It is essential for people who work internationally or in multicultural settings to familiarize themselves with implications of cultural differences. Hofstede’s model can be used as an excellent guide for educators who are aiming to operate more effectively in different parts of the world.

We live in a world of diverse cultures. It is crucial to understand the implications of cultural differences in order to be successful in such a diverse world. Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010) in their book, “Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind: Intercultural Cooperation and Its Importance for Survival,” present a detailed overview of culture and its dimensions, as well as why intercultural cooperation is vital for a brighter future for humanity. The purpose of this essay is to review the model of culture presented by Hofstede et al (2010) with a focus on educational considerations. As intercultural encounters in schools can lead to confusions, it is especially critical for educators to understand the implications of working in diverse educational settings.

According to Hofstede et al. (2010, 6), culture is the collective mental programming of our minds, much of which is acquired during our childhood when we are open to learning and assimilation. The first 10-12 years are when we are most receptive and when we unconsciously absorb what our environment presents us, which ultimately becomes our mental program (Hofstede et al. 2010, 9). Culture can be inferred by the patterns of how we think, feel, and act (Hofstede et al. 2010, 11). It is reflected in all areas of life, from family and school, to organizations and politics, and is an important aspect in explaining why countries differ in many ways.

Culture has multiple layers (Hofstede et al. 2010, 8-9). Rituals, symbols, and heroes of a country represent the outer layers of culture that are visible practices and that can change relatively easily as compared to values. At the core of the culture lie values that constitute the relatively constant layer of culture. Values relate with broad tendencies to things such as “good-evil,” “clean-dirty,” “rational-irrational.” Values shape the institutions of a country, such as families, education systems, governments, and laws (Hofstede et al. 2010, 23-24). Institutions are vital in shaping the future of a country. For example, culture and institutions can explain why some countries develop and others remain underdeveloped, or why some countries are ruled by authoritarian regimes as opposed to democratic ones.

Six dimensions of culture identified by Hofstede et al. (2010, 29-38) can be stated as:

power distance,
collectivism versus individualism,
femininity versus masculinity,
uncertainty avoidance,
long-term versus short-term orientation, and
indulgence versus restraint.

These dimensions can help explain certain prevalent characteristics in a nation or society. For example, power distance can be associated with the use of violence in a country’s domestic political system and the existence of inequality; individualism can help explain national prosperity and social mobility between social classes; femininity and masculinity can have an impact on both parenting, laws, and even the amount of humanitarian aids; whereas uncertainty avoidance is associated with religion, and long-term orientation with national savings rates. Indulgence versus restraint concerns human desires such as enjoying life and having fun.

Since culture affects us in every level of society, it would be a complex task to try to explain all aspects of it. Therefore, the rest of this article focuses on culture as it relates to education along the first five dimensions, which have been shown to have an association with certain educational outcomes as presented by Hofstede et al. (2010). The approach followed by Hofstede et al. is neutral (2010, 25). Hence, both individualistic cultures and collectivistic cultures, for example, can have advantages and disadvantages, therefore one should not be perceived superior to the other.

The first dimension “power distance” (Hofstede et al. 2010, 53-86) represents how inequality is expected and accepted by the less powerful members of a society. In large power distance societies, where inequality is the norm, children are expected to be obedient to their parents as well as teachers. There is a relationship of dependence, and the elderly are treated with respect. In an educational setting, which is teacher-centered, teachers are regarded with respect and even fear. In such cultures, students stand up when teachers enter the classroom and they show respect for the teacher even outside the classroom. The teacher dictates the communication pattern by deciding who speaks when. There is a strict order in the classroom. The educational quality is dependent on the teacher, who is seen as the guru or “the wise one.” High power distance countries are mostly Asian countries, Eastern European countries, Latin countries, Arabic-speaking countries, and African countries. In low power distance cultures, on the other hand, education is student-centered. Students and teachers are expected to treat each other as equals. Students are expected to take initiative and shape their own growth paths towards being independent individuals. Students can intervene while the teacher is talking; they are expected to ask questions; they can criticize or challenge the teacher intellectually, and are not expected to show respect for the teacher outside the school setting. In low power distance cultures, two-way communication is vital to a student’s success. Examples of low power distance countries are German-speaking countries, Scandinavian countries, Baltic countries, the United States, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.

The second dimension of culture is “collectivism and individualism” (Hofstede et al. 2010, 89-133) and relates to the role of the individual versus the role of the group. Most of the world’s population lives in collectivist cultures and individualist cultures are the exception. Examples of countries with individualist cultures include the United States, Australia, Great Britain, and Canada. Examples of collectivist cultures include Latin American countries, Pakistan, Indonesia, South Korea, and China. Collectivist cultures are “we” oriented whereas individualist cultures are “I'” oriented. The in-group and out-group distinctions are starker in collectivist societies making them more exclusionist as compared to individualist cultures that are more universalist (or inclusive) with respect to the larger society outside one’s moral circle. In collectivist cultures, children grow up in extended family settings whereas in individualist cultures children grow up in nuclear families. In collectivist cultures, the purpose of education is to get a good paying job that can benefit the extended family whereas in individualist cultures the purpose of education is to facilitate children to become independent and stand on their own feet. In collectivist cultures, loyalty to the family is central to one’s life and there is a dependence relationship between family members. On the other hand, healthy individuals in individualist cultures are supposed to leave home after they become financially independent.

In an educational setting, students from collectivist cultures show a tendency to not speak up. This is because the student sees herself as part of a group, and feels no need to speak up unless the rest of the group makes her speak. In such cultures, the teacher needs to take the initiative and call a student by name to help her speak. Also, in collectivist cultures students tend not to speak up in larger groups without the teacher’s presence, especially when there are strangers. The remedy for this tendency is to divide the group into smaller sizes to increase participation. Due to strong in-group and out-group identities in collectivist cultures, students tend to form subgroups based on their ethnic or clan backgrounds. Therefore, it is a challenge to form groups based on task assignments in collectivist cultures as compared to individualist cultures where task assignments determine formation of groups. Furthermore, in these cases, students expect to see preferential treatment from the teacher if they share the same background. In individualist cultures, such a treatment is seen as nepotism and treated as immoral. This is in contrast with collectivist cultures that perceive it as immoral if the teacher does not exhibit preferential treatment for his or her kin.

In the individualist educational setting, students expect to be treated as individuals and in an impartial manner without any discrimination. Students can easily form groups, discuss issues or differences openly without worrying about losing face, and can also confront each other. In contrast, in the collectivist educational setting, the teacher needs to deal with a student as part of an in-group, not as an individual. Collectivist cultures avoid confrontations and conflict, as students feel a need to save face and not to be ashamed.

In individualist cultures, learning is perceived as a life-long process that should continue after school and throughout one’s whole life. The focus is on how to learn rather than knowing how to do certain tasks. The aim of education is to prepare the student to become an individual in a society that is composed of other individuals. Thus, it is critical to teach students to learn how to deal with the surprises of life that cannot be guessed beforehand. On the other hand, in collectivist cultures, the focus of education is to prepare an individual to become a good group member. Therefore, students are given virtues and skills on how to do things and how to fit into the tradition of the in-group. Education is a one-time process that is attained during youth and does not continue later in life. In the individualist society, diplomas and certificates are regarded as individual accomplishments that foster one’s self-respect as well as feeling of achievement, and help to enhance one’s economic capability. In the collective society, diplomas and certificates bring honor to the individuals and their in-groups such as the family, and are regarded as tools to engage with higher status groups such as becoming a member of a rich extended family through marriage.

The third dimension of culture, “masculinity and femininity” (Hofstede et al. 2010, 135-184), is related to the prevalence or desirability of assertiveness versus modesty in a society. A society can be characterized as masculine when emotional gender role differences are apparent. In other words, men are supposed to take responsibility outside the home and be assertive, tough, and financially oriented; whereas women are supposed to take responsibility at home by being the caretaker of all, modest, kind, and tender. These stark distinctions get blurry in more feminine cultures where both men and women tend to take on the role of the compassionate caretaker of the family. Scandinavian countries like Sweden and Norway are examples of feminine cultures, and Latin American and Eastern European cultures are examples of masculine cultures.

