls and perfumes; and repairs to buildings. Awqaf funded medical schools and their libraries as well, and their revenues covered various expenses such as maintenance, wages of teachers, and stipends of students.12 In the Bayezid complex in Edirne, for instance, there were 21 doctors and other officers to look after only 50 patients who were cured through performances of 10 musicians, carried out three days a week.13

Estimates show existence of some 26 thousand awqaf in the Ottoman State.14 In 1527, 12% of the whole Ottoman state revenues were controlled by waqf administrations, while at the end of the eighteenth century the combined income of the Ottoman awqaf reached to one-third of the state’s total revenue, including the yield from tax farms in the Balkans, Turkey, and the Arab world. Although these estimates rest on arguable assumptions, there is no disagreement over the orders of magnitude. As a measure of their rights and status in the society, nearly 40% of awqaf were established by women by means of their own wealth.10 Founded in 1552 by the wife of Suleyman the Magnificent, Jerusalem’s Haseki Hurrem Sultan charitable complex possessed 26 entire villages, several shops, a covered bazaar, 2 soap plants, 11 flour mills, and 2 bathhouses, all in Palestine and Lebanon. For centuries, the revenues produced by these assets were used to operate a huge soup kitchen, along with a mosque and two hostels for pilgrims and wayfarers.15

There is abundant evidence to show the massive economic significance of the waqf system that even a single waqf could carry great economic value. Another waqf established in Halep (Aleppo) in the eighteenth century included 10 houses, 67 shops, 4 inns, 2 storerooms, several dyeing plants and baths, 3 bakeries, 8 orchards, and 3 gardens, among various other assets, including agricultural land. By the end of the eighteenth century, in Istanbul, whose estimated population of 700,000 made it the largest city in Europe, up to 30,000 people a day were being fed by charitable complexes established under the waqf system. At the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, three-quarters of the country’s arable land belonged to awqaf.10

A closer look at the Ottoman practice

Throughout the Ottoman realms, the waqf was without any doubt, the primary philanthropic institution which had long served as a major instrument for delivering public goods. For six centuries, the Ottomans largely succeeded to eradicate poverty through awqaf via a voluntary transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor and the latter were fed and taken care of in a decentralized manner. More importantly, health and educational services, essential conditions for the development of human capital, were provided via this institution.16 Waqf was instrumental to the spread of the Ottomans whose policy of settlement relied heavily on the establishment of awqaf in support of Sufi centers that were planted along the frontiers of the expanding state, on its strategic trade routes and traffic arteries, amidst its political rivals and enemies, or in other strategic locations, thus contributing to the spread of Islam as well.3

Alternatively, waqf was extensively used for the development of public and commercial institutions leading to the economic revitalization of major cities, and also as perhaps the major tool to bring about cultural integration for conveying Ottoman culture and services to the regions being settled. The participation of centrally appointed officials and local notables in awqaf helped bridge gaps between these two groups and produced a homogeneous urban elite throughout the vast empire.3

The Ottoman state contributed to awqaf in two ways. First, either by directly establishing waqf17 or by granting land to those who wanted to found a waqf. In this way, the vacant lands had been brought into cultivation, creating extra revenues for the state. Second, the state contributed by supervising, controlling, and recording the revenues and expenditures in order to secure their well-functioning. The control and the supervision of the waqf system can be attributed to the importance of the land in Ottoman politics.8

Granting these privileges, the state sacrificed from large amounts of tax revenue, yet also kept an eye on the activities of awqaf to ensure quality of service.18 The revenues and expenditures of the awqaf had been recorded very carefully. In terms of production of statistical records, systematization in record-keeping, there are not too many states in history to rival the Ottomans.19 Many of these records have been carefully archived,20 and are still available as primary sources to researchers. 21

Awqaf in daily life

The Ottoman state was mainly responsible for security, justice, and border protection. Almost all other social tasks were being performed individuals. The belief that “Charity pleases God and brings God’s blessings” determined Muslim behavior in many fundamental acts of economic importance and the Ottomans were particularly zealous in that regard.22 People set up and administered awqaf for benevolent purposes, which followed the principle, “there always is a necessity to service wherever living things exist.”23

The beneficiaries were not limited to the poor and needy. Awqaf have served the public for a variety of purposes that outline an endless list: protecting the unfortunate, meeting the need of wayfarers and pilgrims, raising orphans, providing scholarships to students, employing the unemployed, educating apprentice artisans toward mastery, helping the bankrupt or those with excessive debt, covering marriage expenses for needy couples, sheltering animals, taking care of widows, hungry and the destitute, sick and the disabled, running health care, sports and educational programs, producing candles for mosques, taking care of the environment, paving roads, enlightening streets, paying a neighborhood’s taxes, supporting retired sailors, organizing picnics for a designated guild, subsidizing the cultivation of rare roses, operating commuter ships, lending to small businesses, helping prisoners, and providing toys to children of poor families. These were among hundreds of other purposes of varying social significance. Also, there have been many applications to launch, construct, manage, and preserve public institutions and infrastructure like military establishments, pavements, lighthouses, malls, cemeteries, hospitals, public baths, drinking fountains, mosques, schools, dormitories, inns, caravanserais, dervish hospices, bridges, roads, aqueducts, libraries and so on.

Some basic ethics of charity in Islam are anonymity, avoiding pretension, preserving purity of intention, and protecting assisted people from any possible psychological effects.24 A thoughtful application of these principles came into life in the “Charity Stones.” In this Ottoman practice, charitable people would leave some money (generally in the dark of the night) to these two-meter-high marble columns with a hole on top, which were commonly located at the unobserved corners of mosques, madrasahs, cemeteries, mausoleums, and neighborhoods. Needy people, later on, would take money from there, astonishingly, no more than they needed. The rest would be left back with decency for someone else, which shows the achieved level of the brotherhood and solidarity in the society.25 These stones were used to prevent a form of mendicancy in the society and at the same time, not to offend needy people.

The Turkish waqf spirit which cares for all living beings has extended its reach to birds as well, when from the fifteenth century on, kiosks for birds were started to be built. Some of these “bird houses,” also called “bird palaces,” resembled mosques with their minarets, high-hopped towers and signs in the form of a crescent, and displayed an extraordinary workmanship. Having observed such bird houses with great interest, the Austrian ambassador Busbecq wrote in 1550s that “in Turkey everything has become humanized and every rigid thing has been softened; even the animals.”10 Many examples of awqaf have served for protection and enhancement of the environment as well.26 In “Ottoman land,” Comte de Bonneval stated, “it is possible to see Turks passionate enough to dedicate money for men to water unfruitful trees, in order to protect them from drought due to hot weather.”27 According to D’Ohsson, this caring motivation is rooted in Islam: “Qur’an has transformed Turks into the best philanthropists of the world.”28

There were awqaf established for each aspect of life. One can talk about the excess supply of public goods rather than their scarcity thanks to extensive waqf services, so much so that Ottoman cities did not need to implement actual municipality organizations to deliver urban services in a centralized and coordinated manner before 1856.29 “Thanks to the awqaf flourished during the Ottoman Empire, a person would have borne into a waqf house, slept in a waqf cradle, ate and drunk from waqf properties, read waqf books, taught in a waqf school, received his salary from a waqf administration, and when he died, put into a waqf coffin and buried in a waqf cemetery.”30 Had the awqaf gained corporate powers, “they would have acquired the ability to transform themselves into organizations akin to municipalities.”31

By means of the awqaf founded in different spheres of social life, privately accumulated capital was voluntarily endowed to finance all sorts of social, cultural, religious, and economical services alongside with health and transportation, all of which were free of charge and open to everyone, without discrimination. As a result, the awqaf played a very eminent role in setting up a sound integration, cooperation, and mutual confidence between the society and the state. Aqwaf, in other words, became the medium for financing Islam as a society,32 and have served as the primary mechanism for a better distribution of income.

