Journey into Europe: Islam, Immigration and Identity explores the mighty continent of Europe by an academic whose origins lie in the Third World. Professor Akbar Ahmed, one of the renowned scholars of Islam, reverses the longstanding tradition of scholars from the Global North studying the Global South.

Professor Ahmed divides the book into three parts. Part I analyses the fundamental character of European society and its various identities; Part II dwells on the Muslim communities in Europe and elucidates their place on the continent; and Part III reflects on the major challenges the continent is facing and offers some incredibly prudent solutions to deal with them.

At the outset, the author juxtaposes the ideas of the twentieth century German sociologist, Max Weber, and those of the fourteenth century Arab sociologist, Ibn Khaldun, and critically examines European identity from their perspectives. He argues that Weber’s works, which evaluate societies on the parameters of modernity, fail to explain the recent developments in Europe, whereas Ibn Khaldun’s theories, which talk of tribal traditions and codes, perfectly sum up the state of affairs on the continent today.

Central to the analysis of Ibn Khaldun, the book highlights, was the nature of tribal society, which is defined through shared bloodlines and bound by what he called asabiyyah, or social cohesion. The book argues that the rise of right-wing politics across Europe is a sign of the re-emergence of the tribal nature of its society, which means that Ibn Khaldun provides the right framework for understanding the direction in which Europe is moving.

It highlights the predominance of the German culture and identity on the European continent and lucidly explains concepts such as Volk, Heimat, janteloven, and hygge that reflect what the author calls “Primordial Tribal Identity” among Germanic peoples. It is argued that these are the precise concepts that take predatory forms and target minorities when the continent is hit by economic and political instability, as is happening now.

The book also addresses, in great detail, “European Pluralistic Identity.” While doing so, the author elaborates the history and legacy of Muslim-ruled Andalusia, where knowledge and learning were highly regarded, and women and religious minorities were deeply respected. It highlights how ilm, or the Qur’anic instruction to seek knowledge, came to characterize the culture of Andalusia. As a result of what the author refers to as the “ilm ethos” of the erstwhile Andalusians, the region developed a pluralistic and inclusive culture, which in Spanish is called la convivencia, or coexistence.

This section of the book is particularly noteworthy as it underlines the direct, causal relationship between the ilm ethos and convivencia. The author rightly points out that “the urge to reach out to God through knowledge, which is embedded in the ilm ethos, is thus translated into an embrace of God’s creation irrespective of racial, religious, or class differences, which may be defined as convivencia.” It reminds us of the importance we need to give to understanding each other’s faith traditions if we want to do away with the conflict and intolerance that our world is today enduring.

The second part of the book explores the distinct Muslim communities of Europe, which are categorized as Muslim immigrants, indigenous Muslims, and Muslim converts.

The discussion over the condition of Muslim immigrants in Europe clearly refers to the stark difference between the character of British and French colonialism, and thereby the status of Muslim immigrants in these countries, the vast majority of whom have origins in their respective former colonies. It is diligently highlighted in the book that although both these countries, which exemplified European imperialism, have histories of atrocities against their colonial subjects, imperial Britain had a relatively inclusive approach which allowed its subjects to find a place and grow in British society while retaining their own identity with integrity; whereas, there was no such possibility for the French colonial subjects. As a result, while there are a number of immigrant success stories in all spheres of British public life, such as Baroness Sayeeda Warsi in politics, Sir Mo Farah in sports, Salman Rushdie in literature, and Abdus Salam in science, it is not possible to find Muslims excelling in such diverse fields in France.

With regards to the indigenous Muslim population of Europe, the book offers its readers a window into the native yet marginalized and forgotten Muslim communities of the continent. The author revives the memory of the horrific genocide against Bosnian Muslims in the early 1990s and quotes a very pertinent question by the former Mayor of Srebrenica, Camil Durakovic, as to whether the European response to it would have been as lethargic as it was if the Bosniaks had not been Muslims.

The social and economic conditions of other marginalized indigenous Muslim communities such as the Turks of Greece and Bulgaria, the Pomaks, and the Albanians; and the forgotten communities like the Tatars, the Roma, and the Cham are also fairly addressed in the book. Despite their long history of loyalty and service to their motherlands, they are not considered as part of the Volk in the nationalist, tribal imagination of Europe.

“The continent that centuries ago launched the crusades against the Muslim world and later colonized it is now, ironically, providing Islam with a new lease of life” (p. 306).

This sentence brilliantly encapsulates the significance of Muslim converts in Europe. At a time when referring to Islam as a religion of barbarity has become a norm, thousands of Europeans, especially women, are wholeheartedly embracing it:

“… Europeans approached the subject of conversion to Islam with intellectual seriousness and careful reasoning. They are in the tradition of the European philosophers in their quest for truth and meaning. … Their conversion is invariable a mixture of head and heart. It should also be noted that European primordial identity – which has reservations regarding morally vacuous materialism, consumerism, and globalization and defines differentiated roles for men and women – finds an echo in the attraction many converts feel toward Islam today” (p. 306).

The final part of the book deals with a range of matters of crucial importance, such as the effect of European primordial identity on Muslims and Jews, the impact of the repugnant terrorist group ISIS on the lives of European Muslims, and the imperative for convivencia on the continent.

This section of the book discusses in great detail how Jews were persecuted, and Muslims appreciated, throughout Europe’s history because of the typical attitude of primordial tribal identity towards religious and ethnic minorities. This attitude has been reflected in the works of German philosophers like Johann Gottfried von Herder. Herder believed that only those who lived in their own lands with the people of their own ethnicity and shared the same cultural traditions were deserving of respect, and therefore he disparaged the Jews for relocating to Europe and admired the Arabs for continuing to live in their original homeland in the deserts of the Middle East.

However, Ahmed notes that the establishment and the rise of the State of Israel has been a formidable force on European politics and perspectives. Simultaneously, the unabated chaos in the Middle East and the consequential refugee crisis have resulted in the dramatic reversal of relationships. Although anti-Semitism is still rife within European right-wing movements, the general European view of Jews, who are now settled in their homeland, is mostly positive; whereas even moderate Europeans view the Muslim community, who have been dislocated from their homelands, with suspicion.

A careful and comprehensive analysis has been done by the author on the issue of ISIS and the support that it garnered from some sections of European Muslims, which is reflected in the fact that over 5,000 of them travelled to Syria and Iraq to join the terrorist group. He argues “that supporters of terrorism are not monolith, and their paths to terrorism are different,” and divides “these Muslims into three categories: those immigrants with a tribal background, those with a modernist Islamic background, and European converts.”

The author gives a set of different reasons that these Muslims had/have for their support of the dreaded terrorist group. For instance, for those with a tribal background where taking revenge is part of the culture, marginalization, constant cultural humiliation, and an utter lack of opportunities in Europe drove some of them to seek revenge through terrorism. For those with a modernist Islamic background, the inability of elders to engage in serious intellectual debates meant they tried to find answers on the Internet, where some ended up reading literature posted by radical groups. Lacking proper guidance about their new faith and its doctrines, new European converts were not taught how to eliminate discrimination and injustice against their new fellow brothers and sisters in faith. In their efforts to find guidance, some were radicalized.

Ahmed’s book also points to the very important fact that support for ISIS is high in places where Islamophobia is high, and it is low where Islamophobia is low. It notes that given Southern Europe has some memory of convivencia and as a result has low Islamophobia, no European Muslims who travelled to the Middle East to join ISIS came from this region.

Based on the fieldwork findings, Professor Ahmed concludes his book with ten immensely valuable solutions. These are meant to contain the crisis that seems to be engulfing Europe. The first among them is reviving the ilm ethos and seeking knowledge about one another, which is extremely close to my heart.

Ahmed’s book is a must-read not only for students of anthropology and sociology but also for the decision-makers, in Europe and beyond.

Journey into Europe: Islam, Immigration and Identity
By Akbar Ahmed
591 pages, hardcover
Brookings Institution Press (February 27, 2018)
ISBN: 978-0815727583

Jefferson, a deist himself, appears in the book uniquely positioned among the Founding Fathers, with his unyielding advocacy of equal rights for all beliefs, including Muslims, Jews, Catholics, and pagans, all of which were despised by the Protestant groups that dominated the young American society at the time. Spellberg traces the origins of his fervor for religious pluralism and his demand for tolerating Muslims and other beliefs to the liberal European thinkers like Locke. A detailed history of European debates on religious freedom and tolerance helps the reader to understand that the current tension in Europe about the rights and place of Muslims in the continent also has ties going back several centuries. We see that hostility against Islam, often based on an inaccurate and incomplete understanding of the religion of Islam and Islamic history, was very visible in the 17th and 18th centuries. It was an exception in those times to paint a relatively objective picture of Muslims and their beliefs. Interestingly, those figures who did that or advocated some form of tolerance for Muslims ended up being labeled as Muslims, which at that time in the Christian world meant being labeled an infidel. Jefferson got his share of this, too: he was called a Muslim or infidel when he advocated for the equality of all religions, including Islam.

Jefferson’s defense of religious freedom and equality is better understood when it is seen in the light of his own view of Islam and Islamic history. He was not different from his contemporaries in this aspect. His purchase of a translation of the Qur’an for his library shows his interest to learn more about the religion, partly caused by his involvement as the US Ambassador to Paris during negotiations with the North African tribes for American hostages. His brief study of Islam didn’t help eliminate his negative perception of Islam. It was an image continuously perpetuated by the surrounding climate of hostility against Islam which was, by and large, an imitation of European attitudes. Nevertheless, his opposition to any type of religious coercion in the hands of the government and his attachment to the ideal of national and religious equality was strong enough to include Muslims as acceptable and legitimate members of American society.

Spellberg finds no historical record showing that Jefferson or his contemporaries officially acknowledged the presence of Muslims in America at the time, even though there were many, at least among the slaves brought from Africa, and perhaps some among Jefferson’s own slaves. In a sense, the talk about religious pluralism in the early years of American government often referred to Muslims (often called Turks, due to the Ottomans) as imaginary members of the society, focusing on what would happen if they were there. For most Americans of Jefferson’s time, there was little or no difference between Muslims and pagans.

It is clear that the notion of religious freedom as championed by Jefferson and others in these conditions required a certain level of unwavering commitment to equality. These years produced a strong foundation upon which today’s Muslims in America, with other religious groups, came to enjoy their equal rights. Under constitutional protection, rights were granted without a demand from real Muslims – and people of all faiths, or no faith at all.

Overall, Spellberg’s book is an important read on the history of European and American perceptions of Islam and religious freedom. Its well crafted story of the process by which religious equality came to be a foundational element of the American ideal is of immense value to any student of American history.