In masculine educational settings, students strive on showing themselves off and competing openly with classmates. Failure is hardly acceptable, which may even lead students to commit suicide. Competitive sports are taken very seriously. Job choice decisions by students are mainly based on a student’s perception of availability of career opportunities. A teacher’s brilliance and student success are the most important criteria in evaluating teachers. Boys tend to get priority in education. Women generally teach younger students, whereas men teach at the college level.

In feminine educational settings, success is something that one keeps to oneself and assertive behavior is mocked. Displays of smartness and excellence easily induce jealousy. Failure is a minor issue and is not cared about as much. Competitive sports are only extracurricular activities that do not carry much importance. Job choices are made based on a student’s interests. A teacher’s social skills and student’s social adaptability are the main criteria for evaluating teachers. Both boys and girls are educated using the same curricula. Both men and women can teach young children and college students, since roles are mixed.

The fourth dimension, “uncertainty avoidance” (Hofstede et al. 2010, 187-233), relates to the society’s degree of tolerance of the ambiguous and the unpredictable. As human beings, we have to live with the fact that the future is uncertain. This dimension shows itself in the form of a need for rules and is expressed through nervous stress or anxiety. Examples of high uncertainty avoidance cultures include Greece, Portugal, Guatemala, Uruguay, Belgium, and Russia. Examples of low uncertainty avoidance cultures include Jamaica, Singapore, Sweden, and Denmark.

In the classroom setting, students from strong uncertainty avoidance cultures may prefer highly structured learning with clear objectives, clear timetables, as well as detailed assignments. Accordingly, accuracy should be rewarded, such as in the case of finding the one correct answer to a problem. Students expect the teacher to be the expert and respect teachers who use cryptic academic language. Students do not disagree with their professors. Students are more likely to attribute their success to luck and circumstances. Parents are occasionally brought in by teachers into the classroom, but they are almost never consulted as the teacher is always the expert.

On the other hand, students from weak uncertainty avoidance cultures do not prefer too much structure. Instead, they favor open-ended problems with vague objectives as well as broad assignments without timetables. Students from such cultures do not hesitate to disagree with instructors and they still respect them even if they admit that they do not know the answer to a particular question. Students are more likely to attribute their success to their own achievement. Teachers actively involve parents in a student’s education and ask for ideas for enhancement.

The fifth and final dimension of culture, “long-term versus short-term orientation” (Hofstede et al. 2010, 235-274), relates to the importance of future rewards. It can be observed in the form of “perseverance and thrift” in long-term oriented cultures and has been associated with economic growth in East Asia. Short-term orientation can be observed more in the form of giving precedence to virtues related to past and present, such as respect for tradition, protecting face, and meeting social obligations. Examples of long-term oriented cultures include China, Honk Kong, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. Examples of short-term oriented cultures include Egypt, Nigeria, Puerto Rico, and Ghana.

In short-term oriented cultures, the main work values include freedom, rights, achievement, and thinking for oneself, whereas in long-term oriented cultures, the main work values include learning, honesty, adaptiveness, accountability, and self-discipline. Math scores are strongly correlated with the long-term orientation of a culture (e.g. East Asian countries) as measured by the TIMMS (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study – an international comparative test of math and science scores). Also, math and science scores are highly mutually correlated. This suggests that learning and teaching are culturally conditioned. This difference of scores across cultures can be explained by the differences in the encouragement of self-enhancement that reduces children’s interest in self-improvement activities like education. Accordingly, in such cultures, people seek positive information about themselves, and dismiss negative information. One needs to admit that he or she needs self-improvement and that takes a culture which encourages admitting such a deficiency. For example, Asian students in the United States are more likely to attribute success to effort and failure to lack of it.

Apart from the dimensions of culture, intercultural encounters can have important implications both between migrant or refugee students and local teachers, as well as expatriate instructors teaching in a foreign country to native students (Hofstede et al. 2010, 393-395). Hofstede et al. (2010, 395) suggest that the teachers should learn the language of the students (rather than expecting students to learn their language) to be able to overcome cultural barriers and be more effective in teaching in a culturally relevant manner. Information should be fit into a cultural framework to be meaningful. Therefore, culturally adequate translation is a very valuable art, as what is considered to be important in one language does not necessarily translate into another language meaningfully.

Moreover, differences in cognitive abilities need to be considered by teachers working in foreign cultures (Hofstede et al. 2010, 394). We learn fundamental things according to the demands of our environment while growing up. Therefore, we become better at things that we often do and that are important to us. Learning abilities including memory power emanate from cultural patterns of a society. For example, in China the visual nature of the script develops the pattern recognition abilities while imposing rote learning on students. Another complication arises from use of irrelevant material in classrooms. Some concepts that may be relevant in some countries may not apply in others. For example, organizational behavior concepts in wealthy countries may be irrelevant in poor countries. Finally, intercultural issues can emerge from institutional differences that create varying expectations in relation to the educational process and the role of different parties. Examples include the pay and status of teachers, whether the students served are from elite families or whether the educational system is elitist, and the role of the state in dictating the curriculum (Hofstede et al. 2010, 395).

In sum, culture is a complex concept with multiple dimensions. Cultural differences are a fact of life. It is essential for people who work internationally or in multicultural settings to familiarize themselves with implications of such differences. Hofstede et al. (2010)’s cultural model helps us understand this complex phenomenon, and can be used as an excellent guide for educators who are aiming to operate more effectively in different parts of the world.

Reference

Hofstede, Geert, Gert J. Hofstede and Michael Minkov. 2010. Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw Hill.

The purpose of this article is to shed light on such questions from an academic perspective by focusing especially on religious identity. It is especially crucial to understand identity as it is a widely used concept in social scientific academic disciplines in explaining the causes of many prominent social and cultural phenomena that take place in the world.

Identity is derived from group membership. In this respect, Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010) equate identity to one’s belonging to a group. Further, Hofstede et al. (2010) state that identity is visible, it is commonly rooted in language (such as Latin American identity deriving from Spanish) or religious affiliation (such as Muslim identity deriving from Islam), and can be differentiated by shared symbols, heroes, and rituals that are part of observable practices but not necessarily the values of a nation. Identity is not a core part of national cultures; it is explicit, and it can change.

An individual can have multiple identities. For example, one can identify herself as a woman, Jewish, and American. Multiple identities are dependent on culture, especially on the individualist – collectivist cultural dimension. Individualistic environments allow multiple identities and permit identity shifts. On the other hand, in collectivistic cultures, one’s group identity is mainly based on one group, which may be ethnic, religious, community-based, or national (Hofstede et al. 2010).

People who share similar ethnic and cultural backgrounds may have different group identities and fight with each other, such as Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland (Hofstede et al. 2010). In this respect, Pruitt and Kim (2004) posit that groups with strong group identity are the ones whose members are highly identified with the group and they are more likely to be involved in conflict. Accordingly, members of such groups feel the suffering of the fellow group members deeply. Group identity is especially strong among people who have historical ethnic or religious ties and perceive that they are being illegitimately deprived of their basic needs (Pruitt and Kim 2004). For example, Muslims in different areas of the world, including places as distant as the United States and Indonesia, can protest at the same time when they perceive injustice against Egyptian Muslims.

From another perspective, in explaining the changes taking place in the world after the Cold War, Huntington (2007) states that social, cultural, and economic modernization processes have disrupted people’s identity sources in the second half of the twentieth century as people moved from countryside to the city. Religion has provided the meaning and purpose as the new source of identity that people seek, hence a new revival of religion and de-secularization began. For example, Orthodoxy in Slavic republics and Islam in Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union resurged, filling the gap of the communist ideology as people identified themselves more and more with their authentic religions that were suppressed by Communism (which was the main source of identity in the Soviet Union).

