For lust of knowing what should not be known/ We take the Golden Road to Samarkand. [[1]]

The Silk Road has always been known for providing pathways that allow the Far East to exchange goods and ideas with the European West. History often remembers that the Silk Road helped Europe expand and flourish. However, the cities that lived in close proximity to the Silk Road routes also benefited economically and culturally. Samarkand, specifically, became a multi-ethnic city of trade under the leadership of Tamerlane in the 14^th century. According to historian Christopher I. Beckwith, Tamerlane formed Samarkand into a “model city” [[2]]. But was it Tamerlane’s skill as a political leader, or the influence of the trade routes that brought glory to the grand city? While Tamerlane’s empire was vast and incredible, it is impossible to deny that the Silk Road played a larger role in the flourishing of Samarkand due to the market established in the city, as well as its toleration of those with different cultural and religious identities.

Timur the Lame, or Tamerlane, was a successful military and political ruler in the city of Samarkand. As a child, Timur found himself living on the Central Asian steppes where he and his tribe would migrate at the mercy of the seasonal weather [[3]]. However, as he grew older, Timur soon found himself gaining a foothold and conquering tribes, making alliances with other warlords, and looting as a missionary throughout Central Asia [[4]]. One of Timur’s most influential alliances was made with the Balkh warlord Amir Husayn. Throughout the course of the alliance between Timur and Husayn, tensions were high and it eventually disintegrated [[5]]. Despite Timur facing betrayal during his previous experience with Husayn, the two again joined forces to eventually overthrow the Sarbadar government in Samarkand in 1366 [[6]]. While ruling alongside Husayn in Samarkand, Timur gained many followers. Timur was regarded as a brave, intelligent, and generous ruler among his people though it was well known that he was also ruthless to his enemies [[7]]. With his skill to gain followers and prestige all across the Central Asian steppes and cities, Timur was finally able to make his way into the Mongol courts. After Genghis Khan died, Timur was able to cement his control as the sole ruler of the Chagatai territory on April 9, 1370 [[8]].

The ancient city of Samarkand is well known to be a melting pot of people with different races and religions. The Sogdian people are considered to be one of the first to populate the area. In fact, the first traces of the Sogdian people date back to 700 BC. Valerie Hansen of Yale University writes that it is likely that the early Sogdian settlers lived peacefully within the city as merchants, farmers, and servants. She also states that the Sogdians were also able to continue using their native language although it was not the mainstream language of the city [[9]]. However, the Sogdians were not the only people to occupy the city. When Ruiz Gonzales de Clavijo visited the city while on embassy in 1412, he noted that there were people from across the world living in the city. Clavijo wrote:

…The population now of all nationalities gathered together in Samarqand… [Amounting] to about 150,000 souls. Of the nations brought here together there were to be seen Turks, Arabs and Moors of diverse sects, with Christians who were Greeks and Armenians, Catholics, Jacobites, and Nestorians…[[10]]

These different religious and ethnic groups likely lived in peace and toleration of one another and focused on improving commerce within the city.

While Tamerlane was a successful ruler and won the respect and loyalty of his citizens, that alone did not cause the city of Samarkand to become great. Instead, the Silk Road routes are most likely the reason for the city’s strong economy. The Silk Road was a series of trade routes that stretched from China, located in the Far East, to the European West. These dangerous trade routes allowed merchants to not only sell silk, but also chemicals, spices, minerals, leather goods, and paper [[11]]. While China traded with many different countries across the known world, the country mainly focused its trade with Samarkand. The Chinese likely had a special trading partnership established with the Sogdians, who were seen as the “main contributors” to the Silk Roads [[12]]. Hansen refers to the painting that was seen in the Panjikent House. In this painting, a woman is shown who appears to be a deity. The style of art was likely influenced by the Chinese because of their relationship with the city [[13]].

The city of Samarkand also had an elaborate trading marketplace set up with the city itself. Ruiz Gonzalez de Clavijo also mentioned that the city of Samarkand was stocked full of goods and other merchandise from around the world. Some items were even exclusively sold within the city. Spices from India, for example, were “never to be found in the markets of Alexandria.” According to Clavijo, when Timur succeeded in conquering new lands, he would often bring the best craftsmen of the conquered territory to Samarkand. For example, Timur brought weavers from Damascus, gun smiths from Turkey, as well as glassmakers and armorers that were found in other locations [[14]]. Additionally, the fertile soil in the areas surrounding the city helped farmers to harvest wheat, wine, fruit, and cotton. The price of goods was then controlled to prevent inflation from rising too high. Clavijo mentions that the price of a pair of sheep would normally cost a “ducat,” which is equivalent to about six shillings. A person in Samarkand could also pay a “half a real,” equivalent to about three pence, for a bushel and a half of barley [[15]].

Aside from the strong economy and ethnic tolerance in the city, Samarkand is also known for its beauty. On his trip, Clavijo noted that Samarkand was larger than Seville and also noticed surrounding suburbs, orchards, and vineyards outside of the city. It is noted that the “most noble and beautiful houses” are also located among the vineyards, gardens, and farmlands [[16]]. Inside the city, Samarkand also possessed beautiful buildings. Historian Xinru Liu of the College of New Jersey writes that the city’s close proximity to the Silk Roads and the cultural influences from within caused Samarkand to have several different cultural buildings erected from within. For example, Liu mentions that Islamic scholars traveled along the Silk Roads and, eventually, Islamic architectural building and centers sprang up throughout the city [[17]].