There are seven chapters in the book. The first chapter summarizes the basic tenets of the classical narrative, then criticizes it listing many questions which the classical narrative cannot satisfactorily answer. Islamic civilization’s contribution to the development of modern science is so immense that it is impossible to completely ignore this part of the history in any serious discussion of the general history of science or civilization. The problem arises in assessing the importance and the nature of Islamic science. Generally accepted views of the classical narrative go something along these lines: Islamic civilization was a desert civilization and began to develop scientific thought only when it came in contact with more advanced civilizations (Persian, Indian and Greek and most importantly Greek). A vital component of the rise of science in Islamic civilization was the remarkable translation movement that took place during the early period of Abbasid times (750–900 CE), in which many important scientific books of other civilizations, particularly those of ancient Greeks, were translated into Arabic. The classical narrative says by learning Greek science through this translation activity, Islamic science reached its golden age while Greek science was neglected under Byzantine rule. Adherents of the classical narrative generally assume that Islamic civilization did not go much beyond translation, did not make original contributions to scientific knowledge or produced any new science of its own. They also assume this period of the golden age did not last long and came to an end with Ghazali’s “attack” on philosophers in his major work Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of Philosophers). They assume that Islamic science began to decline with Ghazali while there was an awaking in Europe, sometimes called the Renaissance of the twelfth century, when Europeans began to translate major Arabic philosophical and scientific texts into Latin. Some of these texts had already been translated from much earlier Greek and Sanskrit texts into Arabic. So, they reconnected with their Greco-Roman legacy. The classical narrative says from that point on Europe had no need for Islamic science, hence the role of Islamic civilization was to simply translate and preserve the ancient Greek science and make it available to Europeans later. Thus, according to this view all the roots of modern science were European. The classical theory also attempts to explain the process by which the acquisition of Greek science by the Muslim world occurred. There are a few versions of this proposal which are called “contact theory,” “pocket transmission theory,” and “translation through Syriac medium first.”

In this first chapter of the book, Saliba argues that the classical narrative is an oversimplification of what actually happened in reality and fails to answer many fundamental questions. The first problem is about origins. He argues none of the proposed methods of translation is convincing to explain the reasons why, how, and when Muslims acquired Greek science. In terms of the nature and quality of translations, Saliba gives examples of sophistication and maturity exhibited by the Muslim scientists that is well beyond what would be expected from an early generation of translators who are struggling to understand a foreign science. Moreover, already in the early period of the translation movement Muslim scientists produced original new science such as algebra by al-Khwarizmi (830 CE), remarkable advances by Habash a-Hasib (850 CE) in the field of trigonometry and mathematical projections that go far beyond what was known from Indian and Greek sources, and developed decimal fractions. He argues such advances could not happen suddenly. There must be a longer tradition of scientific activity in the Islamic world and real motivations for the rise of science which cannot be explained by the classical narrative.

Not only does the classical narrative fail to explain beginnings but also more recent developments as well. Saliba gives many examples from various scientific disciplines to show that the Islamic science did not decline after Ghazali. Astronomy is a perfect counterexample to this thesis of the classical narrative, and it is not the only one. In fact, there were so many advances in astronomy in the Islamic world after Ghazali that Saliba calls the post-Ghazali period as the golden age of Islamic astronomy. Recent research in the second half of the twentieth century shows that astronomy has particularly interesting connections to the European Renaissance. Saliba comments that post-Ghazali works by the Muslim scientists were not sufficiently considered by the adherents of the classical narrative because of their pre-supposition that no significant science of any interest could have been produced in this period. This caused unfortunate damage in terms of understanding the post-Ghazali period in the Islamic world as well as the European Renaissance itself.

In the second chapter, Saliba proposes an alternative thesis/narrative to the classical narrative in terms of the beginnings of the rise of scientific activities in the Islamic world. His thesis is based on the writings of Al-Nadim (full name Abu al-Faraj Muhammad b. Abi Ya’qub Ishaq al-Nadim) who wrote about intellectual history of the early Islamic period. Saliba also supports his thesis with well known historical facts. In summary, the alternative narrative proposes that there was already a significant amount of interest and activity in the nascent Islamic civilization before the translation movement began. Rather than learning science from others (Greeks) just because they came into contact with them, the Islamic world actively sought those sciences because of a keen interest to advance their own scientific knowledge. Unlike the classical narrative, the alternative thesis argues that Muslim scientists already had a high level of knowledge and maturity when the translation activities began. This is evidenced by the high quality of translations of highly technical materials, and corrections of errors in the original sources. The main societal factors for the rise of science in the new civilization are listed as a) the need for people (bureaucrats) with a high level of scientific knowledge in administrations, and b) competition between those people to acquire higher levels of scientific knowledge to be able to advance in the ranks of governments.

In the next chapter, Saliba gives detailed examples, mostly from astronomy, to show how critically Muslim scientists received and reacted to the Greek science. They noticed observational errors and internal inconsistencies in Greek texts. They also pointed out more philosophical and foundational errors and contradictions. Muslim scientists showed a high level of sophistication, maturity and critical spirit. They had a comprehensive look at the Greek texts they translated and studied them in relation to one another. Saliba argues that it is not possible to explain these phenomena with the classical narrative. Moreover, Muslim scholars went beyond just criticizing these errors and made many novel contributions to exact sciences. In the process, they realized the proper place of mathematics in the natural sciences. Saliba also comments that Muslim scientists continued to make original contributions to astronomy and other mathematical sciences long after Ghazali, when the classical narrative would preach the death of Islamic science.

In chapter four, Saliba gives examples of critical innovations by Muslim astronomers. He remarks that the interest of the Islamic society in astronomy was very strong due to many religious requirements that need to be answered by astronomy, such as visibility of the moon, daily prayer times, and qibla (direction of worship) etc. Such problems were not considered by Greeks before. Muslim astronomers could not ignore absurdities in Ptolemaic astronomy where mathematical models in Almagest violated the fundamental cosmological assumptions in Planetary Hypotheses. Although Ptolemy’s mathematical models usually made good predictions computationally, it was not satisfactory for the scientists in the new civilization to allow those models to violate the physical properties of the celestial bodies. They took it upon themselves to propose alternative mathematical models that satisfied both requirements. They were highly successful in that quest. The solution of this problem required some new mathematical theorems. Two of the most important of such theorems were Urdi’s Lemma and Tusi couple invented by Urdi and Nasir al-Din al-Tusi in the thirteenth century. Both of these were fecund and fundamental theorems that were used repeatedly by many astronomers who followed them for a long time. Renaissance astronomer Copernicus was among those who made use of these theorems. Also noted in this chapter is Shams al-Din al-Khafri’s understanding of the role of mathematics in describing the physical phenomena.

The title of chapter five is “Science between Philosophy and Religion: the Case of Astronomy,” wherein Saliba considers the relationship between the religion of Islam and scientific developments in astronomy. He explains that religious motivations led to the creation of new disciplines such as ilm al-hay’a (science of configuration) and advances in trigonometry. He states that astronomy and trigonometry are the best examples which demonstrate the intersecting interest between the practice of a religion and scientific thinking that need to be developed as a result of that practice. Many important scientists in medieval Islam were at the same time religious authorities. A few examples among such scholars are Ibn al-Nafis, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi and Ibn al-Shatir. Saliba also notes that the European paradigm of conflict between science and religion does not exist in the Islamic world.

“Islamic Science and Renaissance Europe: The Copernican Connections” is the title of chapter six. Researchers in the second half of twentieth century first realized that many of the astronomical models of Copernicus were identical to that of Ibn al-Shatir from three centuries earlier. This surprising discovery, which contradicted the view that Renaissance science was a European self-contained creation, opened the door for further investigations which revealed more surprising outcomes. The mathematical theorem called the Tusi couple that is mentioned above plays an important role in Copernicus’s model. Copernicus stated the theorem and proved it in 1543 without mentioning that he invented a new theorem or saw it in any other source. The theorem was first invented and proved by Tusi in the middle of the thirteenth century. By comparing the two proofs, W. Hartner noticed in 1973 that Copernicus’s proof was identical to Tusi’s. He even used the same letters for essential geometric points. That is where Tusi used the Arabic letters “alif,” “ba” etc. Copernicus used the corresponding Latin letters “A,” “B” etc. This discovery makes it pretty certain that Copernicus knew about Tusi’s work.

Saliba shows Copernicus’s case is not an isolated instance and gives more evidence in this chapter of the phenomenon that “there are much too many coincidences of ideas appearing first in Arabic texts usually written between the 12th and 15th centuries, which reappear, without much explanation, in Latin sources of the 16th and 17th centuries.” Saliba’s explanation of this phenomenon is that by the Renaissance time men of science themselves learned Arabic and no longer needed translations. There are many examples that show European reliance on Arabic sciences in the post-Copernicus period when the whole worldview was supposed to have been changed by him. Renaissance men of science had a high regard for the Islamic sciences and were looking to the Islamic world for the latest in scientific activities rather than the classical Greek sources.

In the last chapter Saliba discusses the age of decline in Islamic science. He starts by rejecting the two main reasons proposed by the advocates of the classical narrative and argues that it did not start after Ghazali (eleventh century) or the destruction of Baghdad by Mongols in 1258. Saliba says that those who believe the first reason look at the Islamic civilization as a source of religious thought only and operate under the assumption that the European paradigm of conflict between religion and science applies to Islamic world as well. Saliba argues that this assumption is not true for the Islamic world and that scientific activities did not decline after Ghazali. Those who think the main reason was the destruction of Baghdad by Mongols saw the Islamic civilization mostly in political terms and paid little attention to its intellectual history. Saliba gives many examples of high quality and sophisticated scientific production in the Islamic world, mostly in astronomy but in other areas as well, well after both of these events. He says those examples were ignored or not properly read by the adherents of the classical view who did not expect to find any important scientific production in the Islamic world after the thirteenth century.

There still remains the problem and timing of decline of science in the Islamic world. When did it happen? Saliba notes that decline is a relative concept. What actually happened was the European science advanced more rapidly than the rest of the world after the sixteenth century. Hence it looked like science declined elsewhere, including the Islamic world. According to Saliba the main reason for these rapid developments in science in Europe was related to the discovery of the “new world.” He argues that the wealth and resources obtained by Europeans as a result of discovery of new lands helped them fund scientific activities. Europe witnessed the rise of royal and scientific academies where most educated men of the time were assembled and engaged in scientific research without having to worry about financial needs. Healthy competition among these institutions led to new scientific discoveries. Western superiority in science continues to this day and the constant brain drain that feeds the West at the expense of the developing and third worlds does not help to change the balance.

In summary, this book presents fundamental challenges to many of the commonly held views about the intellectual and scientific history of the Islamic world and proposes alternative explanations. The science of astronomy is used as a template to test and justify these claims. The author invites researchers to subject his proposals to the test of historical data in other disciplines as well. This book is highly recommended to all interested in the general history of science, and that of the Islamic world and the Renaissance period in particular.

Nuh Aydin is an associate professor of Mathematics at Kenyon College, Ohio, USA.

Jacques Derrida¹

For over two thousand years despotism has been used by the West as a concept for slandering systems that differ from it. What this means is that the term itself is European. It was used against the French king as a means of opposition. It was also used by Montesquieu and Engels as a strategy of accusation against Oriental regimes. Karl Wittfogel attempted to adopt it for the case of Soviet Russia, but he did not succeed, because the term has been indexed to the East since the time of ancient Greece. The East for the Greeks was Persia, then, it became Seljuk-Ottoman Empire and the Mongols for a while.

“Enlightened despotism” was used in positive terms for Frederic the Great and Catherine II; however, even this positive attempt did not conceal this myth or alleviate the burden of this prejudice. To sum up, the term despotism has cast a silhouette over the Eurasian map since the time of Aristotle’s Politics. What is more, the notions developed in the West still dominate today, even in the mindset of some “intellectuals” in the East.