Similarly, in Turkey, in the 1990s, the ultra-secularist state-driven Kemalist identity was challenged with the revival of the Muslim identity. In this respect, Huntington (2007) argues that psychological, emotional and social needs of people caught in the traumas of modernization are best satisfied by a global religious revival. In the case of Muslim communities, Islam provided the answer to these needs, causing the Islamic Resurgence. According to Huntington (2007), the recent Islamic Resurgence is “the latest phase in the adjustment of Islamic civilization to the West, an effort to find the ‘solution’ not in Western ideologies but in Islam. It embodies acceptance of modernity, rejection of Western culture, and recommitment to Islam as the guide to life in the modern world.” Similarly, Hunt and Aslandogan (2007, 96) posit that by the early twentieth century, Muslims perceived themselves as “part of intellectual, political, and social movements that sought either a restoration and renewal of the Islamic civilization of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, a return to the purity of the period of Muhammad and his immediate successors, or even a thoroughgoing ‘modernization’ of Islam.”

The resurgence was not limited to the Islamic world. In South Korea, a traditionally Buddhist nation, where only one to three percent of the population was Christian in 1950, Christianity spread. Presbyterians and Catholics were at least 30 percent of South Korea’s population in the 1980s (Huntington 2007). In the case of Latin America, “The number of Protestants in Latin America increased from roughly 7 million in 1960 to about 50 million in 1990” (Huntington 2007, 1779) which according to Huntington (2007, 1783) is “a major net increase in religious commitment and participation” rather than a replacement of one religion with another. According to Huntington, such changes in South Korea and Latin America reflect the ability of Protestantism in meeting the psychological, emotional, and social needs of people caught in the traumas of modernization more than Catholicism and Buddhism. Hence, worldwide identities became more aligned with religion due to psychological and spiritual needs satisfaction in the midst of the complexities of modernization and change, which can create confusion.

From the theories of conflict perspective, identity can be used to explain many of the conflicts in the world. According to Deutsch, Coleman and Marcus (2006), basic needs such as security, identity, recognition of identity, freedom, distributive justice, and participation are seen as the essential elements for human development. Social identity theory asserts that the group that one belongs to is part of his identity, and one tends to view the group favorably to reinforce his self-respect. Thus, one perceives an attack on his in-group as an assault on his self-worth (Pruitt and Kim 2004). Since identity groups serve as the primary vehicle through which these needs are expressed and satisfied, intergroup conflict takes place when one group’s basic needs are frustrated or denied (Deutsch et al. 2006). Accordingly, intergroup conflict increases cohesiveness within the competing groups, primarily through the effects of threat. A perception of threat plays a key role by heightening in-group solidarity in addition to increasing hostility toward the threatening out-group, especially if there is a history of antagonism between the groups (Deutsch et al. 2006).

Furthermore, identity groups exist in organizations and communities. Wherever groups gather around a common social identity, if needs for recognition of that identity or for dignity, safety, or control are obstructed, conflict is highly likely. In this respect, professional groups, scientific disciplines, political parties, government departments, lobby groups, businesses, sports teams, street gangs – all carry a sense of group identity that shapes their dealings with other groups (Deutsch et al. 2006).

Based on social identity theory, since an individual’s self-esteem is linked to group membership, a positive self-concept requires favorable evaluations of one’s group and discriminatory comparisons with other groups (Deutsch et al. 2006). For example, ethnic groups exhibit ethnocentrism and national groups exhibit nationalism-pride and loyalty to their own nation, while defaming other nations.

According to Huntington (2007), in fault line wars, casual and multiple identities often transform and become more focused and hardened. With increased violence, communal conflicts become identity wars and the initial issues at stake tend to get redefined more exclusively as “us” against “them” as group cohesion and commitment are enhanced. With political leaders’ narratives emphasizing and capitalizing on ethnic and religious loyalties, civilization consciousness strengthens with respect to other identities. An example is the war in Bosnia where the common Slavic or Yugoslav ethnic identity diminished, and Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox identities came to the front among the three fighting groups as nationalist political leaders built their agendas on ethnocentrism and religious differences.

Nevertheless, religious identity can take a constructive form and play an important role in peace building (Deutsch et al. 2006). Accordingly, when faithfulness is a source of extending compassion, justice, tolerance, and respect to other people regardless of their faith, it can prevent violence and help build peace. In places where religious diversity is celebrated, religious identity can become the mediating factor for understanding and cooperation. Faith based diplomacy is an example where religious identity is the opening point for building trust and starting dialogue (Deutsch et al. 2006). Parties involved in interfaith – intercultural dialogue can attain a better understanding of their own religious or cultural identity and how it acts to form their perspective of the world and others. Therefore, interfaith dialogue is not only about learning about others’ faith traditions, but it is also exploration of one’s own identity. It also helps develop respect and understanding of various traditions as parties break down barriers of misunderstanding and build trusting relationships (Deutsch et al. 2006).

Another area where religious identities can foster bonds with others is humanitarian relief work. One can capitalize on her religious beliefs in protecting or enhancing human life regardless of ethnic or religious identity of the needy. The Kimse Yok Mu foundation in Turkey is based on such concepts that transcend identity based boundaries. Furthermore, Hunt and Aslandogan (2007) point out that education can become the vehicle through which a higher sense of identity can be developed to end divisions and frictions over artificial differences. Hence, the role of education for promoting a universal view of humanity and for the development of understanding and tolerance to secure respect for the rights of others is tremendous. One such educational endeavor is brought to life through the implementation of the annual Turkish Olympiads in Turkey, where identity based differences are minimized and universal values are emphasized around speaking a common language among students from more than 140 countries.

In conclusion, understanding the concept of identity can be especially important for international development, disaster relief, interfaith – intercultural dialogue, and education work in differentiating why and how various groups of people around the world identify themselves with various factors such as religion, ethnicity, language, and race. In the international development domain, it is vital to work with identity-based sensitivities in mind, as identity underlies many conflicts around the world. In the interfaith – intercultural dialogue domain, on the other hand, different identities provide the basis for much needed cooperation for a brighter future for all.

References

• Deutsch Morton, Peter T. Coleman, and Eric C. Marcus. 2006. The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice. Kindle Edition.
• Hofstede, Geert, Gert J. Hofstede and Michael Minkov. 2010. Cultures And Organizations: Software of The Mind. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw Hill.
• Hunt, Robert, and Yuksel Aslandogan. 2007. Muslim Citizens of the Globalized World. Kindle Edition.
• Huntington, Samuel P. 2007. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Simon & Schuster. Kindle Edition.
• Pruitt, Dean G. and Sung Hee Kim. 2004. Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw Hill.

This past April has been a busy one for The Fountain staff. We have had gatherings with our contributors in several states in the US, including Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Texas, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Travel is a great joy when merged with thoughtful discussions – this is at least what we believe at The Fountain. Discussions are a feast when you have participants, each a brilliant mind in their respective fields, and many of whom are faculty or PhD candidates. We are especially thankful to the Dialogue Institute in Jackson, Mississippi, for bringing together a very distinguished group of guests who eagerly shared their views and asked inquisitive questions.

The Dialogue Institute in Houston has been organizing roundtable discussions every Sunday in cooperation with The Fountain, and the “consumerism” theme we laid down in April reminded us of our personal and societal weaknesses as we are tempted to consume more and more, usually unnecessarily. In Pittsburgh, we visited a recently formed study group of Americans (hosted by Peace Islands) who pick an article, and read, discuss, and contemplate over it when each new issue comes out. And finally, we gladly enjoyed a faith-filled event titled “When Beauty Whispers to the Heart,” an interfaith conference organized in cooperation with Sacred Heart University in New Haven, Connecticut, and Peace Islands Institute.

Panels and one-on-one talks about the magazine and its ethos followed one after another, filling a whole month, all the way from the glacier covered Niagara Falls in Buffalo to the warm shores of Miami. We did not have to survive shark attacks and a volcanic eruption, as Walter Mitty of Life magazine did in the movie; but we at least had the same feeling of “drawing closer” when we conversed with our contributors and readers. These gatherings meant a lot to us, as we believe our contributors are among “those who will shape tomorrow with their ideas will be the guides of generations to come. The way they think and reason will redesign the world, and their messages will brighten the future” (quote from the Lead Article).