Awqaf’s services were provided through decentralized decision-making, i.e., not by a central authority but by philanthropists determined to address social and economic issues in their neighborhood.17 The multiplicity of waqf founders, together with the generally uncoordinated character of their choices, furnished abundant opportunities for learning from failures and successes. Such associations that individuals create, operate, and transform essentially on their own, without direct guidance from the state, also contributed to a strong civil society.31

The notion that wasting or misusing properties of awqaf, the state, or orphans is a severe violation of the rights of others, thus will be punished in the Hereafter, provided an extreme sense of self-discipline in individuals and immunity to those properties. Traditionally, waqf deeds even contained imprecations to discourage any possible abuse and orisons to encourage compliance with the deed.33

The centralization policy, promoted partly by the Western powers and partly by the Ottoman reformers in the late nineteenth century, undermined the role of awqaf and transformed these traditional institutions to European-inspired municipalities for providing public services with a central manner.34 Most countries now directly or indirectly administer waqf lands in separate Ministries, leading to the demise of its nongovernmental identity. Moreover, as a usual practice in the Europe, North America, and Australia, Muslim communities establish nonprofit organizations which in turn own the waqf property. Despite the reduction in its influence in the social spheres, and despite the considerable cutback in the size of its properties and revenues due to the colonial experience and the emergence of modern nation states, waqf remains as an institution of substantial wealth and potential, and it still holds some of the historical flexibility that qualifies it to play a major role in contemporary societies.35

Senkaya has a Master’s Degree in Nonprofit Leadership. He can be contacted at senkayao@seattleu.edu.

Notes

1The word waqf, and its plural form awqaf, were derived from the Arabic root verb waqafa, which means “to cause a thing to stop and stand still.” Heffening defines waqf as: a pious endowment established when an owner of a property surrenders her/his disposal rights, without transferring them to some other party (Heffening, W. “Waqf.” Vol. 4. In Encyclopedia of Islam, 1096-1103. 1934).

2 Toraman, Cengiz. “Cash Awqaf in the Ottomans as Philanthropic Foundations and Their Accounting Practices” Paper presented at the fifth Accounting History International Conference. Canada: Edward School of Business, University of Saskatchewan, August 9-12, 2007. http://www.commerce.usask.ca/special/5ahic/papers/5AHIC-37%20FINAL%20Paper.pdf

3 Dallal, Ahmad. “The Islamic Institution of Waqf: A Historical Overview.” In Islam and Social Policy, Stephen P. Heyneman, 13-43. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2004.

4 Othman, Muhammad Z. “Institution of Waqf.” Islamic Culture 58, no. 1 (1984): 55-62.

5 Canan, ?brahim. Kütüb-i Sitte Tercüme ve ?erhi. Vol. 16, 275-281. Ankara: Akça? Yay?nlar?, 2004.

6 Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. “Islamic Waqf Endowment.” http://www.isesco.org.ma/english/publications/WAQF/Chap6.php

7 Çizakça, Murat. A History of Philanthropic Foundations: The Islamic World from the Seventh Century to the Present. Istanbul: Bogazici University Press, 2000.

8 Ba?kan, Birol. Paper presented at 17th Middle East History And Theory Conference, May 10-11. Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Chicago. 2002, “Waqf System as a Redistribution Mechanism in Ottoman Empire.” http://cas.uchicago.edu/workshops/mehat/past_conferences/Baskan.pdf

9 Ar?, Saim. “Osmanl? Mahallesinde Sosyal Dayan??ma Örne?i: Avar?z Vak?flar?.” Sizinti 24, no. 287 (2002) http://www.sizinti.com.tr/konular.php?KONUID=210

10 Yediy?ld?z, Bahaeddin. Place of the Waqf in Turkish Cultural System. Translated by R Acun and M Oz. Istanbul: Second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II), 1996. http://www.history.hacettepe.edu.tr/archive/waqfkultur.html

11 Qur’an, 55:26-27.

12 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Waqf

13 Maksudo?lu, Mehmet E. “Osmanl? Vak?f Uygulamas?ndan Baz? Örnekler” Diyanet Ilmi Dergi, 2003 http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/DIYANET/ilmi_dergi/ilmi_39_3/main.asp?makno=6

14 According to the findings of Ekrem Hakk? Ayverdi (in The Ottoman Architectural Artifacts in Europe), there were 3339 Turkish waqf buildings in Bulgaria in 1982. Of these 2356 were small and large mosques, 142 universities, 273 bridges, 16 caravanseraies and the rest consisting of baths (hamam), tombs, fortresses, public fountains, libraries etc. (Yediy?ld?z).

15 Peri, Oded. “Waqf and Ottoman Welfare Policy. The Poor Kitchen of Hasseki Sultan in Eighteenth-Century Jerusalem.” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 35, no. 2 (1992): 167-186.

16 Çizakça, Murat (interviewed by Dr. Shariq Nasir). “Combining Islamic History with Islamic Institutional Economics.” Islamic Business and Finance, March 2006 http://www.cpifinancial.net/v2/Magazine.aspx?v=1&aid=392&cat=IBF&in=5

17 Named as state waqf, this type of awqaf are legally different from private charitable awqaf. Because the Sultan established the waqf from the treasury of the State, these awqaf were called, waqfi gayri sahih (Ba?kan).

18 Emino?lu, Kamil. “Osmanl?lar’da Vak?f Anlay???.” Sizinti 8, no. 90 (1996) http://www.sizinti.com.tr/konular.php?KONUID=2411

19 Crecelius, Daniel. “Introduction.” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 38, no. 3 (1995): 249.

20 http://www.vgm.gov.tr/01_VakifKayitlariArsivi/001_VakfiyeArsivi/vakfiye.cfm.

21 For more information regarding superintendence mechanisms readers may consult to Akgunduz. Akgündüz, Ahmet. “?slâm Hukukunda ve Osmanl? Tatbikat?nda Vak?f Müesseseleri”, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Bas?mevi, 1988.

22 ?nalc?k, Halil. “The Economic Mind.” In An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

23 A?manvermez, Ahmet. “Bir Vak?f Medeniyeti Olarak Osmanl?.” http://www.kalemguzeli.net/bir-vakif-medeniyeti-olarak-osmanli.html

24 Qur’an, 2:261-274.

25 Ünver, Süheyl. “Sadaka Ta?lar?.” Hayat Tarih 11, 1967.

26 Seker, Mehmet. “Osmanl? Vakfiyelerinde Çevre Bilinci.” Ekoloji 1, no.4 (1992): 26-30.

27 Hilal, Ziyaeddin. “Yabancilarin Gözüyle Osmanli’da Vakif Hizmetleri.” Sizinti 29, no. 338 (2007) http://www.sizinti.com.tr/konular.php?KONUID=3139

28 D’Ohsson, Moradjea. Tableau General del Empire Otoman.

29 Bayyigit, Mehmet. “Sosyal Yard?mla?ma ve Dayan??ma Kurumu Olarak Vak?flar.” 59-66. 1999.

30 Arsebük, Esat. Medeni Hukuk, Ba?lang?ç ve ?ah?s Hukuku. Vol. 1, 298. 1938.

31 Kuran, Timur. “The provision of public goods under Islamic law: Origins, impact, and limitations of the waqf…” Law & Society Review 35, no. 4 (2001): 841-897.