There have been many books written on this subject. Edward Said struggled greatly at the beginning with his Orientalism, published in 1978, and in subsequent studies. There has been much research conducted on the problems and contradictions of Eurocentrism. In 1748 Montesquieu presents us with a discussion of despotism in his The Spirit of Laws. However, his outmoded theory was found to be ridiculous by Voltaire at the time and by Anquetil-Duperron thirty years later in 1778.

In fact, the aim of the “Eastern Orientalists” is clear: they are trying to find an explanation for the lack of development in the East. Montesquieu-who invented the term despotism while criticizing the French king-would be pleased if he could hear the repercussions of his theory still haunting Eastern history after 250 years. The philosophers of the Enlightenment were very clever men, they used special terms for special aims, and the myth of “Oriental despotism” is one of the terms used for multiple aims.

The French thinker Louis Althusser analyzes and criticizes Montesquieu in his book Politics and History.2 Althusser first of all tries to “understand” the thinker he is examining. He evaluates works by Montesquieu in general terms and he divides the thoughts into themes. Despotism is one of these themes.

Althusser thinks that Montesquieu’s main aim was not to defend a republic or a democracy against despotism, but rather to support monarchy and make it something that the King would opt for. Therefore, he continually tries to frighten the King with the specter of despotism, a degenerated form of monarchy. He wanted to show the King that if you abuse the monarchy you will become a despot, like that of the Turkish and Chinese states. His warning was, “Be careful not to abuse the monarchy!”

Montesquieu was not an innocent philosopher merely giving advice to his ruler. Philosophers are at least as far removed from innocence as politicians are. However, Althusser does not see things so simple. He thinks that Montesquieu uttered these “great ideas” in order to consolidate the importance of the feudal lords, of whom he was one, in the eyes of the King.

According to Althusser, Montesquieu was trying to bring back the interests of his class that would be lost by centralizing the monarchy.3 Montesquieu was in the camp of the feudal rightist party and he was constantly criticizing Louis XIV-a monarch who represents French monarchy at its peak; he was advising him not to be a despot. If the French king became drawn into the sphere of despotism, then the privileges and rights of the upper classes would be abolished, and they would have to hand over not only their power, but also their wealth to the control of the central authority. Montesquieu lists all the problems inherent in despotism; Louis XIV would continue to distribute offices that had formerly belonged to the aristocrats-a practice started by Cardinal Richelieu-to the newly emerging bourgeoisie, and the logical consequence of this is that Louis XIV would come close to establishing a tyranny.4

Here is what Montesquieu said clearly: Despotism is a regime of fear. There is only one ruler. There are no intermediaries between the King and the people. The despot who rules arbitrarily does stand much of a chance if the people, living like a herd of animals, were to rebel against him en masse. Despotism can not oppose rebellions because the King will be the only target of a huge upsurge, and therefore the life of the king and the continuity of the regime can easily be threatened. However, if there are intermediary classes-of which Montesquieu was a member-who stand between the king and the people, they would be the target of the masses. The king would be free from blame and he would not be a direct target. Finally, Montesquieu concludes: “O Kings! Distance yourself from despotism if you want to protect your reign from the violence of the people.”5

Montesquieu denigrates despotism, particularly in his Letters from Persia, by giving examples from the administration of the Ottoman sultan and the Iranian shah (the Ottomans and the Safavids became the devils in this despotism context and were the parties accused of despotism).6 Yet, as Althusser cleverly recognized, Montesquieu’s problem was not with the Ottoman Empire or Iran. They were just distorted mirrors, fake images, or boogeyman chosen to serve the aim of the feudal rightist opposition that was trying to stand against the king. In short, Althusser wanted the Turks and the Ottomans to be left alone and he was calling for European thought to confess their faults.

Concepts should be perceived as an umbrella rather than as a shopping bag into which we can cram everything. If we use them in the latter fashion then, as implied by Braudel, they tell us nothing, while trying to tell everything. Likewise, Karl Popper-a philosopher of science-was right when he said if we do not limit a concept, a theory, or a scheme and if we try to use it to explain everything, then it is difficult to call it scientific. This is also true for the concept of despotism. If this term is used in an unrestricted sense and is universalized, there will be a superficiality that eliminates all minor differences within the concept. This leads to an evaporation of the deep meanings that are hidden in the nuances, an atrophy of complex thinking and an establishment of thinking based on limits and ease. Because of this we need to talk about multiple despotisms rather than unique despotism.

In The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought, 7 there are four meanings for the term despotism:

1. In political terms, despotism emerged for the first time in the war between the Persians and Greeks in 5th century B.C. However, the term was formulated by Aristotle. According to him, despotism was an administration confined to Asian barbaric people. Therefore, the first conceptual iron door between Asia and Europe was constructed by Aristotle, who is known as “the first teacher” in Islamic philosophy. According to him, Asian peoples are natural born slaves and are accustomed to living under the authority of a single leader. He thought that their power was derived from despotism. However, since Greek (Europeans) people were superior to Asians in terms of rational capability and spirit, they should be the rulers. Thus, despotism was commonly used in a pejorative sense.

2. In the 16th century, the colonial powers that went to discover new lands to plunder frequently remembered Aristotle’s legitimizing despotism concept. The slave trade was inspired by this ancient obsession with despotism. The people who divided the world into two camps, the free and the barbaric, like Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes, and Grotius, believed that the soldiers of European republics were more virtuous than those of the barbarians. According to this belief, it was therefore acceptable for the virtuous to convert the slavish barbarians into slaves.

3. In the 17th and 18th centuries two opposing groups in France, the French aristocrats and the Huguenots (French Protestants, some of who took refugee in the Ottoman Empire after the Edict of Nantes) used the term despotism as a tool of criticism for a European state. Therefore, the content of the term despotism expanded to European rulers who were ruling over free people. In conclusion, the term became two-sided; one for “Western despotism” and the other for “Eastern.” The despotism concept of Montesquieu emerged in the context of this century.

4. There is one other thesis which originated from the Swedish-born French liberal Benjamin Constant and was developed by Tocqueville. This thesis argues that the term of despotism had lost its ancient and original meaning after the French Revolution. These discussions allowed despotism to enter European politics and led to many interesting discussions, like “democratic despotism” or “the tyranny of the majority.”

After all these definitions those of Hegel, Marx, Weber, J. Stuart Mill, and Wittfogel follow; these are not very different in the main line of thought, also seeing despotism as something reserved for the East. They use terms “petrification, “resistance to change” and “static” as symbols of despotism and see it as the reason why eastern societies did not create democratic tendencies and a civil society.

Edward Said in his Orientalism has already shown that the concept of “the East” is a fiction. To put it more correctly, it is an image constructed by the European imperial subject in his mind and then imposed on the world. Therefore, there is no fixed “reality” of the East; rather there is only the ideologically distorted image of the “East” constructed over the ages in the Western imagination. Yet, our mission seems more difficult, as Said does not present us with any clue that can differentiate the “factual” and “fictional” faces of the East. He only diagnoses the existence of the fiction and analyzes the roles of the most important actors (Orientalists) in creating such a fiction. This critical tradition of Orientalism developed greatly after the pioneering role of Edward Said. According to his perception, the East has been singly constructed in the West. Arif Dirlik in his The Postcolonial Aura elegantly criticizes Said”s thought and says that Said is obsessed with external Orientalists; however, Dirlik puts it that Said seems to be unable to recognize the internal Orientalists among easterners.

According to Dirlik, Edward Said takes Orientalism as something that has finished; however Dirlik suggests that it is a continuing process. Thus, he advises that we closely examine local compradors. He asks the question that if there were not collaborationists in the “Orient” would it be so easy for a perspective like Orientalism to settle there? Finally, departing from the Chinese example, he tries to display how Asian intellectuals supported and adopted the Orientalist discourse at its birth and throughout its evolution, and how they worked hard in order to make their societies adopt this perspective.8 This striking thought of Arif Dirlik may facilitate our task, as it is very interesting to note how eastern intellectuals adopted a pejorative and humiliating term like eastern despotism for defining their own histories without questioning and criticizing it, how they were able to take on the habit of seeing their societies through the eyes of a Western subject and in the name of liberation and modernization. According to this approach, the commoditization of Chinese culture and its presentation as a static and petrified entity and marketing it like a commodity to Western people are one side of the Orientalization of the Orient itself.

The other side is glorifying the superior Western race, its land and its culture after humiliating the Orient. Furthermore, the East believes that if it possesses superior properties to that of the West it will be also superior and have a free-minded society. To sum up, much as Hegel strived to achieve, Easterners have put themselves onto this scale of frozen, static and unchanging societies because that is what the West thinks of them. So we have to admire the success of the Orientalist project. Lucette Valensi, in his encompassing and striking study, The Birth of the Despot: Venice and the Sublime Porte, draws conclusions from reports of Venetian ambassadors and arrives at how the concept of the “despot” was constructed in Europe. He says that the Ottoman sultan had not been called a despot and the Ottoman order had not been conceptualized as despotism before. On the contrary, the power, brilliance, and progressiveness of the Ottoman administration were often discussed.

However, beginning with the 17th century, the discourses of the Venetian ambassadors started to change. It was strange, according to Valensi, how the “grand Turc” was transformed into a “despot” in the 17th century. He rightfully asks why the Venetian ambassadors had glorified the Ottoman sultan until the 16th century and then humiliated him in the 17th century. It is clear that there was a change in the Venetian perspective of the Ottomans during this century. As Valensi himself elegantly points out: In the end, the ambassadors and then Montesquieu dressed an ancient Greek concept in a Turkish robe. To say it more correctly, that time is not very distant from us. The fantasy of pure power follows us and transforms its vision continuously.9 According to Valensi, Oriental despotism is just an image reflected onto non-western societies by the West in order to satisfy its fantasy of power. Yet, this image reflects the passion of power in the West; a passion that desires to be as powerful as the Ottomans. Voltaire declares the concept of despotism as presented by his contemporary Montesquieu as ridiculous; he defends that a mass of people ruled by a regime led by a single leader cannot survive; even though it might be possible for it to remain standing, it will not be for long. There was no despotic rule according to Voltaire because it could not exist. It is nothing less than a lie to talk about the existence of such a regime.

As I mentioned above, the concept of despotism, which Voltaire found absurd and fictive, has been used with the aim of concealing rather than describing, complicating rather than explaining. However, we should direct our energy and attention to understanding the facts rather than thinking within limits and fantasies. Then, our attempt to find the realities will remind us that our past is not “a foreign country,” it will give us sound clues about our present and past. Likewise, Voltaire, addressing Montesquieu, explained the Ottoman reality to those who thought like Montesquieu. Voltaire underlined that not only were the Turks free, but they also did not discriminate according to class. Their only criterion of privilege was merit. The facts Voltaire provides about the Ottomans are in complete contrast with the fiction. In conclusion, when carefully examined, myths like “Oriental despotism” do not amount to anything more than European fantasies about the East. Seeing despotism as an oriental concept is no more realistic than the Western misconception of the harem, where the sultan is depicted with hundreds of women. As long as we adopt orientalist presumptions without thoroughly questioning them, we will be unable to tell where the fictional ends and where the factual starts.