What you will find in this issue is another journey across an ocean of ideas, from the meaning of true liberty which “Laborers of Thought” of the future will aspire, to the psychology of morality and how we apply it in our everyday lives; from a dialogue of flowers to the artificial replacement of a failing heart. A book review on Thomas Jefferson’s Qur’an explains the nature of freedom to practice any faith in North America and how it has evolved since the founding fathers. This review is complemented by Donald Beechers’ “Hearts and Minds for a Country: Nation and Construction of Self Identity,” in which the author discusses the concept of nationalism in the context of Canada, which is by definition an immigrant nation.

These situations entail the psychology of morality-an intriguing and growing topic of study. Significant and insightful research has been completed in an attempt to understand more about morality from a psychological perspective. Many questions have been raised in the realm of morality and ethics, such as: How do people think about morality? What are people’s concepts of a moral person? How do people apply morality in conflict and their everyday lives?

In psychologists’ attempts to answer these questions, we learn more about mankind as a whole and about our own individual selves. This article will summarize some of the most prominent studies in the field of morality psychology and use these perspectives to help attain a better understanding of who a moral person is and what they do.

Exploring differences in moral foundations between political liberals and conservatives is one interesting area of research in the psychology of morality. Graham, et al. (2009) established a definition of a moral foundation as consisting of five moral intuitions: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. The researchers found that political liberals were likely to chiefly judge a moral situation along the harm/care and fairness/reciprocity aspects, while conservatives were more likely to use all aspects equally. The results of this study seem to agree with the ideologies of liberals and conservatives. Considering that conservatives are less receptive to changes in political policies and culture, it makes sense that they would place a high value on the authority of a government, and also that they would give more weight to protecting their in-group from outside influences. This ideology may in turn stem from a Hobbesian worldview (Thomas Hobbes, 1588-1679) in that everyone is at the most basic level self-interested, and therefore they must protect their own interests from the interests of others.

Liberals, on the other hand, would be more likely to go against the authority of the government or in-group concerns if they felt a moral injustice was being committed. This may be one reason why conservatives sometimes accuse liberals of not being patriotic.

As for the purity/sanctity condition, there is some doubt as to whether it can really be considered a moral facet. Conservatives seem to think that this is the case, but liberals on the other hand give nearly zero consideration to aspects of purity during moral judgments, as it seems to be an unrelated concept. Additionally, this idea may explain why conservatives tend to be against gay marriage, while liberals are more likely to support gay relationships.

Before moving on, let me pose another question: which action is more moral, volunteering time in a soup kitchen or keeping your vow to your wife not to go to the racetrack and gamble on payday?

Now we turn our attention to an enlightening study by Janoff-Bulman, et al. (2009) that analyzed morality in a different way: by categorizing it into two distinctive types, prescriptive and proscriptive. Prescriptive morality has a commendatory and encouraging nature, and it is characterized by taking positive action and the question what one should do to be moral. Proscriptive morality is more commanding and punishing in its aspects, and it is characterized by preventing negative action and the question what one should not do to prevent immorality. The distinction between the two can be states as helping versus not harming.

The researchers provide evidence for these two different types of morality in their studies. For example, in one experiment, participants were asked to describe what they thought it meant to be-depending on the manipulation-either moral or immoral. They had correctly predicted that proscriptive morality tended to have more concrete and defined language, so as to assist its adherents in knowing exactly what actions are wrong. Prescriptive morality’s language was more abstract so as to include more possible right actions.

It was also found that people were more disapproving when someone committed forbidden acts as opposed to someone failing to perform righteous acts. This finding-that it is generally more objectionable to see an overtly immoral act than to see a failure to commit a positive act-is strong evidence for the prescriptive/proscriptive distinctions of morality.

There are many more questions about morality researchers are asking. For instance, what lies behind the rationalization of a racist behavior or attitude? How are people’s moral principles influenced by the particular identity of the individuals involved? Uhlmann, et al. (2009) examined these topics. Most of us tend to think of ourselves as having a relatively stable moral standing, but this study showed that for most people, this simply is not the case. People were presented with different moral dilemmas that measured if they would support either a consequentialist solution or a deontological solution to the dilemma. According to the researchers’ hypothesis, changing some details of the scenario could influence people’s preference for either consequentialism (the idea that it is permissible to commit an action that would normally be considered immoral for the benefit of the greater good) or deontology (the idea that there are some actions that are morally wrong under any and all circumstances); this is in fact what they observed.

They observed that political liberals were more likely to sacrifice a white man to save a black group of people and less likely to sacrifice a black man to save a white group. The reverse effect was observed for conservatives in that they were more willing to sacrifice a black man to save a white group and vice versa. They also found that conservatives were more likely to endorse the unintended killing of Iraqi civilians by American forces than the unintentional killing of American civilians by Iraqi armed forces.

These results provides a striking example of how people’s moral concepts can change when the specifics of those involved in the moral equation change, which in turn suggests that people value some lives more than others. Conservatives, in particular, seem to value people who are part of the in-group over people who are not. This study also suggests that liberals may actually devalue in-group members in an attempt to maintain a non-racist morality.

Another major question is how do religious concepts and the knowledge that one’s actions are being judged affect how people behave morally? The following study (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007) asked participants to play a game that would measure their generosity towards total strangers. The researchers discovered that people who were primed with words relating to God and religion were more generous on average than those who received no priming. The researchers also found that priming people with secular concepts of moral institutions had the same effect.

These results provide strong evidence that people will try to act more morally if they have some idea in the back of their minds, whether conscious or not, about being judged in some manner for their moral actions. This does not have to apply exclusively to religious concepts, as the results of this study show. As a matter of fact, related research conducted by Bateson, Nettle, and Roberts (2006) showed that just the indirect suggestion of being judged by other people was enough to reproduce this effect-an increase in moral behavior. Specifically, they saw a three-fold increase in the amount paid for drinks supplied on an honor system when the image associated with payment resembled human eyes versus a control image. Apparently, a pair of eyes is enough to trigger a conscious or subconscious idea of being watched and judged.

What is known about the neural activity of the brain itself with regards to moral judgments? What roles do cognitive and emotional processes in the brain play in thinking about morality? Greene et al. (2004) conducted detailed biological mapping of brain neuronal activity of individuals during their thought processes that went along with solving hypothetical moral dilemmas. It was observed that areas in the brain associated with abstract reasoning and cognitive control-regions noted included the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex-were found to be more active during very difficult moral judgments where utilitarian resolutions require violation of personal moral convictions. They concluded from their work that utilitarian moral judgments rely more on cognitive processes and abstract thinking, whilst more personal moral judgments relied primarily on social-emotional processes.

This is good evidence for two different types of moral processing-cognitive or more logical, and emotional or more personal. During this study, Greene and colleagues also considered the degree of personal relatedness of a scenario with the likelihood of utilitarian resolution, and therefore the associated cognitive processes and abstract-thinking brain regions. They looked at what happens when you alter the classic moral dilemma of the runaway trolley car (Thomson, 1986) by making it either more personal or less personal. It was observed that people were more likely to engage in utilitarian calculations when the harm was less personal-in the case, that involved pulling a lever to kill a person-as opposed to when harm was more personal, in the case requiring pushing someone off of a bridge.

Morality is often connected to religion and religious values, and a natural topic to investigate is the role that sacred values may play in moral psychology. Ginges et al. (2007) examined the Israeli-Palestine conflict in an attempt to answer the question of how sacred values are involved in the resolution of political conflicts. The researchers wanted to shed some light on several issues related to sacred values in political conflict – namely, how do instrumental incentives, such as monetary gain, affect compromise with sacred values?

Interestingly, they observed that adding instrumental incentives to hypothetical deals involving the forfeiting of some sacred value actually made the subjects who held sacred values more opposed to and outraged about compromise than if they simply offered the compromise on its own. They also found that these people were less opposed to compromise if the deal also stipulated that the opposing party would give up one of their own sacred rights.