Initially, the city of Samarkand was established as a military garrison by the Arabs after defeating the Turks in 712 [[18]]. Overtime, the city became prosperous and a large trading hub where people from across the world could trade for exclusive items. How did the city of Samarkand become such an influential power at this time? Some, including Christopher I. Beckwith, and Clavijo, argue that the rule of Tamerlane is what expanded the city’s influence, wealth, and power. However, it is more plausible that the presence of the Silk Roads and the city’s multi-ethnic identity is what made it great. Today, Samarkand still remains a prosperous city of trade with multi-ethnic identity [[19]].

Bibliography

• Beckwith, Christopher I. Empires of the Silk Road: A History of the Bronze Age to the Present (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
• de Clavijo, Ruiz Gonzales. “Clavijo’s Embassy to Tamerlane.” University of Washington, http://depts.washington.edu/silkroad/texts/clavijo/cltxt1.html (accessed April 26, 2017).
• Flecker, James Elroy. “The Golden Road to Samarkand.” AllPoetry.com, https://allpoetry.com/The-Golden-Road-to-Samarkand (accessed April 24, 2017).
• Hansen, Valerie. The Silk Road: A New History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
• Liu, Xinru. The Silk Road in World History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
• Marozzi, Justin. Tamerlane: Sword of Islam, Conqueror of the World (Cambridge: Da Capo  Press, 2004).

Footnotes

[1] James Elroy Flecker, “The Golden Road to Samarkand,” AllPoetry.com, https://allpoetry.com/The-Golden-Road-to-Samarkand (accessed April 24, 2017).

[2] Christopher I. Beckwith, Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 203.

[3] Justin Marozzi, Tamerlane: Sword of Islam, Conqueror of the World (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2004), 28.

[4] Ibid, 30, 40-48.

[5] According to Justin Marozzi, Timur and Amir Husayn, formed an alliance via a marriage between Timur and Aljai Turkhan-agha, who was Husayn’s sister. The two men went undercover as missionaries when Timur decided that he did not want to submit to Moghul rule. It was even during this time as a missionary that Timur most like injured his leg, which never healed, giving him the nickname “Timur the Lame.” In 1365, the partnership ended when Husayn left Timur on the battlefield after resentment tore the two allies apart. They eventually worked together once more in the battle for Samarkand, but while ruling the city, the alliance once more became strained due to differences in political policies and beliefs. Husayn, reportedly, began to tax Timur and his followers because the two leaders had opposing styles of leadership. The alliance between the two officially ended when Aljai, Timur’s wife and Husayn’s sister, died. In 1370, Timur, backed by the government in Bukhara marched with his followers on Balkh to conquer Husayn’s city. Husayn was captured by one of Timur’s men and reportedly tried to bribe the guard with pearls. He was eventually brought before Timur, surrendered, and then executed.

[6] Ibid, 40.

[7] Beckwith, 197-200.

[8] Beckwith, 198.

[9] Valerie Hansen, The Silk Road: A New History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 117, 120.

[10] Ruiz Gonzales de Clavijo, “Clavijo’s Embassy to Tamerlane,” University of Washington, http://depts.washington.edu/silkroad/texts/clavijo/cltxt1.html (accessed April 26, 2017).

[11] Hansen, 5.

[12] Ibid, 4.

[13] Ibid, 126-127.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Clavijo’s Embassy to Tamerlane.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Xinru Liu, The Silk Road in World History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 106-107.

[18] Beckwith, 133.

[19] Liu, 66-67.

The purpose of this article is to shed light on such questions from an academic perspective by focusing especially on religious identity. It is especially crucial to understand identity as it is a widely used concept in social scientific academic disciplines in explaining the causes of many prominent social and cultural phenomena that take place in the world.

Identity is derived from group membership. In this respect, Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010) equate identity to one’s belonging to a group. Further, Hofstede et al. (2010) state that identity is visible, it is commonly rooted in language (such as Latin American identity deriving from Spanish) or religious affiliation (such as Muslim identity deriving from Islam), and can be differentiated by shared symbols, heroes, and rituals that are part of observable practices but not necessarily the values of a nation. Identity is not a core part of national cultures; it is explicit, and it can change.

An individual can have multiple identities. For example, one can identify herself as a woman, Jewish, and American. Multiple identities are dependent on culture, especially on the individualist – collectivist cultural dimension. Individualistic environments allow multiple identities and permit identity shifts. On the other hand, in collectivistic cultures, one’s group identity is mainly based on one group, which may be ethnic, religious, community-based, or national (Hofstede et al. 2010).

