My leaves reflected the moonlight. I looked up at the moon, and it looked back at me brightly. But even its lights seemed somehow unfamiliar to me.

I slowly turned my flower head to the right to watch my brothers and sisters. They all looked pretty exhausted from the long journey, and in their face I saw the same concerns as mine. They, too, felt like strangers here.

Feeling a little bit depressed, I sighed and just wanted to sleep, but in this precise moment a move in the dark bushes that separated the garden from the fence attracted my attention. I caught sight of a small hyacinth. She looked at me curiously, as I smiled at her with mild exertion.

My smile was returned immediately, and visibly excited she gave a sign to those behind her. All of a sudden, there appeared a bevy of hyacinths, closely followed by – I could not recognize them right away – small carnations and roses.

Chatting and giggling, they hopped over to me and I realized that they were thrilled. A small carnation stumbled while running and fell to the ground. The hyacinth, which I saw first, ran back to her and helped her up.

The flower children surrounded me, eyeing me curiously. I smiled back at them kindly, a little nervous. Unexpectedly, they all erupted into laughter. I hadn’t seen such vivid flower children for a long time.

The hyacinth took the little carnation that had stumbled by the hand and started to speak:

“You and your siblings did arrive just now, didn’t you?”

I nodded, hoping that she was old enough to guess that I simply wanted to have my peace and quiet. But unfortunately, she apparently wasn’t… None of these little children were.

A murmur went through the swarm of children.

“Wow! Then you are a tulip, aren’t you? We have heard of you tulips. You guys are the first tulips coming from there,” said the hyacinth, pointing east. Her big eyes were shining with enthusiasm.

Yes, the East. From there, I came here; from a land where the sun rose and sometimes only reluctantly went down again.

My petals cramped. It had been very painful to leave that wonderful place, my home and my people.

As if reading my gloomy thoughts, the hyacinth said:

“It’s really beautiful here in the West! God showers us with water and it is pleasantly cool, sometimes even colder than we would like. Besides, we are well treated. The people are really fond of us.”

These words reminded me of the magnificent brightly lit tulip festivals, which used to be celebrated in the Ottoman Empire, of the nights made into days, and of the wonderful names we have been given, like face of the beloved or lucky star. At once I felt warm all over my carpels.

But once again, grief seized my flower head, and my sepals sank slightly due to their oppressive severity. “How long are you here, now?” I asked the kids, only to divert my attention from these thoughts.

The hyacinth shrugged her leaves:

“I don’t know exactly, but I think it was my great-grandparents, who were brought here.” The other flower children nodded doubtfully. They didn’t know anymore.

“Do you actually know anything of the country from which you, and…” – I briefly swallowed – ” … I originated?” They shook their heads. They were so young, so inexperienced. I smiled and sighed acquiescently, because I had to suppress my fatigue.

“Would you love to learn something about your country from me?” I asked.

The hyacinth politely set me straight:

“Here is our homeland. Here we were born, and here we are living in peace and joy with each other. I know my homeland. But I would pretty much like to hear something about the country where you and our great-grandparents come from.”

Smiling back at her, I was slightly confused about this answer. She was very smart, for sure, and would be a wise flower.

“Well, then sit down. I want to tell you about my homeland that is also the land of your ancestors.” They bounced close, and formed a semicircle around me with their eyes curiously focused on me.

“I am a tulip and I used to live and prosper in the Ottoman Empire, where I was surrounded with every imaginable flower. The Turks love us so much so that we have become an important part of their art and literature.”

Again a murmur was heard, and I had to smile about the naive way of these children. My fatigue and my gloomy mood slowly vanished. It was nice to relive those memories again.

“I don’t want to dive too deep into this topic. But we all are common motifs of the so-called Quatre-Fleur style of the Ottomans in the crafts.” It still made me very proud when I thought of it.

The hyacinth intervened:

“In this country, people say that we flowers have our own language. Each of us has a very special meaning for them and is given away as a present on certain occasions.”

I looked at her in surprise and let her continue. It sounded exciting.

“And not only have the flowers special meanings, but their colors as well.” The children in the semicircle nodded in agreement. “Tulips, for example, symbolize love and affection. Lovers present each other red tulips. Orange symbolizes fascination and blue means a promise of fidelity.”

My stamens trembled with joy when I heard that. How beautiful, indeed!

“This brings me back to the Ottomans,” I smiled at the children. “They also have something like a language of flowers, but somehow different from yours. They, for example, place yellow roses on the window sill, which is saying something like: there are sick or old people living in this house. In this way, passersby were prompted to behave quietly, which they did.”

I gave the flower children a short while to digest this new information, which apparently pleased them.

“By the way, do you actually know where I originally come from?” I asked them. They shook their heads. “My ancestors once left their home as well and were brought into the Ottoman Empire.”

The astonished hyacinth interrupted me:

“Does that mean that this isn’t the first migration?”

I gave her a nod. “Your ancestors were not the first, and I certainly won’t be the last who moves from one place to another in this wide world. There have always been trade relations between nations, and this will certainly remain so.”

The children smiled at me.

“And from where did you come to the Ottoman Empire?” the little carnation asked me timidly.

“Well, my real home … We tulips were already mentioned by the Greek writer Xenophon, who lived from 430 to 354 BC. And in the fourteenth century the Persian poet Hafez introduced my species into literature. He called us Lale, and this name so much appealed to the Ottomans that they adopted it.”

“In Turkish garden culture we had our heyday with Sultan Ahmet III. At that time, a whole era was named after us: The Tulip Era – Lale devri, which began in 1718. The tulip hype exceeded all bounds. There were 1323 different varieties.”

“Do they only have tulips over there?”

I shook my flower head. “No. The Ottomans had many flowers, including hyacinths as well. A part of the courtyard gardens of the Sultan were always reserved for you, the hyacinths; and this is still the case today.”

The hyacinths giggled again and whispered to each other. “See, I told you,” the first hyacinth whispered to the others.

“The poet Fazli, an Ottoman poet, often wove the hyacinth motif into his poems,” I continued. “And in Edirne and Istanbul, there are meadows covered with fragrant hyacinths.”

“Do you also know where we came to the Ottomans from?” another hyacinth, tall but very thin, asked.

“From the gardens of Baghdad and Aleppo,” I told her. A murmur rose again. The crowd of children thoroughly enjoyed themselves.

“How exciting,” they blurted.

Thus I added, “by the way, you folks came to Europe in the sixteenth century.” While they kept on jabbering with each other, the little pink carnation looked at me expectantly. Then she squeaked hesitant and softly:

“Have you also got flowers like me in the Ottoman Empire?”

I smiled at her. “Carnations, you mean?”

She nodded eagerly, and her cute petals shook with her head.

“Of course, even at the time of Theophrastus, in 300 BC, you were already growing. But I guess it was the Arabs who brought you to the Ottomans. At least, you got your name from them. The Arabs call you Qaranful, which is probably derived from the Latin Caryophyllus or from the Greek Karyphillon. And the Ottomans call you Karanfil.”

The eyes of the flower children widened and they tried to repeat the name slowly. Apparently they liked it very much.

For the first time, a small rose spoke up, slowly and gracefully as is to be expected from a rose:

“And what about us? What did we mean to the Ottomans?”

Again, I had to smile. What a question!

“Roses are sacred to all Muslims and, therefore, also to the Ottomans. They play a major role in Turkish culture.” The roses looked at me in surprise. “The Ottomans never left rose petals lying on the floor because rose in their tradition symbolized the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him.”

“Wow,” the children whispered reverently, as with one voice. The carnations and hyacinths respectfully looked up at the roses. They, in turn, humbly looked at me, waiting for me to go on, which I did:

Again, the flower children were whispering to each other. At the sight of them, I rejoiced. Now, they were my new neighbors. What luck! With them, I would certainly never get bored.

I looked over at my tulip siblings. They had already made themselves comfortable and were sound asleep. Out of the blue, I felt tired again. “Dear children! Tomorrow I’ll tell you more, if you want. But for today, it’s enough.”

A disappointed murmur rose. But the hyacinth encouraged me.

“Okay friends. She’s right. It’s enough for today. We should go back. Our parents are probably already worried. It’s getting late.”

“But I certainly would like to know more about my ancestors in Albania,” the little carnation complained.

“Arabia! Your ancestors came from Arabia! Just listen more carefully,” the hyacinth chastened her. She stood up and pulled the others behind her. “And now let’s go home!”

“Didn’t you forget something”, the hyacinth asked the flower children. As if on command they all turned again to me and shouted:

“Thank you very much, Mrs. Tulip!”

I laughed. The hyacinth had a very good grip on them.

“You are welcome,” I replied. “Good night!”

“Good night,” they echoed back, and with a broad grin and still fidgety, they retreated. I was alone again, and at once felt a little lonely. So I hurried back to my brothers and sisters.

This country seemed to be very exciting, at least more exciting than I would have thought. I smiled and suddenly did not even remember why it seemed so strange to me in the beginning.

There are many possible explanations for this, not least of which is the presentation of science and the use of reason in Islamic texts, but also sociological factors, such as different economic situations during the Middle Ages, and internal political structures. There is also the fact that the Qur’an simply doesn’t contradict scientific findings .

The Middle Ages (or the Dark Ages as they used to be known) of European civilisation extended between the 5th and 16th centuries, encapsulating the Islamic Golden Age spanning the 7th to 16th centuries. It was once thought that Islamic science during this time was little more than a translation of Greek conclusions, however there is now sufficient evidence to suggest that this was a scientific revolution in its own right, and it contributed greatly to the basis of modern scientific thought. Part of the reason science played such a key role in the Golden Age of Islam is surely because of the importance placed on it in Islamic texts. There are hundreds of references in the Qur’an related to human knowledge and contemplation, including the first command of God, instructing humanity to “read.” The hadith also contains hundreds of references the Prophet made to seek knowledge, including one instance of the him saying, “Seek for science, even in China” ; the significance of China being that it is the furthest known country to the Muslim Empire. There is a moral obligation for Muslims to seek knowledge; in fact, learning is often seen as a form of worship and a quest for spiritual perfection through knowledge. This surely acted as an incentive that enabled them to become the great scientific civilization they were during the Golden Age. The Renaissance, which followed the Middle Ages, could be described as the Western equivalent

There is nothing in the Bible to discredit specific scientific discoveries, though it also doesn’t encourage the scientific pursuit in the same manner as the Qur’an. The Bible does convey an ordered world in which science is not only possible but should tend towards the truth, but any such scientific commendation can also be levelled at the Qur’an.

