However, a recent book, Islamic Science and Making of the European Renaissance, by George Saliba calls these arguments into question. This book prompted me to think more critically about this long, accepted argument. Can this prominent scholar of Islam or his famous book, Tahafut al-Falasifah, be held responsible, single handedly, for causing an age of decline in the scientific activities in the Muslim World?

Many orientalists argue that Ghazali’s Tahafut is responsible for the age of decline in science in the Muslim World. This is their key thesis as they attempt to explain the scientific and intellectual history of the Islamic world. It seems to be the most widely accepted view on the matter not only in the Western world but in the Muslim world as well. George Saliba, a Professor of Arabic and Islamic Science at Columbia University who specializes in the development of astronomy within Islamic civilization, calls this view the “classical narrative” (Saliba, 2007). However, interesting discoveries in the second half of the twentieth century by historians of science challenged many of the assertions of this classical narrative. An example of such discoveries is the strong connections between Ibn al-Shatir, a famous Damascene astronomer of the fourteenth century, and the Renaissance astronomer Copernicus (Roberts, 1957). If Ghazali had killed science in Islam in the twelfth century, then al-Shatir’s work from the fourteenth century could not have been so influential on Copernicus’s work. Saliba challenges almost all of the major tenets of the classical narrative on the basis of (1) a critical examination of historical evidence, some of which is quite recent, and (2) the results of his own long-term research in Islamic astronomy.

Saliba’s response to the question

In making his argument, Saliba first notes that most of the orientalists operate under the assumption that there must be a sharp conflict between religion and science. This paradigm is probably based on their European experience. To them, al-Ghazali represents the orthodox tradition in Islam and with Tahafut, written in the late eleventh century (between 1091 and 1095), they assume that orthodox religious thought won a decisive victory over rational, scientific thought. From that point on they assume that science in Islam declined, and the Islamic world did not produce anything significant in terms of scientific advancements.

Saliba argues that both of these assumptions are false. First, the European paradigm of conflict between religion and science does not really apply to the Islamic world. The religion of Islam encourages rational and scientific inquiry. Therefore, Muslims see no insurmountable contradictions between their faith and natural laws. Hence, studying religion and studying natural sciences does not create a conflict for Muslims.

Secondly, many of the scientists in the Islamic world were also religious authorities at the same time. A few examples among such scholars are Ibn al-Nafis, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi ,and Ibn al-Shatir who lived in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and made important contributions to such diverse scientific disciplines as mathematics, astronomy, medicine, physics and philosophy. In fact, these scholars were regarded primarily as religious figures by the general public with side interests in sciences. Early Muslim scholars did not hesitate to acquire scientific knowledge wherever they could find it, whether it be in Indian civilization, in Greek civilization, or in Persian civilization. Not only did they acquire these sciences through translation, but they also critically examined them in a comprehensive way. Making corrections and improvements and even introducing new disciplines, they showed a high degree of ownership and maturity. This led to a remarkable period of creativity and rapid advancements in many scientific disciplines in the Islamic world beginning as early as the eighth century (Saliba, 2007).

Contrary to the classical narrative, scientific advancements in the Islamic world did not stop or even slow down after Ghazali. Saliba gives many examples of sophisticated scientific achievements in the Islamic world well after Ghazali. Based on his life-long research in the area, he concludes that the golden age of Islamic astronomy was in the post-Ghazali period from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. Discoveries by Western historians of science in the second half of the twentieth century show that there are surprisingly strong connections between Copernicus (sixteenth century) and Muslim astronomers from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, such as Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and Ibn al-Shatir (Roberts, 1957; Saliba, 2007). These discoveries were shocking to many in the scholarly community who did not expect to find any transfer of knowledge from the Islamic civilization to Europe in the post-Ghazali period. Unfortunately, this new information has not been sufficiently digested by today’s scholars and does not yet generally appear in secondary sources.

Saliba also provides examples from other disciplines, such as medicine, that show that a high level of scientific production took place in more than one discipline in the Islamic world in the post-Ghazali period. How is it that such important scientific materials could have been overlooked by the experts? According to Saliba a major reason for modern historians of science to have missed the large amount of scientific production in Islamic world in the post-Ghazali period is the damage caused by the classical narrative. Most historians simply weren’t looking for it because the classic narrative stipulated that science in Islam was dead after Ghazali. Even though some new discoveries have been made, there are still many scientific works waiting to be studied from that period. As an example of these omissions, Berggren, the author of Episodes in the Mathematics of Medieval Islam, says that he used this title for his book as opposed to The History of Mathematics in Medieval Islam simply because “Such a book could not be written yet, for so much material remains unstudied that we do not know enough of the whole story” (Berggren, 1986).

The Content and the Method of the Tahafut

Even though Saliba’s arguments and evidence are quite convincing to doubt or reject the common narrative, I wanted to go straight to the source-the Tahafut-and have a closer look to see if it might be a book that can be held responsible for killing the science or scientific thought in Islamic civilization.

In Tahafut, Ghazali refutes twenty philosophical doctrines. Using a scientific, or in this context philosophical, method, he first explains those philosophical doctrines before criticizing them. His explanations were so comprehensive and so clear that he made them accessible to non-philosophers, and thus, his ideas became generally better known in the Islamic world. Next, he gave arguments to refute those doctrines. In doing so, he used the very same logical and philosophical principles and arguments that philosophers used in the first place to support their claims. Ghazali mainly argues that the philosophers who proposed the doctrines that conflict with religious principles failed to provide valid and rigorous proofs for their propositions. Hence, he attacked their methodologies using their own tools and principles.

An important point Ghazali makes in Tahafut is that he has no problems with the philosophers’ mathematics, astronomical sciences, or logic. He says (Marmura 2000, p. 11):

Regarding mathematical sciences, there is no sense in denying them or disagreeing with them. For these reduce in the final analysis to arithmetic and geometry. As regards to logical sciences, these are concerned with examining the instrument of thought in intelligible things. There is no significant disagreement encountered in these.