People who share similar ethnic and cultural backgrounds may have different group identities and fight with each other, such as Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland (Hofstede et al. 2010). In this respect, Pruitt and Kim (2004) posit that groups with strong group identity are the ones whose members are highly identified with the group and they are more likely to be involved in conflict. Accordingly, members of such groups feel the suffering of the fellow group members deeply. Group identity is especially strong among people who have historical ethnic or religious ties and perceive that they are being illegitimately deprived of their basic needs (Pruitt and Kim 2004). For example, Muslims in different areas of the world, including places as distant as the United States and Indonesia, can protest at the same time when they perceive injustice against Egyptian Muslims.

From another perspective, in explaining the changes taking place in the world after the Cold War, Huntington (2007) states that social, cultural, and economic modernization processes have disrupted people’s identity sources in the second half of the twentieth century as people moved from countryside to the city. Religion has provided the meaning and purpose as the new source of identity that people seek, hence a new revival of religion and de-secularization began. For example, Orthodoxy in Slavic republics and Islam in Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union resurged, filling the gap of the communist ideology as people identified themselves more and more with their authentic religions that were suppressed by Communism (which was the main source of identity in the Soviet Union).

Similarly, in Turkey, in the 1990s, the ultra-secularist state-driven Kemalist identity was challenged with the revival of the Muslim identity. In this respect, Huntington (2007) argues that psychological, emotional and social needs of people caught in the traumas of modernization are best satisfied by a global religious revival. In the case of Muslim communities, Islam provided the answer to these needs, causing the Islamic Resurgence. According to Huntington (2007), the recent Islamic Resurgence is “the latest phase in the adjustment of Islamic civilization to the West, an effort to find the ‘solution’ not in Western ideologies but in Islam. It embodies acceptance of modernity, rejection of Western culture, and recommitment to Islam as the guide to life in the modern world.” Similarly, Hunt and Aslandogan (2007, 96) posit that by the early twentieth century, Muslims perceived themselves as “part of intellectual, political, and social movements that sought either a restoration and renewal of the Islamic civilization of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, a return to the purity of the period of Muhammad and his immediate successors, or even a thoroughgoing ‘modernization’ of Islam.”

The resurgence was not limited to the Islamic world. In South Korea, a traditionally Buddhist nation, where only one to three percent of the population was Christian in 1950, Christianity spread. Presbyterians and Catholics were at least 30 percent of South Korea’s population in the 1980s (Huntington 2007). In the case of Latin America, “The number of Protestants in Latin America increased from roughly 7 million in 1960 to about 50 million in 1990” (Huntington 2007, 1779) which according to Huntington (2007, 1783) is “a major net increase in religious commitment and participation” rather than a replacement of one religion with another. According to Huntington, such changes in South Korea and Latin America reflect the ability of Protestantism in meeting the psychological, emotional, and social needs of people caught in the traumas of modernization more than Catholicism and Buddhism. Hence, worldwide identities became more aligned with religion due to psychological and spiritual needs satisfaction in the midst of the complexities of modernization and change, which can create confusion.

From the theories of conflict perspective, identity can be used to explain many of the conflicts in the world. According to Deutsch, Coleman and Marcus (2006), basic needs such as security, identity, recognition of identity, freedom, distributive justice, and participation are seen as the essential elements for human development. Social identity theory asserts that the group that one belongs to is part of his identity, and one tends to view the group favorably to reinforce his self-respect. Thus, one perceives an attack on his in-group as an assault on his self-worth (Pruitt and Kim 2004). Since identity groups serve as the primary vehicle through which these needs are expressed and satisfied, intergroup conflict takes place when one group’s basic needs are frustrated or denied (Deutsch et al. 2006). Accordingly, intergroup conflict increases cohesiveness within the competing groups, primarily through the effects of threat. A perception of threat plays a key role by heightening in-group solidarity in addition to increasing hostility toward the threatening out-group, especially if there is a history of antagonism between the groups (Deutsch et al. 2006).

Furthermore, identity groups exist in organizations and communities. Wherever groups gather around a common social identity, if needs for recognition of that identity or for dignity, safety, or control are obstructed, conflict is highly likely. In this respect, professional groups, scientific disciplines, political parties, government departments, lobby groups, businesses, sports teams, street gangs – all carry a sense of group identity that shapes their dealings with other groups (Deutsch et al. 2006).

Based on social identity theory, since an individual’s self-esteem is linked to group membership, a positive self-concept requires favorable evaluations of one’s group and discriminatory comparisons with other groups (Deutsch et al. 2006). For example, ethnic groups exhibit ethnocentrism and national groups exhibit nationalism-pride and loyalty to their own nation, while defaming other nations.

According to Huntington (2007), in fault line wars, casual and multiple identities often transform and become more focused and hardened. With increased violence, communal conflicts become identity wars and the initial issues at stake tend to get redefined more exclusively as “us” against “them” as group cohesion and commitment are enhanced. With political leaders’ narratives emphasizing and capitalizing on ethnic and religious loyalties, civilization consciousness strengthens with respect to other identities. An example is the war in Bosnia where the common Slavic or Yugoslav ethnic identity diminished, and Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox identities came to the front among the three fighting groups as nationalist political leaders built their agendas on ethnocentrism and religious differences.