What’s unique about the Qur’an, however, is that it is not as susceptible to the human fallibility excuse, in that it was written immediately after the Archangel Gabriel imparted the Revelation to Muhammad, it was arranged by Muhammad himself, and has remained unchanged since, at least when speaking of the original Arabic and not a translation. The areas of science explored in the Qur’an range greatly from astronomy to physics to biology, and all seem to be in well keeping with modern scientific findings.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the Qur’an does not contain any hardline indisputable science, however. The meanings of many of the Arabic words are subtle and open to interpretation, and different interpretations of the same passages have been used to support different scientific enquiries at different times.

The rapid expansion of the Muslim empire beginning in the 7th century brought great wealth and security, and this naturally led to great advancements in science and technology, similar to the Greek and Roman empires before them. Once an empire establishes itself and can comfortably support its population in terms of food and security, it can turn sights on its lesser problems, and attempt to solve them using its ingenuity, thus making great strides in science and technology. The West had, as already noted, become stagnant in these fields following the collapse of the Roman Empire. Europe was unified once more under the Catholic Church, but there was much animosity between the destitute working class and the self-interested ruling class. It was a time of prosperity for few, and the Muslim empire attracted great minds and became the hub of scientific achievement. Viewed in this context, the Islamic Golden Age is not so much a religious achievement as it is a cultural achievement of a burgeoning civilisation.

The contrast with the Western Renaissance is clear. Galileo, a friend of the pope and of the church, is the most famous example. Upon expressing his approval of Copernican theories, he was incarcerated for heresy. The pope famously rebutted Galileo’s arguments by stating that Galileo could not assert a scientific theory that contradicted the scripture unless it could be shown that God, in his infinite power, could not have brought it about that all the evidence in support of the theory existed and the theory itself not be true. This is of course an impossibly high standard of truth for science to achieve, and furthermore put in jeopardy all scientific knowledge. Galileo was, however, purposefully antagonistic towards the church, and may have done more harm, especially for the relationship between religion and science, than he is usually given credit for. Rene Descartes was on the verge of publishing a similar paper in support of Copernicus, but suppressed it upon seeing the treatment that Galileo received. During this time, it was required that all work be approved by representatives of the church before it was published in order to avoid the publication of any heretical material. This was catastrophic for any scientific theory that may have contradicted the interpretation of the scripture as advocated by the Church. Islamic science avoided this problem. While the Church, as a figure of authority, advocated a particular interpretation of the scriptures and had in the past exercised this authority with punitive measures such as excommunication and incarceration, Islam had no centralised authority with the same level of control. The closest analogous administration is the caliphate, whose role has changed over time, but never gained the overarching power of the Christian church. This could well be due to the Muslim Empire being founded by many small tribes with Bedouin roots, and city states, who had no history of being subject to a greater authority. Also, due to their disparate nature, both culturally and geographically, such an overarching authority was a logistical impossibility. Furthermore, the legitimacy of any one caliph was always controversial; the most divisive split of course being between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims, the former believing Abu Bakr, Muhammad’s father-in-law, was his rightful successor, while the latter preferring his cousin and son-in-law Ali ibn Abi Talib. Such disagreement continued and constantly threatened the supreme power of the caliphate, despite Muhammad’s assertion that Muslims should fulfil oath of allegiance to only one caliph. This disagreement in turn led to a lack of a single ruling authority, and a lack of one single interpretation being enforced across the empire. Often, the interpretation of the Islamic texts varied from community to community. Further supporting a lack of enforcement was the Qur’an. “There is no compulsion in religion” can be interpreted both as a decree of tolerance to other religions, and also a decree of tolerance within Islam itself. This aspect of religious tolerance must surely have played some part in the ability of Muslims to abide alternate interpretations of their text, and also rationalise discrepancies between the text and the constantly evolving hypotheses of science. Without an authority to push an anti-scientific agenda, the Muslim Empire became a hub of scientific enquiry which, along with an unusual tolerance for religion, attracted scientific minds from across the entire region.

There is another hypothesis that should be noted, which is that the view of Christianity and science being in direct opposition to each other is unwarranted. After all, modern scientific prosperity grew out of the Christian West, and it can also be argued that without the fundamental view that nature is uniform and has an observable order and organisation, provided initially only by religion, science would never have even had a grounding on which to start. Perhaps religion and science are not as diametrically opposed as they seem, and their previous confrontations have been due to misunderstandings that are not fundamental to their positions. While it is undoubtedly true that Christianity and science have in the past had a tolerant, if not a symbiotic, relationship, it is nevertheless the case that for quite some time the two held hostile policies in regard to each other, and these policies have resulted in animosity that exists even to this day. This animosity is not a necessity, however, as demonstrated by Islam.

It seems it can then be concluded that the roots of the Islamic propensity for science are a product of both Islamic texts and sociological factors, such as a lack of a centralised authority pushing a particular interpretation of the text. The search for knowledge which the Qur’an advocates must surely have helped initiate this scientific resurgence, but it was also the ability of the Muslim population to interpret the findings of the scientific community (and it should be noted that Muslim and scientific groups were by no means mutually exclusive) in a way that didn’t conflict with their theological beliefs which allowed science to flourish. The Golden Age of the Muslim Empire should stand as an example to all cultures that science and religion can coexist, and not just tenuously, but harmoniously.

Stephen Pant is a freelance writer in Australia. He has a degree in philosophy and history from Monash University, Melbourne.

Notes

1. H.R. Turner. 1997. Science in Medieval Islam: An Illustrated Introduction, Austin: University of Texas Press, pp. 5-9.

2. George Saliba. 2007. Arabic Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance, Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press.

3. A.H. Syed, Islam and Science, New Delhi, 2003, p. 111.

4. Ibid.

5. Maurice Bucaille. 1978. The Bible, the Qur’an and Science: The Holy Scriptures Examined in the Light of Modern Knowledge. Indianapolis, p. 92.

6. Syed. 2003. p. 116.

7. Syed. 2003. p. 115.

8. F. M. Donner. 1981. The Early Arab Conquests. Retrieved 16/5/2009 from http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/med/donner.html

9. John Cottingham. 1991. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Cambridge: CUP, pp. xi–xiii.

10. Sachiko Murata, William Chittick. 1994. The Vision of Islam. New York, p. xxiv.

11. A. H. Siddiqui. Translation of Sahih Muslim. 2007, 20:4543.

12. Qur’an 2:256.

13. Syed. 2003. p. 112–113.

The spread of Islam would obviously not have occurred without its Prophet, Muhammad, who was able to win support for his spiritual and political status within Arabia in the early seventh century. After having claimed to receive divine revelations, Muhammad slowly acquired a small following and eventually some seventy families had converted to Islam. However, not all of his contemporaries were convinced of the genuineness of his message. This was especially true of the pagan rulers of his Quraysh tribe in Mecca. Consequent persecutions caused the early Muslims to flee to Yathrib, which was located 250 miles north of Mecca. Yet, what appeared to be a backward move for the early believers actually benefited them and their religion as the tribes around Yathrib were enthralled by Muhammad’s spiritual vision and pledged allegiance to the ummah (community). A series of conflicts between the Quraysh and Muslims climaxed in 630 when the Quraysh broke an earlier peace treaty that had been established. This saw Muhammad march upon Mecca with 10,000 men and take the city without bloodshed. He then destroyed the idols around the Kabah and rededicated it to God. By the time of Muhammad’s death in 632, as Karen Armstrong explains, “almost all the tribes of Arabia had joined the ummah as Confederates or as converted Muslims.” As history will show, this was not the end of this remarkable series of events. For unification of Arabia would not cease at the death of the founder of Islam but would rather dramatically gain momentum through his successors, the Caliphs.

With the combination of three important factors: unification, conquest, and religious zeal, the early Caliphs were able to consolidate Muslim rule in Arabia and prepare a launching pad for further conquests. This initial spread of Islam was so rapid that, as H. U. Rahman explains, “in less than one century after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD, Muslim rule covered more of the earth than had the Roman Empire at its peak.” This unification did not however happen overnight, and it must be emphasized that Islamic rulers always had much division to contend with. The first Caliph, Abu Bakr, had the difficult job of uniting all of the tribes that had forsaken their allegiance to the ummah after Muhammad’s death. Yet through political, theological, and at times military coercion, Abu Bakr was able to completely unify Arabia before his death in 634. Secondly, despite the assassinations of the next three caliphs – Umar, Uthman, and Ali – which characterizes the bloody period that ensued, the spread of Islam continued to gain momentum as successful military campaigns were carried out abroad. From 634–44, the Caliphate of Umar had conquered Jerusalem, controlled Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, and defeated the Persian Empire. Furthermore, in Uthman’s reign (644–50), Muslims conquered Cyprus, Tripoli in North Africa, and established Islamic rule in Iran, Afghanistan, and the Sind region. The above two methods of internal unification and successful conquest led to the establishment of the Islamic world during the seventh century, and the speed in which it accomplished this announced to the world that Islam was here – and here to stay.

The third explanation of the rapid spread of Islam throughout Arabia and beyond was – most importantly – the religious zeal of the leaders, soldiers, and general Arab population. Plainly put, without being fuelled with a sense that God was on their side, the Muslim conquests would have fallen far short of their eventual reality. Tamara Sonn explains that the basic tenets of Islamic faith captivated the people and structured Islamic life in Medina, and it was around these practices and core values that the early Muslim community was built. Francesco Gabrieli supports Sonn and places a heavy emphasis on religion as the principal factor underlying and motivating the Arab conquests. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any group achieving geographical expansion without a clear goal and purpose; for the Mongols of the thirteenth century it was a brutal ideological reason, whilst for the Muslims it was the feeling that they were being divinely guided.

Nevertheless the spread of a religious or ideological ideal can only be truly successful if those whom it is trying to gain submission from are disillusioned or unhappy with their own contemporary world. This was the case for the many thousands of people under Byzantine rule. We find that a great number gladly adhered to the conquering Islamic rulers and Quranic law as they found protection and benefits that had not been attained under Byzantine rule. Many minorities had become increasingly dissatisfied with the Byzantine regime due to their insecurities of being persecuted and instead came to favor the secure Islamic rulership who allowed autonomy for minority groups if their taxes were paid. The preference of many of the conquered peoples to favor Islamic rule enabled the Islamic Empire to remain politically stable, which is a prerequisite for any group wanting to expand its geographic borders.