These results are important in that they show how radically different sacred values are from instrumental values. Sacred values are, for the most part, non-negotiable, except in the cases mentioned above, and it seems as though the idea of offering something of instrumental value in an attempt to negotiate the non-negotiable only serves as an insult to those who hold these sacred values. It is only when some other sacred value is offered up that we see some willingness to compromise, suggesting that sacred values cannot be compared with instrumental values, but they can be compared to other sacred values. Because of this, one may wonder whether sacred values can really be considered truly uncontestable, as opposed to simply a different type of value that is not comparable with more material principles.

An important side of the psychology of morality concerns how people perceive the moral legitimacy of authority under different circumstances. More specifically, how much of a moral investment do the participants have in the moral issues. The researchers Skitka, et al. (2009) correlated an individual’s general degree of moral conviction with how much they either supported or agreed with the U.S. Supreme Court ruling on physician-assisted suicide in 2006 that prevented the Attorney General from prosecuting doctors in Oregon who operated under state law. It was discovered that the degree of moral investment a person had about this decision increased the variance of people’s perception of the legitimacy of authority. More specifically, people who supported the decision with high moral conviction more strongly supported the post-decision legitimacy of the Supreme Court than people with lower moral conviction, and people against the decision with high moral conviction more strongly opposed the post-decision legitimacy of the Supreme Court than people with lower moral conviction.

These results are strong evidence for the idea that our perceived legitimacy of authority is intimately tied with our moral conviction on the issues that matter most to us. In other words, if the government made a ruling that we did not agree with, but did not care much about (for example, the ruling that pizza is a vegetable), we wouldn’t have much reason to deny the legitimacy of the government. However, decisions made about issues we have a strong moral standing on tend to either strongly reinforce or strongly undermine the perceived legitimacy of authority in our attempt to reconcile our moral standing versus the decree of authority. Additionally, a study could be run to test the hypothesis that liberals would be more willing to deny the legitimacy of the government, and conservatives would be more willing to affirm the government’s power.

We believe it is moral to care about others and give charity, but what motivates the moral response of giving? Some psychologists are interested in this question. Olivola & Shafir (2011) found that people were willing to give more money to a charity if they were required to run a marathon as opposed to simply attending a picnic. This finding shows that associating donations with self-sacrifice or suffering activates people’s concepts of morality.

How could we measure if having concepts of justice and fairness cause people to strengthen their moral responses as well? An experiment might be set up in this manner: one group of participants would be told that they would be donating to a village in Africa that is suffering from a drought, and as a result, running low on food. The other group would be told that local rebels are constantly raiding the village and taking their food, thus depleting their food supplies. We would then measure how much people would be willing to donate to the village in each situation. The condition of need arising from a natural disaster should not activate concepts of justice and fairness; however, even if some people think suffering from droughts is an inherently unjust event, the second condition – need arising from a military-type attack – should greatly outweigh the first in terms of justice/fairness considerations. Based on the results of the Olivola & Shafir (2011) study, it is reasonable to expect that people would donate more money to the people being raided, since that condition should activate moral concepts such as justice and fairness.

What do these studies tell us about what a truly moral person is? Let’s first look at the five moral foundations again, from Graham, et al. (2009). It appears that a truly moral person bases their judgments primarily on harm/care and fairness/reciprocity. This is because there can be situations where authority or in-group concerns can conflict with harm and fairness considerations, and in these situations the latter set of moral outlooks should prevail. One only needs to consider an example such as this: imagine you are asked to commit atrocities in the name of your country. It should be clear that these atrocities couldn’t be justified in this way. Based on the results of Skitka et al. (2009) such a request may even lead one to deny the legitimacy of whatever authority commanded this action-which is what a truly moral person would and should do in that situation. For reasons like these, harm/care and fairness/reciprocity should be on the forefront of one’s moral concerns.

Harm/care and fairness/reciprocity are also probably closely related to each other, and in many situations, one moral concept is found with the other. Consider an instance where a person beats his wife in an act of drunken violence. It’s clear that harm/care are involved in this situation, but also consider that we could say that what he is doing is an injustice to his wife. Similarly, suppose an example where a banker swindles a client for thousands of dollars. It’s clear this has to do with fairness/reciprocity, but we could also consider this action as a way of harming somebody else in a non-physical manner.

Research further clarifies a truly moral person as one who leads a disciplined life that builds off of the proscriptive, preventing immorality, and subsequently the prescriptive, acting morally. Such a person must be a role model for everyone else to follow. For this reason, a truly moral person is careful not to commit proscribed acts. A person who performs many good deeds, but also many bad deeds, will appear insincere and hypocritical. In other words, a truly moral person does their best to not mix the good with the bad. Once a person has built a strong moral foundation of avoiding proscribed behaviors, he or she can branch out and help others with ever-increasing frequency. Furthermore, with regards to the study on the effects of being watched, a truly moral person acts in every situation as though he or she is being watched or will be judged later on, even if they know that they are alone. This is because they know that any action they do may have consequences at some point, either immediate or distant.

Work in the area of the psychology of morality sheds some light on how a moral person behaves, however an ideally moral person does what is right with 100% accuracy, and no matter what the circumstances. This is an ideal, and very few people can be considered to be ideal moral examples. Prophets are the only people who could be considered to be morally infallible. Prophets like Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad, peace be upon them, serve as examples of perfect moral conduct. Even though none of us can hope to attain the rank of a Prophet, every person ought to strive for this ideal and be the best person they can be. If we hope to have any positive impact on the world we must first start by changing ourselves for the better. Only then can we attempt to sincerely help other people around us, starting with our close family and friends, and later on, the larger world.

M. Tarik Ozgur is a graduate of Lehigh University Physiology Department in 2013.

References

• Bateson, M., Nettle, D., & Roberts, G. (2006). Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting. Biology letters, 2(3), 412-414.
• Ginges, J., Atran, S., Medin, D., & Shikaki, K. (2007). Sacred bounds on rational resolution of violent political conflict. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(18), 7357-7360.
• Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B.A. Liberals and Conservatives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 96 (5), 1029.
• Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. Neuron, 44(2), 389-400.
• Janoff-Bulman, R., Sheikh, S., & Hepp, S. (2009). Proscriptive versus prescriptive morality: Two faces of moral regulation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(3), 521-537.
• Olivola, C. Y. (2011). When noble means hinder noble ends: The benefits and costs of a preference for martyrdom in altruism. The Science of Giving: Experimental Approaches to Study of Charity, 49-62. New York, NY: Routledge.
• Shariff, A. F., & Norenzayan, A. (2007). God Is Watching You Priming God Concepts Increases Prosocial Behavior in an Anonymous Economic Game. Psychological Science, 18(9), 803-809.
• Skitka, L. J., Aramovich, N. P., Lytle, B. L., & Sargis, E. G. (2009). Knitting together an elephant: An integrative approach to understanding the psychology of justice reasoning. In The psychology of justice and legitimacy: The Ontario symposium (Vol. 11, pp. 1-26).
• Thomson, J.J. (1986). Rights, Restitution, and Risk Essays, in Moral Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Uhlmann, E. L., Pizarro, D. A., Tannenbaum, D., & Ditto, P. H. (2009). The motivated use of moral principles. Judgment and Decision Making, 4(6), 476-491.

So when it comes to self identity, in what kinds of groups are we most likely to flourish? And if the sociological truism holds that we bond first with those who confirm our identities by being most like us, how large is that group likely to be?

Steven Pinker, in The Blank Slate, states that “The universality of ethnocentrism and other forms of group-against-group hostility across societies, and the ease with which such hostility can be aroused in people within our own society” is one of the greatest obstacles to the extension of identity communities.