Therefore, it is clear that his views could not be used to justify a position against the study of mathematical sciences.

To give the reader a sense of what kinds of philosophical doctrines the Tahafut is concerned with and aims to refute, a selected few out of the twenty are listed below (Marmura 2000, p. 10, 11). The list shows that the questions discussed in Tahafut concern some of the most fundamental issues in theology, particularly in the Islamic theology.

The first problem: On refuting their doctrine of the world’s pre-eternity.

The sixth: On refuting their doctrine denying the divine attributes.

The tenth: On showing that upholding a materialist doctrine and the denial of the Maker is a necessary consequence [of what they hold].

The twentieth: On refuting their denial of bodily resurrection and the accompanying bodily pleasures and pains in paradise and hell.

Concluding Remarks

When I discuss the question given in the title of this article with my colleagues, and I argue that it would be unfair to hold Ghazali or Tahafut responsible for the decline of science in Islam, I sometimes hear the objection that “perhaps the content or the method of Tahafut may not justify this conclusion, but this is not how people understood it.” But then, one must consider the evidence given by Saliba that there is a large amount of sophisticated scientific production in the Islamic world well after Ghazali, and there is still much more to be discovered. Considering the content of Tahafut and the scientific advances in post-Ghazali period, I have a hard time convincing myself that the classical narrative is the ultimate truth on the matter. This position is supported by the fact that it is usually not realistic to try to explain most major social and historical transformations in terms of a single person, a book, an event, or the like. According to Saliba, the decline in Islamic science was the result of a combination of many internal and external reasons that took place several centuries after Ghazali.

Finally, one may wonder why this question is important or relevant. After all, these things happened a long time ago, and we have to deal with the current realities. One answer would be that there are many lessons to be learned from the history. And of course if the correct version of the history is not available, conclusions will be flawed. If anybody is interested in reviving science and scientific activities in a society, there is much that can be learned from the early Islamic period when there was a remarkable rapid and widespread rise in science, as well as lessons from the later periods of Islamic history when the Islamic world fell behind in scientific production. Some researchers are beginning to realize how much damage the classical narrative has caused in understanding the general history and the development of the modern science. It is always useful to have a critical mind to question and reevaluate assumptions when they do not conform to the evidence.

References

• Berggren, J. L. 1986. Episodes in the Mathematics of Medieval Islam, New York: Springer-Verlag.
• Marmura, Michael E. (translator). 2000. Al-Ghazali The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahafut al-Falasifah) Provo: Brigham Young University Press.
• Roberts, Victor . 1957. “The Solar and Lunar Theory of Ibn al-Shatir: A pre-Copernican Copernican Model,” Isis 48:428-432.
• Saliba, George. 2007. Islamic Science and Making of the European Renaissance, Cambridge: MIT Press.

There are seven chapters in the book. The first chapter summarizes the basic tenets of the classical narrative, then criticizes it listing many questions which the classical narrative cannot satisfactorily answer. Islamic civilization’s contribution to the development of modern science is so immense that it is impossible to completely ignore this part of the history in any serious discussion of the general history of science or civilization. The problem arises in assessing the importance and the nature of Islamic science. Generally accepted views of the classical narrative go something along these lines: Islamic civilization was a desert civilization and began to develop scientific thought only when it came in contact with more advanced civilizations (Persian, Indian and Greek and most importantly Greek). A vital component of the rise of science in Islamic civilization was the remarkable translation movement that took place during the early period of Abbasid times (750–900 CE), in which many important scientific books of other civilizations, particularly those of ancient Greeks, were translated into Arabic. The classical narrative says by learning Greek science through this translation activity, Islamic science reached its golden age while Greek science was neglected under Byzantine rule. Adherents of the classical narrative generally assume that Islamic civilization did not go much beyond translation, did not make original contributions to scientific knowledge or produced any new science of its own. They also assume this period of the golden age did not last long and came to an end with Ghazali’s “attack” on philosophers in his major work Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of Philosophers). They assume that Islamic science began to decline with Ghazali while there was an awaking in Europe, sometimes called the Renaissance of the twelfth century, when Europeans began to translate major Arabic philosophical and scientific texts into Latin. Some of these texts had already been translated from much earlier Greek and Sanskrit texts into Arabic. So, they reconnected with their Greco-Roman legacy. The classical narrative says from that point on Europe had no need for Islamic science, hence the role of Islamic civilization was to simply translate and preserve the ancient Greek science and make it available to Europeans later. Thus, according to this view all the roots of modern science were European. The classical theory also attempts to explain the process by which the acquisition of Greek science by the Muslim world occurred. There are a few versions of this proposal which are called “contact theory,” “pocket transmission theory,” and “translation through Syriac medium first.”

In this first chapter of the book, Saliba argues that the classical narrative is an oversimplification of what actually happened in reality and fails to answer many fundamental questions. The first problem is about origins. He argues none of the proposed methods of translation is convincing to explain the reasons why, how, and when Muslims acquired Greek science. In terms of the nature and quality of translations, Saliba gives examples of sophistication and maturity exhibited by the Muslim scientists that is well beyond what would be expected from an early generation of translators who are struggling to understand a foreign science. Moreover, already in the early period of the translation movement Muslim scientists produced original new science such as algebra by al-Khwarizmi (830 CE), remarkable advances by Habash a-Hasib (850 CE) in the field of trigonometry and mathematical projections that go far beyond what was known from Indian and Greek sources, and developed decimal fractions. He argues such advances could not happen suddenly. There must be a longer tradition of scientific activity in the Islamic world and real motivations for the rise of science which cannot be explained by the classical narrative.

Not only does the classical narrative fail to explain beginnings but also more recent developments as well. Saliba gives many examples from various scientific disciplines to show that the Islamic science did not decline after Ghazali. Astronomy is a perfect counterexample to this thesis of the classical narrative, and it is not the only one. In fact, there were so many advances in astronomy in the Islamic world after Ghazali that Saliba calls the post-Ghazali period as the golden age of Islamic astronomy. Recent research in the second half of the twentieth century shows that astronomy has particularly interesting connections to the European Renaissance. Saliba comments that post-Ghazali works by the Muslim scientists were not sufficiently considered by the adherents of the classical narrative because of their pre-supposition that no significant science of any interest could have been produced in this period. This caused unfortunate damage in terms of understanding the post-Ghazali period in the Islamic world as well as the European Renaissance itself.