Turning back the clock to the infant stages of Islam, we find that the Muslims were fraught with political struggles for power. With factions developing within the Islamic world following Ali’s assassination (the fourth Caliph) in 661, the unity and prosperity of the new Islamic Empire became threatened. However, it was the way that the Muslims were efficiently able to get back on their feet and consolidate unity that saw these power struggles, which had the potential to dismantle Islamic hopes for expansion, averted. The Islamic world needed a leader who could unite as many of these factions together as possible, and this stability came with the establishment of the Ummayad Dynasty through Muawiyyah I. He ruled from 661–80 and was the first Caliph to move his capital away from Medina, transferring it to Damascus. However unpopular this move was, R. Stephen Humphreys explains that Muawiyyah I saved the Muslim Empire from disintegration as he was, “the only man with the political and military resources available to restore unity within the realm of Islam.” Although the Umayyad period is typically characterized by political and military success, the Umayyad rulers did not forget its founding religion. According to Karen Armstrong, Muawiyyah I was simply “a religious man and a devout Muslim.” Furthermore, a statement of Islam’s superiority to past religions was symbolically made through the establishment of the Dome of the Rock, which was completed at Jerusalem in 691 under Caliph Abd al-Malik. This spiritual construction shows that Islamic rulers could not go forward unless they acknowledged the close relationship between conquest and the Muslim religion, and this was done most emphatically with the construction of this monument.

Despite geographical consolidations made by the early Umayyad Caliphs, discontent remained within the Islamic world with several extremist groups emerging regularly in Islamic culture. This was perhaps a catalyst for Umayyad leaders having a more political conception of Islam than did previous rulers. Although the discontentment of factions within the Islamic world, such as the Shias, could not be eradicated, internal stability generally emerged at the commencement of the Umayyad Dynasty. Paul Lunde explains that the pacification of the central lands under early Umayyad rulers enabled them to focus primarily on conquest so that the spread of Islam could continue. Furthermore, according to Armstrong, conquest was able to be successfully waged during al-Walid I’s reign between 705–715 where the Umayyad dynasty reached its peak and the Muslim armies continued the conquest of North Africa, and established a kingdom in Spain. However, even though the Umayyad Dynasty had expanded its Islamic borders throughout the Arab world, its power soon declined, as internal friction had finally reached unmanageability. Then, the Umayyads – somewhat inevitably – succumbed to the overwhelming power of the Abbasids in 750.

Even though the overthrow of the Umayyad family by the Abbasids was horrific and angered many, this brutal act did not slow the continual geographical or economical gains of Islam. In fact, at the height of Abbasid power in 800 (who had moved the Islamic capital to Baghdad in 762) only Constantinople and Xian, the capital of the great T’ang China, rivaled Baghdad’s wealth. Although military might was the predominant vehicle of Islamic power, the strength of Muslims at the zenith of Abbasid power in the ninth century was represented through a great cultural renaissance which took place in literary criticism, philosophy, poetry, and science. This marked the beginnings of “Muslim genius” as individuals such as Abu Bakr Al Razi (864–925) studied medicine and uncovered unique contraceptive methods; and Abu Nasr Al Farabi (870–950) incorporated logic and politics into philosophy. As Armstrong explains, such was the grandeur of this era that the Muslim scholars made more scientific discoveries during this time than in the whole previously recorded history put together. Hence, these examples symbolize the prestige of the superpower Abbasid Empire of the old world, which asserted itself not only through military conquests but through cultural and scientific discovery.

However, despite the Abbasid period reaching new heights in regards to its geographical expansion, it too slowly declined in prestige from about 935 and would soon be unable to hold off a young and powerful group of Muslims in the centuries to follow: the Turks.

Before the success of one final Islamic Empire is discussed, it is important to reflect on several other specific reasons why Islam spread so rapidly throughout Arabia and to the whole world. Three of these deserve particular mention. First, the Caliphs and Muslim rulers were willing to use existing administrative structures to enforce laws, and it was not uncommon for non-Islamic officials to be used in high places within a conquered society. Second, there was seldom force or coercion used from Islamic forces once a military campaign was successful. As Francesco Gabrieli explains, the traditional theory of the conquests being characterized merely by Bedouin neophytes of Islam rushing from their desert birthplace to convert other nations with the sword has been completely dismissed by modern historiography. In fact, Arabs were quite content with their passive non-Muslim subjects known as dhimmis (those who were second-class citizens under Islamic law, yet protected under this status) and no real effort was made to convert them. This hands-off approach actually led to an increase in Islamic converts regularly throughout the Islamic Empire as individuals were pleased to make their own decision about religion, which is something that had not been afforded them under Byzantine rule.

Finally, further comparisons between Byzantine Christianity and Islam highlight how many became turned off by Christendom but enthusiastic and inquisitive about Islam. Christianity had become heavily clericized by the seventh century and appeared to be exclusive, whilst Islam appealed to individuals by offering unparalleled simplicity through its core principles. According to Abul-Fazl Ezzati, the five pillars of Islam, when compared to Christian orthodoxy, “replaced complexity of religious doctrines with simplicity, trinity with unity, empty theological discussions with concrete observation and fundamental analysis.” Moreover, the extent and rapidity of the success of Islamic military conquests had Muslims feeling that there was something divine aiding their cause. Zealous Muslims and their missionary activities always went hand in hand with the success of Islam and this sense of mission motivated Muslims to assist the expansion efforts in whatever way they could. Hence, Islam appealed to many contemporaries’ needs and with the lure of further expansion, many felt that Islam was the path for the future.

With this understanding in mind, we can finally return to the last great Islamic Empire of the ancient world through looking at the Ottoman Empire. Although Islam had by no means died out in terms of its expansion after Abbasid rule, it had clearly slowed by the fourteenth century. As Armstrong explains, from 935 onwards, “the caliphs no longer (wielded) temporal power but merely (retained) a symbolic authority. Real power now resided with the local rulers, who established dynasties in various parts of the empire.” Moreover, with the addition of the Mongol raids, which began in 1220, Islamic cities became desolate and the spread of Islam was curtailed for the first time in centuries as attention was turned to internal frontiers. However, a final thrust of Islamic expansion would occur through the Ottoman Empire, who slowly consolidated its own power in Anatolia, and by the late fourteenth century had begun to threaten Europe. One of the early Sultans, Murad I (1360–1389), had become the most powerful of the western Muslim rulers and this led to the name of the Ottomans symbolizing hope for a reunified Islamic empire. This hope was fueled by geographical gains made through military expansion by several Ottoman Sultans, such as Murad I (1421–1451), who asserted Ottoman power against Hungary and the West and by 1453 his successor, Mehmed II, who had conquered Constantinople, changed its name to Istanbul, and made it the Ottoman capital. Accordingly, the Ottomans had recommenced Muslim expansion and would look to achieve something past Islamic Empires could not – to successfully challenge Western Europe.

Ottoman expansion continued with Suleiman the Magnificent (1520–66) whose Empire, after conquering Hungary in 1526, had become the greatest power in Eastern Europe. It is important to note here that Suleiman saw the consolidation of Islamic values as the key to his military successes. As Jason Goodwin explains, Suleiman, “oversaw the most detailed codification of sultanic and Quranic law that had ever been known in an Islamic state.” Hence, although the Ottoman Empire did not represent all Muslims, it is clear that great Sultans such as Suleiman did not forget the founder of their religion as they saw themselves as a genuine continuation of early Islamic history. Justin McCarthy puts it clearly for us – “the base of the Ottoman Empire was Islam. Religion was intimately bound up with the ideology and legitimacy of the government … Their Empire was always styled a Muslim empire, one in the line of Islamic empires that had included the Umayyads, the Abbasids, and the Seljuks.” We see once again here, this time under the rule of the Ottomans, that legitimacy and support of a great Islamic Empire went hand in hand with a reflection on the spiritual past of the Muslim tradition.

Nevertheless, during the latter stages of Ottoman rule, the sultans began looking too far outwardly and neglecting inner spirituality, which deadened the degree of support that Muslims would give it. This empire fatally climaxed when the Ottomans looked to secure further lands in Europe. Their efforts fell horribly short, and they lost a vital battle to the coalition of the Holy League in 1683 at Vienna. When they were forced to humiliatingly sign the Treaty of Carlowicz in 1699, they had to yield Ottoman Hungary to Austria, which was the first major Ottoman reversal. Although the Empire did not crumble overnight, this point marks the end of Ottoman expansion – and indeed Islamic expansion – and the beginning of its slow decline.

The powerful Islamic dynasties and empires finally came to an end with the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Yet the legacy that both it and previous rulerships had left behind was remarkable geographical expansion, which had emanated from a small tribe in Arabia. The spread of Islam was orchestrated through the close connection of most Muslims and their leaders to an Islamic way of life, which gave them a sense of purpose for their conquests and expansions. It is important to understand that this was not always done smoothly; the overthrows of Islamic Empires did not always happen peacefully and blood was often internally shed in order to propel a fresher and stronger willed Islamic group forward. Although much internal strife was a common characteristic of the Islamic Empires, the historical reality shows us that enough of the Muslim population was willing to forget past disagreements and get on with a common cause of conquering peoples and gaining territory. Yet the key to all of this success was surely the religious foundation of the Prophet and the early Caliphs. Through future Islamic rulers regularly reminding their adherents of their Prophet and of his message, the Muslims felt as if they were part of something greater than themselves. Despite religious zeal fluctuating from time to time, Islamic faith would always seem to be reinvigorated which led to grand Empires being established and Islamic history being created.

Paul Kearns has a major in history and English from Monash University, Melbourne.

Notes

1. Karen Armstrong, Islam: A Short History, New York, 2000, p. 12.

2. Ibid, 23.

3. H. U. Rahman, A Chronology of Islamic History: 570-1000 ce, London, 1989, p. vii.

4. Tamara Sonn, A Brief History of Islam, Oxford, 2004, p. 23.

5. Armstrong, 2000, pp. 27, 29.

6. Ibid, p. xiv.

7. Sonn, 2004, p. 22.

8. Francesco Gabrieli, Muhammad and the Conquests of Islam, London, 1968, p. 104.

9. Sonn, 2000, pp. 25, 34.

10. R. Stephen Humphreys. Mu‘awiya ibn Abi Sufyan: From Arabia to Empire, Oxford, 2006, p. 84.

11. Armstrong. 2000, p. 42.

12. Ibid, p. 44.

13. Gerald R. Hawting. The First Dynasty of Islam: The Umayyad Caliphate AD 661-750, London, 1986, p. 2.

14. Paul Lunde. Islam, London, 2002, p. 52.

15. Armstrong, 2000, p. 50.

16. Lunde, 2002, p. 56.

17. Akbar S. Ahmed. Discovering Islam: Making Sense of Muslim History and Society, London, 2002, pp. 44-5.

18. Armstrong, 2000, p. 56.

19. Ibid, p. 54.

20. Gabrieli, 1968, p. 105.

21. Ibid, p. 115.

22. Abul-Fazl Ezzati. An Introduction to the History of the Spread of Islam, London, 1978, p. 43.

23. Ibid, p. 3.

24. Armstrong, 2000, p. xix.

25. Sonn, 2000, p. 78.

26. Patrick Kinross. The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, New York, 1979, p. 187.

27. Jason Goodwin. Lords of the Horizon: A History of the Ottoman Empire, New York, 1998, p. 83.

28. Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History to 1923, London, 1997, p. 106.