Still, for an opener, you can see self and group formation at work in high school cafeterias as clusters of the like-minded create an identity by excluding outsiders, largely through gossip, sometimes around matters as trivial as a dress code, or who owns the latest electronic gadgetry. In effect, they are behaving like little tribes or nations. The fascinating part is the emotional drive to belong, and the fear of exclusion, even from groups arbitrarily defined and ephemeral, including those created in cyber space. These same principles pertain to the 700 gangs which form the social fabric of south-central Los Angeles. Yet, arguably, this same group-making process, through intellectual imagination, might be extended all the way up to the world nation or global community, with each echelon defined by shared interests, activities, values, and memories. A nation, among them, is a mutuality of thinking among persons sharing common purposes. Yet as a principle of social cohesion, it is also emotional, allegiance-oriented, exclusionary, and collectively administered. There is no nation without those who are not members. Nations may also entail chauvinism, loyalty tests in time of threat, and hostility toward non-members. Karl Deutsch famously defined a nation as “a group of people united by a mistaken view about the past and a hatred of their neighbors.” In his view, national groups lie to themselves about who they are as warriors or victims in order to justify their aggression. They can act as gangs. That is an unnecessarily dark view of the national experience, but it gets much brighter as we go along.

According to the traditional dictionary definition, a national bond arises, not only because people share a common geographical territory, but because they practice the same mores, speak the same language, worship the same gods, fight common enemies, participate in the same identifying rituals and traditions, share a common stock of stories and a common history, and are often related to each other through blood ties. Cohesion around sporting events and beer preferences is merely a parody of bedrock national identity, although in a self-effacing manner, Canadians like to start there. But it is inversely conceivable that diverse peoples with diverse allegiances may somehow share a common territory without a sense of national identity, because most of those listed characteristics typically defining a nation are simply not shared by the members of pluralistic societies. So if such populations are to find an identity center for themselves in a nation, they really have only three options.

One is to redefine themselves around more vague, generic and inclusive categories of nationhood. Another is to impose uniformity through the melting pot, the Lord Durham solution, through enforced and universal education, imposed official languages, an official history, and official social rituals in the search for a common brand of allegiance. A third is to choose a new concept under which they can unite themselves as a secular community and forget about being a nation altogether. In my view of Canadian practice, we are currently pursuing all three solutions at once. The third option entails falling back upon the universals of our humanity. We might simply acknowledge the common desires and instincts of all humankind as members of the global village, and we might view Canada as a piece of this village in which we listen to each other’s first national stories in a spirit of good will. Is that not the mandate of the Canadian ministry of multiculturalism? To be sure, it would seem only right that we remain free to express the national imperatives of our birthplaces, our mother tongues, our religions, and our respective ethnicities, yet such practices appear to obstruct the formation of a specifically Canadian national identity-or maybe not? The point is very much up for discussion.

Let’s return for a moment to the second option, the nationalist teach-in for all citizens. While recognizing diversity, national governments may also recognize the value in proactively promoting a national brand, but it is a challenging enterprise, because a meaningful nationalism cannot be bought with jingoism, cheerleading, and trinkets, or bread, circuses, and revisionist history. Identity as a mind-state entails a combination of pride and duty that is somehow earned and experienced, who knows exactly how? It is something we instinctively desire, yet identity arises only when we feel emotionally drawn to the collectivity of minds, values, and practices that constitute a nation-the argument becomes circular. We may well wonder how such emotional allegiances may best be fostered. It is a point to which I will return. But it must also be lamented that nations may also include stories of failure; in fact, our literature is full to overflowing with them, and they are studied in our university classrooms with empathetic attention. From that perspective, a lament for our national failure to create a national home for new Canadians may be our most common and unifying characteristic; it is an obsession among our literary critics.

There are many stories to choose from, but I am most immediately reminded of a touching personal narrative written by Elena Maccaferri and translated by her sister as A Bench on Which to Rest. Maccaferri came to Canada from a small village above Bologna, lured to a better life by an Italo-Canadian who promised marriage, but failed to meet her at the dock upon her arrival. A hard and lonely life followed, until she was at last found by a man who had also come from her village. She went on to raise children here, who grew up Canadian in soul and spirit, but Elena could never find a true home away from her native mountains, and was overwhelmed by nostalgia. At last, when her children were grown, she returned to Italy, only to discover that all she once knew had vanished. Canada had found no place in her emotions, but had succeeded only in alienating her even from her own children.

Thomas Henricks stated that “for the most part, people experience personhood in the terms that their host societies offer them.” But that does not always happen, and when that host society somehow fails to offer acceptable terms around which personal values can flourish, the story becomes tragic, as it was for Maccaferri. It was a crisis in personal identity in relation to a nation. And while I’m telling stories about the inability of a host nation to inspire allegiance, I’ll mention another, which goes back to my bachelor days as a young Carleton professor. I had just exhausted my resources on a six-bedroom fixer-upper in Ottawa south with rooms left over to rent out to students. In that little community we had a mysterious roomer who never joined in our collective kitchen exploits and conversations. That was not a problem in itself, but his place in the household came to a strange crisis, nevertheless, when one afternoon a couple of the other students found him in the kitchen counting out huge piles of change. He explained simply that if the laundromat owners were so stupid in their choice of coin boxes, they deserved to be robbed. In no time I had a report upstairs, and went down for an account of my own. It was a sad litany: that his father had come to Canada with promises and expectations, and that to his mind this country had ruined him, giving him only custodial work to do. In his disappointment, he had trained his children to blame the entire country, giving them carte blanche to recover his losses any way they could. The laundromat theft had been conducted as a grievance against the nation. Any Canadian was thus a fair target, and revenge could be taken indiscriminately. What bizarre turns the idea of nation can take; it is a reminder that dialogue can help.

When social groups are organized around adhesion to extended clans or tribes, as they were among the First Nations of the New World, we have an early example of the tribal-nation as a tight working survival community sharing a single culture, and calling for unflinching loyalty. But it was only after the long hiatus of the Dark Ages, and a pre-Renaissance period characterized by city states and assorted feudal principalities that the modern nation emerged in conjunction with the political institutions that framed the autonomous state.

The sixteenth century was the first great age of nation building, with England leading the way under the Tudors. And what an experiment it was. A poem I teach nearly every year is entitled The Faerie Queene, written by Edmund Spenser. It was, unabashedly, a national epic which, by chivalric and allegorical example, set out to teach its readers the great civic virtues upon which the new nation could build, including loyalty to the queen and a sense of duty in the cause of right and justice.

Of course, there is nothing like war and the threat of invasion to quicken a sense of common cause and rouse a sense of national fervor. This is simply a by-product of the craving for self- protection which can only be realized where there is a feeling of all-for-one and one-for-all. Canadians still construct some of their strongest moments of national identity through recollections arising from the First and Second World wars. They are noble stories in which we all can share, dealing with a nation coming of age through the baptism of sacrifice. And we have been reminded at times that the nation expects such matters to be treated with ultimate respect and honor. On these occasions the self is lost for a moment in the experience of the nation, and in that regard it is an experience of extended identity, a national ritual that contains the self within the group. The spiritual philosopher, Fethullah Gulen, extends that loss of self in a nation into a hope for a collective future: “Any nation that liberates itself from the deadly web of selfishness and egoism, stereotyping, excessive entitlements, fear of the future, long-lasting hatred and hostility, and at the same time respects the freedom of ideas and beliefs, while turning away from oppressors, as well as giving rights to the innocent, will surely experience long life.” That requires not only self-investment, but collective monitoring and the mastery of the dialogic self in each member. Such a nation must seek to amplify the positive qualities of experiential identity at the national level. But how to extend that experience to the optimum level of respectful allegiance is a challenging formula to meet.

We are, in fact, discussing a rather elusive state of mind. What is it like to experience an ideal national allegiance? How will it feel to be a participating member? One part of our nature seeks a spontaneous glow of unconditional brotherhood in a community of homogenous values. Another part realizes, intellectually, that we have a mutually beneficial contractual arrangement with fellow citizens only at a legal and organizational level. The German terms for these, often employed by scholars, are gemeinschaft for the former, and gesellschaft for the latter. The contrast can be understood historically. In the Middle Ages, rural populations spent their entire lives within view of their parish church steeples; their thought preoccupations were concerned with fixed or received views invested in work, rituals, and customs which remained unchanged throughout generations. Such communities had little need for debate or discussion, because everyone knew what the others were thinking. These were societies entirely integrated through common religious festivals, language, history, and traditions. These were experiential quality nations generating a sense of gemeinschaft.