In the second chapter, Saliba proposes an alternative thesis/narrative to the classical narrative in terms of the beginnings of the rise of scientific activities in the Islamic world. His thesis is based on the writings of Al-Nadim (full name Abu al-Faraj Muhammad b. Abi Ya’qub Ishaq al-Nadim) who wrote about intellectual history of the early Islamic period. Saliba also supports his thesis with well known historical facts. In summary, the alternative narrative proposes that there was already a significant amount of interest and activity in the nascent Islamic civilization before the translation movement began. Rather than learning science from others (Greeks) just because they came into contact with them, the Islamic world actively sought those sciences because of a keen interest to advance their own scientific knowledge. Unlike the classical narrative, the alternative thesis argues that Muslim scientists already had a high level of knowledge and maturity when the translation activities began. This is evidenced by the high quality of translations of highly technical materials, and corrections of errors in the original sources. The main societal factors for the rise of science in the new civilization are listed as a) the need for people (bureaucrats) with a high level of scientific knowledge in administrations, and b) competition between those people to acquire higher levels of scientific knowledge to be able to advance in the ranks of governments.

In the next chapter, Saliba gives detailed examples, mostly from astronomy, to show how critically Muslim scientists received and reacted to the Greek science. They noticed observational errors and internal inconsistencies in Greek texts. They also pointed out more philosophical and foundational errors and contradictions. Muslim scientists showed a high level of sophistication, maturity and critical spirit. They had a comprehensive look at the Greek texts they translated and studied them in relation to one another. Saliba argues that it is not possible to explain these phenomena with the classical narrative. Moreover, Muslim scholars went beyond just criticizing these errors and made many novel contributions to exact sciences. In the process, they realized the proper place of mathematics in the natural sciences. Saliba also comments that Muslim scientists continued to make original contributions to astronomy and other mathematical sciences long after Ghazali, when the classical narrative would preach the death of Islamic science.

In chapter four, Saliba gives examples of critical innovations by Muslim astronomers. He remarks that the interest of the Islamic society in astronomy was very strong due to many religious requirements that need to be answered by astronomy, such as visibility of the moon, daily prayer times, and qibla (direction of worship) etc. Such problems were not considered by Greeks before. Muslim astronomers could not ignore absurdities in Ptolemaic astronomy where mathematical models in Almagest violated the fundamental cosmological assumptions in Planetary Hypotheses. Although Ptolemy’s mathematical models usually made good predictions computationally, it was not satisfactory for the scientists in the new civilization to allow those models to violate the physical properties of the celestial bodies. They took it upon themselves to propose alternative mathematical models that satisfied both requirements. They were highly successful in that quest. The solution of this problem required some new mathematical theorems. Two of the most important of such theorems were Urdi’s Lemma and Tusi couple invented by Urdi and Nasir al-Din al-Tusi in the thirteenth century. Both of these were fecund and fundamental theorems that were used repeatedly by many astronomers who followed them for a long time. Renaissance astronomer Copernicus was among those who made use of these theorems. Also noted in this chapter is Shams al-Din al-Khafri’s understanding of the role of mathematics in describing the physical phenomena.

The title of chapter five is “Science between Philosophy and Religion: the Case of Astronomy,” wherein Saliba considers the relationship between the religion of Islam and scientific developments in astronomy. He explains that religious motivations led to the creation of new disciplines such as ilm al-hay’a (science of configuration) and advances in trigonometry. He states that astronomy and trigonometry are the best examples which demonstrate the intersecting interest between the practice of a religion and scientific thinking that need to be developed as a result of that practice. Many important scientists in medieval Islam were at the same time religious authorities. A few examples among such scholars are Ibn al-Nafis, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi and Ibn al-Shatir. Saliba also notes that the European paradigm of conflict between science and religion does not exist in the Islamic world.

“Islamic Science and Renaissance Europe: The Copernican Connections” is the title of chapter six. Researchers in the second half of twentieth century first realized that many of the astronomical models of Copernicus were identical to that of Ibn al-Shatir from three centuries earlier. This surprising discovery, which contradicted the view that Renaissance science was a European self-contained creation, opened the door for further investigations which revealed more surprising outcomes. The mathematical theorem called the Tusi couple that is mentioned above plays an important role in Copernicus’s model. Copernicus stated the theorem and proved it in 1543 without mentioning that he invented a new theorem or saw it in any other source. The theorem was first invented and proved by Tusi in the middle of the thirteenth century. By comparing the two proofs, W. Hartner noticed in 1973 that Copernicus’s proof was identical to Tusi’s. He even used the same letters for essential geometric points. That is where Tusi used the Arabic letters “alif,” “ba” etc. Copernicus used the corresponding Latin letters “A,” “B” etc. This discovery makes it pretty certain that Copernicus knew about Tusi’s work.

Saliba shows Copernicus’s case is not an isolated instance and gives more evidence in this chapter of the phenomenon that “there are much too many coincidences of ideas appearing first in Arabic texts usually written between the 12th and 15th centuries, which reappear, without much explanation, in Latin sources of the 16th and 17th centuries.” Saliba’s explanation of this phenomenon is that by the Renaissance time men of science themselves learned Arabic and no longer needed translations. There are many examples that show European reliance on Arabic sciences in the post-Copernicus period when the whole worldview was supposed to have been changed by him. Renaissance men of science had a high regard for the Islamic sciences and were looking to the Islamic world for the latest in scientific activities rather than the classical Greek sources.