Notes

1. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, The John Hopkins University Press, 1976, p.80
2. Louis Althusser, Politika ve Tarih: Montesquieu-Rousseau, (Politics and History: Montesquieu-Rousseau) Ankara: Verso, 1987. Translated by Alaattin Azenel and Ömür Sezgin.
3. For this transitional period, the seigneurs or landlords were delivering their rights to central government, that is, the central state was becoming a universal seigneurate, see W. H. Lewis, The Splendid Century: Life in the France of Louis XIV, Anchor Books, 1957, pp. 73-79.
4. Stephan J. Lee, Aspects of European History, 1494-1789, Routledge, 1986, p. 167.
5. Micheal Curtis, “The Oriental Despotic Universe of Montesquieu&”, Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies, n. 3, 1994, pp. 1-33.
6. Montesquieu, Ãran Mektuplari (Letters from Persia), Anka, Istanbul, 2001, p. 88-89. Translated by Muhiddin Gaklu.
7. David Miller (ed), The Blackwell Encylopedia of Political Thought, Blackwell, 1998.
8. Arif Dirlik, Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism, Westview Press, 1998
9. Lucette Valensi, The Birth of the Despot: Venice and the Sublime Porte (Despotun Dogusu: Venedik ve Bab-i Âli), tr. A. Turgut Arnas, Baslam, Istanbul: 1994.

There may be some credit to the idea that it is not proper to compare the immigrants in France to those in Germany, due to the historical and cultural differences in their social structures. However, the typical characteristics of ghettos and the similar approaches of the governments to the immigrants imply that such unpleasant events can always take place. First of all, the immigrants who are pushed into ghettos and usually cannot be assimilated are in an isolated position from the main society in terms of language, culture, and education fields. There are clear examples of this in Germany; the large numbers of immigrants living in certain regions bring along serious language and education problems. Many young people start life without a good educational degree, without career opportunities, and after having had negative experiences in school life. Such young people are mostly idle, have achieved nothing close to a satisfactory educational level, and, not caring about human values, they tend to solve their problems through violence as well as being open to manipulation. We face potential danger as long as this situation remains the same. Riots like in Paris might happen in other countries as well. Developing early solutions and maintaining social peace before such unpleasant events happen is in no doubt a better alternative than having to send riot police to the suburbs. Politicians and local administrations should adapt more sensitive approaches to the immigrants, or rather the minorities, who live in the ghettos and similar locations that have such potential.

Germans, for instance, should first of all give up trying to blame the problems on ethnic and religious reasons and form the main frame of a fresh vision of living together. Actually the German constitution does have the relevant essentials for such an approach. However, in spite of the first article of the German Constitution “The dignity of man is inviolable,” Germans in administrative positions often fail to fulfill this principle. Anybody who observes German society in this respect can witness how the dignity of the immigrants is violated, how they are looked down upon, and psychologically isolated at schools, factories, and other workplaces. Beyond violating the individuals’ dignity, insulting words or behavior sometimes even amounts to insulting an entire nation. What is more, unfortunately sometimes even some statesmen present such behavior prompted by the media.

As a matter of fact, the ghettos and similar locations in Germany were not consciously formed by the minorities. The immigrants who came to the country as workers about forty years ago started living around their workplaces in the beginning. Therefore, the number of foreigners at the schools in these neighborhoods started to increase more and more. So the formation of the ghettos started with the dwellings centered around workplaces and then it affected the educational institutions. On the other hand, the fact that in most German cities landlords refused to let out their apartments to immigrants had and still has a role in the formation of the ghettos.

Despite this fact, a minister in one of the parties in Germany made an interesting comment, particularly for the Turks, saying “Turks consider themselves to be superior to Germans, so they prefer to live in ghettos instead of integrating into German society.” On hearing such opinions, one cannot help but remember the old Nazi view of the Jews.

One of the reasons for such attitudes is that some politicians try to gain credit by adopting such policies in order to attract nationalist votes. Surely, these policies do not benefit society and history proves that those who trigger social chaos become the first ones to pay the price. When the hostile and provocative manners of politicians cause unrest, it is the media that should assume the responsibility for maintaining the peace.

Unfortunately, let alone playing a positive role, a significant part of the German media just fans the flames. Almost everyday they exaggerate marginal events and German society is misinformed about Muslims. The result is a biased society that is afraid of all Muslims. Thus, the media is in fact preparing grounds for similar social troubles that happened in France; for ignorance and fanaticism trigger the same kind of reaction on the opposite side.

Even after the provocative events of publishing a caricature that insults the Messenger of God and thereby all the Muslims in the world, most Muslims protested the event within a democratic framework. In spite of this, some European media organs used the freedom of press as an excuse to violate the sacred values of Muslims and they also tried to reflect all Muslims as pro-violence by showing some street demonstrations and violent events, as if millions of Muslims had approved of using violence. The fact that European Muslims protested the provocation within their democratic rights has been overlooked and unfortunately Islamophobia still continues to grow.

The following is a concrete example of the insistent negative attitude of the German media against Muslims. At a news program on the ZDF Channel, the reporter asks questions about the events in the Paris suburbs to Daniel Cohn-Bendikt, the French senator of the Greens in the European Parliament. The program was an evident proof of the terrible need for a radical change in the German mentality about Islam and Muslims. Two points were emphasized by the reporter: the role of religion and the young people’s refusal to integrate! The senator just laughed and his answer revealed how superficial the reporter’s comments were: “the events in the suburbs are in no way related to religion. Some of the people who have been left to their own fate and discriminated against for decades might have turned to religion, but the rebellion doesn’t have a religious motive. Look at the education given in the ghettos. Lots of young people want to benefit from education opportunities, they want to be integrated. But they see how they are discriminated when you look at the terrible condition of their schools.”

The integration policies in Germany, Britain, Holland, and France have all failed. But why? Because the cultural identity of people has been ignored; policies that require them to abandon their religious and national identities and become assimilated into the culture of the country in which they live are being imposed. Today, European countries need to both revise their integration policies to date as well as developing a new “vision of living together” that is beyond integration. The events in Holland at the end of 2004 and the events in Paris in 2005, along with the latest one, the impertinent caricature, give food for thought to state authorities and should allow them to draw important conclusions. The initial precautions to be taken can be to seek ways to enhance educational opportunities in the suburbs and urge the media to give up horror scenarios, rather preparing sensible and informative news to contribute to peace in society.

On the other hand, integration-oriented problems in Europe are generally more common with Muslim immigrants. It is known that in some countries the integration policies towards Christian immigrants have succeeded. The Spanish and Italians in France and the Poles in Germany can be given as examples. The same integration policies didn’t work for Muslims in countries like France, Germany, and Holland. For this reason, terms like “integration” do not make much sense for Muslim immigrants now. After a few decades of integration policies, most Muslims still don’t know with what they are to integrate. No one denies that they should abide by German laws, conform to the social rules, and learn the German language. When the German minister, Prof. Maria Bohmer, said that the immigrants should speak German, learn about German history, recognize the social values, and abide by the legal system of the country this was, of course, approved by all sides.

At this point, both sides need to present a positive approach to reach a healthy solution. On the one hand we have many Muslims who are maintaining their identity and who are citizens that are respected by their German friends. On the other hand, some extremists in the German community just adhere to their bias against foreigners, no matter how they behave. Nevertheless, one shouldn’t jump to conclusions and make an overgeneralization about all Germans.

Sooner or later, good efforts will be shown the respect they deserve. When both sides come together with honesty and good intentions at dialogue activities, we witness that the new “vision of living together” is not a dream, but a reality that is at hand. One should keep in mind that feelings of love, kindness, and the relevant positive responses are inherent in human nature. All of us have the conscience mechanisms to appreciate these feelings. What falls to us is to turn the inherent feelings in human nature in the positive direction, which is already in compliance with what the religions teach.

Montaigne says that the main motivation for writing his famous Essays was to end his great solitude. Why was he lonely? Why did he feel alone and prefer conversing with his readers in an attempt to reduce his isolation? The answer to this question again can be found in his writings. He came from a wilder region of France, from behind the Alps that divided Western Europe. Thus, he was protected from the ills that the Italian Renaissance had imposed on European mentalities. What made him feel lonely was the meeting of his country with these new ideas and sects, the murder of thousands of people in the war of Saint Bartholomew (1572) on religious pretexts, and the arrival of this “European” attitude to his hometown²

This isolation preserved Montaigne from the mental crisis that his contemporaries were experiencing. He looks at both the past and the present and future within the possibilities that exist in the “thought from the wilderness.” It is for this reason that he has no prejudices. He is a free man of the world. This fact is demonstrated in his attitude toward the Orient and in particular to the Ottomans, whose images had been so distorted because of established prejudices.

Islam in European Culture

The thesis that supports the idea that there were vital differences between European and Ottoman societies and cultures and the politics of positioning them as opposites who were not willing to come to an agreement should give way to the thesis that there are more complicated and closer relationships between them. A deeper investigation will even allow us to trace signs of a “modern” mentality in the Ottoman culture that reaches all the way back to the beginning of the sixteenth century³ The Ottomans were interested in European affairs. Many historical readings bring us to a point that the survival of Protestantism owes itself to Ottoman support. It is not too difficult to find other examples.

It is known that Postel and Jean Bodin admired the Ottoman state and its administration in the sixteenth century and they were desirous to transmit these thoughts to their political theory. Likewise, Alan Grossrichard had already demonstrated that the image of the East, which was the “tour de force” of Montesquieu in his Persian Letters, was the representative of a popular ghost-that of despotism-in Europe during the seventeenth century. There are many researchers, from Bryan S. Turner to John M. Hobson, who have stated that both the negative side of European thought, like Hegel, Engels, and Marx, and the positive side, like Max Weber, shared the viewpoint of Orientalism that was against the East and Islam, particularly against the Ottomans. Even now it is questioned whether there is implicit Orientalism in the writings of European travelers-including Lady Montague, who was a most objective person. This list can be easily extended: despite his play Mahomet, which took a very negative view of the East, Voltaire was an admirer of the morality and discipline of the Muslims and the Ottomans. Lord Byron was a lover of Ottoman and Istanbul civilization, despite his political animosity that derived from his love of Hellenism. The “poet of the lakes,” Lamertine was awarded with a farm house by Sultan Abdulmecid, as a sign of appreciation for his book A History of the Turks. The father of Jean Jacque Rousseau was a repairer of clocks in Topkapi Palace in Istanbul. Goethe learned to read the Qur’an and pray from the Bashkird Turks, who were among the Russians who invaded Germany. Campanella said in his La Citta del Sole (The City of the Sun) that the utopia he had fictionalized had been realized in this world by the Ottomans. The writer of Don Quixote, Cervantes, lost one of his arms in the war of Lepanto, which he fought against the Ottomans; he wrote his novels during his imprisonment after this war inspired by Algerian scholars. The philosopher Leibniz presented a treatise of conquest to the French King in which he discussed how to destroy the Ottomans.