Renaissance societies worked outwards from this communal base toward new identities based on restraint in a secular, legislated, legal, and impersonal society. This new order we might call a second experiential quality of nation, conceived as a partnership or a social contract to promote political and economic order. Both the communal nation and the legal nation are principles of group organization and experience, but they do not share a common ethos. For better or for worse, the modern plural nation has been compelled to redefine itself as a society regulated by law, charters, and citizenship-a gesellschaft. My point is that as societies foster libertarian individualism, much of that intuitive and communal sense of the first experiential quality of nation disappears. We have heard much, since the nineteenth century, about alienation, solipsism, existentialism, the anxieties of modernity, the breakdown of the nuclear family, rapid mobility, and transnationalism.

The longing for a tribal structure in size and cohesion prevails even in modern societies. We might try to replace that feeling at the national level through an equitably administered legal society, through education, and through health and welfare support. But that returns us to the awkward crux. Does a true sense of brotherhood and identity emerge only when there are collective bonds that include language, religion, customs, food and festivals, and life on a village scale? States may structure themselves around welfare nets, global educational systems, and the legal protection of opportunity for all, but there remains intense anxiety over the oneness of our collective national experience.

Donald A. Beecher is Chancellor’s Professor at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada.
(Editor’s note: A follow-up of this article can be find in the 100th issue of The Fountain Magazine)

While a lover who transcends his or her self with the wings of love and reaches the Lord in the horizon of passion and enthusiasm, and carries out his or her responsibilities toward the King of his or her with his or her inner and outer senses and faculties, the heart of that lover is set on His vision. Such a believer’s nature is “burned” with the light of Divine Grandeur or the Divine “Facial” Light, and lost in wonder and amazement. With the cup of love on one’s lips, while the veils of the Unseen are lifted one after the other, he or she becomes intoxicated with studying the meanings that come in rays from behind those veils, and is enraptured with the pleasure of watching the scenes behind them. One’s walking and stopping occur at the command of God, speech is no more than the inspiration that comes from Him, and silence, when observed, is done in His name. At various times, he or she journeys toward Him or is in His “company,” or is occupied with communicating His message to others. Some have defined love, in the context of God’s love of His distinguished servants, as bestowing favors, and as obedience, devotion, and unconditional submission in the context of a servant’s love of God. The following couplets of Rabi‘atu’l-‘Adawiya are significant in expressing this meaning:

You talk about loving God while you disobey Him;
I swear by my life that this is something very strange.
If you were truthful in your love, you would obey Him,
for a lover obeys whom he loves.

Love is based on two important pillars: that which is manifested by the lover’s acts (a lover tries to comply with the Beloved’s will), and the lover’s inner world (a lover should inwardly be closed to anything not related to Him). Heroes of love mean this when they talk about love. According to them, emotional concern with or love of any kind of pleasure, including spiritual, cannot be called “ love” in its true sense. It can only be figurative love.

Every lover cannot feel the same degree of love for the Beloved, for love varies according to the lover’s spiritual and emotional depth, the degree of consciousness of and care in obedience to the Beloved. For example, the love felt by those beginning the way is not established and constant. They dream of acquiring the rank of perfect goodness in the shade of the Truth of Muhammad as Ahmad and, at times, receive signs of knowledge of God, thrill at the twinkle of the “light” appearing on their horizon, and vaguely feel amazement and wonder. On the other hand, those who have made great progress fly in the heaven of love toward the highest point. They live in the bright climate of the Qur’an as embodiments and examples of the good morals of Prophet Muhammad, upon him be peace and blessings. While trying to represent his good morals, they expect no material or spiritual reward and demand no pleasure. Even at the summit of this holy representation, like fruit-bearing trees whose branches bend with the weight of their fruit, they lower their wings of humility and always mention the Beloved. If they are shaken with a fault or error, they severely criticize and fight with themselves. And finally, those most advanced in the love of God are like rain clouds in the “heaven” of Islam. They feel all existence with Him, live with Him, and see and breathe with Him. In a neverending cycle, they are filled with pangs of separation (from Him) and a desire to meet Him; when relieved or emptied, they mount on a beam of light and descend to the earth to embrace the whole of existence.

One who turns to Him with heartfelt desire and sincere enthusiasm, regardless of the degree of love, receives a reward according to the depth of feeling and concern for Him. The first group of people mentioned above receive special favor and mercy. The second group of people reach the horizon of perceiving the Attributes of Grace and Majesty, and are freed from defects of character. Those of the third group are illumined by the light of His Being, awakened to the reality of things, and are in touch with the dimension of existence behind veils. That is, the Almighty manifests the light of His Grandeur or “Face” to burn up the corporeal attributes of those whom He loves and elevates them to the realm of Divine Attributes, such as the All-Seeing and All-Hearing. He awakens them fully to the fact that they are poor and helpless before Him, and fills their hearts with the light of His existence.

One whose love has reached this degree, and who is rewarded with so much Divine favor, attains an eternal life beyond existence or non-existence. Like a bar of iron put into fire and thus appearing as a bar of fire, such a lover may be unable to distinguish the Divine Being and His manifestations, and therefore expresses feelings and experiences in terms associated with such false beliefs as incarnation and union (with God). In such circumstances, one must consider the Sunna’s established criteria. The expressions uttered by profoundly spiritual individuals lost in and intoxicated with love of God cannot be used as the criteria by which to judge them. Otherwise, we may feel enmity toward such friends of God, who are favored with His continuous company according to the Prophetic Tradition: A man is with him whom he loves, and, as declared in the hadith qudsi: Whoever becomes an enemy of My friends has waged war on Me.

O God! Endear belief to us and made it appealing to our hearts, and make unbelief, transgression, and rebellion hateful to us; and include us among those with right conduct and sound thinking. And bestow blessings and peace on our master Muhammad, the master the Messengers.

A consocational democracy is a type of democracy which emphasizes the importance of power-sharing and decision-making among different segments in society. But is consociational democracy the most suitable form of democracy when it comes to establishing lasting peace in post-conflict societies?

Consocational democracy addresses problems in democratic state building that result from deep segmentation. These divisions as a result are easily defined and measured where real boundaries (political or otherwise) exist. As a result of these environmental and social conditions there exists a natural tendency for competition and the supporting of ethnically-based parties (Andeweg 2000).

The consocational framework is dependent on elite cooperation. This is the centerpiece of the model and is based on the premise that communal violence between groups is often exacerbated by elites so that when these elites have a voice in government, they have a vested interest in maintaining its integrity. Although elite meddling in conflict is the most potent, it is not the only incendiary in inter-group relations (Andeweg 2000).

Under the current model where a society has the characteristics necessitating a consocational framework, the sub-groups have two choices: to remain a part of the country or to separate. These two forces pull on individuals of each group in which decisions are often based on various factors. Those societies that do not cooperate are termed “centrifugal.” In this case, the sub-groups emphasize separation over integration. Consocationalism is a top-down integration/cooperation mechanism that seeks to overcome centrifugal forces (Andeweg 2000).

Loyaltiyes and state building

One of the forces that create these centrifugal tendencies is also one of the characteristics that make communal life possible i.e. group loyalty. According to A.A.M. Kinneging (2004) loyalty, “pertains to a bond that withstands the passing of time and the winds of change: a bond that is conceived of as lasting, permanent, unbreakable, even holy” (Kinneging 2004, 68). This definition of loyalty indicates how intractable it is when integrating many different groups with different loyalties under one government. In this case, as Kinneging points out, the community is higher than the individual. In ethnically homogenous countries this presents no problem and allows democracy to flourish at all levels. Often times this is not the case in heterogeneous societies where either the state enforces a loyalty to its institutions, such as in the republican liberal democracy model, while still maintaining individual rights or enforces it in such a way that violates individual rights in an undemocratic manner.