In the last chapter Saliba discusses the age of decline in Islamic science. He starts by rejecting the two main reasons proposed by the advocates of the classical narrative and argues that it did not start after Ghazali (eleventh century) or the destruction of Baghdad by Mongols in 1258. Saliba says that those who believe the first reason look at the Islamic civilization as a source of religious thought only and operate under the assumption that the European paradigm of conflict between religion and science applies to Islamic world as well. Saliba argues that this assumption is not true for the Islamic world and that scientific activities did not decline after Ghazali. Those who think the main reason was the destruction of Baghdad by Mongols saw the Islamic civilization mostly in political terms and paid little attention to its intellectual history. Saliba gives many examples of high quality and sophisticated scientific production in the Islamic world, mostly in astronomy but in other areas as well, well after both of these events. He says those examples were ignored or not properly read by the adherents of the classical view who did not expect to find any important scientific production in the Islamic world after the thirteenth century.

There still remains the problem and timing of decline of science in the Islamic world. When did it happen? Saliba notes that decline is a relative concept. What actually happened was the European science advanced more rapidly than the rest of the world after the sixteenth century. Hence it looked like science declined elsewhere, including the Islamic world. According to Saliba the main reason for these rapid developments in science in Europe was related to the discovery of the “new world.” He argues that the wealth and resources obtained by Europeans as a result of discovery of new lands helped them fund scientific activities. Europe witnessed the rise of royal and scientific academies where most educated men of the time were assembled and engaged in scientific research without having to worry about financial needs. Healthy competition among these institutions led to new scientific discoveries. Western superiority in science continues to this day and the constant brain drain that feeds the West at the expense of the developing and third worlds does not help to change the balance.

In summary, this book presents fundamental challenges to many of the commonly held views about the intellectual and scientific history of the Islamic world and proposes alternative explanations. The science of astronomy is used as a template to test and justify these claims. The author invites researchers to subject his proposals to the test of historical data in other disciplines as well. This book is highly recommended to all interested in the general history of science, and that of the Islamic world and the Renaissance period in particular.

Nuh Aydin is an associate professor of Mathematics at Kenyon College, Ohio, USA.

On the basis of the omnipotence puzzle, one can reject the existence of God as an absolutely perfect, omnipotent and eternal being because the notion of such a being seems to be incoherent, thus it has no real referent. However, there are various theistic views that try to make sense of this puzzle by preserving omnipotence as an essential property of God. Let’s examine Aquinas’s and al-Ghazali’s views regarding omnipotence and see how an answer to such questions can be produced.

Aquinas

Aquinas was one of the most prominent figures of Christianity in the Middle Ages. He attempted to systematize the Christian faith within the framework of Aristotelian philosophy. His philosophy is known as Thomism and accepted as the official doctrine of the Catholic Church to this day. One of the central issues Aquinas dealt with was God’s nature and His omnipotence. Let us examine his ideas on this.

According to Aquinas, hypothetical cases such as God killing Himself or lying, imply contradictions in relation to God’s nature. God is eternal and truthful by nature. And in his terms, “anything that implies a contradiction does not fall within the power of God” (Aquinas, 1963, Q. 25, art. 3, p. 165). Contradictory cases are impossible; they could never happen. Since they are not genuine cases, divine power is not applicable to them. However, Aquinas did not carefully formulate the idea he proposed here. In expressing this intuition he used the modal verb “cannot” with the subject term “God” in most cases. Take into account the following of his remarks:

God cannot make yes and no true at the same time, not because of His lack of power, but because of the lack of possibility, such things are intrinsically impossible (Aquinas, 1952, I-18, 19).

Even though he did not think that the term “cannot” in the sentence above does not pose a limitation on divine power because the case in question is not a genuine case, the linguistic meaning of “cannot” implies that God’s power is applicable to such a case, and therefore He is unable to do it. Let’s continue with al-Ghazali’s view on omnipotence.

Al-Ghazali

Al-Ghazali can be regarded as one of the most influential Medieval theologians in the Islamic world. His criticisms directed to Avicenna’s or al-Farabi’s attempts to interpret Islam in terms of Aristotelian philosophy had a major influence on the formation of the Islamic world. He is usually considered to be a dogmatic theologian who attacked philosophy and prevented free thinking and intellectual progress in the Islamic world. However, if his criticisms are examined carefully, we see that his target was not the activity of philosophy but the false beliefs produced by certain philosophers. Avicenna and al-Farabi were critized by him on the grounds that their philosophies included some elements coming from Aristotelian philosophy, which is not accepted by Islam. It should be noted that his way of critizing them is not any less philosophical than his opponent’s way of arguing. He was certainly not dogmatic in rejecting them and engaged in philosophical activity in doing so. One of the most recurrent topics in his work was the omnipotence of God.

Like Aquinas, al-Ghazali excludes contradictions or impossibilities from the scope of divine power. That is to say, impossibilities are not objects of power. Let’s examine what he says exactly in his masterwork, Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers):

The impossible is not within the power [of being enacted]. The impossible consists in affirming a thing conjointly with denying it, affirming the more specific while denying the more general, or affirming two things while negating one [of them]. What does not reduce to this is not impossible, and what is not impossible is within [divine] power (al-Ghazali, 1997, 17th Discussion, 29th paragraph, 179).

However, al-Ghazali is more sensitive than Aquinas in expressing this idea. In his main works where he analyzes omnipotence, the Tahafut and al-Iqtisad, he never uses “cannot” as a modal verb in a sentence whose subject is God. I think this was a conscious decision, because the semantics or meaning of the term “can” or “cannot” includes the idea of ability or inability to do something, which is closely linked to the notion of power. The sentence “God cannot do x” presupposes that x is included in the extension to which divine power is applicable but God is unable to do it. To avoid this, al-Ghazali simply says “the impossible is not within divine power.” The idea assumed here by al-Ghazali is expressed by the notion of category mistakes in contemporary philosophy of language.