Nevertheless, religious identity can take a constructive form and play an important role in peace building (Deutsch et al. 2006). Accordingly, when faithfulness is a source of extending compassion, justice, tolerance, and respect to other people regardless of their faith, it can prevent violence and help build peace. In places where religious diversity is celebrated, religious identity can become the mediating factor for understanding and cooperation. Faith based diplomacy is an example where religious identity is the opening point for building trust and starting dialogue (Deutsch et al. 2006). Parties involved in interfaith – intercultural dialogue can attain a better understanding of their own religious or cultural identity and how it acts to form their perspective of the world and others. Therefore, interfaith dialogue is not only about learning about others’ faith traditions, but it is also exploration of one’s own identity. It also helps develop respect and understanding of various traditions as parties break down barriers of misunderstanding and build trusting relationships (Deutsch et al. 2006).

Another area where religious identities can foster bonds with others is humanitarian relief work. One can capitalize on her religious beliefs in protecting or enhancing human life regardless of ethnic or religious identity of the needy. The Kimse Yok Mu foundation in Turkey is based on such concepts that transcend identity based boundaries. Furthermore, Hunt and Aslandogan (2007) point out that education can become the vehicle through which a higher sense of identity can be developed to end divisions and frictions over artificial differences. Hence, the role of education for promoting a universal view of humanity and for the development of understanding and tolerance to secure respect for the rights of others is tremendous. One such educational endeavor is brought to life through the implementation of the annual Turkish Olympiads in Turkey, where identity based differences are minimized and universal values are emphasized around speaking a common language among students from more than 140 countries.

In conclusion, understanding the concept of identity can be especially important for international development, disaster relief, interfaith – intercultural dialogue, and education work in differentiating why and how various groups of people around the world identify themselves with various factors such as religion, ethnicity, language, and race. In the international development domain, it is vital to work with identity-based sensitivities in mind, as identity underlies many conflicts around the world. In the interfaith – intercultural dialogue domain, on the other hand, different identities provide the basis for much needed cooperation for a brighter future for all.

References

• Deutsch Morton, Peter T. Coleman, and Eric C. Marcus. 2006. The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice. Kindle Edition.
• Hofstede, Geert, Gert J. Hofstede and Michael Minkov. 2010. Cultures And Organizations: Software of The Mind. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw Hill.
• Hunt, Robert, and Yuksel Aslandogan. 2007. Muslim Citizens of the Globalized World. Kindle Edition.
• Huntington, Samuel P. 2007. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Simon & Schuster. Kindle Edition.
• Pruitt, Dean G. and Sung Hee Kim. 2004. Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw Hill.

Rwanda is a country that has passed through a disastrous conflict and genocide with devastating effects. But the lessons learned in the aftermath of the genocide have changed the country forever.

Rwanda, a small country located in central Africa, has been home to nine million people from two tribes known as the Hutu and the Tutsi which have lived side by side in peace for centuries. There was no known ethnic conflict or major conflict between Hutus and Tutsis until the last fifty years. Rwanda was first colonized by Germany in 1899. Belgium took control of the country in 1919. In 1961, Rwanda’s monarchical government was removed by a referendum and the first parliamentary elections were held but at the expense of a number of massacres. In the following year, the country gained its independence.

Although the country became independent in 1962, the effects of colonialism lingered until recently. An example of this is the ethnic division between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes. During the colonial period, the Belgian colonizers and the Church significantly favored the Tutsis over the Hutus. The colonizers had followed a divide and rule strategy and used the Tutsis in power instead of controlling the country directly; this widened ethnic differences. The colonizers had made membership of the Tutsi tribe a means of getting better education or obtaining a government or administrative position. Since both tribes speak the same language and have the same skin color, it was virtually impossible to tell them apart, so the colonizers had issued ethnic identity cards based on the measurement of people’s nose length. Until World War II, the Tutsis were masters of the country with a proven long record. However, the strategies of outsiders including the Church had changed in the mid-twentieth century so that Hutus gained more access to positions of power. In the 1950s, the Hutus took power and controlled the country. Considerable numbers of Tutsis were exiled to neighboring countries on many occasions. Until the 1990s, Hutu power was largely unchallenged in Rwanda. However, Tutsi exiles were organizing in neighboring countries and this was perceived as a grave threat to Hutu rule. Political conflict over the control of power and resources resulted in an exponential increase in ethnic violence. The Hutu government conceived Tutsi empowerment as a threat to their own interests and launched a media campaign calling for genocide. After a chain of events, including the death of the Rwandan president in a plane crash, a terrifying genocide commenced. For a while, Hutu people were strongly encouraged to kill their Tutsi neighbors, and those who did so were rewarded for their actions.

As a result, the genocide exploded quickly between April and June 1994. The world did not attempt to prevent the massacres. Men and women, children and the elderly, all were identified by their ethnicity and executed wherever they were found. Hatred was at its peak so that even relatives turned against each other. While a Hutu husband was among the survivors, his Tutsi wife was killed, and their children were kept alive as they were seen as sharing their father’s Hutu ethnicity. More than 800,000 people (Tutsis and moderate Hutus), according to official records, were massacred by the army and the extremists.

At last, without any international help, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), a Tutsi-led rebel movement, overthrew the regime in June 1994 and the genocide was stopped. The country has been at peace ever since; however, Rwandans continue to struggle with the legacy of genocide.