29. Armstrong, 2000, p. xxvi.

Asli Sancar has two more books and numerous articles, mainly dealing with women and family.

This book by the author, entitled “Ottoman Women: Myth and Reality,” combines both splendid design and objective narration, and could be referred to as a proof of the real status of women at that time giving full information on every aspect of their lives.

World of women-not as seen on TV

In our time when the rights of women are not well protected but are at least widely spoken about, it is very important to have research on the position of Ottoman women based not on common imagination (sometimes very colourful), but on the historical truth.

Unfortunately the further the topic moves to the East the more deviated the data becomes. Remarks untrue from the very beginning are more and more likely to be decorated with what-somebody-thinks-(s)he-could-have-seen. So for decades, when it came to the issue of a woman living in Muslim society there were only two options: whether a sultan’s harem full of silk, coffee, gold, hatred and intrigues or a harem in a mud house managed by a cruel and uneducated husband.

The truth had always been a card – laid at the table, played and beaten. Real facts were mixed with fruits of imagination; objective data was presented only when it could have been useful for the narrator.

In her book the author successfully presents the real state of affairs proving her point of view by documents from Ottoman records and remarks by Western travelers. Ottoman society was a highly organized and sophisticated system, so the position of a woman – should the issue concern her life in a household harem, childbirth and custody, charity and social activities – was regulated by religion and law. Even the foreigners disliking Muslim society and bearing hostility towards the Ottoman Empire, in particular, could not help but admit that Ottoman women enjoyed much more freedom and were way more respected and loved than their Christian sisters.

Ottoman woman: social position, rights, life in the harem

This research consists of six main chapters describing all the main aspects of Ottoman women’s lives. The chapters are dedicated to description of Ottoman women by Western travelers, life in the household harem, the status of slaves in the harem, the imperial harem, Ottoman women in court records and the metaphysical meaning of being a woman in the Ottoman Empire. The first chapter presents observations through Westerners eyes. Placing this part at the beginning is quite logical in respect to putting things in order and separating proven documentary facts from the fairy tale. Special attention was paid to the remarks of several female travelers and persons who had stayed in the Ottoman Empire for a long time and thus witnessed Ottoman life.

Even travelers’ comments needed to be studied with great care. Their accuracy had to be taken into consideration. The Ottomans would never have tolerated any interfering in their private life, so even female travelers with well-established diplomatic connections were accepted into the Ottoman harems with great restrictions.

Arabian nights vs. Ottoman daylight: outbeating the harem myth

When a woman needs to struggle with an enemy, she does it in a very delicate, feminine way. Here we see the author beating the harmful myth of harem life in a very confident and logical manner. “Women are not prisoners in any sense of the word, nor are they pining behind the latticed windows as we are sometimes led to believe…,” Elizabeth Cooper wrote in 1916.

Starting the second chapter of the book dedicated to life in the household harem by breaking with a popular myth presenting Ottoman and thus Oriental women as prisoners of their homes, is both bold and logical. It can be clearly seen that Ottoman women were never captives of their part of the house. But the fantasies of the Arabian nights made her image a hostage to common opinion in Western eyes. French translation of Arabian tales published in Europe at the beginning of XVIII century served the Ottoman women badly, turning them into sensual, infidel, vile creatures inventing one intrigue after another while spending their days in the sweet laziness of the harem.

Contradiction between exotic tales and reality should be solved fairly – this is what the author wants, and what women would have desired. They were secluded because they were loved and cared about, not imprisoned. The harem had never been a prison, but a sacred space where all the family enjoyed everyday life, celebrated holidays and was engaged in various social activities. Richer women were busy with distributing charity and caring for orphans and the disabled. They hardly had time for gossip, and their strong faith in God and the education they had would never have let them act improperly.

The chapter dedicated to the imperial harem is marvelous. Whoever thinks of “dolce far niente” practiced by the harem women day after day should study it carefully. A reader will see that not a single creature in the imperial harem possibly could be accused of doing nothing. If one takes a walk in modern Istanbul, no matter what the route is, he/she will surely see a mosque, a public bath, a hospital, a market complex, a water-spring, or a school ordered to be built by a queen mother, or by a mother of a prince, or by any other high-ranked lady from the harem. For God’s sake when did they manage to do all these? Between gossiping and intriguing? Oh that’s a shame! There should be some Turkish coffee break in between…

Winning her rights back: court records

Imagine an Ottoman woman coming to the court to protect her rights.

An Ottoman woman appealing to an Ottoman court. Winning the case, having been restored in her rights. It is not simply “possible.” This was a real documented process clearly showing that a woman living in the Ottoman Empire should never be thought of as something between a nice pet and a piece of the home decor. For centuries she was free in her half of the house which was considered sacred.

Here I can give a lot of examples of what an Ottoman woman did in her life. And the reader acquainted with Oriental life and traditions only by means of pocket novels written in a month, read in a couple of days and forgotten forever, could think that this book is just another fantasy product attributing more freedom to the prisoners of the harem in order to gain more attention by female readers.

The truth is even more shocking. A creature considered indolent, depraved and exotic will sooner or later come to the court of civilization and appeal to get back her dignity and good name. Indeed she has all the evidence of what she really was – the author presents citing from the Ottoman court records as well as the opinion of Lucy M. Garnett who in 1909 wrote: “With regard to their legal status, Turkish women – already possess the legal, personal, and proprietary rights necessary to give them a social position equal, if not superior to that of European women generally.”

Design of the book

“The interior is as exciting and rich as the exterior. Images are beautifully reproduced be they photographs, drawings or old paintings.” (PMA review of the design of the book)

“Her beauty is of color rather than of line”, says Z. Duckett Ferriman. Design of this book is both of color and line. It is of luxury worthy of the Topkapý Palace. Graphical concept is deeply connected with the spirit of the book. Richness of colors and illustrations, selected with major taste and care, seem to reflect the position and respect an Ottoman woman enjoyed. The very notion of East has always been associated with luxury, mystery and wonderful colors that could hardly be seen in the West. This time this is not just a stereotype. That is why there are so many attractive definitions like “Oriental green,” “Turquoise,” “Glow of the Desert” used especially for goods closely related to style and fashion. The cover could be called royal green with semi-sweet coffee foam beige and wedding bracelet gold on it. Gentlemen in charge of art and graphic design did everything possible to turn this book into a real pearl of the harem – with textile details and paintings by Osman Hamdi, every page takes us to the world of women – beautiful, pure and splendidly decorated.

The book was highly appreciated by PMA for its perfect design. Everyone who will read it will be deeply impressed by the luxury of every single page, clarity of paintings, photographs and any other illustrations – each of them in its place, in total harmony with the message of the “Ottoman Women.”

Ottoman woman: year 2008

Finishing this review, I would like to express my sincere gratitude and admiration to the author, Asli Sancar Hanimefendi, for marvellously starring in two roles at the same time: one of them is that of an American-born lady writing fairly on Ottoman women (almost three hundred years after Lady Montague, one hundred and seventy after Miss Julia Pardoe and nearly a hundred years after Z. Duckett Ferriman), and the other is the role of a Turkish woman, member of the new society feeling respect and devotion to history and the truth. There is also a third one behind every line and in every color of this book.

An Ottoman woman in the court.

Presenting her book.

Calling for justice.

Valeria Kolos is a Ukrainian Turkish-English-Russian translator. Having graduated from the Oriental Studies Department of the Kyiv Shevchenko National University in 1999, she has been living in Istanbul for 6 years. V.Kolos has some publications (poems in Turkish) in several literature magazines.

I could claim that I did not want to go just because of my fear of flying, but I must confess that when I was first offered to join a trip to Turkey, I was filled with trepidation. The source of my misgivings was actually a stereotype I was harboring-I thought of the Turks as an unbeatable and ferocious military power. While growing up in Boston as a second-generation Lebanese, I heard stories about the “old country” all my life. As one story goes, it was the “Turks” who caused my maternal grandfather to leave his beloved Mount Lebanon and immigrate to America. That was in 1913, when it was common for Turkish soldiers to swoop down on villages in Syria, round up the young men, and consign them to distant shores to quash uprisings against the Ottoman Empire. None of them ever returned. So, at the age of twenty-two, having no heart to shoot anyone and dodging the violence he found so odious, my grandfather headed for America. On my father’s side of the family, I had an uncle called “Turk.” Family folklore had it that Uncle Turk earned his lifelong sobriquet because of the mayhem he committed on the football field at Colby College about sixty years ago. Another thing that made a lasting impression on me was a popular song that came out in the 1950s:

So take me back to Constantinople

No, you can’t go back to Constantinople

Been a long time gone, Constantinople

Why did Constantinople get the works?

That’s nobody’s business but the Turks

This song reinforced the image I had of the Turks-that their military prowess was something people wrote songs about.

My interest in Turkish politics was piqued more recently when concerns were raised about the strength and resolve of its secular government. I decided that on my trip I would try to learn more about the situation, in particular, the relationship between secularism, religion, and the headscarf.

The first time I studied Islamic history was at Harvard in a postgraduate course. I remembered the lesson on Constantinople, the brightest jewel in the crown of the Byzantine Empire. Its conquest had eluded the Muslim emirs for seven centuries, until it fell at the hands of the Ottoman Sultans, renowned for their military expertise.

Ironically, I was drawn to the military museum in Istanbul, and it was an amazing experience because the walls seemed to reverberate with the pride of past accomplishments. What fascinated me was the detailed story of the conquest of Constantinople and the life-size figures on display. There was the conqueror, Mehmet, sitting straight and tall on a white stallion, and beside him, standing with a cane was an old man with a long white beard-Mehmet’s spiritual advisor Aksemseddin. In 1453, the conquest had rocked the world. Mehmet was just twenty-one years old at the time. At Harvard, I had never learned anything about Mehmet having a spiritual advisor, although I had asked my professor many times, without ever receiving a satisfactory answer, what the role of religion was in the Ottoman Empire, especially for the Turks.

In the twenty-first century, the role of religion is the subject of much debate. In Turkey, a great deal of discussion has arisen over the law that forbids women from wearing a headscarf on government property (such as the military museum) or at government-run universities. The law is based on Turkey’s eighty-year history of maintaining the separation of church and state. For a foreigner like myself, it was strange to witness college girls who would stand outside the university gates to take the headscarf off before entering (or risk being thrown out of school), and then stand outside the gates to put it back on when they were leaving.