32 Hoexter, Miriam. “The Waqf and the Public Sphere.” In The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies, Miriam Hoexter Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, and Nehemia Levtzion, 119-138. Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 2002.

33 Gözübenli, Be?ir. “?slam Toplumunda Vak?f Kültürünün Do?u?u.” Yeni Ümit 15, no.60 (2003) http://www.yeniumit.com.tr/konular.php?sayi_id=60&konu_id=54&yumit=bolum2

34 Kilicalp, Sevinc S. “Centralization of the Ottoman State and Modernization of the Waqf System.” 4th ed. In Master in International Studies in Philanthropy and Social Entrepreneurship, 1-28. Bologna: University of Bologna, February 2008. http://www.misp.it/2008/images/stories/documenti/KilicalpPaper.pdf

35 (Habitat II)

Homo economicus

Pioneered by Adam Smith, one of the founders of capitalism, the idea of homo-economicus is used as a base to construct theories on consumption and investment. In his famous book The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith emphasizes the importance of self interest in human behaviors and describes the self-interest as the key driver of social prosperity. An economic agent has been constructed as a representative one which typifies the economic behavior of a typical person in the society and it is assumed that this agent systematically behaves rationally when deciding on any issue, especially the economic issues. If we define rationality, from the economics standpoint, as an act that aims for the maximum possible degree of acquirements with given limited resources, this constructed agent will be rational by behaving in favor of his/her own self-interest, hence he/she will always be optimizing.

Are we really rational?

In fact, the core belief in the idea of homo-economicus that homo-sapiens, the wise man, acts selfishly is a realistic assumption as self-interest is an important part of the innate human nature and an important intrinsic motive. We always want the best for ourselves and this motive is not exactly greed, but an intrinsic motivation to behave on one’s interest. But, it is also true that not everyone is rational in the society and not all behaviors are considered rational in an economic sense. To test whether the individuals make rational choices or not, Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky conducted numerous experiments to test the human rationality and they reached this conclusion that human behaviors are not as rational as predicted by the homo-economicus assumption, instead they found that depending on how the question is framed or how things are measured people can make different choices. Also, they observed that not all behaviors are utility maximizing, sometimes people act altruistically, and sometimes people have the tendency to stay in the status quo. An interesting result of their experiment is that, when people make decisions, they emotionally value losses twice as much as they value an equivalent gain. In an experiment, they ask the subjects the following question:

Would you accept this gamble?
– 50% chance to win $150
– 50% chance to lose $100

They realized that, even though the expected value of gain in the above gamble (50% x $150= $75) is higher than the expected value of loss (50% x $100= $50), there are fewer takers of the gamble. Instead of showing their other experiment results, we can easily look at some of the marketing tricks to have an idea about the irrational choices we make in our daily life.
In a marketing strategy called Decoy marketing, marketers observe a boost in their sales of an expensive offer when they offer a similar item that is inferior in quality but about the same price of the expensive item. In his book Predictably Irrational Don Areily conducts an experiment using magazine subscription offers where subjects were offered two alternative subscription choices to The Economist magazine, one print only subscription (the inferior option which serves to make the combined offer look like a better value) and one internet and print subscription and they observe huge jump in sales due to the decoying effect.

In another experiment in Predictably Irrational, the author shows that people would walk 15 minutes to save $7 on an $18 item but wouldn’t take the same 15-minute trip to save the same amount on a $455 item. In fact, it is the same amount of savings, and a rational person is expected to behave consistently at each case.

The current financial turmoil is a typical example for how people can make irrational decisions. Currently, the world is experiencing a catastrophic financial and economic meltdown started at the subprime mortgage markets in United States and spread out to other financial markets. Some people claim that the irrational behavior of sophisticated investors was the root cause of the recent meltdown. To get a better understanding of the issue, we need to look at the balance of greed and fear in the investors’ behavior. While greed leads to overconfidence in the economy and excessive risk taking, the fear in the market leads to inactivity in the market and excessive aversion to risk. When investors make a decision about whether buying a stock, bond or any sophisticated security, they are expected to evaluate the expected reward versus the risk of possible expected loss. As predicted in Kahneman and Tversky study, the wisdom in the Wall Street is that “Fear always trumps greed.” Neuroscientists describe the situation when greed dominates the fear as a “moral meltdown,” and this is the situation where human brain loses control of reward and loss comparison and completely ignores risks. Take the trading in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) which was perceived as one of major problems that leads to the recent financial crises. Since the security was rated excellent by the rating agencies and all losses were insured by AIG insurance company, the investors observed too much reward opportunities while no weight was given to the risk of a collapse in the market. That is the point when greed dominates fear in the market and fear fails to balance greed in the normal investor’s brain. In the aftermath of the financial collapse, what we see right now is just the opposite of what was the case in the buildup of the financial bubble. Now, both investors and bankers are in a mode of excessive fear where negative news significantly decrease the stock prices and instead of providing credit to the markets, investors sit on a huge pile of cash.

If the excessive greed and overconfidence in the economy results in catastrophic events, should we ask investors to be less greedy? According to the Adam Smith, all humans have sympathy for the rich and famous. We can even find this in Holy Scriptures as well. There is always a sympathy for, and envy of, the rich. Hence, asking people to act against their innate nature may not be a wise decision but we should also keep in mind that this inherent human tendency can lead to moral corruption in the society. What we need is the balance of fear and greed in our behaviors and if one dominates the other, there will be misery for the whole.

Devrim Bulut holds a PhD degree in economics. Having taught at several universities in the United States for the last 5 years, he conducts research on market irrationality.

Yet, despite all the attention devoted by academic observers, activists, and policymakers, progress in remedying these still endemic social problems has been limited, uneven, and all too reversible. Why have the efforts of an army of social scientists working over several generations not yielded more tangible progress in combating our most pressing social problems? In this essay, I argue that the lack of a coherent conception of human nature has contributed to the frustrating results of our attempts to advance human society through scientific inquiry. I suggest that greater understanding of the human spirit can contribute to the overarching project of improving the human condition that unites all of the social sciences.

Speaking broadly and simplifying vastly (as limited space necessitates), two meta-paradigms concerning human nature have guided much social science research in the past several decades. On the one hand, there is a rationalist paradigm that theorizes human beings as egoists rationally pursuing their self-interest. This understanding of human nature provides the foundation for the discipline of economics and has become increasingly dominant in political science. In emphasizing that actions follow a “logic of consequences” in which decisions are based on how expected outcomes will affect an individual’s utility, the rationalist paradigm does not consider morality an inherent dimension of human action. In this framework, people are portrayed as largely amoral, only taking normatively proper actions if doing so benefits them personally or if they happen to derive unusually high utility from virtuous behavior due to idiosyncrasies in character.