Montaigne

We have to add a new name to this list: Michel de Montaigne. In spite of having a few prejudices, Montaigne was one of the few modern writers who did not let prejudices dominate his view. In the first sentence of his Essays he promised that this book was going to be an honest one. Indeed, he continuously revised and edited his books before each new edition was published, including his essays on the Ottomans. He questioned his thoughts with reference to new sources he read and added new essays⁴

In the revised and extended 1595 edition of his book, which was published after his death, he advised French soldiers, whose laxity he had observed during the civil war in Perigord, to take Turkish soldiers for their model. He said that all young French soldiers should learn discipline from the Turkish armies:

Their discipline is very different from and superior to ours. At times of war, our soldiers are more irresponsible and disorderly than at times of peace; on the other hand, Turkish soldiers are moderate and reluctant to behave so, because stealing from the poor is punished with a few lashes in peace time, but very severely at war. Taking away an egg by force without paying money for it is punished with 50 lashes. Moreover, those who steal the most insignificant thing that does not even satisfy hunger nor have any value whatsoever are sentenced to death. I am surprised to read about Selim that when he conquered Damascus on his campaign to Egypt none of his soldiers took anything from the peerless gardens of this city, even though they were unprotected⁵

Montaigne, then, was not aware of “Eastern despotism,” a thesis that had been influential since the seventeenth century. Distanced from the influence of this thesis, he mentions how the philanthropic activities of the Turks extended to include fauna and flora, stating that the Turks had charities and hospitals even for animals.

Montaigne was influenced by the unfavorable winds that blew against the Ottomans through France, but he desired to use the Ottomans against his own despots as a mirror. In other words, he used a method that was similar to that of most other French intellectuals, like Montesquieu, after him.

He was aware of the power of habits and how they can capture people and he emphasized how wrong it was to label everything that is opposed to local habit as barbarism. To quote Dr Zeynep Sayin of Istanbul University:

The universal certainty that Descartes tried to find seems impossible for Montaigne because he is not in favor of certainty that is independent from conditions. On the contrary he analyses humans and societies in their differences. “I am not mislead to think that everybody should be like me…It seems reasonable to me to think that there are thousands of different lives.”⁶

Finally, Montaigne was aware of the fact that judgments do not carry the claim of universality; they are limited to the conditions in which they emerge. He was not bounded by Eurocentrism and was aware that there are different worlds and different life-styles. He did not try to regulate world according to himself, but rather realized that it is essential to recognize differences. It is probably because of this attitude that Montaigne stands in an exceptional place in Western thinking and why he does not find a place in books of “history of Western philosophy.”

Montaigne and the Ottomans

It is thanks to the magnificent study of Clarence Dana Rouillard⁷ that we learn that in the great world of Montaigne the Orient was identical with the “Turk,” i.e. the Ottomans. We are able to see that the Ottoman grew like a flower in Montaigne’s works and that he revised his thoughts and prejudices with new contributions and information with every new edition.

According to Rouillard, Montaigne-like P. Villey who prepared Essays for publication-believed in the necessity of knowing something well before judging it. More importantly, the Orient he identified with the Ottomans played a significant role in terms of widening his vision as it broadened the horizons of his era. According to Rouillard, Montaigne owes the wide vision and pluralism in his essays to the Ottomans to a great extent.

Rouillard, who surprised us with this striking information, firstly analyses Montaigne’s acquaintance with the Ottomans. According to him it is very interesting to observe the development of Montaigne’s knowledge about the Ottomans. Prior to the first publication of Essays in 1580, the only information that we get about Montaigne’s readings is that he got his information on Turks from the Italian history of Guichardin, not from the classics or chronicle writers and historians like Joinville or Froissart. The only reference to the Turks in the 1580 edition was that they partook of food by reclining on comfortable sofas and their belief that Paradise was a sensual abode. However, Montaigne’s curiosity was not confined to the borders of Western Europe and was open to all human activities experienced in modern history.

It seems that Paul Villey, a Montaigne specialist, did not study the 1582 edition of Essays attentively enough. Though rare and insignificantly small, there are some new additions to this edition. We are able to conclude from some points in this new edition that Montaigne read a new study that had been written directly about the Ottomans. Thus we got a clue that Montaigne’s interest about the Ottomans had increased.

As a matter of fact, the number of these clues increases in following editions. For the first time Montaigne encounters direct material concerning the Ottoman world in a Polish history book that he studied and used in the third edition. In this book was an engraving that displayed the celebration held on the occasion of the circumcision of Murad III’s sons. This engraving made Montaigne to think of the Ottoman world, their costumes, and context in a different way. In the last edition to be prepared before Montaigne passed away, his interest in foreign places was at its peak. In this last edition, Montaigne found, read, and analyzed books in Latin that had been written, directly or indirectly about Ottoman history, including the book of Halkokondil on the foundation and rise of the Ottomans and Postel’s De la Republique des Turcs. (He knew Postel-one of the significant intellectual of his time-personally.) There were nearly 50 references to the Ottomans in the last edition of Essays.

“The Turk the warrior!”

It seems clear that Montaigne did not believe in theological explanations concerning the defeat or victory of the Christians against Muslims. For example, he commented very dryly-which is not what one would expect from a European-on the war of Lepanto in 1571 in which the Christians won and which was followed by days of festivities:

A maritime war was won against Turks in the preceding months under the commandership of Don Juan d’Austria; but God was pleased when we saw the reverse many times in the past.

Montaigne desired that his fellow countrymen not put so much importance on this victory because the Turkish army was still standing. He recognized explicitly that the Turks had developed a considerable military force that could only be explained on the basis of material and human power. He related the Turkish ability to establish such a great army to their discipline. According to him, the Turks knew how to use their minds as much as they knew how to fight and this is what made them different from an army of barbarians.

Montaigne thought the acts of the Turks were not restrained merely because of the heavy punishments that were imposed. They were also accustomed to rigid physical discipline and sobriety. This quality made them superior to Western soldiers. He expressed his thoughts as follows:

In order to verify to what extent Turkish armies are more intelligent and behave more reasonably than ours it is enough to say that besides their other virtues they drink only water and eat rice and salty meat. Thus, each of them can carry one month’s provisions with them.

Montaigne explained another influential factor in the success of the Turks which was the Sultan being in command of their armies. Selim I thought that victories that had been won without the sultans leading the armies were not complete and thought it was shameful to be proud of such a victory. However, Montaigne did not treat all sultans identically; he did not have a holistic perspective. He was well aware of the fact that all sultans had different tendencies. According to him, surprisingly, Beyaz›d II and his contemporary Murad III’s excessive fondness for natural sciences (s’amusants aus sciences) caused harm to their countries; they not only failed to lead their country, but also caused harm.

Montaigne was closely interested in the opinion that espoused that warriors should abstain from the fine arts. He returns to this subject again in his essay “On Pedantry” in which did not only criticize the mistakes and uselessness of a few scientists, but also went further to argue that all kinds of education are useless, if not fatal, especially if education goes beyond the scope of a very few aristocratic minds to reach the general public:

Examples show us that learning the sciences does not make hearts rigid or inclined to fight, but rather more effeminate. The most powerful state nowadays seems to be that of the Turks, and they value weapons and humiliate the arts and sciences.

Montaigne can be excused for this mistaken final sentence, as he was then too distant from the time when samples of Ottoman-Divan literature were to be made available to the European public.

While his contemporaries were calling this so-called aspect of the Turks barbarism-we will not discuss whether this argument was valid or not-Montaigne looked at the issue from a very different perspective, which he claimed was essential for a people to survive. This is an example of Montaigne’s contradictory opinions.

In his essay “On Virtue” Montaigne wrote about the story of a young Turk who dared to challenge the Hungarian King Hunyadi Janos at war, despite lacking experience. This youth, when questioned by Sultan Murad, answered that he learned to be courageous from a rabbit. Fate protected the rabbit from 40 arrows he had shot and allowed it to escape the hunting dogs. The young man believed that the arrow and sword could only function if this was written in fate, and thus fought fearlessly in wars from that day on. A belief in fate was widespread among the Turks. Turkish historians wrote that soldiers felt secure against danger because they believed that the days which they would live were immutable and had already been established.

What Montaigne did was not to accumulate systematic information on a certain topic, but rather he involved in mental exercises. He lists these as the basis of the Turk’s successes in the sixteenth century.

Moral aspects of the Ottomans and Islam

Montaigne preserved his objective standing toward the Ottomans at different times. Although he was critical of many aspects of Turkish society and character, he still did not adhere to extreme definitions or popular descriptions, like the “Barbarous Turk,” or the “Lover Turk.” He even tried to alter the image of the cruel Turk in his other essays. He emphasized, for instance, that the Turks had established charities and hospitals for animals.

The only reference to Islam in the first edition of the book is concerned with worldly heaven. Montaigne was an intellectual whose eyes had not been blinded by religious prejudices and he did not refrain from calling some of their religious bigotry “stupidities.” Even when he wrote about the superstitions of the Turks he did not explain the issue in defense of Christianity, but saw such things as errors that could be found on both sides. Thus he was able to preserve the balance that he wanted to establish in his book.

Montaigne was a devout Catholic. He not only dealt with Islam, but also Calvinism and Protestantism, which came to his country from behind the Alps and he criticized the translation of the Bible into local languages, praising the Turks for their respect of the original language of their sacred revealed text. In the end, in one of the best examples of tolerance in Essays, he reminds his countrymen that the Ottomans outstripped them in terms of some Christian values.

Do you want to see it with your own eyes? Compare our traditions and customs with those of a pagan or a Muslim. [You will see that ours is beneath theirs] Although his doctrine is superior, a Christian has to accept the fact that a Muslim we underestimate can teach him many things in terms of justice, affection, and virtues.

The references to Turks increase in later editions of Essays. An interesting letter sent to Mehmed the Conqueror by Pope Pius II and the response sultan gave him is contained in one of them. Another example is Bayezid I’s and Timur’s rejection of mutual gifts. As an example Montaigne shows the pride of Turks in the leader of the Janissaries Hasan Agha, who preferred to die after he had been severely reproved by Sultan Mehmed.

The virtue of the “eye of the wilderness”

What are the results that we may extract from Essays?

First of all, Montaigne was not looking at the problems within a fixed framework. He examined the Turks, arriving at rich observations and interpretations. He was basically interested in human nature, not religious doctrines. Was he not a believer then? Since it is impossible to call anyone who fought for the Catholic cause an unbeliever, we should rather say that Montaigne did not look at Islam and the Ottomans from the perspective of the prejudices of popular theology and religion. Though there are some fictive and incorrect statements in his essays, his perspective about the Turks and Ottomans is not derived from a single source. He was not bound with a systematic connection to a doctrine and he did not have an idae fixes. He came with a new perspective and a new interpretation every time. He learned long before Nietzsche not to look at information as natural facts. According to him there are only interpretations and the interpretations of these. He approached his subject knowing that most of the information he took in his book concerning Islam was not facts, but rather interpretations.

This is the privileged standing that differentiates Montaigne from others. Maybe this was the point that made him so alone-he had no one except his friend La Boetie. We owe Montaigne’s Essays to this solitude. Though he thought that his loneliness derived from his melancholic psychology, his seclusion could have been caused by his differences in his mode of thought and perception. He refrained from lies, i.e., the knowledge of his contemporaries, which he said were interpretations of interpretations, he focused on the knowledge of objects and directed his attention to the truth. He said that “we are making interpretations of the interpretations of objects.” He transmitted the information written in the books on the Ottomans, their histories, cultures, and moral qualities, but he did not adopt them, calling them rather “our stupidities.” He tried to pass beyond this wall of information that he felt had been built around him and to hear the voices of objects. This should be one of the virtues of the eye from the wilderness that he possessed.