Category mistakes

When an expression systematically misleads us because of category confusion in representing a certain fact, then it is a “category mistake” (Ryle, 1949, 16). For example, referring to faculties, libraries, museums and scientific departments as being in the same category with universities is a category mistake. The university is not a member of the class of which the listed units are members of, but it is rather the way in which all of them are organized (Ryle, 1949, 16). We can give more examples. Predicating colors of numbers is another category mistake. For example, “Number 2 is yellow” is a sentence asserted as a result of category confusion. Numbers are not the things to which the color predicates apply. In other words, color-predicates have a certain range or extension of applicability, which excludes numbers. On the other hand, the properties of “being odd” or “being even” apply to numbers but not to material objects. To say that this chair is even is another category mistake.

So each predicate has a certain extension to which this predicate legitimately applies. Things or expressions that are not in the scope (extension) of a certain predicate lead to a category mistake if they are associated with this predicate. So the sentence “God cannot do x” includes a category mistake if x is a contradiction because contradictions are not within the scope of divine power.

As a result, the question of whether or not God can kill Himself can be answered in the following way by supporting al-Ghazali’s unnamed intuition of category mistakes: this question presupposes that divine power is applicable to such a case, but this is a category mistake. Because of that, this is an illegitimate question that can be answered neither by “yes” nor by “no.” It is like the following question: How many times did you kick your dog? Assume that you don’t have a dog. If you do not have a dog, then there is no point in asking the number of times you kicked the dog that you do not even have. Considering the reality, it is an absurd question.

The notion of Omnipotence

An answer formulated in this way, in response to the puzzle, treats the notion of power as a crucial element in understanding the relation between God and the universe. It also allows us to understand the meaning of omnipotence clearly. An omnipotent agent is an agent who can perform everything that falls under the scope of the notion of divine power. An omnipotent agent cannot be characterized as a being that is able to do anything unqualifiedly. Cases that do not fall under the scope of power are not legitimate cases to which divine power is applicable. The classical criticism of this view is that God is limited by proposing such a scope of limitation. However, what is limited is not an agent, namely God, but a notion, which is divine power. Contradictions are used in determining the notion of divine power. So they put a limitation on the definition or meaning of “divine power,” rather than on the agent who is powerful. By excluding these contradictions from the scope of power and including things that are within this scope, the notion is defined. In this sense, defining is putting limitations on the notion of power. God conceptualized in this way has infinite power, i.e. He can create everything that falls under the scope of power. Otherwise, allowing such contradictions within the scope of divine power will undermine of the very concept of God. Then, for instance, we should have said that God can kill Himself. If God can kill Himself, then He could not be accepted as God anymore because God is essentially eternal by definition. In order to have an intelligible idea of God, the scope of divine power must exclude such absurdities.

Conclusion

As it is shown in the sample case of omnipotence, the apparently theological problem has logical and linguistic aspects. This puzzle can be handled by some clarification of the meanings of crucial terms regarding this puzzle. Both Aquinas and al-Ghazali were aware of this aspect of the problem even though they did not clearly express the intuition, which we call “category mistakes,” in contemporary philosophy of language. Much confusion is encountered in daily life, especially in the topic of religion, that stems from the misuse of language. If we want to get rid of such confusion and be clear in our thinking, then we should seriously ponder on the use of language.

Bibliography

• Al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid. Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers). Michael E. Marmura (tr.), Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1997.
• Al-Iqtisad fi al-Itiqad. Ibrahim Agah Cubukcu and Huseyin Atay (ed.s), Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Ilahiyat Fakultesi Yayinlari, 1962.
• Aquinas, Thomas. On the Power of God (Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei). Lawrence Shapcote. Trans. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1952.
• Summa Theologiae. Latin text and English Translation. T. Gilby. (ed). 60 vols. London, 1963.
• Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. London: Taylor and Francis Books. 1949.

Different views of the teacher

The curriculum is a process. It is not a set of documents distributed win a central government office. The curriculum is based on a set of beliefs and views about the classification and organization of knowledge the respective roles of the teacher and learner, and the process of learning.

It may seem obvious that good teaching is carried out by good teachers, but within this simple concept are many diverse issues. Is a good teacher one who comes to school early and stays late? Is he or she one who stimulates the children, writes copious notes about philosophy of education or plans every moment of the day according to a teacher’s maul? Does the teacher’s dress have any bearing on ‘good teaching’? Can the individual who does not speak to his or her neighbours make a good teacher?

The idea of ‘good teacher’ is not simply a job description related to employment contracts, it is the very essence of educational philosophy. Earlier in the century the ‘good teacher’ was a ‘good disciplinarian’. With this notion came a particular understanding of the curriculum and classroom practice. During the l960s, the teacher was seen as a ‘facilitator’ inspiring children to ‘discover’ knowledge. This contrasted with the image of the all-knowledgeable specialist whose job it was to ‘till empty vessels’ with a commodity called ‘knowledge’.

Educationalists have arrived at the conclusion, that effective change in education cannot take place without re-examining the role of’ the teacher. This is an on-going process and the teacher is now seen as a ‘reflective practitioner’ or ‘an artist who is constantly striving to improve his or her art’. Stenhouse (1985) made a ‘call to arms’ saying that ‘the way ahead is to disseminate the idea of teacher as artist with the implication that artists exercise autonomy of judgement founded upon research directed towards the improvement of their art.’

Teachers need to reflect. They need to improve, but improvement does not take place in a vacuum. It takes place in discussion about issues. The contribution of early Muslim philosophers and educationalists can make an interesting contribution to this discussion.

The role of the teacher in Islamic education

The Prophet Muhammad,upon him be peace, affirmed: ‘Verily I was sent as a teacher.’ and himself established the status and role of the teacher. He chose, prepared and sent Companions to teach whole communities. Of all aspects of Islamic education, the role of the teacher has been the most clearly defined one.

The teacher has always been more important than the books. Imam al-Shafi’i, the famous jurist, said: ‘Whoever learns from books will miss the required achievement’ (lbn Jumah, p.87). Among the most concise descriptions of the teacher’s role was written by Imam al-Ghazali (d, 505H/ 1113) in his Ihya Ulum al-Din. (‘The Revival of the Islamic Sciences’) and his Ayyuha 1-Walad (‘0 Child!’). A text written nearly a hundred years later and covering similar themes and used in training teachers. Ta’lim al-Muta’allim by al-Zamuji. has also been translated into English. Below we summarise some of the main principles of teaching according to al-Ghazali.