In political science, the assumptions underlying the rationalist paradigm lead to a rather pessimistic outlook on the likelihood of arriving at morally agreeable outcomes. For instance, there is no reason to believe that a dictator will stop employing violence against his own citizens just because the international community urges that it is the right thing to do; rather, such behavior will continue until the leader’s incentive structure changes, making political repression too costly to continue. However, characterizing people as rational actors need not entail such a bleak outlook. In economics, for example, there seems to be an almost axiomatic faith in Adam Smith’s notion that the rational pursuit of self-interest benefits the entire collectivity.

In contrast to the rationalist approach, there is a normative paradigm that conceives of human beings as primarily concerned with aligning their actions to standards of appropriateness for particular roles and identities in different social situations. While the rationalist paradigm thrives in economics and political science, the normative paradigm is most prevalent in sociology. From this perspective, people are less concerned with doing whatever it takes to achieve their aims than with determining which actions are prescribed for given circumstances and behaving accordingly. In this way, actors do what is perceived as right for its own sake, operating according to a “logic of appropriateness” rather than a “logic of consequences.” In a sharp contrast to the amoral egoists that populate rationalist models of the world, human actors in the normative paradigm are conceived of as fundamentally moral beings, deeply influenced by what their communities consider right and proper.

While acknowledging the potential for a gap between standards of appropriate behavior and the capacity to adhere to those standards in practice, the normative paradigm tends towards an optimistic estimate of the possibility of achieving morally desirable outcomes. Problematic behavior can be corrected through moral suasion based on clearly articulated normative standards, without necessarily appealing to the self-interest of deviant actors, as in the rationalist paradigm. For instance, pro-democracy international institutions might be able to socialize officials from authoritarian countries into valuing democracy for its own sake, transcending their rational inclination to perpetuate oppressive arrangements.

How can we reconcile these profoundly disparate visions of humanity in analyzing and attempting to remedy social problems? Many acknowledge that social action can follow both the rationalist “logic of consequences” and the normative “logic of appropriateness,” but social theorists have yet to construct a coherent framework that can explain when action might follow one or the other logic. Far too much energy has been expended in unproductive debates in which analysts draw on limited empirical findings to assert the superiority of their favored approach.

To be sure, both paradigms are intuitively plausible, and one can easily find cases that fit the predictions of each. But both approaches are incomplete, and unable on their own to account for the full range of human behavior. The rationalist paradigm offers no explanation for why discourses about norms and morality comprise such an essential part of everyday human experience, while the normative approach fails to account for the pervasiveness of anti-social and immoral behavior. But if we are neither the self-seeking sociopaths envisioned by the rationalist paradigm nor the perfectly socialized automatons imagined by the normative paradigm, then who are we?

I suggest that social scientific analysis and policymaking might be well served by drawing on conceptions of human nature that derive more from the inherited wisdom of religious traditions and less from the abstract deductions of contemporary theoretical paradigms. The perspective I advocate takes up a broad theme of the Abrahamic faiths – the universal corruptibility of the human spirit, beginning with the transgressions of the very first human beings in the story of the Garden of Eden. In other words, I argue that it is analytically useful for social science research to conceptualize human beings as sinners.

With this characterization, I suggest that people are highly aware of and concerned with the normative prescriptions of the various social groupings to which they belong, and typically act to uphold and reinforce these standards of behavior. However, as the fallible creatures that we are, we fall prey to a range of spiritual lapses that lead us to use to violate even our most sacred moral codes. Common-sense reflection on the historical record of human behavior can shed light on how our penchant for sinfulness expresses itself. We have shown that we disregard the lives of others in the pursuit of profit and power. We dehumanize and oppress those whom we perceive as different from ourselves. We grow comfortable in positions of wealth and influence, protecting our own standing against changes that would benefit the rest of society. We think only of our own short-term gain rather than our long-term responsibilities to those who will come after us. We are indifferent to the suffering of strangers. We break promises, tell lies, and act hypocritically. We take for granted and hurt the ones we love.

Of course, our propensity for sinful behavior does not mean that we are only capable of depravity. Indeed, most of the time we follow the moral standards of our communities in an unreflective, straightforward fashion. And we are certainly capable of deep compassion and heroic self-sacrifice. But our spiritual imperfection means that we all have an inherent potential to stray from a righteous path, especially during extreme conditions like warfare, political instability, poverty, and economic depression. This potential is universal and timeless, and exists within men and women, rich and poor, traditional and modern, educated and illiterate, believer and skeptic alike. The exact nature of our vices, and the extent to which they impact other people, might vary according to our social positions (a prince’s failings can cause greater harm than a pauper’s), but corruptibility is something we all share.

Imagining human beings as sinners makes sense of the paradoxical views of humanity offered by the rationalist and normative paradigms while overcoming their limitations. This perspective incorporates the normative paradigm’s insight that people care about upholding the standards of appropriateness of their communities, but sheds the naïve expectation that they will almost automatically abide by these standards. This perspective also accepts the rationalist paradigm’s premise that people often engage in aberrant, self-serving action. However, while the rationalist paradigm suggests that people pursue their own satisfaction without considering the normative implications of their behavior, the view of humans as sinners recognizes that people generally aspire towards decency, even if they are sometimes susceptible to moral breakdown. Eschewing firm a priori assumptions about people’s inclination towards normatively appropriate behavior, the spiritual paradigm I propose starts from acknowledging our demonstrated capacity for both upstanding and immoral behavior. A social science research program built upon such a vision of humanity would aim to investigate the social conditions under which people engage in different types of behavior – virtuous and vicious – and draw upon this knowledge to design policies that will better confront the most lasting and pernicious social problems.

An inadequate understanding of humankind’s spiritual character can lead to two types of problems that have plagued modern attempts to shape our societies for the better. First, we often craft policies that rest on naïve assumptions about human nature, and which could only work in practice if we were saints rather than sinners. For instance, a laissez faire approach to economic regulation stems from the notion that allowing people to freely pursue their economic self-interest leads the economy to thrive. But this position underestimates the extent to which economic actors, left unchecked, are prone to greedy or shortsighted behavior that can harm society as a whole. The current financial crisis resulted from the creation of high-risk financial instruments that led consumers to take on mortgages they could not afford and companies to over-invest in dubious mortgage-backed securities. These policies enriched the finance industry and expanded the ranks of homeowners in the short-term, but the bursting of the housing bubble led to an epidemic of foreclosures, a stock market crash, a drying up of credit, and a global economic recession.

The policy of abstinence-only sex education is another case in which the likelihood of virtue is overestimated. This policy relies on the sexual restraint of young people to reduce pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections among teenagers. Such programs have been found to be ineffective because they fail to appreciate the difficulty of resisting the temptation to engage in risky sexual behavior for even the most steadfast advocates of abstinence. These examples suggest that policies too dependent on the proper behavior of those involved will tend not to be very successful.

A second problem deriving from our inadequate understanding of human nature is our tendency to divide the world into rigid categories of those who are righteous and those who are wicked, often succumbing to the hubristic assumption that God is on our side. Rather than recognizing that we are all equal in our potential for moral failure, we forget our own sinfulness, with the ironic result that those most ostensibly committed to social progress along Enlightenment principles can be guilty of the most brutal inhumanity.

Idealistic political movements have frequently illustrated such a dynamic. The French Revolution, for instance, produced the Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789, proclaiming liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression to be natural rights. Just a few years later, Robespierre’s Committee for Public Safety launched a program of arbitrary executions to protect the revolutionary government from the perceived threat of internal enemies, an absurd blasphemy of the Revolution’s foundational principles. Similarly, the vanguard of the Bolshevik Revolution viewed itself as leading the world towards a communist future that would eradicate inequality and establish the conditions for universal human flourishing. Yet this project devolved into a paranoid police state that imprisoned and executed millions of kulaks, Cossacks, and other class enemies for the sake of the unquestionably righteous Revolution.