Notes

1. Tugrul Inal, “Denemelere bir giris denemesi” (An Introductory Effort to Essays), Frankafoni, n. 5, 1993, p. 12.
2. Semiramis Kantel, “Montaigne ve dil” (Montaigne and Language), Frankafoni, n.5, 1993, p. 33.
3. Cemal Kafadar, “The Ottomans and Europe” in Handbook of European History, 1400-1600, v.1, ed. H. Oberman and others. (Leiden: Brill, 1994), p. 622.
4. Montaigne published his Essays four times with different and extended versions each time. Corrections and editions in the fifth edition (1595) were made by his adopted daughter after his death in 1592. Thus, the book extended to 3 volumes. See J.M. Cohen, “Introduction” in Montaigne, Essays, (London: Penguin books, 1966), p. 20.
5. Ali Celebi, “Montaigne’de Turkler” (Turks in Montaigne), Frankafoni, n. 5, 1993, p. 26-27. This article uses Rouillard, whom we will touch upon in depth in the following pages. Unfortunately, this study cannot go beyond a mere translation to become an original study.
6. Zeynep B. Sayın, “Yenicağ: Descartes ve Montaigne,” Cogito, n. 10, 1997, p. 158.
7. Clarance Dana Rouillard, The Turk in French history, thought and literature (1520-1660), Ancienne Libraire Furne, Paris: 1938.

When Did English and Hindi Begin to Differ?

The long-established “comparative method” of linguistics uses vocabulary, the structure of words, and the sound systems of languages to draw language family trees, depicting in what order related languages (such as, English, Hindi, and ancient Hittite) diverged from their mother languages and the relative “relatedness” of sister languages. Dates of divergence are usually referred to dates of historical or archaeological significance. For example, the Romanian language, a relative of Italian, must have been introduced to the region between 112 and 270 AD, when Roman troops occupied Dacia. However, the comparative method does not provide any dates itself, other than those of relative chronology. Lexicostatistics, the rival study for vocabulary change, extracts essential vocabulary from languages, such as “I, three, and hand,” which are assumed to be more resistant to change, and produces a metric of shared cognates and, hence, language kinship. Assuming a constant rate of language change over time, one can extrapolate to pre-history dates for language evolution. For example, one may try to estimate when the proto-Indo-European, the ancestor of English, Hindi, and Hittite, started branching into distinct new languages. Unfortunately, the promise of lexicostatistics (and its method, called glottochronology) became doubtful quickly after its birth. It was criticized very much in the same way as biological phylogenetic analyses were. One example to show the correspondence is that just as the mutation rates of genes (sequences of DNA) may change over time, languages may also be changing faster or slower at certain periods. Lexicostatistics is unreliable, as the similarity between languages could be mere chance convergences, or borrowings, or on the other hand, distant relatives could be unrecognizable after a great deal of divergence. These objections have plagued biology in similar ways.

Phylogenetics and Philology Side by Side

IJeJaEghoManMeHandMainRukaCheriDastHathThreeTroisTriTriaSeTinMotherMereMatMiteraMaderMaNewNouveaunoviykenuryosTazeNeyanoseNezNosMitiNaNak

Figure 1: A partial list

for Indo-European words used by Gray and Atkinson (Dyen, I. Kruskal, J.B. & Black, P., FILE IE-DATA1 at http://www.ntu.edu.au/education/langs/ielex/IE-DATA1)

The recent study by Gray and Atkinson from the University of Auckland, New Zealand, published on November 27 in Nature, uses enhanced methods developed for phylogenetic studies in language tree construction, which produces trees that are consistent with those established by the comparative method. Most importantly, maximum-likelihood models and the Bayesian inference method were employed, both being statistical methods now established in phylogenetics, to counteract any weaknesses found in past attempts of glottochronology. Their method makes it possible to estimate divergence times without a strict rate of change, also enabling the determination of unsubstantiated sections of the tree, and the incorporation of these uncertainties in the calculation of the trees and divergence times. Gray and Atkinson only used fourteen age constraints to calibrate their divergence time calculations in estimating chronology, and after confirming tests eliminated some of these constraints, doubtful cognates, and other problems, they were able to come up with a date for the initial divergence of all Indo-European languages of 7,800 to 9,800 years ago. These dates coincide beautifully with the Anatolian farmer hypothesis, which claims dispersion of Indo-Europeans from Anatolia (modern-day Turkey) with the spreading of agriculture around 8,000-9,500 years ago, a hypothesis now supported by genetic studies that report a Neolithic, Near Eastern contribution to the European gene pool as well.

An Alternative Theory

This study does not extinguish one of the fiercest discussions of this century, which is favored by many linguists, that linguistic evidence favors the Kurgan expansion hypothesis, with Kurgan horsemen invading and spreading from the Asian steppes 6,000 years ago. It is thought that Kurgan horsemen possessed certain advantages, like the knowledge of the wheel and horseback riding, just as the Anatolians knew about farming. These linguists claim that the statistical and computational methods used in biology do not reflect the way languages change, and these methods use only vocabulary, but ignore grammar. This new study is a shot in the arm for the supporters of the Anatolian theory and resurrects glottochronology. Obviously, the discussion is far from being over. To reconcile the two, Gray and Atkinson note that they have observed an intense diversification period in their data at a date of 6,000 years ago, and they refer to an inclusive theory of both Anatolian origin and Kurgan expansion.2

Intertwined Trees

In their article Gray and Atkinson predict the combination of computational phylogenetic methods and vocabulary data to examine archaeological hypotheses in the future, as methods developed for biology continue to establish themselves in social sciences. As David Searls of Glaxo-Smith-Kline Pharmaceuticals concludes in his “News and Views” article in the same issue of Nature,3 “[this work] should stimulate even more cross-fertilization of ideas among those studying the intertwined trees of life and language.”

The Need for Balance

Human beings are social creatures with a complicated network of relations. No one can be completely independent of this network, for each person’s survival depends upon it. Given this, a constant search for balance between these relations is necessary to avoid conflict. Classical Greek philosophers considered humanity a zo-on politikon-a political mammal, thus emphasizing the fact that every person is, in some way, a political actor.

For believers and Muslims, belief is an essential component of human existence. Even some agnostic humanists accept the possibility of a spiritual life and recognize its ethical merits. Given this, political and spiritual activities cannot be separated from human life or from each other. In other words, they have a holistic link. This concept also is found in a more specific Christian perspective and in the Islamic tradition. Among its European exponents have been Dag Hammarskjold, Thomas Masaryk, and Vaclav Havel.¹ Ms. Salima Ghezali and Prof. Abu Zaid are fine examples of active Muslim as meta-politicians.²

Before delving into this subject further, it is necessary to make the following points clear. First, a distinction must be made between policy and politics, between power plays and party strategy on the one hand and policy as a long-time approach to social problems on the other. As policy conforms better with the classical Greek concept of politeia (the government of the city/society or polis), I shall concentrate upon it.

Second, I use Islam not in the political context of Arabism, political rituals, or self-proclaimed Islamic states, but in its literal meaning of monotheism and belief in Divine Unicity and a coherent creation as explained in the Qur’an. In this spiritual context, every man and woman who reaches a certain age and is mentally competent is entirely and directly responsible for each of his or her acts.

Islam, in the context of this reality, means accepting this responsibility and using one’s God-given intellect and dignity to keep on the “just path” (the Shari‘a). There is no room for any human-made religious hierarchy (e.g., imam, ayatolla, caliph, amir³), or for fatalism or passivity, for personal responsibility means that one has to choose instead of be led by others.

Spirituality and Society

The well-known phrase al-Islam din wa dunya (Islam is spirituality and society) can serve as a starting point in the search for harmony between Muslim identity and political action. Din refers to Islam as a whole. Its most important points are Islam’s pillars, belief, duties, external principles (the Shari‘a), inner experience (Sufism), and striving against the ego (jihad). All of this, taken together, forms Islam-in-society. In this authentic Islam, no religious or secular hierarchy serves as an intermediary between believers and God. This fact, unfortunately, is often overlooked or ignored. Various people and groups have linked it to state structure, national community, political nationalism, tribal society, and even political party. All such attempts are abuses of Islam.

Dunya refers to human society as a whole. It is not a mono-religious community, but rather a society in which several religious and philosophical communities use their status as citizens to contribute to the well-being of all. An example of such a concept is found in European humanist organizations, whose members can be atheists, agnostics, or spiritual-without-specification.

There is no reason for Muslims to be prejudiced against such groups, for their adherents are neither anti-Islamic nor partisans of ignorance. Not being religious does not mean being against religion. These groups work for human dignity and responsibility just as Muslims do, although they approach it from a different perspective. Dunya is holistic, and its aspects (e.g., psychology, politics, art, science, sexuality, and history) interact intensively. Abuses have been just as numerous as corrections throughout the Muslim world’s 1,400-plus years of existence. Authentic Islam has not always been triumphant in the past, but it still carries the promise of a splendid future. It is in the hands of inspired, contemporary Muslims to decide.

Church and State

Europe remains suspicious about any attempt to unify religion and politics. This is quite understandable when one considers the traumatic history that such attempts caused in Europe. The first one involved the Muslim world directly: the Crusades.⁴ The “liberation of the Holy Land,” according to Roman Catholic scholars, was a nightmare for the Greek and Eastern Christian communities. Given the facts that the independent Crusader kingdoms fought each other and that Muslims lived in Jerusalem for 4 centuries before the Crusades, the official history of the Crusades turns out to be false. All of the involved communities were traumatized and left with feelings of mutual suspicion and hostility. Whatever good relations remained between Muslims and Christians were confined to mercantile elites, for the general populations remained hostile to each other.

Four centuries later, starting with Luther’s declaration in 1517 against the Catholic Church, Europe became a battlefield for Catholic and Protestant armies.⁵ The Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, which raged during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and was a period of incredible cruelty and massacre, lasted until the end of the Thirty Years War (1648). Millions of people were killed by warfare, famine, and disease-and yet nobody “won.” Out of this violence came the emergency measure to separate church and state. Gradually modified, this concept would become known as laicity during the French Revolution (1789-99).

Before laicity took hold, however, the concept of individual freedom of religion was negated by allocating different Christian denominations to different states. At that moment, the Ottoman State applied a more advanced form of multi-religious coexistence in a single state. The church hierarchy weakened throughout the nineteenth century, while the European states become more democratic. There was another chance to harmonize the link between religion and policy, this time in a democratic way.

The twentieth century witnessed the worst crimes against humanity in recorded history. These were carried out by systems and states that rejected all previously influential religious concepts. And so the perception of religion changed again, this time in a positive way. In this new trauma, people complained about the absence of religion as a moderating and peacemaking force. (O God, why were You absent in Auschwitz?) After WWII, laic states could keep their structure and renew their content. Nearly all European nations have adopted some form of laicity. But this does not mean that they are anti-religious or anti-Islam. If laicity and democracy are not yet perfect, they only need to be improved. There is no reason to criticize laicity as such. These governments are the expressions of their own imperfect democracy.

This process is determined by economic as well as cultural factors. Religious communities can contribute to the perfection of democracy if their own intra-religious dynamic is not usurped by any clerical power group. Only such a status will allow them to have democratic ties with other religious and philosophical groups and with society as a whole.