Although I cannot speak with any authority on the political situation in Turkey, I had first-hand experience with the law. Driving into the museum parking lot, a young man in a military uniform stopped our car, lowered his head, and leaned into the window. Pointing to me in the back seat, he said in Turkish, “That headscarf has to come off!” My gracious Turkish hosts had fully prepared me for this moment. However, it struck me for the first time that Turkey was facing an enormous challenge: to reconcile secularism and religious freedom; something we take for granted in America.

Secularists might say that to speak of religious freedom in Turkey is to be totally nave, but as a student of Turkish history, I am not that nave. I understand the threat to secular society presented by the radical Islamists, but who are the “radical Islamists” in Turkey? Surely, not every religious person wants to overthrow the government? To find clarification on the matter, the news stories I had read were totally inadequate. So, after being introduced to some career-minded college girls who wore the headscarf, I decided to ask them informally for their political and religious views.

Of Turkish history, I knew that in the past few decades there has been a movement among the younger generations to embrace Islam and more young women now wear the headscarf. As sociologists know, with most social movements, whatever has been repressed eventually rises up in society. The religious revival in Turkey could be a response to the secularizing reforms, but there are global factors to consider as well.

I asked the college girls what kind of state they hoped for. Their answer was unequivocal and unanimous. They did not want to live in a society where they had no freedom or equal rights. They vehemently rejected the fundamentalism, that is, the kind of tribal mentality that creates a society bereft of the basic values of Islam, such as peace, justice, compassion, and equality for all human beings; and places greater value on violence, oppression, and punishment. They railed against associating Islam with rigid ideologies and tyrants. The college girls I surveyed indicated no desire for a state religion. They wanted to participate and contribute to a modern society where everyone was free to work and practice their religion.

I understand that some sections in Muslim societies are unable or unwilling to modernize their societies, but such things take time. I discovered that Turkey is really at the vanguard of modernity in the Muslim world, and that Turkish scholars have already conceived of a true representation of Islam. I was introduced to the writings of one of the contemporary Turkish religious thinkers, Fethullah Gulen, who has described the essence of religious practice in these words: “Loving and respecting humanity merely because they are human is an expression of love and respect for the Almighty Creator.” Whether secular or religious, I could think of no better ethos for Muslims to follow.

On my last day in Istanbul, I stood on a hill overlooking the Bosphorus. The chilly winds and watery vistas reminded me of San Francisco Bay. In my view too was the bridge that connects two continents, Europe and Asia. In this and in other indescribable ways, Turkey combined the best of both worlds, where humanistic values and modern Islamic thought can coexist. To me, it felt natural to stand astride the two worlds, to inhabit both, or perhaps neither.

Mary Lahaj has a master’s degree from the Hartford Seminary in Islamic Studies and Christian/Muslim Relations. She is currently the first Muslim woman chaplain at Brigham & Women’s Hospital in their residency program and also works as the Muslim Advisor for the Groton School. In 2005, she received the Promoting Peace Through Dialogue Award, awarded to her by the Boston Dialogue Foundation.

Notes

1. In fact in Turkey the state controls the practice of Islam through the Religious Affairs Directorate. For example, all imams are obliged to read the same sermon (khutba) at Friday prayer, the sermon being provided by the directorate. (Ed.)

The availability of CNN worldwide (media), the growth in international organizations (political), and McDonald’s (economic and cultural) illustrate the diverse factors driving globalization. In addition, it is important to recognize that globalization, as an issue, is linked to capitalism’s triumph in the Cold War. The United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, pointed out that its opponents see globalization as “an ideology of predatory capitalism.”²

Hardt and Negri: Empire

Michael Hardt is a professor of literature at Duke University, and Antonio Negri is currently an inmate at Rebibbia Prison, Rome.³ Their book Empire, a post-Marxist attempt to analyze capitalism/globalism proposes the following simple thesis: “Globalization is a symptom of the new Empire. The new Empire is a result of the demise of the sovereignty of the nation state. However, ‘throughout the contemporary transformations, political controls, state functions, and regulatory mechanisms have continued to rule the realm of economic and social production and exchange. Our basic hypothesis is that sovereignty has taken a new form, composed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule. This new global form of sovereignty is what we call Empire’…⁴ As national sovereignty declines, however, ‘Empire’ emerges. Empire, or globalization, is the latest strategy of the wealthy and powerful to control the weak and powerless. It has a number of advantages over the traditional nation state that it has displaced. First, it has no boundaries. Second, it is attempting to create this myth that it is simply the logical expression of certain economic laws. Third, it wants to shape every aspect of human life. And finally, it shelters behind the rhetoric of peace.”⁵

The study makes much of the decline of state sovereignty. It documents, with some care, the distinctive set of historical and social conditions that gave birth to the idea that a particular people within a particular boundary are sovereign over their actions. It notes that this was often a device that protected tyranny, and that the European Enlightenment had strong tendencies toward racism and colonialism.

Where traditional national sovereignty was grounded in a “transcendent” ruler (e.g., the king over his people), the Empire uses capital to operate on the plane of immanence “through relays and networks of relationships of domination, without reliance on a transcendent center of power…. In the passage of sovereignty toward the plane of immanence, the collapse of boundaries has taken place within each national context and on a global scale.”⁶ Capitalism is not simply about power over resources; it is also about the relationship of religion and ethics to economic life.

The danger in this debate about globalization is that we confine our reflections to the political left (i.e., those with socialist sympathies) and the political right (i.e., those with capitalist sympathies). To prevent this, we turn to Said Nursi. If I am right in stressing the religious factors at the heart of capitalism and globalization, we should expect to learn something from Nursi.

Four Themes in Said Nursi

It is dangerous to apply the ideas of great thinkers to problems that they did not experience. Said Nursi (1877-1960) experienced the concluding years of the Ottoman Caliphate, the First World War, and the establishment of the aggressively secular Republic of Turkey (1923). He responded to modernity’s challenge to belief with the Risale-i Nur (the Treatise of Light).

Although he does not mention globalization, his work contains four relevant themes. The first of these is that it is appropriate to build bridges between Western scientific culture and the Islamic world. Nursi believed that the best of modernity is compatible with and anticipated in Islamic thought. For example, he writes: “Things like the airplane, electricity, railways, and the telegraph have come into existence as wonders of science and technology as the result of humanity’s progress in science and industry. Surely the All-Wise Qur’an, which addresses all of humanity, does not neglect these. Indeed, it has not neglected them.”⁷

He argues that the Qur’an anticipates such technological advances. This enthusiasm for scientific achievement underpins his “natural theology” (i.e., the world itself provides good and decisive arguments for God’s Existence). After discussing various scientific disciplines, he concludes: “Through the certain testimony of hundreds of sciences like these, the universe has been adorned with innumerable instances of wisdom, purposes, and beneficial things within a faultless, perfect order. And the order and wisdom given through that wondrous, all-encompassing wisdom to the totality of the universe have been included in small measure in seeds and in the tiniest living creatures. It is clear and self-evident that aims, purposes, in-stances of wisdom, and benefits can only be followed through choice, will, intention, and volition, not through any other way. Just as they could not be the work of unconscious causes and Nature, which lack will, choice, and purpose, so too they could not interfere in them.”⁸

Nursi saw science as part of God’s intended purpose for humanity: “The miracles of the other prophets all indicate a wonder of human art or craft, and Adam’s miracle indicates in concise form, besides the fundamentals of those crafts, the index of the sciences and branches of knowl-edge, and of the wonders and perfections, and urges humanity toward them.”⁹

His confidence that Islam endorses modern-ity’s technological dynamic, a major feature of globalization, is reflected in this vision of the future. Writing about Nursi, one author states: “Indeed, as we shall see when examining the [Damascus] Sermon, Bediuzzaman [Nursi] predicted that, according to all the signs, Islam and Islamic–or, true–civilization would prevail in the future, and that the majority of mankind would accept and join the religion of Islam. He said: ‘In the future when reason, science and technology hold sway, that will surely be the time the Qur’an will gain ascendancy, which relies on rational proofs and makes the reason confirm its pronouncements.’”¹⁰ In other words, the truth of the Qur’an will be recognized when reason, science, and technology hold sway in the world.

Many who are sympathetic to religion tend to see modernity, as well as the growth of technology and globalization, as evils to be opposed. However, Nursi argues that the achievements of science, modernity, communication, and globalization need to be recognized as representing the best of the human spirit and humanity’s creativity. In addition, they are made possible by the God-designed order of the universe.

Themes two to four are far more critical. The second theme is that society must accommodate in a just way the inequalities of wealth. While Nursi assumes that some inequality is inevitable, he maintains the need for balance:

“. . . just as the source of mankind’s revolutions is one phrase, so another phrase is the origin of all immorality. First Phrase: ‘So long as I’m full, what is it to me if others die of hunger.’ Second Phrase: ‘You work so that I can eat.’ Yes, the upper and lower classes in human society, that is, the rich and the poor, live at peace when in equilibrium. The basis of that equilibrium is compassion and kindness in the upper classes, and respect and obedience in the lower classes. Now, the first phrase has incited the upper classes to practice oppression, immorality, and mercilessness. And just as the second has driven the lower classes to hatred, envy, and to contend the upper classes, and has negated human tranquility for several centuries, so too this century, as the result of the struggle between capital and labor, it has been the cause of the momentous events of Europe well-known by all. Thus, together with all its societies for good works, all its establishments for the teaching of ethics, all its severe discipline and regulations, it could not reconcile these two classes of humanity, nor could it heal the two fearsome wounds in human life. The Qur’an, how-ever, eradicates the first phrase with its injunction to pay zakat, and heals it. While it uproots the second phrase with its prohibition on usury and interest, and cures that. Indeed, the Qur’anic verse stands at the door of the world and declares usury and interest to be forbidden. It reads out its decree to mankind, saying: ‘In order to close the door of strife, close the door of usury and interest!’ It forbids its students to enter it.”¹¹

There are two strategies for balancing inequal-ity: obligatory charity, which falls heavier on the rich, and forbidding usury. Implied in this is the fact that economic globalization becomes problematic when inequality is not managed. Some nations are fortunate and benefit from globalization, while others struggle with it. Nursi’s proposal has much to commend it: fortunate nations are obliged to help unfortunate ones, and IMF loans should not require a prohibitive repayment schedule. Also, debt cancellation is appropriate, given the detrimental contracts negotiated in the mid-1970s by Western financial institutions. The overall point is that inequality needs to be managed with considerable care.