Ghazali’s view of teaching and learning

Ghazali likens studying to the acquisition of wealth. There are four states in both. One may he:

1. actively seeking them but relying on others
2. self sufficient and independent
3. enjoying one’s hard-earned acquisition
4. enjoying and sharing one’s acquisition with others.

The fourth state is the highest. The one who shares his wealth is charitable. The one who shares his knowledge is a teacher. The Prophet upon him he peace said: ‘The best of you is the one who learns the Qur’an and teaches it.’ However, not all who claim to be teachers fall into this category.

In his hook al-Bidaya ,Ghazali describes three types of teacher: ‘There is a man who seeks knowledge as a provision for the life to come … he is of the successful ones’. There is the one who seeks knowledge for worldly benefit. This person is in jeopardy. It is possible that his knowledge will save him and he will repent before he dies. If he does not repent, he may be faced with a bad ending and punishment in the Next World. The third type has been overcome by the devil. He has chosen knowledge as a means to get wealth and influence. In addition to this evil intention he has become arrogant and feels he has obtained a high status with God. Such a person is among those who will be punished in the Hellfire. To be of the first category, Ghazali prescribes eight duties.

1. Empathy with one’s students

The teacher is often likened to the parent. He should feel the same sense of duty and love that the parent feels. The Prophet upon him be peace said: ‘I am to you like the father to his child.’

2. Not working for remuneration

Teachers do the work of the Prophets,that is they educate people in the ways of goodness. The Prophets did not ask for remuneration. They said : ‘Oh my people, I ask you not for riches. My reward is of God alone’ (Hud. ll.29), Teachers should not feel that their students ‘owe’ them anything. They should always give the students full credit and respect for disciplining themselves in order to come close to God. Teachers should not feel pride in what they have done. Although a teacher is allowed to take payment, anyone that teaches for money will soon lose the satisfaction and pleasure of teaching. Payment is a necessary but secondary aspect of a teacher’s motivation. The Messenger, upon him be peace said: ‘Three things which (society) cannot do without: paying of teachers, otherwise people would be ignorant: the selling of Qur’ans otherwise the Book would become rare: and judges. otherwise people would ‘eat’ one another.’

3. Guidance through the programme of study

The teacher should never hold back good advice. The religion is built on good counsel. Guiding the student is part of the religion. Groundwork must always be covered before attempting new tasks and approaching new concepts. ‘Guidance’ means reminding the student of the goal of study and condemning any desire for power boasting and competition.

4. Sensitivity and gentleness in addressing students

As a ‘guide’ the teacher should ‘drive away’ bad characteristics. This requires sensitivity and gentleness. Reprimand should take the form of suggestion as much as possible and guidance should not be through rebuking. Rebuking and outright and direct prohibition invite defiance and encourage stubbornness.

5. Respect for other disciplines

The teacher must never belittle other fields of knowledge in front of his students. He should respect them and prepare his students to study all useful knowledge without impressing on them his or her own personal interests.

6. Matching the lesson to what the student can understand

The teacher should follow the Prophets about whom the Prophet Muhammad said: ‘We Prophets have been commanded to place people in their rightful places and to speak to them according to their ability to understand.’ Giving students concepts which are beyond their comprehension may lead to misunderstanding and frustration. For this reason Jesus said: ‘Do not hang pearls around the necks of pigs.’ The teacher has to assess and evaluate the students’ level and then plan and guide.

7. Dealing with remedial learners

Not all people are the same. The teacher has to ensure, while helping learners to fulfil their potential that they are not given work or exposed to concepts which confuse and frustrate them. Some knowledge is compulsory. The teacher has to make sure the student attains this knowledge and then, sometimes, protect the student from going too far into what might cause harm.

8. Practising what one preaches

It is important that the teachers’ actions match what they teach. The student learns through observation of behaviour. Teachers open themselves to ridicule and accusation if their conduct belies their teachings. He will, through such behaviour, only encourage secret or open disobedience and bad character. In this respect a learned person has a greater responsibility than an ignorant one.

To be of the ‘best of people’ is not easy. The reward is great but so is the responsibility. The descriptions found in the works of Ghazali are as important today as they were 900 years ago. They are based on the words of the greatest of teachers. one who showed us how to fulfil that great role.

Refences

• AL-GHAZAIJ (n.d.) lhya ‘Ulum al-Din, Beirut.
• AL-GHAZALI(1983) Ayyuha 1-Walad (with notes by Daghi, MA.), Cairo.
• STENHOUSE, L. (1985) ‘Curriculum research. artistiy and teaching’ in RUDDUCK. J. AND HOPKINS, 0. (eds) from the Research as a Basis for Teaching: Readings Work of Lawrence Stenh use,London.
• AL-ZARNUJI 1947) Ta’lim, wal-Muta’allim, translated by C. E. Von Grunebaum, New York.
• IBN JUMAH (1933) Tadhkirat al-Sami’ wa’l-Mutakallim, Hyderabad.

Abu Hamid al-Ghazali was born in the city of Tus, northern Persia (Iran), in the year 450t-i/1058.

His father prayed that his two Sons would become great scholars. Al-Ghazali became ‘the most scholarly person of his generation and the imam of his time’ and his brother Ahmed ‘an awe-inspiring preacher’ (A1-Sabki, p.94). Through them, their father’s prayers were answered.

Al-Ghazali studied in Jurjan and Naisapur and became the head of the Nizamiya school in Baghdad, where he was involved in the political and religious issues of his time. He gave up his position of influence to take up devotional retreat in Damascus. From this important period of his life came the masterpiece Ihya Ulum al-Deen, The Revivification of the Religious Sciences. This, along with his other distinguished works, Ayuhal Walad and Bidayatul Hidayah made a great contribution to the development of educational philosophy.

Al-Ghazali died in the town of his birth in 505H/1113.