As casual observers of history, we tend to attribute such atrocities to the uncommonly evil character of the key figures involved: Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, Mao. But such horrors as chattel slavery, colonialism, the Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide, ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, and the Darfur crisis are not simply the work of a single monstrous leader or a few bad apples. They require many hands, and arise from an all-too-human capacity to inflict harm on others, to be overcome with hatred, to turn a blind eye to suffering and injustice – in short, to be inhumane. The urge to dissociate ourselves from such evils is powerful, as we like to think of ourselves as good people, incapable of such savagery. But the history of human suffering is the story of allegedly good people doing terrible things to each other. Thus, we must accept any sin committed by another person as potentially one of our own.

Treading a righteous path – as individuals, as corporations, as nations – is difficult, but certainly not impossible. Bringing our aspirations for values like equality, liberty, and peace closer to fruition requires not just technical knowledge, but also attention to how the spiritual character of human beings shapes the implementation and effectiveness of policy initiatives. When we acknowledge the darker aspects of our nature, the design of policies becomes a matter of identifying and protecting against the sources of temptation we may face.

The structure of American political institutions might serve to illustrate a well-crafted policy in this regard. Wary of the concentration of power in the hands of any one entity, the drafters of American institutions dispersed authority among three distinct branches of government. While members of each branch have worked to enhance their own power, the separation of powers ensures an ongoing wrangling between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, the result being that no one branch can accumulate absolute authority. Instead of trusting political actors to refrain from power seeking, the founders anticipated the temptation to extend one’s reach and devised mechanisms to check that tendency. In this way, democratic rule has survived for over two centuries.

The modern social sciences offer an impressive array of techniques for acquiring systematic knowledge about human societies. But scientific knowledge will not lead the world on a linear march of progress if not coupled with an honest and accurate reckoning of human nature. Turning with humility to the insights into the human spirit offered by religious traditions may be the best way to appreciate and temper the shortcomings we have shared from the beginning.

P. Geoffrey Bakken is PhD candidate in Sociology at the University of Wisconsin.

What is microfinance?

As defined by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), microfinance is “the supply of loans, savings, and other basic financial services to the poor.”¹ Muhammad Yunus provides a much more detailed definition of microfinance to ensure its distinction from other kinds of credit. He gives the goal of microfinance credit as “creating self-employment for income-generating activities and housing for the poor, as opposed to consumption.”² Microfinance, as a concept, was first introduced in the late 1970s by Yunus in Bangladesh through Grameen Bank. To ensure the utilization of the idle capacity of skills among the poor, microfinance credits typically offer tiny loans to individuals ranging from $40–$50 to a couple of thousand dollars. The borrowers are asked to repay the loans within a brief period in order to secure future loans. According to Gary Gardner, worldwide the average microcredit size is $1,026.³ The credits usually come with a fairly high interest rate. At the lower end, we see annual interest rates of 20–30%; at the higher end, the rate can go as high as 60–70% per annum in certain cases.

The need for microfinance

Microfinance addresses, it appears, a moral necessity more than anything else. By empowering the poor through credit extension, this innovative idea of microfinance tackles a serious drawback of the contemporary economic system, that is, the exclusion of the poor from the financial system. The working of modern economies prevents people without assets from securing loans in commercial banks. The rationale is simple; the poor person does not have savings, assets for collateral, or a credit profile. For the lender, the risks associated with the loaned-out credit are disproportionately high in relation to the profit in the ongoing interest rates; the expense of conducting the high-risk financing of businesses run by poor people exceeds the potential returns. Yet, for underutilized or idle economic capacity to be realized, an economic agent needs to assume the risk associated with extending credit to people on low incomes.

Traditionally, poor people have developed informal mechanisms to address their credit needs, such as securing loans from their family networks. Yet, these mechanisms cannot always provide the amount and flexibility needed in dire economic conditions such as an emergency. According to some accounts, there are around 7,000 “microlenders,” or microfinance institutions (MFIs), worldwide reaching out to more than 100 million borrowers.⁴ How did these institutions emerge? The answer is high interest rates. As mentioned above, there are many financial actors lending at rates well above current interest rates because of the higher default risk. Based on this new financing system, new business models developed throughout the world demonstrating that poor people did not necessarily mean risk-prone investment. An interesting aspect of microfinance is the predominance of women as borrowers rather than men. Almost 90% of actual borrowers are women, a fact attributed to the better “repayment performance” of women. This is a deliberate policy on the part of microcredit programs. This reliable repayment performance coupled with women’s tendency to invest the additional income to the benefit of the family⁵ ensures the achievement of several positive outcomes which will be discussed in the following section.

The success of microfinance to date

Microfinancing theory has two broad goals. One of them is the realization of long-term economic development in less developed countries. Investigating and measuring the accomplishment of this goal is beyond the scope of this article; instead, I will focus on the second goal and the level of its achievement in order to evaluate the concept. The second goal, which is improvement in the daily lives of poor people, is also more directly related to the lives of individuals and may give us a better idea about the benefits of microfinancing. If the institution of microfinancing targets poor people and their economic prospects, then we should be able to see tangible evidence of improvement in that area. Proponents of the idea postulate that microfinancing benefits the immediate borrowers economically, but also has wider implications for the household as a whole. The eradication of poverty is one of the celebrated successes of microfinancing at the individual level. According to Littlefield et al., the project has recorded significant improvement in the earnings of microfinancing borrowers as opposed to non-borrowers. For example, in Bolivia two thirds of borrowers experienced an increase in their income. Similarly, in Indonesia the increase in income was about 13% for borrowers and a mere 3% for non-borrowers.6 Various studies demonstrate that among borrowers of microfinance loans about 50% have actually risen above the poverty threshold, an important statistic by any measure.⁷

Another success of the microfinancing program has been the improvement in children’s education. According to the research, education is one of the areas where we can observe the spillover effects of the increased income; extra income is likely to be spent on the education of children. In Bangladesh, the educational achievement of children aged from 11–14 years (whose families took microfinance loans) has doubled to surpass the control group (the children of non-borrowers) by almost 80%. A different study finds that in 1996 the schooling rate among the daughters of borrowers was almost 100% as opposed 60% among the children of non-borrowers; similarly among boys, 81% of the children of microfinancing borrowers went to school as compared to 54% of the rest.⁸ In health care, Littlefield et al. also report noteworthy improvement in immunization, breast-feeding practices, and rehydration therapy for children with diarrhea in countries like Ghana, Bolivia, and Bangladesh.⁹ According to recent literature on economic development, better educational and health care opportunities as part of human development initiatives underlie the new, long-term economic development process. In this regard, it is important to recognize the great potential that microfinance can offer for the future of developing countries.¹⁰