The third theme is that all wealth and property ultimately should be entrusted to God. Nursi speaks of a king with two subjects. One allows the king to hold the property in trust; the other insists on sole ownership. The first subject experiences positive results; the second one eventually becomes an object of pity. According to Nursi: “Transient property becomes everlasting. For this waning life, when given to the Eternal and Self-Subsistent Lord of Glory and spent for His sake, it will be transmuted into eternity. It will yield eternal fruits. The moments of one’s life will apparently vanish and rot like kernels and seeds. But then the flowers of blessedness and auspiciousness will open and bloom in the realm of eternity, and each will also present a luminous and reassuring aspect in the Intermediate Realm.”¹²

This fundamental religious insight should shape our view of globalization. As life is transitory, we can see possessions as ends in themselves or as a means to serve God’s purposes. In the latter case, we seek to make globalization feed the hungry, educate the ignorant, bring hope to the hopeless, and so on by entrusting what we have to God.

The fourth theme is that not all of the West’s achievements should be seen as part of the march of progress. He has harsh words for uncritical supporters of European progress, especially when it is at the cost of religion: “O miserable pseudo-patriot who fervently encourages Muslims to embrace this world and forcibly drives them to European industry and progress! Beware, do not let the bonds with which certain members of this nation are tied to religion be broken! If thus, foolishly, blindly imitating and crushed under foot, their bonds with religion are broken those irreligious people will become as harmful for the life of society as fatal poison.”¹³ The meaning is clear: Together with the third theme, globalization should not become the goal in itself, but rather should serve a vision of social organization that allows humanity’s spiritual dimension to grow and develop.

Concluding Reflections

Unlike the entrenched positions of Hardt and Negri, Nursi offers a far more nuanced approach. To interpret capitalism simply as the tool of the powerful to retain control of as much wealth as possible distorts reality. Capitalism has its roots in certain religious dispositions and has generated vast wealth. It offers many dangers as well as many possibilities.

This is also true of globalization. Nursi certainly would recognize globalization’s technological and scientific underpinning as good. However, he also would want to make sure that globalization works for the good by creating strong safeguards against the vast inequality engendered by so much wealth. I believe that he would have strongly supported the debt-cancellation campaign and agreed that the world’s economic life is intended to serve humanity’s spiritual vision. Generating wealth for itself is madness; generating wealth so that all people can live full God-directed lives is a vision. Globalization might make the latter possible, and all of us should work toward that end.

* Ian Markham is Dean of Hartford Seminary, Hartford, Connecticut.

Footnotes

1. Robertson, R., “Globalization and the Future of ‘Traditional Religion,” in God and Globalization, eds. Max L. Stackhouse with Peter J. Paris, Harrisburg, PA, Trinity Press International: 2000, Vol. I, pp. 53-54.
2. As quoted in ibid., Vol. I, p. 5.
3. A writer, professor at the University of Padua and Marxist political activist, Negri was arrested on 7 April 1979 on the charge of “armed insurrection against the powers of the State.” Acquitted and released after 4 years in jail, he fled to France to avoid re-imprisonment. He returned to Italy in 1997, turned himself in, and received a 13-year sentence. (http://www.notbored.org/negri.html.)
4. Hardt, M., Negri, A., Empire, Harvard University Press: 2000, p. xii.
5. Ibid., pp. xiv-xv.
6. Ibid., pp. 326-32.
7. Nursi, S., The Second Station of the Twentieth Word, The Words, Sozler Publications, Istanbul: 2002
8. Ibid., 3:408.
9. Ibid., 1:272.
10. Sukran Vahide, Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, Sozler Publications, Istanbul: 1992, p. 90.
11. Nursi, S., The Words, Sozler Publications, Istanbul: 2002, p.421.
12. Ibid., 1:38.
13. Ibid., 3:168.

Historical background

Dhimmi designates an indefinitely renewed contract through which non-Muslims have a specific status (but are not full citizens), have their property protected, and are ensured safe conduct in return for acknowledging Islam’s domination and paying the jizya (poll tax).(3) In early Islam, they were Christians, Jews, Magians, Samaritans, and Sabians.(4) The Prophet and the early caliphs showed religious tolerance and caution toward religious minorities.(5) The Ottoman sultans made slight changes, but basically followed the same attitude in a more structured fashion.

Dhimmis in the Ottoman State

Some assert that Ottoman society was divided into ruling (Muslim) and (non-Muslim) raaya classes. But it was more complicated than that, for Muslims and non-Muslims were referred to as raaya (followers, the ruled, or non-participants in government). As the Ottoman State was semi-theocratic, raaya should be understood in the biblical sense as the shepherd and the flock.(6)

Government personnel worked in three areas: religion and law, war and statecraft, and the bureaucracy. The first branch was restricted to Muslim-born subjects. The ulema devoted long years to theological, scholastic, and legal studies in order to become judges and professors. The latter two branches were reserved mainly for non-Muslims. Neither group was inferior to the Muslims.

The Ottoman system was so complex that we cannot determine whether there was religious or racial discrimination. After reforms during the nineteenth century, many intellectuals and ecclesiastics argued that applying a unified law would deprive them of their privileges.(7) The Ottoman system of government was holistic, considered all branches interwoven and interconnected, and was fairly well integrated, in socioeconomic matters but not in religious matters, at least in Turkish-majority areas.

The Millet System

Three days after Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror entered Constantinople (1453), he told everyone to go home and continue his or her occupation and religion. He supervised the election of a new Greek Patriarch, a monk named Genadius, who was elected by Synod and consecrated. He proclaimed the patriarch-elect in the most honorific terms, gave him the pastoral staff with his own hands, and said: Be patriarch, live with us in peace, and enjoy all the privileges of your predecessors.(8) Though other communities later were recognized in the same terms, the Greek Orthodox Church always had more privileges and stronger ties with the central government.

Gradually, dealing with minorities engendered the millet system. Controlling the minority communities through their local bishops and rabbis stopped, and the whole Orthodox Church was organized as Rum Milleti (Roman people). The patriarch collected and allocated the poll tax and served as his community’s temporal leader. He was assigned a ceremonial rank with three tugs (horsetails), allowed his own court and prison in Istanbul’s Fener district, and had unlimited civil jurisdiction over and responsibility for his community. The State assigned him other duties and enforced the laws that he laid down for his community.

Since Islamic law is corporate (not territorial) and Ottoman society was corporate in nature, the Ottoman State dealt with dhimmis as members of a community and not as individuals.(9) A community member was directly responsible for and accountable to the community. Thus the government protected the communities from internal and external aggression, while the community’s leaders managed its affairs. The Porte had to ratify the chosen leader, but this was a mere formality. Each millet’s leader represented his people, and these matters were dealt with through the Foreign Ministry. The Greek Orthodox Patriarch had the rank of vizier and was provided with a guard of Janissaries (soldiers).

The Christian Millet. Most Orthodox Christian Balkan territories had been included in the Patriarchate of Constantinople’s jurisdiction. But by the time of Ottoman conquest, the Slavonic branch in the Sultan’s dominion had split into three patriarchates: Ochrida, Trnovo, and Ipek. These divisions were racial, dynastic, and nationalistic, and not doctrinal. Thus the Conqueror placed all Orthodox Christians under the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople and let him decide how to apportion the tax among them.

The sixteenth-century conquests in the Islamic lands and the capture of Cyprus and Crete brought many Orthodox Christians and the ancient patriarchates of Jerusalem, Antioch, and Alexandria under Muslim control. As the patriarch was influential with the sultan, the Porte made arrangements through which the Greek elements became dominant.(10)

The Jewish Millet. The Conqueror allowed the Jews, recognized as another millet, to settle in Istanbul. He appointed a haham basi (Chief Rabbi) with powers similar to those enjoyed by the patriarch. The haham basi was given precedence over the patriarch next to the head of ulema, and after the conquest, the Jews’ position improved. Although outcasts under the Byzantines, they now started holding various public offices.(11) Jews fleeing persecution in Spain and elsewhere were welcomed into Ottoman lands.

Each minority community was treated according to how it had been incorporated into the Ottoman State. Under Bayezid II and Mehmed the Conqueror, Muslims seem to have favored Jews over Christians, since Christians were suspected of being too sympathetic to Christian Europe. The Jews had no central authority to follow and be instigated by, save that of the office of haham basi, which the Porte could check easily. Almost all Jews were immigrants and brought their distinctive rituals, habits, and customs with them, Therefore, different regions inhabited by homogeneous groups were represented by different synagogues.

The Armenian Millet. In 1462, the Armenians became the last community recognized as a separate millet until the period of decline. Whereas the Patriarch was the most prominent ecclesiastical figure in the Orthodox Church and the Jews had no spiritual universal director, the head of Armenian Church did not reside within the Empire.

The Orthodox Church considered the Armenian church (Gregorian) heretical. Earlier, it had been as powerful as Orthodoxy. When the Armenians became a separate millet, neither little Armenia nor the Armenian provinces of the East, two important seats, were ruled by the Ottomans. Therefore, Mehmed II chose Horaghim, Gregorian bishop of Bursa, as the Armenian patriarch of Istanbul and gave him powers similar to those of the Orthodox patriarch and the haham basi.

Also belonging to this millet were all unclassified subjects, such as the Bogomils and the Paulicans, two heretical sects that originated from the Armenian church. Most Balkan Armenians accepted Islam after the area was overrun by the Ottoman armies. Remaining subjects have retained their particular faith until today. Other members included various Catholic and other Christian groups that the Orthodox Church considered heretical.

The devshirme and ghulam systems

This devshirme system was based on traditional views of dealing with prisoners of war. In the classical Islamic period, jurists advised immediate execution, allowing some or all to be ransomed or freed, exchanges for Muslim prisoners, or enslavement.(12)

Islam allowed slaves to be emancipated; the Ottomans did not. One-fifth of all captives entered the ghulam system (the sultan’s slave family), and were trained and allowed to rise within the system. Such slaves were recruited from Christians aged 10 to 20 years. The preferred ages were probably between 14 and 18, and boys younger than 12 or older than 20 were considered only in exceptional cases.(13)

Recruits were obtained through capture, purchase, gift, or tribute. Slaves not bought for the sultan or given to him were usually either captives or levied with the tribute boys. There was hardly any other way, since slaves passed too rapidly into the Muslim fold to have their children available for the system. The sons of the recruits (though already themselves Muslim) were eligible, but not their grandsons, because by then the grandchildren would most likely be Muslims. Reliable statistical data is rare, but based on contemporary ac-counts, in the sixteenth century probably 3,000 children were recruited annually. Those within the system might have reached as high as 80,000, and the total number recruited throughout the centuries might have been close to 2 million.

This exclusion of all other Muslims’ children and grandchildren lasted until Suleyman the Magnificent broke them. He allowed the Janissaries’ children to join their ranks or other parts of the system. This proved to be a fatal move, for it became the only hereditary institution after the sultanate.