Zakariya al-Ansari was born in Sunaika in the Egyptian province of Sharqiyya in 824H/1449. His teachers include the great scholar of hadith Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani (died 852n/1449) and the jurist Jalal al-Din al-Mahali (d. 871H/1466). He rose to the position of Qadi, a position he held for twenty years. He lived through the end of the Mamluk reign and saw Egypt conquered by the Turkish Sultan Salim I. (1517). Al-Sha’rani describing the twenty years he spent with al-Ansari, said that he was ‘never inattentive and never missed even a supererogatory prayer’. He quoted his sheikh as saying: ‘I do not want to accustom myself to laziness’. Al-Ansari continued in this state of vigilance over religious matters until his death at the age of one hundred.

He wrote several books on jurisprudence including Manhaj altullab and commentaries on a variety of early texts including Ibn Malik’s famous poem containing the rules of Arabic grammar.

The references in this article are taken from a short treatise entitled al lu’lu’ al-Nazim fi Rum al-ta’alum wa ta‘lim, which explains his view of the curriculum.

Education and Ideology

Educational ideology, in the words of Scrimshaw (1983) is ‘that system of beliefs which gives the general direction to the educational policies of those who hold those beliefs’. The educational philosophy of Islam develops from the beliefs found in the Qur’an and Sunna. In the early days of Islam, Muslims’ approach to these beliefs were straightforward and uncontroversial. There were no differences of opinion regarding the beliefs and practices of the Prophet, upon him be peace. His companions constituted clear examples of his educational ideology wherever they settled. However, as Islam spread, it faced new problems and had to deal with differing ideologies and belief systems that had crept into the body of the Muslim community. The need to determine educational practice became increasingly important. The first books collecting the beliefs and practices that ‘gave the general direction of education’ were written in the third century. These included Adab al-Mu’alimeen by Muhammad bin Sahnun.

Educational beliefs address four main questions. They are:

• How is knowledge defined and how should it be classified?
• What is the role of the teacher?
• What is the role of the learner?
• What happens when learning takes place?

The definition and classification of knowledge

Al-Ghazali’s division of knowledge has sometimes been misunderstood. He has been accused of advocating a secular view of the curriculum. This misunderstanding has been compounded by the translation of his two main classifications of knowledge as ‘sacred and ‘profane’². A more accurate translation would be ‘revealed’ and ‘non-revealed’ knowledge. The first category covers ‘that which came from the prophets’. The second category includes ‘all knowledge obtained through the use of the intellect, experimentation or hearing’.

A full understanding of these two categories can only be understood by examining the relationship of the temporal world and the everlasting Hereafter. The two are intrinsically connected. Knowledge of the Hereafter is gained by examining the temporal world. The temporal world gives us signs and proofs of the existence of a Greater Existence and leads us to worship Him. Knowledge of the Hereafter teaches us how to live our temporal lives. All knowledge belongs to God. The two categories differ only in their means of acquisition.

Al-Ghazali also applies legalistic criteria. Knowledge may be fard, compulsory, or not. The fard knowledge is further divided into fard alayn, compulsory on every individual and fard al-kifaya, a compulsion on the community at large. The latter is fulfilled if at least one person learns it.

An example is the studying of medicine. –

Revealed knowledge may be of the fard al-ayn category i.e. the basic beliefs or fard al-kifaya i.e. principles of jurisprudence.

Non-revealed knowledge falls into three categories. The first is fard al-kifaya which therefore ranks among some of the types of revealed knowledge. These are connected to what al -Ghazali calls the four fundamental activities, without which human activities, including spiritual affairs, cannot be organized. They are –

i. agriculture

ii. cloth manufacture

iii. building

iv. politics.

Any activity auxiliary or subsidiary to any of the above is also fard-al kifaya. Iron production is auxiliary to agriculture. Milling and bread making is subsidiary to it. Both are compulsions on the community.

Compulsions fall on the individual or society according to specific situations. For example, one who enters Islam is not expected to know about fasting until the month of fasting arrives. Likewise, the compulsions on a community depend on how the society has developed with regards the four fundamental activities.

Another category is ‘praiseworthy’, which is not compulsory, knowledge. An example is the study of the intricacies of medicine or arithmetic. A basic understanding is supplementary to the fundamentals mentioned above and is therefore compulsory, but this is not true of its intricacies and detailed theories.

The other two categories are ‘blameworthy’ knowledge which includes magic and ‘neutral’ knowledge which includes poetry.

Al-Ansari’s classification of knowledge

Al-Ansari uses a slightly different classification. He identifies four categories.

1. Shariah studies

2. Literary studies

3. Studies based on exercise

4. Intellectual studies

The first category is similar to al Ghazali’s ‘revealed knowledge’. He includes three areas. They are Fiqh (jurisprudence), Tafsir (exegesis) and Hadith (traditions of the Messenger).

The second category includes fourteen branches of language including etymology, grammar, the study of metaphors, rhyme and speech making. The variations of Qur’anic reading are part of this category.

The third category presents the most radical alternative to the approach found in ‘modern’ school systems. Among the skills and studies that are developed through exercise are tasawuf (Islamic mysticism), engineering, music, politics, character building and domestic sciences.

The intellectual studies include areas such as logic, the principles of jurisprudence, medicine, the study of time and astronomy.

Although it is unlikely that any school would want to return purely to the syllabus of al-Ghazali or al-Ansari, their approach can help us to identify priorities in schools. They can also help us to break away from what is becoming a uniformly Western approach to knowledge. Islam has contributed greatly to education and educational theory. By looking at great thinkers like al-Ghazali and al-Ansari, Muslims and non-Muslims alike can consider alternative approaches to syllabus organization.

In our next article we will examine the role of the teacher and the student.

Abu Hamid Muhammad bin Muhammad al-Ghazali was born in the city of , northern Persia (Iran), in the year 1058/450H.

His father, a wool spinner, used to enjoy the company of preachers and scholars and prayed that his sons would be like them. Ghazali, became ‘the most scholarly person of his generation and the imam of his time’; his brother Ahmed ‘an awe-inspiring preacher’ (Al Sabki p.94). Through them, their father’s prayers were answered.