After the Rwandan Genocide, one of the biggest challenges for the new RPF government was handling the detention and prosecution of more than 100,000 people who were accused of genocide-related crimes. Pointing to the seriousness of the situation one of the RPF government ministers said, “When we captured Kigali, we thought we would face criminals in the state; instead, we faced a criminal population.” The genocide orders were given by executives of the state but the crimes were carried out by hundreds of thousands of ordinary people. The pink uniform of prisoners is well known in Rwanda today since the transfer of prisoners from one place in the country to another is common. By 2000, approximately 120,000 people accused of genocidal acts were being held in the prisons, which were populated far beyond their capacity. In ten years, the courts have only managed to prosecute about 10,000 suspects. In other words, it would require at least another 110 years to prosecute all prisoners accused of genocide-related crimes. Although almost half of the prisoners have been released to ease the system at various times, the courts still need to work faster.

To overcome the backlog in the legal system the Rwandan government introduced the Gacaca (pronounced “gachacha”) courts, a community justice system inspired by traditional procedures for cultural communal law enforcement. Gacaca means “justice on the grass” and the court is launched in an open grassy area or village green, near the main street. The main advantages of these courts are the ease of assembling the court in public, and the way they provide the opportunity for everyone to exercise their right to speak through an interactive court. Gacaca is the latest means used by the Rwandan government to realize truth, justice, and more importantly the reconciliation and healing of the community much sooner than would otherwise have been possible. Rwandans have welcomed the Gacaca. One man who lost his brother in his twenties and another who abandoned his wife since she belonged to the so-called hostile tribe have found the Gacaca court in their local area a valuable place to express their feelings and seek justice in the shadow of ineradicable memories. Yet other people, who participated in the genocide, have found the opportunity and encouragement to admit their wrong-doing and relieve the pain of their remorse.

Gacaca has its pros and cons, which I will not go into here; however, the genocide carries important lessons both for Rwanda and the world. It showed how lack of tolerance and understanding of negligible differences can indeed turn into cruelty and brutality, resulting in one of the biggest genocides in history. Rwandans, who were previously divided as Hutus and Tutsis, now do not even pronounce the words Hutu and Tutsi in public in their daily life. Rwanda today exemplifies a good example of living together with differences despite the fact that those differences were recently the cause of a tragic conflict.

Indeed the Rwandan people, who once killed each other without mercy, can tolerate with no discomfort a diversity that in other nations is a great source of potential conflict, an area of interaction that other countries have been struggling with for a long time. Rwandans welcome all religious traditions in their cultural richness. Saturdays and Sundays are like a festival time; Christians all dress in their best clothes and walk to church. (Many Christians observe and practice Saturday Sabbath in Rwanda.) Although Muslims are in a minority, the adhan (call to prayer) is recited from mosque loudspeakers; the shifting Islamic holidays are accepted as national holidays. If religious differences were a cause of fighting, then Rwanda would still be one of the most problematic countries in the world today. In contrast, Rwanda is a good example of how the establishment of accountability combined with tolerance and understanding can help to transform and strengthen a country even when it has fresh memories of one of the biggest genocides in history.

Mehmet Sen is an engineer in San Francisco Bay Area. He visited Rwanda many times for business purposes.

References

• Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, Princeton University Press, 2001.
• Reyntjens, Filip and Stef Vandeginste. 2005. “Rwanda: An Atypical Transition.” In Roads to Reconciliation, edited by Elin Skaar, et al. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
• Stover, Eric and Weinstein, Harvey (2004). My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Susanne Buckley-Zistel (2006): “The Truth Heals?” In Gacaca Jurisdictions and the Consolidation of Peace in Rwanda. Die Friedens-Warte Heft 1–2, pp. 113–130.

There are three kinds of ethnic conflict with two types of patterns. The three kinds of ethnic conflict are pre-modern, modern, and post-modern. The three kinds of conflict, it is believed, have emerged from different, clashing interests; these interests may be tangible or intangible. The resulting conflicts of interest follow certain patterns that are connected with society and the impact of certain politics. For example, these three types of conflict tie in closely with the level of industrialization a society has achieved. The first kind of ethnic conflict, pre-modern, is one that developed before industrialization. An important factor within this type of conflict is religion. Conflicts in Europe first occurred among denominations, and then between “clerical” and “secular” interests. Also, the concept of “social class” (upper, middle, and lower) was introduced during these times, which caused another basis for friction. The second kind of ethnic conflict is modern, which resulted from the establishment of an industrialized (capitalist) society. Although this type of conflict still involved conflicts between social classes, the conflicts were more in terms of labor and business. The third type of conflict, post-modern, came from a highly industrialized society and a well-educated middle class that also involved gender and environmental conflicts. Although there are three types of ethnic conflicts, the first two, pre-modern and modern, fit into today’s major conflicts. They are pre-modern in the sense that religious conflicts play a large part in today’s conflicts, as well as, class conflicts. Additionally, ethnic conflicts have a modern aspect due to the idea of the “nation-state.” The idea of a “nation-state,” and the strong feelings toward this term with hopes for independence and, perhaps, unity, tie in closely with these modern types of ethnic conflicts.