Drawbacks of microfinance

Nonetheless, microfinancing raises important questions with respect to its application and the heavy burden it places on the borrowers. Microfinancing particularly faces two urgent issues undermining its popularity worldwide. The first of these issues concerns microfinance institutions (MFIs). In recent years, MFIs have begun to experience financial difficulties, in particular, high delinquency rates. In contrast to the high repayment rates of the early period of microfinancing, MFIs are having increasing difficulty in sustaining their financial solvency. The early 2000s saw Grameen Bank experiencing serious repayment problems; 19% of its overall loans are one year overdue and about 10% are delinquent as defined by the bank itself. In a similar vein, Nimal Fernando, a consultant for CGAP (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor), reports liquidity and delinquency problems Asian MFIs faced in the 1990s and 2000s.¹¹ Because of high interest rates, borrowers fail to pay off the principal of the loan, and the accumulating interest. Taking the necessary steps to ensure financial sustainability of MFIs, however, comes with a trade-off; the borrowers will have to confront tighter measures on their loans in the form of higher interest rates, shorter due dates for repayment, or limited uses for the loan.¹²

The second problem facing microfinancing surfaced in the form of increased commercialization. MFIs have increasingly gained a commercial nature with investment banks obtaining a larger share of the microcredit sector. The justification for commercialization of microfinance is that increased capital allows financing to reach a larger pool of poor borrowers, enabling them to engage in a wider spectrum of economic activities. No doubt the increased pool of available funds has contributed to the increase in the number of borrowers in the last decade or so. However, this new interest in microfinancing poses problems in addition to its advantages. The surge in commercialization is in large part due to the potential for high returns in the sector. Higher returns for MFIs come at the expense of the poor borrowers across the world in the form of higher interest rates. This outcome is intimately related to the delinquency rates of MFIs. Higher interest rates imply lower repayment performance and longer repayment terms.¹³ The commercialization of microfinance is exemplified by the recent case of Compartamos, a microfinance institution in Mexico. In the words of Jonathan Lewis, “Compartamos is without question an impressive…bottom line success story, a veritable poster child for commercializing microfinance.”¹⁴ But this focus on the lender’s “bottom line” has not proved to be a guarantee of success or satisfaction for the borrower, as we shall see.

Both of these problems, the lack of financial sustainability of MFIs and the commercialization of microfinancing, point to a serious issue at the very foundation of microfinancing: interest-based credits. As we know too well from the current financial and economic crisis, an uncontrolled interest-based economic system is likely to harm the poor rather than the rich who actually own the financial assets. The major burden of “saving” the economic system falls on the shoulders of lower economic groups. Interest-based microfinancing, seen in this light, has a negative effect on the microfinancing system in two ways. Firstly, borrowers try to catch up with interest payments while at the same time putting in an effort to make the best use of the limited amount of credit. As Businessweek put it, the loans from MFIs rival traditional “pawnshops and loan sharks.”¹⁵ In the case of Compartamos, for example, the effective interest rate paid by the borrowers goes as high as 100% annually. Unable to run their business as expected, borrowers defer payment of their loans, which results in higher interest payments. Particularly in a crisis environment, low business volumes are more likely to cause delays in repayments and increases in interest rates, a vicious cycle harmful for the poor. Under such circumstances, the possibility of added economic value is minimized.

Secondly, the interest-based mechanics of microfinancing, and by association its commercialization, have become an effective mechanism for integrating the poor into the global financial system. “Unbankable” until the 1970s, the poor have now been made de facto captives of the financial system. Although the original idea was to help the poor in ways unexplored so far and to make microfinancing “a tool of nonprofit economic development,”¹⁶ neither of these goals has been realized in the long term because of the heavy interest burden of microfinance formulation. In a slight reformulation, the question of the high interest rates is not whether they prevent microloans from working, but rather how they affect the working of the system. What happens is that the loans obtained by borrowers are directed to more urgent uses to “smooth consumption” in the short term, instead of being invested in potentially profitable business activities, which is stated as the chief goal of the microfinancing system. High interest rates change the pattern of loan consumption by borrowers; high interest rates preclude the chances of profitable entrepreneurial activity. Even if the loan is employed for business purposes, at the time of repayment the profits cannot match the interest¹⁷ and this eventually leads to the use of loans for consumption needs.

Conclusion

The contemporary capitalist global economic system has benefits and harms in proportion to the individual’s wealth, usually favoring the rich over the poor. Microfinance began with the hope of offering a helping hand to those outside and on the margins of the global economic system. The goal is an exalted one, suggesting respect and increased economic opportunity for the poor. Yet, the practice of microfinance seems to set it far from its moral foundations. Increased commercialization accompanied by exorbitant interest rates only reinforces the working of the global economic system to benefit the wealthier and harm the poor. Unless the fundamentals of microfinancing are transformed to not-for-profit bases, in the long term we may see this potentially valuable institution simply withering away to another form of aggressive capitalism. I would like to conclude with a quotation from Bediüzzaman Said Nursi pointing to two fundamental problems of our contemporary society:

… [T]he following two attitudes or approaches are the causes of all revolutions and social upheavals, as well as the root of all moral failings: … “I do not care if others die of hunger so long as my stomach is full,” and “You must bear the costs of my ease-you must work so that I may eat.”¹⁸

Microfinancing in its current formulation stands strangely where these two problems meet. On the one hand, it is an effort at minimizing the suffering of others by the extension of finance opportunities. On the other hand, those others carry the burden of this help, making the wealthy wealthier. In this regard, Bediüzzaman’s statement is intimately related to the way microfinancing, a potentially valuable initiative in itself, has become an instrument of the rich used against the poor through its dependence on commercialization and interest.

A. Kadir Yildirim is a PhD candidate in political science at the Ohio State University. He can be reached at yildirim.10@osu.edu.

Notes

1. Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) website, http://www.cgap.org, accessed 12/26/2008.
2. Muhammad Yunus, 2007, “What is Microcredit?”
3. Gary Gardner, 2008, “Microfinance Surging,” Worldwatch Institute.
4. Daniel Pearl and Michael M. Phillips, November 27, 2001, “Grameen Bank, Which Pioneered Loans For the Poor, Has Hit a Repayment Snag,” Wall Street Journal; Gary Gardner, 2008, “Microfinance Surging,” Worldwatch Institute.
5. Elizabeth Littlefield, Jonathan Morduch, and Syed Hashemi, 2003, “Is Microfinance an Effective strategy to reach the Millennium Development Goals?” Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), p. 7
6. Ibid, p. 3.
7. See “Role of Microcredit in Poverty Alleviation,” 2005, First Quarterly Report of State Bank of Pakistan, 2004–2005 for data on India; see Global Development Research Center’s “Data Snapshots on Microfinance,” http://www.gdrc.org/icm/index.html, accessed 02/07/2009 for data on Bangladesh.
8. A.M.R. Chowdhury and A. Bhuiya, 2001, “Do Poverty Alleviation Programmes Reduce Inequity in Health: Lessons from Bangladesh,” in Poverty Inequity and Health, ed. D. Leon and G. Walt (Oxford: Oxford UP).
9. Ibid, p. 6.
10. See World Development Report 2006 by World Bank; and, A.Kadir Yildirim, 2008, “Economic Development via Human Development,” The Fountain, Issue 62 (March–April).
11. Pearl and Phillips, “Grameen Bank, Which Pioneered Loans For the Poor, Has Hit a Repayment Snag”; Nimal A. Fernando, 2008, “Managing Microfinance Risks: Some Observations and Suggestions,” Asian Development Bank.
12. Viktor Berglind and Arizo Karimi, 2007, “Repayment Performance in Microfinance: A Theoretical Analysis,” University Essay from Uppsala University.
13. Ibid, p. 11;
14. Lewis’ study on the case of Compartamos is instructive on the benefits of commercialization for MFIs. Jonathan C. Lewis, 2007, “What Would Leland Stanford Do?” Microcredit Enterprises.
15. Businessweek, December 13, 2007, “The Ugly Side of Microfinancing.”
16. Ibid.
17. See James Surowiecki, “What Microloans Miss,” The New Yorker, 17 March 2008 for a discussion on the impact of high interest rates in microfinancing industry.
18. Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, The Words, New Jersey: Tughra Books, 2005, The Twenty-fifth Word, p. 427.