After their father’s death, the brothers, along with their inheritance, were entrusted to a poor ascetic. When the inheritance ran out, the ascetic commended them to pursue their education in a school where they might be financially supported. Ghazali excelled as a student. He used to ‘thirst after comprehension of things as they are’ (Watt, p.21). He recalls: ‘we studied ‘um, knowledge, for other than Allah, but it refused to be studied except for Allah.’ (Zabidi,p.l94).

He left for Jurjan, where he took notes on the lectures of Abu Nasr al-Isma’ili. On his return journey, he was waylaid by a highwayman. He pleaded only for his notebooks. The highway-man mocked: ‘How can you cali yourself a scholar, when, if I take your books you have lost your knowledge?’ His books were returned to him, and, as a result of the incident, he spent the next three years memorizing his notes, so that ‘no highwayman could rob him of his knowledge’ (Sabki, p. 195).

He travelled to Naisabur, the largest town in Khorasan and studied there under imam al-Haramain, ‘Abd al-Malik al-Juwaini. After his sheikh’s death, he headed for the Seljuk camp of the Sultan Nizam al-Mulk in Baghdad. The scholars of Baghdad recognised Ghazali’s excellence and he was soon appointed head of the Nizamiya school. it was whilst in this position that he became famous and involved himself in the political and religious disputes of the time.

In 1093/485H, Ghazali renounced celebrity and public influence for devotional retreat. He spent long periods in contemplation in the Umayyad Mosque of Damascus. He also visited Makkah several times. it was in 1097/489H, that, at the grave of the Prophet Abraham, he concluded never ‘to receive money from any ruler, nor to greet any ruler nor to be inspector over anyone’ (Ghazali, p.85). On his way home to, he travelled through Baghdad, but, upholding his vow, he stayed at the retreat of Abu Sa’id al-Naisaburi and did not visit its rulers. it was there that he told of the work he had carried out in recluse and the resulting book ihya ‘Ulum al-Din. On arrival in , he concentrated on worship and teaching until, on seeing the poor state of education, he returned to Naisabur and the public defence of the Suma using the teachings of his book ihya, until on Monday 14 Jumadi al-Akhira 1113/505H when, after praying his morning prayers, he told his brother Ahmed to prepare for his funeral. He died that day and was buried next to the imam Ali Rida in Mashad, Iran.

Philosophy of Education among the Muslims before Ghazali

Ghazali’s philosophy contained nothing that could not be traced back to the Qur’an and Sunna.

The Islamic philosophy of education draws largely on the stories in the Qur’an as its primary source. An example is the story in which Allah teaches Adam the meaning of ‘things’, and then instructs him to teach the Angels. Among other stories in the Qur’an used by Muslim educationalists to justify their philosophy is the story of Musa and Khidr and the numerous stories of the Prophets and their disciples.

The Prophet Muhammad, upon whom be peace, advised many of his Companions how to teach. He told Muadh bin Jabal and Abi Musa when they went to the Yemen: ‘Make things easy and do not make things difficult, teach and do not chase away’ (Bukhari). On another occasion he said: ‘Teach and do not rebuke for the teacher is better than the ne who rebukes.’ (Tayalasi)

‘Schools’ in the form of ‘study circles’ were established during the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the frst four Caliphs. These ‘learning centres’ developed around the prominent companions.

Although the sayings of Muhammad, upon whom be peace, and the main companions concerning education were not recorded together, they were contained in scattered collections and transmitted practically wherever schools existed.

The first book expounding the educational philosophy of islam was adab al-muallimin by Muhammad bin Þahmn. This was followed by books by Ibn Jizar al-Qairawani¹ and Abu Hasan al Qabini.’

Ghazali’s ihya is a milestone in the development of educational philosophy because it brought together and simplified many of the ideas of his predecessors. Most subsequent writings on Islamic teaching philosophy merely abridged r commented upon his work.

Ghazali’s writings on education

Among Ghazali’s writings on education are the following:

Ihya ‘Ulum al-Din (The Revival of the Religious Sciences)

Ghazali’s ihya, written during his period of retreat, is probably his most important and well known work. The first of its forty books is Kitab al-Ilm, The Book of Knowledge. This, along with the section on riyadat al-atfal, (Children’s Play) contains Ghazali’s most direct references to education.

Ayyuha l-Walad, (Oh Son)

This short text was written after ihya in response to a request from ne of his students. Its title expresses Ghazali’s view that the teacher is like a father to his student.

Bidayat al-Hdaya (The Beginning of Guidance)

The first chapter of this short text is often read by the novice to his sheikh as a type of initiation. it contains a warning about insincerity in seeking knowledge and a description of the various types of scholar and student.

Minhaj al-Mutalim (The Student’s System)

There is some controversy ver whether this book can rightly be attributed to Ghazali.² Its content is similar to Ayyuha l-Walad and it is thought to be possibly a summary of Ghazali’s writings on education.

AH but the last of the writings mentioned above have been translated into English.

REFERENCES

• AL-SABKI (n.d) Tabaqat al-Shafiat al-Kubra, vol. 6, Dar al-Marifa, Cairo. AL-ZABIDI (n.d) Itihaf Sadat al-Mutaqin, Beirut.
• AL GHAZALI (n.d.) Fada ‘il al-Anam, Cairo BUKHARI (1975) Sahih: Book of Knowledge, Beirut
• TAYALASI (n.d.) Maqasid al-Hasanah, Cairo WATT W.M. (1953) Faith and practice of Ghazali (trans. of Munqidh min al-Dalaf), London.

1. Ibn Jizar Al Qairawani d.395H/1003c.e. who wrote Siyostu Sibyan wa Tadbiraha. Abu Hasan Ali bin Muhammad Al Qabiti d.463H/1072c.e. wrote Adab al-Mualimeen
2. According to Haji Khalifa it is the work of Ghazali. However it is not mentioned in wo/iot al-‘Ayn r Shadharat al-Dhahab r the History ofDamascus by Ibn Asakir.