At first, parents were anxious to keep their children out of the system. But later on, even Muslim families tried to get their children into it because of the prestige it conferred. Originally restricted to the sons of villagers and poor families, it eventually spread to the townsmen’s children. The earlier practice resulted in great social upward mobility; the later practice opened up a new way of accumulating wealth and prestige, and thus undermined the State.

This tribute system brought children from Austria, the Caucasus, the Crimea, and the Balkans. Those captured by raiders and corsairs were presented to the sultan as gifts. Otherwise, recruiting officers visited some villages every 4 years to fill their quota. The officer summoned the priest and got a list of children, visited the houses, and took the most suitable children. If he received more than required, the surplus was sold elsewhere.(14) Contemporary accounts say that it produced the ablest and most talented children.

These children became known as ghilman. The sultan had the absolute sovereignty over them. However, they felt honored by this title and tried to show their loyalty to him. The Ottoman system raised slaves to ministers of state, courtiers, husbands of princesses, rulers of the Islamic state, soldiers and generals, bureaucrats and prime ministers. Race was irrelevant, for only potential talent was considered.(15)

They were taught Turkish, Arabic, Persian, physical training, war affairs, administration, the Ottoman governing institutions, and so on. The successful and meritorious could expect to serve in some of the Empire’s highest positions. Its graduates became fully Muslim, as did those who served in the Ottoman armed forces. However, many non-Muslims served in respectable positions during the reigns of Murad II, Mehmed the Conqueror, and Salim I. Muslims and non-Muslims held provincial administration positions and were members of court slave families (e.g., the grand vizier, governors, princes, military officers, and so on).

Taxation

Dhimmis paid two special taxes: jizya (a tribute or a poll tax) and kharaj (land tax). Ottoman ulema ruled that this rule still was in use, but since all agricultural land belonged to the State, it applied to private holdings. Another tax was taken from all peasants. Many other dues levied on peasants and traders were heavier for dhimmis than for Muslims. Though the land tax was discontinued during the early days of Islam, the Ottomans continued to levy the poll tax in lieu of military service.(16) Interestingly enough, it was confused with land tax and the dhimmis were confused with the masses. The masses’ payment of the land tax thus was actually the dhimmis’ payment of the poll tax.(17)

Originally it was levied only on free men who could earn and afford to pay it. But later on, ministers, rabbinical representatives, the chief rabbi, teachers, slaughterers, and a few Jewish families in Istanbul were excluded. Many Christian families obtained a decree from the sultan that made them exempt. Gibb and Bowen estimate that probably only one-third of all eligible dhimmis paid this tax during the State’s later period.(18)

During the nineteenth century, the land tax was abolished (in principle) and yet retained as a compensation for military duty. Shortly thereafter, Istanbul’s people were exempted from it in toto, although it was still collected in the provinces. Until the republican era, all non-Muslims (except for Istanbul residents) paid only a military and a road tax.

Conclusion

The Ottoman State acted according to Islam and its own interests. It recognized each community’s rights and frequently protected them at the expense of its own citizens. It opened up state offices to non-Muslims as an incentive to become Muslim. Such a policy was unknown to the Europe of that time. However, the Ottomans did not spread the Islamic educational system among the non-Muslims to encourage their conversion, which constituted the state’s very raison d’etre.

Footnotes

1. Abu Jaber, book title/pub. info needed, 213.
2. H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1950-), 1:43.
3. H.A.R. Gibb et al., eds., Encyclopedia of Islam, Dhimma (Leiden: Brill, 1960-).
4. M. Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), 176-77.
5. Ibid., 173.
6. Abu Jaber, 212.
7. Carel Bertram, book title/pub. info needed, 127.
8. Ibid.
9. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976-77), 1:151.
10. Ibid., 153.
11. Cyrus Adler et al., eds., The Jewish Encyclopedia, Turkey (New York and London: Funk & Wagnalls, 1901-06).
12. A. H. Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913).
13. Ibid., 54.
14. Ibid., 46.
15. Vernon Parry, Elite Elements in the Ottoman Empire, in Governing Elites: Studies in Training and Selection, ed. Rupert Wilkinson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 50-73.
16. Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society, 253.
17. The Jewish Encyclopedia, Turkey.
18. Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society, 255.

Why and how civilizations rise and fall is a hard question to answer. To do so, one must understand the civilization and the time in which it began to rise. Jason Goodwin, an English journalist, uses memoirs of European visitors and standard histories to explore the 600-year existence of the Ottoman Empire. He writes: This is a book about a people who do not exist. The word ˜Ottoman does not describe a place. Nobody nowadays speaks their language.

The Ottoman Empire, at one time, stretched from the border of Iran to the gates of Vienna and included hundreds of ethnic groups and three dozen nations. United under a tolerant form of Islam, the Ottoman Turks forged a culture that was such a prodigy of pep, such a miracle of human ingenuity, that contemporaries felt it was helped into being by powers not quite human”diabolical or divine, depending on their point of view.

The Ottomans were the first state to maintain a standing army in Europe since Roman days. Chalcocondyle, a Byzantine chronicler, wrote:

I think there is no prince who has his armies and camps in better order, both in abundance of victuals and in beautiful order they use in encamping without any confusion or embarrassment.

Goodwin argues that the key to Ottoman success, besides an obvious skill at war, was cultural and institutional open-mindedness: The Ottoman umbrella made room for Spanish Jews, Orthodox Greeks, Venetian merchants, Albanian tribesmen, Arab bedouins, and others. The Ottomans did not demand religious or linguistic uniformity. Unlike later imperialists, they never asked themselves why others were not like them. Muslims followed Islamic law, and Christians and Jews were expected to have their own laws. Community leaders were allowed to run the community’s affairs as long as they did not come into direct conflict with Islamic organization.

An Ottoman was not born, but made, passing through imperial schools, following the requisite course of studies says Goodwin. There was no inherited nobility, as in other contemporary European empires, for people rose on merit. Cities prospered by agriculture and trade. Social welfare projects were maintained by tax-exempt charitable foundations holding almost one-third of the land and great wealth. These foundations built bridges and mosques, took care of the sick and the poor, and lodged travelers for free.

With the coming of the Industrial Revolution, however, the Ottomans lost their military, economic, and social superiority. Decreased military power resulted in land losses and reduced tax revenues, and self-indulgent leaders could not adapt the intricate socio-economic structure to changing conditions. Although palace intrigue, factional rivalry, military disloyalty, and nationalist rebellions in Greece and Egypt combined to sap its strength, it survived into the twentieth century.

Goodwin narrates this fascinating story in an elegantly written, thoroughly entertaining work of popular history. As he quotes from Andrija Kacic-Mosic: These songs will not be for everyones taste May those who find them pleasing sing them; may those who do not, go off to sleep.

One of the greatest plagues of history has been our propensity to deny the reality of human unity by constructing artificial hierarchies of human value. With the triumph of science in Europe and the application of Darwin’s theory of evolution to human societies, the determining criteria became skin color and physical characteristics. Individual achievement and ability, non-European beliefs and cultures, were either ignored or explained away. In short, genetics became the new truth. But the theory of evolution is just that: a theory. The absence of any fossil record of transitional species or the ever-elusive ‘missing link’ has caused many scientists to discard it. However, it remains embedded in popular culture as a way to differentiate ourselves from others.

This desire to differentiate has resulted in different perceptions of reality. For many, reality is limited to the world we inhabit. Others proclaim the existence of non-material and invisible worlds: heaven, hell, purgatory, or realms for the spiritually evolved and those waiting to be reborn. And then there are the dualistic perceptions of reality, such as us vs. them, black vs. white, good guy vs. bad guy. How we perceive reality determines our relationship with our surroundings and other people. If we consider ourselves self-originated, we feel alienated and empty because there is nothing to connect us with existence. But if we consider ourselves part of a Divine comprehensive unity, we are related to everything through a common meeting point: God. Such connectedness enables us to feel at home in this world and in the universe.

Virtual reality, once the stuff of science fiction, continues to progress. By stimulating certain areas of the brain, scientists can ‘create’ someone’s reality. If they can do this, certainly God can create a cosmic ‘virtual’ reality that is intimately connected with our eternal, and therefore real, life in the spiritual realm. Religions and spiritual philosophies have been saying this for millennia. And so now it is science that poses the classic Taoist paradox: ‘Though Zhuangzi dreamed of being a butterfly, couldn’t a butterfly dream of being Zhuangzi’ and how would either know which was real?’ Several of our articles address this issue.

Our book review of Lords of the Horizons recounts the Ottoman Empire’s 600-year existence as a multiethnic and multireligious empire consciously based upon the concept of diversity within unity and minority self-rule. One wonders what the modern world would look like if it had decided to follow the Ottoman model instead of nationalism and the desire for difference.

In addition to our new look, we have added a new feature’Global Developments. If you come across similar items that would interest our readers, please pass them on! We encourage our readers to attend the conferences listed, to read and review the books cited, and make the Fountain’s voice heard.

We hope that you enjoy this issue and, as always, look forward to your comments.

There are three kinds of ethnic conflict with two types of patterns. The three kinds of ethnic conflict are pre-modern, modern, and post-modern. The three kinds of conflict, it is believed, have emerged from different, clashing interests; these interests may be tangible or intangible. The resulting conflicts of interest follow certain patterns that are connected with society and the impact of certain politics. For example, these three types of conflict tie in closely with the level of industrialization a society has achieved. The first kind of ethnic conflict, pre-modern, is one that developed before industrialization. An important factor within this type of conflict is religion. Conflicts in Europe first occurred among denominations, and then between “clerical” and “secular” interests. Also, the concept of “social class” (upper, middle, and lower) was introduced during these times, which caused another basis for friction. The second kind of ethnic conflict is modern, which resulted from the establishment of an industrialized (capitalist) society. Although this type of conflict still involved conflicts between social classes, the conflicts were more in terms of labor and business. The third type of conflict, post-modern, came from a highly industrialized society and a well-educated middle class that also involved gender and environmental conflicts. Although there are three types of ethnic conflicts, the first two, pre-modern and modern, fit into today’s major conflicts. They are pre-modern in the sense that religious conflicts play a large part in today’s conflicts, as well as, class conflicts. Additionally, ethnic conflicts have a modern aspect due to the idea of the “nation-state.” The idea of a “nation-state,” and the strong feelings toward this term with hopes for independence and, perhaps, unity, tie in closely with these modern types of ethnic conflicts.

Among the kinds of conflicts mentioned above, are two patterns of ethnic conflict: international and intra-national. International conflicts are crosscutting conflicts that exist between international borders. This type of pattern includes possible conflicts between sovereign states. Usually, one state claims the role of advocate for an ethnic group within the borders of another state. Examples of international conflicts are many. Conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe are among the many examples of international conflicts. For example, conflicts between Turkey and Bulgaria, conflicts between Hungary and Romania concerning the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, and the conflicts between Albania and Serbia about the Albanian population are all examples of international conflicts.