The nineteenth century, particularly towards the end, was a period that was intensively preoccupied with human-centered theories and movements that would be implemented later in the twentieth century. When focusing on the theory of crime developed by Raskolnikov, the protagonist in Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment, it is possible to see the traces of a variety of philosophical or criminal theory approaches that were developed in this era.

The most well-known of such views was that of Karl Marx (1818-1883), which advocated a completely new and revolutionary world order based on economic equality. Because he held the view that all human behavior was determined by social conditions, Marx maintained that it was social circumstances which were responsible for the crime, not the individual. In fact, Marx did not recognize crime as such. Crime to Marx is a responsibility which a society that has been established on unjust grounds has burdened the victimized individual with. It is Mark’s primary assertion that the only possible way to break free from such chaos is a revolution aimed at establishing a Communist order, which would in turn lead to the construction of a society based on social and economic equality.

It is possible to see significant traces of what Marx describes as a society of injustice in Raskolnikov’s crime theory. In the novel, Raskolnikov is a poor student who murders an old woman pawnbroker. The principle factor pushing Raskolnikov to commit the crime is anger at the social circumstances that surrounded him, such as his own poor economic conditions and that of his family, the huge economic imbalance within society and the atrocious tyranny over others of those who have economic power – like his landlord. As such, similar to Marx, Raskolnikov does not consider the crime he is about to commit a crime. For Raskolnikov, the theory is much more than revenge taken on an unjust society, it is a reform carried out on behalf of society. Raskolnikov envisions hundreds of people being saved with the money he will get from the old woman after he has killed her.

Marx was not the only one whose ideas had an influence on those represented by Raskolnikov. For Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) the theory of crime is relevant to psychological influences; childhood, social pressure and values all have an influence on the individual. It is possible to recapitulate Freud’s approach to crime as, man commits the crime, but he is not the criminal. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) developed Freud’s human analyses within his own nihilist philosophy and had the greatest impact on Raskolnikov’s theory of crime.

Before moving on, let us clarify exactly what Nihilism is. It is, in Nietzsche’s own words, “the self devaluation of the highest of values.”¹ In other words, the old Christian ethical worldview is no longer welcome. Nietzsche describes this situation through the famous statement “God is dead.” It is important to point out here that this statement was not made against religion or God per se, but against their corrupted forms. Along these lines, Nietzsche states in The Anti-Christ:

“What sets us apart is not our rejection to recognize God behind history or nature; but our inability to see he who is revered as God to be like God.”

Collapse of the belief in an Absolute Being, which Dostoyevsky considers to be the worst disaster in the history of mankind, consequently eliminates the belief in a real world. This leaves the human being with two alternatives. One is the hopeless and depressive state that is caused by the thought life has no meaning, all is in vain; the other, in the words of a hero in another of Dostoyevsky’s works, is “if there is no God, then God is I”²; or, in other words, Nietzsche’s notion of “Now, I’ve got the power.”

Regarding power as being essential to life, Nietzsche defines power to be “holding a view independent of all other judgments and limitations.”³ His solution to the chaos that is brought forth by the idea of an absence of God can be realized only through the new superior man, who Nietzsche states has the ability to exist beyond the norms of good and evil.

It can be said that it was this desire to become a superior man that resulted in Raskolnikov’s theory of crime. It is possible to see this will in Raskolnikov’s article in which he divides people into two groups; those who join the herd and the heroes. Instead of the first group, whom Raskolnikov designates as victims, he prefers to be affiliated with the second group, whom he groups under the name of Napoleon. A theme even in the poems of Pushkin and Lermantov, Napoleon, the personification of the man for whom nothing is impossible, symbolizes the will to do anything for the sake of one’s ideals for Raskolnikov. This will necessitate the overthrowing of the old value system that states “thou shalt not kill” and the establishment of a system of new values. In this new order, “there is no such thing as ethical phenomenon. There exist only ethical interpretations of phenomena.”⁴ And beyond this is the idea that, “the worst of vices is necessary for the best of virtues,”⁵ amounting to the fact that crime is henceforth licit. This is why we can say that it was the determination to become a Napoleon or a super man that formed Raskolnikov’s crime theory, for he justifies the crime on the grounds of an ideal – the eradication of vice.

Up until this point, the theories of Marx, Freud, or Nietzsche would not consider Raskolnikov’s murder to be a crime. It is the author himself who regards the murder as a crime, because for Dostoyevski, crime is a sin, it is a departure from God. In the novel, Dostoyevsky reveals Raskolnikov to be someone mentally tormented by his crime, so much so, that he finally confesses to it. As a solution, Dostoyevsky prescribes the repair of the human soul, which in a society where all the boundaries between vice and virtue have been eliminated Dostoevsky considers to be possible only through a return to the Absolute Being. For him, to believe that there is an immortality of the soul and that there is a God who takes care of human beings is necessary if one is to attain happiness and to create a moral life.

Notes

1. Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Will To Power, translation by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1967.
2. Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, translation by Richard Pevear, Larissa Volokhonsky. North Point Press.1990.
3. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti Christ, translation by H.L. Mencken, 1920.
4. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good And Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, translation by Walter Kauffman. New York: Random House, 1966.
5. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, translation by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1995

The 2006 World Development Report analyzes the relationship between equity and economic development in Developing countries. In this essay, I re-examine the relationship between equality, equity and development from a long-term economic development perspective. Equality refers to the condition where socioeconomic groups, i.e. upper, middle and lower classes, in a society have access to relatively similar levels of income. Equity, however, roughly corresponds to the broader term of human development,² and emphasizes equality of opportunity, and a broader set of human conditions. In the light of this report by the World Bank, I suggest that contrary to the long-held views, the development of contemporary Developing countries can only be achieved by “leveling the playing field” among citizens.

For long years, it was believed that economic development led to human development. it was assumed that as a country develops economically, it is able to provide more for the basic needs of its citizens such as education, healthcare, and a better quality of life. Even though it seems reasonable to expect improvement in individuals’ quality of life as a country develops, we have not observed many countries successfully achieving this better quality of life by following the advice of policymakers. However, a casual observation suggests that the relationship between economic development and human development may be endogenous; that is, just as it is natural to expect economic development to affect human development, we should be able to observe various aspects of human development shaping the course of development of many Developing countries. In fact, many Developing countries such as India and Turkey perform better in measures of economic development due to their higher levels of educated citizens.

Equality – development tradeoff

Following Simon Kuznets’ (1955) pioneering study on the relationship between economic development and equality, academicians and policymakers believed that there exists an inherent trade-off between economic development and socioeconomic equality. The dominant perspective places economic efficiency concerns at the center of this tradeoff .³Equality-enhancing redistribution programs lead to “diversion of resources away from their most efficient use.” According to this view, employing limited resources in welfare-improving areas results in a decrease in economic growth as well as underutilized resources. Instead of employing the relatively scarce factor of production, that is capital, in new investment opportunities which would economically be more efficient, spending the capital on less productive social redistribution would negatively affect the economic development hopes negatively.