Among the kinds of conflicts mentioned above, are two patterns of ethnic conflict: international and intra-national. International conflicts are crosscutting conflicts that exist between international borders. This type of pattern includes possible conflicts between sovereign states. Usually, one state claims the role of advocate for an ethnic group within the borders of another state. Examples of international conflicts are many. Conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe are among the many examples of international conflicts. For example, conflicts between Turkey and Bulgaria, conflicts between Hungary and Romania concerning the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, and the conflicts between Albania and Serbia about the Albanian population are all examples of international conflicts.

On the other hand, intranational ethnic conflicts are between ethnic groups within existing borders. In this example, there is no international legal right of interference by another sovereign state that might be claiming the role of ethnic advocate. It is said that this pattern of ethnic conflict can be more jeopardizing in the sense that it can splinter a state into two or more states. An example of this is the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian ‘Dual Monarchy’ in 1918 that will be discussed. Moreover, cases of intranational conflicts in Eastern Europe are numerous. An example of this would be the two multi-ethnic federations, the former USSR and former Yugoslavia. Both had traditions of claiming leading roles: Russians in the case of the USSR and the Serbs in the case of Yugoslavia. Another example of intranational ethnic conflicts, the Czecho-Slovak Republic was based on a compromise between Czechs and Slovaks. The explosion of ethnic conflict within a border has seemed to be more evident when the political unit had been successfully claiming independence from the central institution; an example of this is the Serbian minority in Croatia. When looking back in history searching for a cause or resolution for conflicts, one can see a system that was used to reduce the likelihood of conflicts by the Ottoman Empire.

By the 1500s, the Ottoman Empire had conquered many nations. It first conquered its neighboring peoples, and then by the fourteenth century they had spread out to the Balkans. In 1453 Constantinople was conquered, in 1465 Bosnia and Herzegovina was annexed, and then they conquered almost all of Hungary and Transylvania. The Ottoman rulers, who were Muslim, controlled a wide variety of people for centuries and had a great impact on religion, political formations, and other aspects that controlled the lives of the people they had conquered. However, in 1453, Sultan Orhan introduced an innovative system, at the time, called the “millet system” or “nations system” (millet meaning a nation of people). The “nation system” allowed autonomy for non-Turk and non-Muslim groups. Back then, it was used in terms of a community or nation of people with a particular religion within the Ottoman Empire. This system gave rights to members of the “nation” to use their own languages, have their own religious, cultural and educational institutions, and have a leader who was responsible for all public affairs of the “nation”. At the beginning of this system there were four “nations”: Christian, Armenian, Jewish, and non-Ottoman Muslims. Within time, though, the system began to change. The Orthodox, Armenian, and Jewish “nations” were reorganized from 1862 to 1866. The patriarchs were elected by members of the community who were government assembling traders, or non-religious elements, began to handle secular matters. Also, new “nations” were developed by the nineteenth century. Romanian, Bulgarian, and Serbian “nations” were formed under separate churches and gradually grew into separate nations. The Greeks established their own Orthodox Church in Istanbul separate from the patriarch. Also, converted Muslim-Bosnians and Muslim- Albanians incorporated their new Islamic identities with their own ethnic identities. Another change was the organization of “national nations”, a national identity along with communal and religious identities. Along with this, missionaries of various denominations arrived who were seeking certain rights and protection. These missionaries received protection and rights from their own government, especially the Russian, French, and the British. Later, these countries supported their own people. For example, the French supported the (French) Catholics, the Russians supported the (Serb) Orthodox, and the British supported the (English) Protestants. However, when the Ottoman Empire began to weaken and especially when the French Revolution introduced national spirit and independence, everything changed radically. As I mentioned earlier, the “nation” system was innovative; some see it as a factor that most probably held the Empire together for such a long time, and reduced the likelihood of conflict. On the other hand, some people see this system in the sense that it eventually became a base for the national consciousness of various ethnic groups. Either way, the “nation” system played an important role in Central European countries.

Central Europe has always been a region of great ethnic diversity; and such diversity can cause many conflicts. There are three main language groups in Central Europe: Slav, German, and Hungarian. Albanians and Macedonians may, however, argue that they do not “belong” to these language families. Also, Czech and Serbian are two different languages. However, due to early migrations, Central Europe has been the “meeting place” of the three linguistic groups whose cultural patterns have differed from one another. In addition to languages, there are three major religions in this region: Western Christianity, Eastern Christianity, and Islam. Again, this does not imply that these are the only religions in Central Europe. However, the three religions mentioned above are to show that Central Europe had become a “meeting place” for world religions as well. Other factors that may be the cause of conflict in the examples that will be mentioned are language, religion, history, and territorial claims.

The Slavic Peoples: (Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians of the Southern Slavs; and the Czechs of the Western Slayv).