On the other hand, intranational ethnic conflicts are between ethnic groups within existing borders. In this example, there is no international legal right of interference by another sovereign state that might be claiming the role of ethnic advocate. It is said that this pattern of ethnic conflict can be more jeopardizing in the sense that it can splinter a state into two or more states. An example of this is the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian ‘Dual Monarchy’ in 1918 that will be discussed. Moreover, cases of intranational conflicts in Eastern Europe are numerous. An example of this would be the two multi-ethnic federations, the former USSR and former Yugoslavia. Both had traditions of claiming leading roles: Russians in the case of the USSR and the Serbs in the case of Yugoslavia. Another example of intranational ethnic conflicts, the Czecho-Slovak Republic was based on a compromise between Czechs and Slovaks. The explosion of ethnic conflict within a border has seemed to be more evident when the political unit had been successfully claiming independence from the central institution; an example of this is the Serbian minority in Croatia. When looking back in history searching for a cause or resolution for conflicts, one can see a system that was used to reduce the likelihood of conflicts by the Ottoman Empire.

By the 1500s, the Ottoman Empire had conquered many nations. It first conquered its neighboring peoples, and then by the fourteenth century they had spread out to the Balkans. In 1453 Constantinople was conquered, in 1465 Bosnia and Herzegovina was annexed, and then they conquered almost all of Hungary and Transylvania. The Ottoman rulers, who were Muslim, controlled a wide variety of people for centuries and had a great impact on religion, political formations, and other aspects that controlled the lives of the people they had conquered. However, in 1453, Sultan Orhan introduced an innovative system, at the time, called the “millet system” or “nations system” (millet meaning a nation of people). The “nation system” allowed autonomy for non-Turk and non-Muslim groups. Back then, it was used in terms of a community or nation of people with a particular religion within the Ottoman Empire. This system gave rights to members of the “nation” to use their own languages, have their own religious, cultural and educational institutions, and have a leader who was responsible for all public affairs of the “nation”. At the beginning of this system there were four “nations”: Christian, Armenian, Jewish, and non-Ottoman Muslims. Within time, though, the system began to change. The Orthodox, Armenian, and Jewish “nations” were reorganized from 1862 to 1866. The patriarchs were elected by members of the community who were government assembling traders, or non-religious elements, began to handle secular matters. Also, new “nations” were developed by the nineteenth century. Romanian, Bulgarian, and Serbian “nations” were formed under separate churches and gradually grew into separate nations. The Greeks established their own Orthodox Church in Istanbul separate from the patriarch. Also, converted Muslim-Bosnians and Muslim- Albanians incorporated their new Islamic identities with their own ethnic identities. Another change was the organization of “national nations”, a national identity along with communal and religious identities. Along with this, missionaries of various denominations arrived who were seeking certain rights and protection. These missionaries received protection and rights from their own government, especially the Russian, French, and the British. Later, these countries supported their own people. For example, the French supported the (French) Catholics, the Russians supported the (Serb) Orthodox, and the British supported the (English) Protestants. However, when the Ottoman Empire began to weaken and especially when the French Revolution introduced national spirit and independence, everything changed radically. As I mentioned earlier, the “nation” system was innovative; some see it as a factor that most probably held the Empire together for such a long time, and reduced the likelihood of conflict. On the other hand, some people see this system in the sense that it eventually became a base for the national consciousness of various ethnic groups. Either way, the “nation” system played an important role in Central European countries.

Central Europe has always been a region of great ethnic diversity; and such diversity can cause many conflicts. There are three main language groups in Central Europe: Slav, German, and Hungarian. Albanians and Macedonians may, however, argue that they do not “belong” to these language families. Also, Czech and Serbian are two different languages. However, due to early migrations, Central Europe has been the “meeting place” of the three linguistic groups whose cultural patterns have differed from one another. In addition to languages, there are three major religions in this region: Western Christianity, Eastern Christianity, and Islam. Again, this does not imply that these are the only religions in Central Europe. However, the three religions mentioned above are to show that Central Europe had become a “meeting place” for world religions as well. Other factors that may be the cause of conflict in the examples that will be mentioned are language, religion, history, and territorial claims.

The Slavic Peoples: (Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians of the Southern Slavs; and the Czechs of the Western Slayv).

It is believed that the Serbs migrated to the Balkans in the 12th century and converted to Orthodox Christianity in the foollowing centuries when the first Serb political formation emerged. It was in 1389 that the Ottoman Turks defeated the Serbs in the well-known Battle of Kosova. This battle is deeply remembered in Serbian history books and has a significant part in the conflict between the Bosnians and the Serbs gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878. Language: The Serbian language and the Croatian language are written in the Latin script. It was once proposed that Serbs and Croatian form a nation together based on this fact. Religion: Serbs have a commonality with Russians due to the Orthodox religion, however, they are neighboring with Muslim Bosnians, Albanians, and Bulgarians, and with Catholic Hungarians. History: There was a rivalry between Bulgarians and Greeks, and Southern Slays and Magyars. Also, the memory of defeat at the hands of the Turks in the 14th century still lingers. Territory: The Serbs believe they were the ones to first form the “Serb kingdom” in Bosnia. Also, Hungary may claim Vojvodina that is controlled by Serbs.

The Southern Slav Croats settled in Croatia in the 17th century and had accepted Roman Catholicism by the ninth century. They formed a kingdom in the tenth and eleventh century, and then conquered Dalmatia from the Venetians. However, in 1091, Hungary conquered much of the Croatian land. In 1092, a union was formed between Croatia-Slavonia and Hungary under the Hungary monarch. Croats formed a southern frontier of Christendom and then another southern frontier of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1527. After the revolution during 1848-49, Croatia received independence from Hungary in 1851. In 1918, Croatia became part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and then later of Yugoslavia. Language: There are similarities with other Slavic languages but the latin script distinguishes it from the Serb language. Religion: There is a split between them and neighboring Eastern Orthodox and Muslim Bulgarians, and Bosnian and Albanian Muslims. History: There was a long rivalry with the Hungarians and the defeat by the Ottoman Turks. Territory: There is possibly a claim of the northern part of Bosnia and in northern Croatia by Hungarians.

Today’s Bosnians and Herzegovians are descendants of Serbs and some Croats. They settled in what became Bosnia, in the 12th century, during the seventh century. Bosnians and Herzegovians lived separately until the Ottomans conquered Bosnia in 1463 that then conquered Herzegovina in 1482. The Berlin Congress placed Bosnia-Herzegovina under the Austro-Hungarian rule in 1878. Later in 1918, Bosnia-Herzegovina became part of Serbia, which was turned into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Language: The language is Serbo-Croatian written primarily in Latin script. Religion: Bosnian Serbs are mainly Roman Catholic, but there are Bosnian and Herzegovian Muslims. History: There are the recurrent claims to Bosnia-Herzegovina by both Serbs and Croats. Territory: There does not seem to be any territorial conflicts.

The Czechs have a similar history with Bohemians and Moravians. The Bohemian Czechs continuously arrived from the first through the fifth century. The first Bohemian dynasty was established in the ninth century. Until then, it was a part of the Moravian Empire and had accepted Roman Catholicism. In 1526, Bohemia lost its autonomy that was gained in 950 when the Austrian, Habsburg rule began. When the Austrian-Hungarian Dual Monarchy was formed in 1867, Bohemian citizens were not granted independence and were a part of the Empire. Only in 1919, independence was brought to Czechoslovakia. Language: The language is Czech written in Latin script. Religion: They are either nominally Roman Catholic or Protestant. History: The most significant elements are the Habsburg-Austrian rule in 1526-1919 and the gaining of independence as Czechoslovakia in 1919. Territory: They are alongside borders between Bohemia, Germany, and Poland.

THE HUNGARIANS:

The Magyars migrated to the region of today’s Hungary and Transylavania in the ninth century. The Hungarian kingdom first united under the first Hungarian king, St. Stephen, who brought the Christian religion to the population. Under pressure from lesser nobles, the Golden Bull was granted in 1222 limiting the power of the nobles and established the beginnings of a Parliament. In 1241, the Mongols occupied the country. Overall, the borders included the Slovak population, Romanian population in Transylvania, and in the Balkans the Serbs, Bosnians, and Croatians. In 1526, Ottoman Turks defeated the Hungarians. The Hungary was then split into three parts; one part was ruled by Austrian and Hungarian nobles, the second part (the central part) was completely under Turkish rule, and the third part was ruled by Hungarian nobles. Later the Turks gave all of Hungary to the Austrians in the Peace of Kalowitz. Vojvodina was part of Hungary and Croatia until the 16th century, which was later restored to them in the same century. The three regions of Vojvodina are the Screm, Backa, and the western part of Banat. Also there were diverse interests by other ethnic groups such as the Serbs, Romanians, and, German colonists. The collapse of the Austin-Hungarian Empire was, undoubtedly, also due to ethnic conflicts and diversity, while the geographic location may have played a role since Austria was closer to Western Europe. Western Europe is considered by many to have been the place where the spirit of independence originated.

Of course ethnic conflicts continue to occur in Central Europe. Central Europe has, also, become a main area of conflict since the dismantlement of communist rule. For example, in Germany, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, in November 1989, that marked the end of the Cold War was followed by an eruption of ethnic conflict that no one had expected. Two years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall people in many regions continue to struggle with conflicts between groups based on language and religion.

Finding a solution for Central Europe is no easy task. All over the region there are many “ethnic pockets.” Also, Europe is very much characterized by nationalism, wars, and ethnic tensions, which make it more difficult for true peace. There have been suggested solutions to the ethnic conflict problem, though. One author mentions that “. . . the key to reduction of ethnic conflict, requires structural change”(Ronen). Although it is not possible to completely change the structure, some attention must be brought to it. The structure should be made into new democratic ones. Conflicting groups should sincerely try to find a compromise between their conflicts and try to resolve them peacefully. It is also important to bring honest, peace seeking governmental leaders to the countries; because no matter how one tries to change the structure, the ones leading the country must be sincere and try to convince others to do so. Only through peace, is there a true possible solution.

References

• The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict, Democracy and Self-Determination in Central Europe. Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 1997.
• Griffiths, Stephen. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 1993.
• Taylor, Trevor and Sato, Seizaburo. Future Sources of Global Conflict. Royal Institute of International Affai is. 1995.
• Swatos, William Jr. Politics and Religion in Central and Eastern Europe. Praegers Publishers. 1994.
• Deak, Istvan. Assimilation and Nationalism in East Central Europe During the Last Century of Habsburg Rule. University of Pittsburgh. 1983.