The main alternative view highlights the welfare consequences of the presumed tradeoff between growth and equality. Proponents of this perspective claim that a focus on rapid growth is likely to entail “distorted patterns of development” and to reduce the welfare of the poor in the society. In particular, the state along with the actors in the private sector directs its focus on increasing productivity and efficiency in the manufacturing sector. Any financial commitment that potentially decreases efficiency in the economy is strictly avoided; redistribution to the poor in the society is considered among such expenditures. The socio-economic distress of the poor simply takes a backseat vis A vis economic efficiency. In order to minimize the short-term effects of the growth-oriented economy, equality should take precedence over economic growth. In the long-run, equality will positively impact economic development.

A recent report by the World Bank draws attention to this widely-accepted tradeoff between development and equality,⁴and proposes an alternative. The report claims that equality and development are complementary to each other rather than contradictory. Economic growth without equality can only provide distorted patterns of economic development leaving the majority of the population in need, just as we observe in many Developing countries today. On the other hand, an exclusive focus on equality is likely to hinder development as valuable resources at the disposal of capital-holders are diverted from their efficient use. As a result, a long-term solution to this impasse requires the introduction of a delicate trade-off between the two: Investment in human. Human development, hence, lies at the heart of this new conception of economic development.

Equity and equality

Equality, in the conventional sense of the term, refers to the elimination of extreme disparity with respect to wealth among individuals within a given community. For this end, different states have applied various forms of redistribution in order to eliminate inequality of income. Such use of the term mostly taps into the outcome aspect of equality. That is, the goal is to minimize the differences in incomes of the people by redistributing wealth from the rich to the poor. Equity, on the other hand, is the new term offered by the World Bank to development terminology. Equity is based on a larger conceptualization of the notion of equality. It suggests equal opportunities in respect to education, health and such; no explicit implication is being offered for the outcome-based notion of equality. Individual responsibility, in this regard, is critical in bridging equal opportunity at the outset with the final outcome.

John Rawls’ notion of the “veil of ignorance” summarizes the basic idea behind this contemporary understanding of equity.⁵ The veil of ignorance is expected to provide a fair allocation of resources that all members of a society would agree. In a hypothetical decision-making situation prior to their knowledge of which position they would occupy in the society, individuals are asked to allocate resources to members of the community; they may be the worse-off or best-off in the community, hence they will put an effort in fairly allocating the resources. In essence, Rawls concludes that “primary goods” should be provided for all, referring to the equality of opportunity for all. Amartya Sen dwells on a similar concept of primary goods, “functionings,” and defines it as “the set of actions a person performs and of states the person values and enjoys.”⁶ It is important to recognize the fact that no suggestions are being made here with respect to the conventional understanding of equality, that is income redistribution. The emphasis in this conceptualization of equity highlights the relative importance of equal opportunity provision over outcome-based redistribution, but not necessarily the exclusion of the latter for the sake of the former.

Inequality traps

Based on this relatively modern notion of equity, it is possible to identify three ways that equity and development are complementary in Developing countries. The first of these ways touches on the notion of “inequality traps.” Inequality traps can be defined as the reproduction of economic, political and social inequalities “over time and across generations.”⁷ Existing political and economic inequalities in Developing countries systematically favor the interests of a relatively small elite group over the rest of the society. By the use of overt or covert power, the elite in Developing countries are able to influence the policymaking process more effectively despite their disadvantage in number. As the poor are likely to be much less involved in the political decision-making process, the vicious circle of underperformance continues.

The second way that equity and development relate to each other comes in the form of inefficient redistribution mechanisms. The institutional structures are tailored to benefit not the neediest in the society, but rather middle-class and upper middle-class citizens.⁸Hence, the influence of the more advantaged in the society further determines the shape of the institutional structure.

Finally, leveling the playing field does potentially affect the investment and innovation environment. A modern economy is inconceivable without an active investment environment. Inequality of opportunity prevents individuals like Nthabiseng from taking part in the modern economy and realizing their potential. Barred from entry, either through institutional mechanisms or mere negligence, individuals facing inequality of opportunity will not be able to enrich the environment of competition necessary for economic development. The relatively few and well-endowed rich will be less likely to feel any pressure to pursue innovation and investment opportunities. Competition, which is regarded as the major source of development, will not come about. As a result, the resulting environment is inimical to sustainable development and poverty reduction.

Implications

Several world religions endorse social justice, helping the poor, and equality as central principles in their teachings. Even though these principles may manifest themselves in fundamentally different ways, the basic idea remains the same. Christians are urged to love their neighbors as themselves; Buddhists are responsible for caring for the poor; one of the five pillars of Islam is zakat (almsgiving); and, the word for “charity” is the same as for “justice” in Hebrew.⁹ As a demonstration of this shared concern among world religions, the World Faiths Development Dialogue has issued a statement the essence of which asserts as follows: “All religions would see the extreme material poverty in the world today as a moral indictment to contemporary humanity and a breach of trust within the human family.”¹⁰ In addition to this poverty-reducing aspect of religions, it is easy to see how this recent understanding of equity can also be inferred from one of the fundamental tenets of all religions. Human dignity constitutes a shared and fundamental theological principle for world religions.¹¹ In order for human beings to reflect this dignity, the latent potential for perfection has to be provided with the right set of opportunities, and basic necessities such as health care, education, and nutrition. Otherwise, undeveloped individual potentials do run the risk of being wasted leading to both dishonoring human dignity and economic underdevelopment, as a social phenomenon.

In what preceded, I introduced a new perspective on economic development, a chronic problem among Developing countries. By making a distinction between equality of income and equality of opportunities, the presumed trade-off between equality and economic growth might be overcome. It is my hope that this new emphasis on equality and human development will allow billions of people living in dire conditions to reclaim their dignity as humans. Eventually, this emphasis on human development will result in economic development, long-anticipated in Developing countries.

A. Kadir Yildirim is a PhD candidate in political science at the Ohio State University. He can be reached at yildirim.10@osu.edu.

Notes

1. The story of Nthabiseng and Pieter is taken from World Development Report 2006 by World Bank.
2. Human Development is defined by the United Nations Development Programme as “the priority of human well-being, and aimed at ensuring and enlarging human choices which lead to equality of opportunities for all people in society and empowerment of people so that they participate in – and benefit from – the development process.” Education, health care, and quality of life are different aspects of human development. For reference, see: http://www.undp.org/rbec/nhdr/1996/georgia/glossary.htm
3. Bruce Moon and William Dixon. 1992. “Basic Needs and Growth-Welfare Trade-offs.” International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 36 (2).
4. World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development. Oxford University Press: New York.
5. John Rawls. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
6. Amartya Sen. 1985. Commodities and Capabilities. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
7. World Development Report, p. 2.
8. Rudra, Nita. Who Really Gets Hurt? Globalization and the Race to the Bottom in Developing Countries Manuscript. Also, see World Development Report, p. 179, for a similar discussion.
9. World Development Report, p. 76.
10. http://www.wfdd.org.uk/, September 1999.
11. In a recent article in The Fountain, Halim Calis presents a compelling argument on human dignity in Islam and Christianity as a common ground for interfaith dialogue. See “Holy Sources of Human Dignity.” The Fountain, Issue 58, 2007.