It is believed that the Serbs migrated to the Balkans in the 12th century and converted to Orthodox Christianity in the foollowing centuries when the first Serb political formation emerged. It was in 1389 that the Ottoman Turks defeated the Serbs in the well-known Battle of Kosova. This battle is deeply remembered in Serbian history books and has a significant part in the conflict between the Bosnians and the Serbs gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878. Language: The Serbian language and the Croatian language are written in the Latin script. It was once proposed that Serbs and Croatian form a nation together based on this fact. Religion: Serbs have a commonality with Russians due to the Orthodox religion, however, they are neighboring with Muslim Bosnians, Albanians, and Bulgarians, and with Catholic Hungarians. History: There was a rivalry between Bulgarians and Greeks, and Southern Slays and Magyars. Also, the memory of defeat at the hands of the Turks in the 14th century still lingers. Territory: The Serbs believe they were the ones to first form the “Serb kingdom” in Bosnia. Also, Hungary may claim Vojvodina that is controlled by Serbs.

The Southern Slav Croats settled in Croatia in the 17th century and had accepted Roman Catholicism by the ninth century. They formed a kingdom in the tenth and eleventh century, and then conquered Dalmatia from the Venetians. However, in 1091, Hungary conquered much of the Croatian land. In 1092, a union was formed between Croatia-Slavonia and Hungary under the Hungary monarch. Croats formed a southern frontier of Christendom and then another southern frontier of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1527. After the revolution during 1848-49, Croatia received independence from Hungary in 1851. In 1918, Croatia became part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and then later of Yugoslavia. Language: There are similarities with other Slavic languages but the latin script distinguishes it from the Serb language. Religion: There is a split between them and neighboring Eastern Orthodox and Muslim Bulgarians, and Bosnian and Albanian Muslims. History: There was a long rivalry with the Hungarians and the defeat by the Ottoman Turks. Territory: There is possibly a claim of the northern part of Bosnia and in northern Croatia by Hungarians.

Today’s Bosnians and Herzegovians are descendants of Serbs and some Croats. They settled in what became Bosnia, in the 12th century, during the seventh century. Bosnians and Herzegovians lived separately until the Ottomans conquered Bosnia in 1463 that then conquered Herzegovina in 1482. The Berlin Congress placed Bosnia-Herzegovina under the Austro-Hungarian rule in 1878. Later in 1918, Bosnia-Herzegovina became part of Serbia, which was turned into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Language: The language is Serbo-Croatian written primarily in Latin script. Religion: Bosnian Serbs are mainly Roman Catholic, but there are Bosnian and Herzegovian Muslims. History: There are the recurrent claims to Bosnia-Herzegovina by both Serbs and Croats. Territory: There does not seem to be any territorial conflicts.

The Czechs have a similar history with Bohemians and Moravians. The Bohemian Czechs continuously arrived from the first through the fifth century. The first Bohemian dynasty was established in the ninth century. Until then, it was a part of the Moravian Empire and had accepted Roman Catholicism. In 1526, Bohemia lost its autonomy that was gained in 950 when the Austrian, Habsburg rule began. When the Austrian-Hungarian Dual Monarchy was formed in 1867, Bohemian citizens were not granted independence and were a part of the Empire. Only in 1919, independence was brought to Czechoslovakia. Language: The language is Czech written in Latin script. Religion: They are either nominally Roman Catholic or Protestant. History: The most significant elements are the Habsburg-Austrian rule in 1526-1919 and the gaining of independence as Czechoslovakia in 1919. Territory: They are alongside borders between Bohemia, Germany, and Poland.

THE HUNGARIANS:

The Magyars migrated to the region of today’s Hungary and Transylavania in the ninth century. The Hungarian kingdom first united under the first Hungarian king, St. Stephen, who brought the Christian religion to the population. Under pressure from lesser nobles, the Golden Bull was granted in 1222 limiting the power of the nobles and established the beginnings of a Parliament. In 1241, the Mongols occupied the country. Overall, the borders included the Slovak population, Romanian population in Transylvania, and in the Balkans the Serbs, Bosnians, and Croatians. In 1526, Ottoman Turks defeated the Hungarians. The Hungary was then split into three parts; one part was ruled by Austrian and Hungarian nobles, the second part (the central part) was completely under Turkish rule, and the third part was ruled by Hungarian nobles. Later the Turks gave all of Hungary to the Austrians in the Peace of Kalowitz. Vojvodina was part of Hungary and Croatia until the 16th century, which was later restored to them in the same century. The three regions of Vojvodina are the Screm, Backa, and the western part of Banat. Also there were diverse interests by other ethnic groups such as the Serbs, Romanians, and, German colonists. The collapse of the Austin-Hungarian Empire was, undoubtedly, also due to ethnic conflicts and diversity, while the geographic location may have played a role since Austria was closer to Western Europe. Western Europe is considered by many to have been the place where the spirit of independence originated.

Of course ethnic conflicts continue to occur in Central Europe. Central Europe has, also, become a main area of conflict since the dismantlement of communist rule. For example, in Germany, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, in November 1989, that marked the end of the Cold War was followed by an eruption of ethnic conflict that no one had expected. Two years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall people in many regions continue to struggle with conflicts between groups based on language and religion.