Muslim Communities in Europe

European Muslims live as dispersed minority communities in many European countries, be they constitutional monarchies, republics, or otherwise. Ballot systems differ, as does the size of the Parliament, terms of elections, and so on. Essentially, there is consultancy between the state and the population, as well as between the citizens themselves.

This concept of mutual consultancy (shura) is found in the Qur’an: The believers conduct their affairs in mutual consent (42:39). The Qur’an recommends a method for policy, not a political organization. The Prophet was not told to establish a state or name a successor. From the Traditions, we learn that he knew that his function was only to guide and protect his community. The title of caliph, based upon Qur’an 33:72, applies to all people as spiritual representatives and followers of God. It has no political function in authentic Islam, and this and all other titles are no more than human inventions.

Within the context of European society, shura can-and should-take the form of democratic commitment. European citizens and the Muslim community can reinforce each other during these years of broad general disgust with local and even national political institutions. As such people consider democracy corrupt, inefficient, or obsolete, Muslims can oppose this defection from democracy by pointing out that such a development might acutally make the situation even worse.

According to the Qur’an, Prophethood contains identical elements regardless of the Prophet. So, what was significant for Prophet Muhammad was significant for all other Prophets. Consider the case of Moses who, according to both the Bible and the Qur’an, was sent to guide and inspire his enslaved people. He went to Pharaoh and, accepting the risk of royal anger, called for moderation and justice. Indeed, Pharaoh rejected his demand and became even more cruel. After Divine intervention, Moses led his people on their long and dangerous journey toward the land where, according to God’s Promise, they would find freedom and justice.

The Jewish identity was formed during this journey. Moses did not offer a well-defined territory or become the head of a state. In fact, his authority was even challenged at times. The dynamism of Prophetic action was the main element in this journey, as it was in Prophet Muhammad’s emigration to Madina to establish the Muslim community in a welcoming atmosphere.

From a moral point of view, Vaclav Havel might be one of Europe’s most significant contemporary politicians.6 He represents a religious view in a discrete way, without stating membership in a particular religious community and certainly not claiming leadership. He is democratic in his methods, and considers religion only as a motivation to act. However, it really counts. He resembles his predecessor Masaryk, who was a philosopher and a litterateur before assuming political responsibilities. Although underestimated as a politician when compared with Churchill or de Gaulle, his life has been just as adventurous as theirs despite the much smaller size of his country.

European Muslim intellectuals and would-be politicians would be well advised to study the lives and decisions of Masaryk and Havel, for both escaped from the narrow-minded nationalism that has trapped so many Muslim Arab politicians. To them, nationalism meant preserving the local cultural heritage in order to strengthen the popular identity in face of oppression. This is a valuable gift to humanity, rather than a treasure to be guarded jealously. Havel began his political activity by writing a letter to President Gustav Husak to protest the injustice of the Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia. Husak, just like Pharaoh, rejected it. And so we ask: Is there a parallel between the actions of Moses and Havel? How significant is the fact that these two men, one a Prophet and the other a politician-philosopher, had no desire for power? Such questions might inspire Christians and Muslims. Also, didn’t Muslims consider the downfall of communism, to which Havel contributed greatly, a symbolic and even religious fact?

Conclusion

As European Muslims face problems that are usually identical to those of the entire population, isolation is a completely inappropriate solution. Maintaining cultural and linguistic heritages should be done by cultural, as opposed to political, associations. The current trend of Muslim involvement in several political tendencies without forming a Muslim political party needs to be reinforced. The emergence of a self-proclaimed Muslim party is not desirable, for its impact would be negative-other such parties would be formed by those who, for whatever reason, would view that party as not “Muslim” enough. This would engender isolation, quarrels, and maybe even violence. A far better solution would be to increase communication between existing parties and between politicians and citizens. Such an approach is Qur’anic in nature.

Whenever democracy is threatened by a politician or political ideology that pays no respect to internal democracy or promotes discrimination or racism, the best antidote is a good civic policy. Such a negative scenario is now developing in Belgium. Our local Muslim politicians should be the first ones to insist that a policy of justice and honesty be carried out by all democratic parties. This is far more efficient than legal action, ballot reforms or thresholds, alarmist attitudes, or pretending that the problem is not so bad. This does not exclude the possibility of lawsuits against politicians who try to win votes by racist appeals. In addition, exit polls on election day should be forbidden so that false information cannot lead to questionable results

Footnotes

1. Dag Hammarskjold (1905-61): Swedish economist, statesman, and secretary-general of the UN (1953-61) He is generally thought to have combined great moral force with subtlety in meeting international challenges; Tomaš Masaryk (1850-1937): Chief founder and first president (1918-35) of Czechoslovakia; Vaclav Havel (1936- ): Prominent Czech playwright, poet, and political dissident, who, after the fall of communism, was president of Czechoslovakia (1989-92) and president of the Czech Republic (1993- ).
2. Ms. Salima Ghezali: Algerian publisher of Al-Watan (The Nation) newspaper, courageous critic of both the Algerian military governnment and the anti-government armed Islamist groups, and recipient of the Sakharov Prize; Prof. Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid: Qur’anic scholar from Cairo whose interpretation of the Qur’an caused him to be prosecuted by Egyptian Islamists. Labelling him an apostate, they divorced him from his wife, Ibtihal Younes. The couple now lives in The Netherlands.
3. Imam: One who leads Muslims in prayer. Ayatolla: Sign of God, a religious title given to only the most exemplary Shi‘a theologians and religious scholars. Caliph: Successor (to the Prophet). As the Prophet’s spiritual/religious mantle is unique and therefore cannot be inherited, this title has come to mean a ruler. Amir: Leader, mainly in the political and moral sense.
4. The Crusades: A series of wars undertaken by European Christians between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries to recover the Holy Land from the Muslims.
5. Martin Luther (1483-1546): German priest and scholar whose questioning of certain Catholic practices led to the Protestant Reformation. He is a pivotal figure in both Western civilization and Christianity.

Bibliography

• Tariq Ramadan: To Be a European Muslim. The Islamic Foundation: 1999.
• John Esposito. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? 3d. ed. Oxford Univ. Press: 1999.
• Fatima Mernissi. Women and Islam: An Historical and Theological Enquiry. South Asia Books: 1998.
• Tomaš G. Masaryk: The Ideals of Humanity and How To Work. Ayer: 1970.

Nationalism or ethnic differences have been unleashed in this [twentieth] century, particularly by European officials following the well-known principle of divide and rule. The target of this insidious assault is the Muslim world.

Nationalism gives some satisfaction but encourages self-pride and produces a power that sometimes is improper. Therefore it should not be abandoned, but people must realize that there are two kinds of nationalism: negative and positive. The first kind, which is ominous and harmful, is fed through swallowing others and sustained through enmity against others. As such nationalism causes mutual antagonism and discord, the Qur’an and the Prophet reject it: “Islam has forbidden the national (tribal) zealotry of the Age of Ignorance.”¹

The Qur’an is explicit on this point: When non-believers set zealotry, the tribalism of the Age of Ignorance, in their hearts, God sent down His peace and reassurance upon His Messenger and the believers, and fastened to them the word of self-restraint and God-consciousness to which they have better right and of which they are worthy. God knows everything (48:26). The sacred and positive Islamic nationalism contains no negative partisan nationalism. What state with more than 1 billion members, other than the Muslim state, has so many eternal brothers and sisters?

Previous outbreaks of negative nationalism have harmed Islamic unity and the Muslim world. For example, the Umayyads preferred Arabs in their government and so offended other [non-Arab] Muslims and suffered many misfortunes. European nations because excessively nationalistic during this century, which caused the long-standing ominous French– German enmity to erupt into the vastly destructive First World War. And in our own history, just as Babylon was destroyed by internal tribal division, the beginning of the Ottoman State’s second constitutional period [declared in 1908] saw the formation of many minority-based groups or societies, particularly among the Greeks and Armenians. What befell the Ottoman State as a result illustrates negative nationalism’s harm.

The national or tribal conflict between Muslim peoples or communities is so great a misfortune that it is like getting bitten by a snake to avoid a mosquito. At a time when the European powers resemble huge dragons just waiting to attack us to satisfy their insatiable greed, our national integrity is harmed by encouraging hostility and taking sides, because of national differences, against our citizens in the eastern cities and the coreligionists among our southern neighbors.

There is no reason to for enmity toward our southern coreligionists, from where the Qur’an’s light and Islam’s radiance came to us, for such national conflicts only benefit Europe. Also, such feelings may cause enmity toward the Qur’an and Islam, which would destroy all Muslims’ worldly and otherworldly lives. To destroy these two worlds’ cornerstones under the pretext of serving social life through nationalism or patriotism is stupidity.

Fourth matter

The second kind of nationalism is positive and, arising from social life’s intrinsic requirements. Thus it brings about mutual assistance and solidarity, produces a beneficial power, and strengthens Islamic unity.

Its goal should be to serve and protect-not replace-Islam, for the unity desired and established by Islam is manifold and counts in both the intermediate and eternal worlds. Since nationalist unity only can be as strong as one aspect of Islamic unity, trying to replace the latter with the former is as foolish as replacing the diamonds in a citadel with its stones. So, followers of the Qur’an! Your land has carried the flag of the Qur’an for 1,000 years, since the time of the ‘Abbasids, over three continents and challenged the world. You have made your national feeling and solidarity a stronghold to protect Islam and, by repelling the world’s dreadful assaults, are included in the meaning of: God will bring a people He loves, and who love Him, humble toward believers and stern toward unbelievers, striving in His way and not fearing the reproach of any reproachers (5:24).

You should be afraid of and avoid being led by the deceitful instigation of Europe and Westernized hypocrites, who are included in the meaning of that verse’s first part: O you who believe! Whosoever of you turns from his [her] religion…

Fifth matter

The awakening peoples of Asia blindly follow the European style of nationalism and sacrifice many sacred things for its sake.² However, just as a suit made from the same cloth cannot fit every body and an elderly prayer leader does not wear clothes designed for a tango dancer, each people should strive for authenticity. If Europe is like a marketplace or a barracks, Asia is an arable field or a mosque. A businessperson may go to dance, but a farmer cannot. A barracks’ conditions differ from those of a mosque.

Most Prophets appeared in Asia, while philosophers usually emerged in Europe. This is a sign from eternal Destiny that Asian vitality and progress is possible through religion and spirituality. Philosophy and science should support-not replace-religion.

Indifference to religion is a grave mistake. Do not forget that Europe is devoted to its religion, and that such Western leaders as Wilson, Lloyd George and Venizelos are as fanatically devoted to their religion as a priest.³

Any comparison of Islam with Christianity is false. Europe progressed when it reformed its religion after 3 centuries of wars caused by the Church and religion’s misuse by despotic rulers and priests who sought to crush the masses and the intellectuals [to preserve the status quo, which favored their interests]. But in Islam, religious devotion caused only one internal war.⁴

Muslims realized a far greater progress than their contemporaries whenever they followed Islam earnestly, as seen in the Islamic state of Andalusia, the greatest teacher of Renaissance Europe.⁵ Whenever Muslims have been indifferent to religion, they have declined and fallen to a miserable state.