Finding a solution for Central Europe is no easy task. All over the region there are many “ethnic pockets.” Also, Europe is very much characterized by nationalism, wars, and ethnic tensions, which make it more difficult for true peace. There have been suggested solutions to the ethnic conflict problem, though. One author mentions that “. . . the key to reduction of ethnic conflict, requires structural change”(Ronen). Although it is not possible to completely change the structure, some attention must be brought to it. The structure should be made into new democratic ones. Conflicting groups should sincerely try to find a compromise between their conflicts and try to resolve them peacefully. It is also important to bring honest, peace seeking governmental leaders to the countries; because no matter how one tries to change the structure, the ones leading the country must be sincere and try to convince others to do so. Only through peace, is there a true possible solution.

References

• The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict, Democracy and Self-Determination in Central Europe. Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 1997.
• Griffiths, Stephen. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 1993.
• Taylor, Trevor and Sato, Seizaburo. Future Sources of Global Conflict. Royal Institute of International Affai is. 1995.
• Swatos, William Jr. Politics and Religion in Central and Eastern Europe. Praegers Publishers. 1994.
• Deak, Istvan. Assimilation and Nationalism in East Central Europe During the Last Century of Habsburg Rule. University of Pittsburgh. 1983.

Although the disintegration of the Soviet Union has, largely, put an end to the end of Cold War, the world has not become more peaceful. The bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia and other savage conflicts have signaled the emergence of a new nationalism. In this context, to justify the use of force we frequently hear talk of self-determination and the rights of peoples.

Membership of the United Nations has increased sharply only twice in its history. The first time was in the late fifties and early sixties, at the people of the decolonization following the retreat of the Western imperial powers. The second time was after the disintegration of the Soviet empire and then, a little later, of Yugoslavia. In the latter case, the new sovereign nation-states were not colonies achieving a new independence.

It is thought that the latest increase in the number of nation-states will encourage distinct communities within larger states to seek some measure of independence. Although the legal right for self-determination as the basis for the use of force to gain independence is not new, it would be wrong to deny that the use of force is now perceived as a likely means of realizing full independence or some degree of autonomy. That perception is surely one of the strongest reasons behind many of the conflicts currently stretching taking place in Bosnia- Herzegovina, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Kashmir, Northern Iraq, Somalia, Dniester region of Moldova, the Abkhazian region of Georgia, etc. These are only some of the hot spots which have one, or more than one group of people engaged in armed struggle for independence. Of course the list could easily be enlarged.

Language is certainly a decisive factor in the assertion of ethnic identity. According to the Summer Institute of Linguistics, Dallas, Texas, there are 6,170 languages spoken in the world at this time (Grimes (ed). 1988, p.vii: quoted in Moynihan, 1933, p.72) However, there are only 184 states in the world, the latest additions being Eritrea, Monaco and Andorra.

The steady increase in the number of nation-states indicates that the process of state-building is far from over. International analysts John O’Loughlin and Herman van der Wusten expect the number to reach around 250 by the middle of the next century (O’Loughin and Van der Wusten, in Taylor (ed). 1993, p.l08). The way that number will be attained is likely to be by using force. That likelihood alone is enough reason for taking the issue very seriously. For, as the number of nation-states increases, so too do the chances of war between them as the conflicts of interest between the states become more complicated.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, it was a self-evident truth that wars, strictly speaking, could only be engaged in by established states. Other terms were used to describe other forms of violence such as insurrection, civil unrest, piracy, or rebellion. At most, there was ‘civil war’ where the adjective modified the idea and the law which applied.

Especially after the Second World War, opinions about what constitutes war and which entities in the international arena may wage war have altered. The swift break-up of colonial empires and the increasing consensus that there was a right of peoples to self-determination have led some to the view that wars of national liberation are international wars, albeit they are not inter-state wars (Wilson, 1988, p.134). It can he convincingly argued that the rules governing the Legitimacy of resort to force (jus ad bellum) and the rules governing the conduct of hostilities (jus in bello) have changed markedly since the Second World War and especially since 1960.

As the ethnic conflicts spread around the world, they are becoming another source of human misery in the aftermath of the Cold War. It is a reality of our time that secessionist, irridentist, and national liberation wars are the greatest killers-either directly through bloodshed or indirectly through hunger or disease stemming from such wars (Farley, 1986, p. 139). O’Loughlin and Van der Wusten hold that the causes of wars after the 1990s will most probably be ethno-nationalist disputes (Taylor (ed.), 1993, p.106), that is, related to national liberation or separatist movements. For the last two years, we have been witnessing through the nastiest example of such a conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Unless a remedy is found to these ethnic disputes, the peoples of the earth will not experience in the foreseeable future the peace that seemed to be, to so many, the promise of the end of the Cold War era. 

References

• FARLEY, Lawrence T. (1986) Plebiscites and Sovereignty: the Crisis of Political Illegitimacy, Westview Press, London.
• GRIMES, Barbara F.( ed) ( 1988) Ethnologue:Languages of the World. Summer Institute of Linguistics. Dallas.
• O’LOUGHLIN, J. & VAN DER WUSTEN, H. (1993) ‘Political geography of war and peace’, in Taylor(ed.)
• TAYLOR, Peter J. (1993) Political Geography of The Twentieth Century, Belhaven Press, London.
• MOYNIHAN, DANIEL P. (1993) Pandemonium:Ethnicity in International Politics, Oxford Univercity Press.
• WILSON, Heather A. (1988) International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, Clarendon Press.