Through its numerous principles of compassion, such as mandating the prescribed alms (zakat) and prohibiting interest, Islam protects the masses. Through its many warnings, like: Will you not exercise your reason? Will they not contemplate and reflect? Do they not ponder?, it considers intellect and science as proofs for its truths, and protects and encourages scientists to conduct research. Since it is the citadel of the masses and scientists, no one should regret being a Muslim.

Islam differs from other religions because it is founded upon pure monotheism and so denies any intermediary or intermediate causal creative or formative effect. Christianity admits such influences, for it allows saints and elders a certain partnership in the manifestation of God’s Sovereignty by saying that God has begotten a son: They have taken as lords beside God their rabbis, monks, and the Messiah son of Mary, when they were commanded to serve but One God. There is no god but He, be He glorified from their associating partners with Him (9:31). Christians who rise to the highest worldly posts can remain Christians. They even become, like the late American president Wilson, bigoted and full of egotism. Their Muslim counterparts, however, are expected to renounce egotism and pride in order to be good Muslims. Followers of pure monotheism, Muslims who cannot do so either become indifferent to Islam or even lose their faith.

Sixth matter

To those extreme negative nationalists and separatists, I say the following: The Earth’s surface has been the stage of many changes and emigrations. Once the center of the Islamic administration was formed in our country, many peoples, like moths to a light, flocked to it to settle. As the resulting intermingling makes it impossible to determine their national origins, except by reading the Supreme Guarded Tablet, it is meaningless and harmful to build a society and our attitudes on nationalism…. When determining national identity, language, religion, and (geographical) land are key factors. Their joint existence means a strong national structure. But the lack of any one factor does not exclude the possibility of a strong national identity and sentiment.

Of the hundreds of benefits that Islam’s sacred nationality has given our country’s social life, I cite only two examples: First, the Muslim state has maintained its vitality and existence, despite its population of only 20 or 30 million and European hostility, because of the conviction that: “If I die, I will die a martyr; if I survive, I will survive as a holy warrior of Islam.” This conviction comes from the Qur’an’s light and is held by our state’s army. Thus equipped, that army has welcomed death with perfect enthusiasm and terrified Europe for centuries. What else could inculcate such a sublime quality of self-sacrifice in our soldiers’ minds, make them single-minded and pure-hearted? What kind of nationalistic zeal can be substituted for it and cause soldiers to sacrifice everything, even their lives, for its sake? Second, whenever the dragons-the European great powers-afflict this Muslim state, it deeply affects and shakes the Muslim world. Those imperialist powers governing Muslim lands usually restrain their urge to attack this state, for they fear that the Muslims under their control will revolt. What other force can substitute for this continual, and certainly non-trivial, spiritual support (Muslim unity)? Those who offer it should not be offended by [being forced to project] a negative nationalism and patriotism that make us indifferent to other Muslims

Footnotes

1. The Age of Ignorance: The pre-Islamic period of the Arabian peninsula.
2. Bediuzzaman locates the traditional Muslim world in Asia, by which he means the contemporary Far East, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa.
3. Woodrow Wilson: American politician and president (1856-1924); Lloyd George (1863-1945), British statesman and prime minister; Eleutherios Venizelos (1864-1936): Greek statesman and premier.
4. The Battle of the Camel (656), during which ‘Ali’s forces defeated the army led by ‘A’isha, Talha, and Ibn Zubayr.
5. Andalusia is the name of Islamic Spain, which existed from 712 to 1492. At a time when most of Europe was lost in the Dark Ages, it was a beacon of knowledge and intellectual endeavor that attracted many European students. After is fall to Catholic Spain, its intellectual heritage was dispersed and was instrumental in Europe’s intellectual re-awakening and Renaissance. Adapted from Bediuzzaman’s Twenty-sixth Letter, Second Topic.

The Drive for Ecumenical Unity

First, when speaking of unity, Jesus never specified a date or time period. Most probably he did this in an attempt to limit human weakness and shortsightedness in this field. However, separation and scattering happened anyway. Rather than considering this something undesirable, we should recognize it as a normal result of human diversity and a source of richness for humanity. Human diversity starts with diversity in the white, black, red, and yellow races, followed by new-color races arising from interracial sexual relations between the original races.

According to Teilhard de Chardin,1 the human race is undergoing a process of permanent change, continuous development, and an unstoppable growth toward an ever-higher level of spiritualization in its quest to achieve a clearer and better understanding of the Divine Reality, the Divine Truth. All faith communities can accept that the perennial Reality from which all existing matter originated is also the final Omega-destination of all beings. Only then, after a long period of growth, will humanity and all religions be united in the All of the spiritual Reality.

After centuries of war and conflict, collaboration and unity among nations progressed with the creation of the United Nations (UN), its affiliated institutes, and the International Court at The Hague in The Netherlands. Sometime in the not-too-distant future, we hope that the dream of Baha’ullah2-the creation of a world parliament, a world government, a world currency unit, and a universal language-will be realized. Is it not time for the world’s diverse faith communities to realize a similar union in collaboration?

Second, people are talking of a small ecumenism between Christian faith communities and a great ecumenism between the world’s faith communities. The ecumenism appellation undoubtedly will be greeted with suspicion by non-Christian faith communities due to its Western origin. In line with the growing trend of including non-Christian faith communities in Christian ecumenist encounters, it might be advisable to replace ecumenism with dialogue. Interfaith dialogue then can be used for all interfaith dialogue encounters.

Third, our world is faced with the problems of an escalating gap between rich and poor and the ever-increasing poverty of 20 percent of the world’s population. Although the world’s political, financial, and industrial leaders acknowledge that something should be done, they have not reached any consensus on how to tackle these problems. Faith communities, in cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), could speed up this process by fulfilling the necessary role of pressing and pushing these leaders to reach some kind of agreement. However, to be effective and have a lasting influence they must be able to collaborate with each other.

After many years of meetings, it is becoming clear to more and more people that drives for unity between the Christian Protestant communities, as well as drives for unity between the Catholic Church and other Christian communities, are not making any real progress. A growing number of people now believe that such unity should be considered as a very long-term goal.

What should be sought now is not unity, but rather a union in collaboration. This seems to be happening due to advances in telecommunication technology, an acquisition of better knowledge and estimation of other cultures, and also the immigration of non-Christian faith communities to traditionally Christian countries. For example, this latter factor has made Islam the second largest faith community in the European Union.

Fourth, to realize such a union in collaboration, the following four attitudes must be present:

A True Interest in the World’s Problems. All interfaith meetings should deal with the suffering of so many of our brothers and sisters on this planet from a position of real concern and compassion. But more than that, they should formulate the sincere desire within themselves to do something about it. Such a global consciousness should be the basic mental attitude from which all faith communities start when working on interfaith dialogue.

The problems of poverty in South America and India, as well as many other countries, cannot be solved in a reasonably short time period by local and even nationally combined efforts. A change for the better in the socioeconomic infrastructures, many of which remain under the control of a small minority of landowners and industrialists who derive great financial benefits from the status quo, will be possible only through political and moral pressure from the outside. This represents a challenge for a United Religions Organization in collaboration with local politicians.3

A Clearly Defined Purpose so That Efficient Solutions Can Be Reached and Implemented. Efficient solutions will be produced only when all faith communities become a “One Voice Forum” having behind it the power of all their adherents. This could become a reality by creating a world religious organization, such as has been proposed by Episcopal Bishop William Swing’s United Religions Initiative (URI), launched in 1995. This body does not seek to unite all religions into one, but to bring them together at the same table so that their voice will be heard and taken seriously by the UN. An important step in this direction was the creation of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in Geneva, Switzerland.4 The WCC could become a basis for a world organization if non-Christian faith communities and the Catholic Church were to become members.

In the case of Europe, a more unified European collaboration should be studied to promote communication between European interfaith dialogue organizations. An umbrella organization, something like a European Interfaith Council, is urgently needed, as is a European interfaith magazine, to combine all efforts on a European-wide level.

Giving Priority to the Common Welfare. This involves subordinating personal interests to the interests of the whole, a problem often encountered on the political level. For example, the UN’s activities will remain very limited as long as America gives priority to its own interests. This is also applicable to NGOs and faith communities, for concentrating on their own organizational agendas, instead of on the common welfare of humanity, makes real dialogue and real collaboration difficult. As far as I know, only Japan places the welfare of the whole community above that of the individual in all aspects of life. This is perhaps due to its centuries-old Buddhist and Confucian background. Whatever the reason, this remains a unique world phenomenon that is not recognized or understood sufficiently by the world community.

Adopting a “Go and Learn” Attitude. In other words, we have to move beyond the typical Western attitude of “Go and Teach.” This attitude is characteristic of Christianity and Islam, for adherents of both religions believe in their religion’s superiority and that they have exclusive possession of the whole truth. Unfortunately, such attitudes have resulted in colonization, negating and even persecuting other cultures and religions. What is required today is the attitude of “Go and Learn,” of being interested in and learning about others, of coming to respect their identity and values.

Due to this new attitude, we might integrate some of these values in our own way of life and be enriched as a result. As long as the Catholic Church and other Christian denominations, as well as Islam, do not renounce their claim of exclusive possession of the Truth, the above-mentioned union in collaboration will remain an almost-impossible undertaking. The only way forward is one of accepting and recognizing other faith communities and working to go beyond the differences and similarities to arrive at a union in collaboration. Overall unity should not be the goal

Footnotes

1. Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955): Teilhard aimed at a metaphysic of evolution, holding that it was a process converging toward a final unity that he called the Omega point. He attempted to show that what is of permanent value in traditional philosophical thought can be maintained and even integrated with a modern scientific outlook if one accepts that the tendencies of material things are directed, either wholly or in part, beyond the things themselves toward the production of higher, more complex, more perfectly unified beings…. Teilhard argued that the appearance of man brought an added dimension into the world. This he defines as the birth of reflection: animals know, but man knows that he knows; he has “knowledge to the square.” Another great advance in Teilhard’s scheme of evolution is the socialization of mankind. This is not the triumph of herd instinct but a cultural convergence of humanity toward a single society. Evolution has gone about as far as it can to perfect human beings physically: its next step will be social and spiritual. Teilhard saw such evolution already in progress; through technology, urbanization, and modern communications, more and more links being established between different peoples’ politics, economics, and habits of thought in an apparently geometric progression. (www.britannica.com)
2. Baha’ullah (1817-92): Founder of the Baha’i faith upon his claim to be the manifestation of the unknowable God. He propounded a comprehensive teaching that advocated the unity of all religions and the universal brotherhood of man. Emphasizing social ethics, he eschewed ritual worship and devoted himself to the abolition of racial, class, and religious prejudices. (www.britannica.com)
3. For more information, check out: www.united-religions. org/newsite/index.htm, or contact: United Religions Initiative, PO Box 29242, San Francisco, CA 94129-0242 USA; e-mail: office@uri.org.
4. The World Council of Churches (WCC) is an ecumenical organization founded in 1948 in Amsterdam as “a fellowship of Churches which accept Jesus Christ our Lord as God and Saviour.” The WCC is not a church, nor does it issue orders or directions to the churches. It works for the unity and renewal of the Christian denominations and offers them a forum in which they may work together in the spirit of tolerance and mutual understanding (www.britannica. com). It now has 337 Christian churches as members, mainly Protestant and Eastern Orthodox. The Catholic Church and Southern Baptists are not members.