Loyalties typically follow racial or religious lines. They can even be more fragmented such as loyalty to one’s town or city. Evidence can be seen in the sport’s world. Loyalty is typically to a person or an institution (Healy 2007). Loyalty to the nation-state has been somewhat of a recent phenomenon. The lack of loyalty can be detrimental to state integrity when it is towards another group. The lack of loyalty between sub-groups is something that consocationalism does not address as it represents an administrative/electoral solution to a heavily divided society. It does not address the psychological/emotional element that loyalty forms a part of and which in essence is the backbone of society.

Lijphart envisioned consocationalism as a temporary solution in which it was only meant as a transitory phase to greater levels of democratic cooperation (Andeweg 2000). This of course assumes that through elite cooperation and living peacefully alongside each other under one roof, it is possible that these groups would eventually reconcile their differences and move to greater integration. Unfortunately, there is the other direction such as entrenched differences that only get worse with time that may stalemate/postpone the conflict i.e. not resolving the conflicts (Fox & Miller 2007). Still, consocational democracy is considered the best option for deeply stratified societies because it recognizes, among other things, that some sub-groups have a complete way of life that requires a certain level of autonomy from the state.

The risk in this approach is that these sub-groups may look at the government as a burden or unnecessary overhang on complete control of their affairs. In response, the state may have a few choices at its disposal that may either create incentives such as the consocational framework or force a state identity upon all sub-groups, essentially eliminating them.

Bosnia: Adversarial communities under one roof

Bosnia is composed of three adversarial communities that have existed since the 15th century. Primarily, these communities came into existence around a particular religion. These religions of interest in the Bosnian case are Orthodox Christianity, Catholic Christianity and Islam. The Serbian people primarily follow Orthodox Christianity, the Croatians follow Catholic Christianity, and the Bosniacs follow Islam. These communities erupted into full-fledged war in the early 90’s when the Orthodox Serbs engaged in genocide against the Muslim Bosniacs (Kasapovic 2005).

These people were subject to the first consocational system of the world, the millet system which was implemented by the Ottoman Empire shortly after conquering the area that is now the former Yugoslavia. The millet system, which has roots in the religion of Islam, gave different religious communities their own autonomy headed by an elite (millet bashi) who was responsible for different religious and civil areas. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the various nation-states that emerged did not act so kindly on the remaining Muslim groups and either forced them to leave or massacred them. The Bosniacs represented a unique example as well as other indigenous ethnic groups who converted to Islam during Ottoman rule (Katsikas 2009).

These communities have historical differences that cannot disappear overnight. The Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croatians owe their divide to the Great Schism in the 11th century between Constantinople and Rome (Norwich 1999). The Muslim Bosniacs and Orthodox Serbs owe their divide to Serb defeat at the hands of the Ottomans in the 14th century (Kinross 2003). Although present-day communities probably give little thought to these events, the mimetic transmission of hatred means that these communities are seemingly locked in an adversarial relationship.

After the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord, a consocational-type government was established. Kasapovic described it as an “asymmetrical confederation” in which the country is divided into two parts with one part being more consocational between Bosniacs and Croatians and the other representing a more homogenous state of Serbs. At the national level equal representation is given to the three groups, mutual veto exists, autonomy is given to each group, and consensus is maintained (Kasapovic 2005).

More than fifteen years after the Dayton Peace Accord there is peace, but as Kasapovic pointed out, this is only because all groups consented to peace. Kasapovic notes that the state is still highly unstable because there is no consensus on its organization and there are continuing external threats that may tear the country apart (Kasapovic 2005). This instability means that these groups, by and large, have not resolved their differences.

He argues that there are three reasons for this inefficiency of the model of consocational democracy, one “at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state, and one more at the level of the Federation as a state sub-entity: no consensus on the state, no consensus on the political system, no consistent strategy of international actors in establishing a democratic state, and the unfavorable two-segmental structure of the Federation with one segment outnumbering the other” (Kasapovic 2005, 9).

The fact remains that despite living in a consocational-type system for six centuries, the different groups that compose Bosnia’s adversarial groups have not cooperated at any level that would have caused them to avoid the deluge in the early 90’s. This indicates that although these people are living together under one country, they harbor distrust or hatred of those who compose the other group. The fact that they are all part of one country appears to have no influence on the perceptions towards the other group.

Considering that this conflict has been ongoing at varying intensities for several hundred years, an unfreezing process is needed. The concept of unfreezing has its roots with the organization theorist Kurt Lewin who proposed an unfreezing, moving/changing, and re-freezing process. In the process, values are changed and thus can be labeled change management. The re-freezing may have more clout with individual organizations, but the re-freezing creates an organized way of thinking akin to concepts of efficiency i.e. an established uniform identity (Levasseur 2001).

The involvement of religious leaders has importance in this case. Since these conflicts involved Christian and Muslim communities which are international religions, and since these conflicts also involved an international response, these local conflicts have implications that are not only local. International religious leaders should remember to be sensitive to religious sentiments despite their distance from Bosnia.

Haynes pointed out that one of the problems of the roles religious leaders face is that they lack the capacity to build a strategy for peace (Haynes 2009). As members of an international faith, these leaders would have access to a large network of resources that would facilitate them in their role as peace-makers. One of the aspects that may be appropriately addressed in Bosnia is training these leaders to both acquire these resources as well as use them appropriately. This would make their role far more influential than the elites.

The side effect is that many of these religious leaders may have instigated violence against the other or continue to preach hatred towards the other. These leaders need to either be isolated by the national government or reprimanded severely by those leaders of international representation. The globalized world makes all this possible. The world in this essence can either be a harbinger of peace or a catalyst for war at the local level.

Religious leaders should be engaged in dialog with each other as much as other community members are engaged in workshops both inventing solutions and implementing them. Once a healthy environment of dialog is fostered, then either naturally or through planned social action, inclusive networks should be developed. These networks can create cooperation and community.

Lastly, the existence of these networks means that the state as a reactionary entity becomes a mirror of that society. In this case, the consocational model of governance might work and if possible a more unified democratic format may be chosen. The result would be a multi-group democratic state with shared loyalties to the state, one’s own group, and to another group. This does not guarantee continued peace, but at least secures it much more tightly than as proposed under the consocational framework alone.

Hummel is a doctoral candidate at the School of Public Administration, Florida Atlantic University.

References

• Andeweg, Ruby B. 2000. “Consociational democracy,” Annual Review of Political Science 3, no. 1: 509-536.
• Fox, Charles & Hugh Miller. 2007. Postmodern Public Administration, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe.
• Haynes, Jeffrey. 2009. “Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 47, no.1: 52-75.
• Healy, Mary. 2007. “School Choice, Brand Loyalty and Civic Loyalty,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 41, no. 4: 743-756.
• Kasapovic, Mirjana. 2005. “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Consociational or Liberal Democracy,” Croatian Political Science Review 42, no. 5: 3-30.
• Katsikas, Stefanos. 2009. “Millets in Nation-states: The Case of Greek and Bulgarian Muslims,” Nationalities Papers 37, no. 2: 177-201.
• Kinneging, Andreas A. M. 2004. “Loyalty in the Modern World,” Modern Age 46, no. 1/2: 68.
• Kinross, Lord. 2003. The Ottoman Empire, London: Folio Society.
• Levasseur, Robert E. 2001. “People Skills: Change Management Tools – Lewin’s Change Model,” Interfaces 31, no. 4: 3.
• Norwich, John J. 1999. A Short History of Byzantium, New York: Vintage Books.

Historical events mentioned in the Holy Qur’an reveal critical clues about the social arrangements of the tribes onto which God has sent His messengers. By scrutinizing on these parables one can easily notice that whenever a prophet is sent to a group of people, his message was denied at first by the ruling clique of that social order. In various places of the Holy Qur’an, these people, who are at the climax of the society and who oppose the prophets and their followers, are addressed as al-mala’ (the chieftains). Mala’ is a distinctive group in tribal culture because, even though they are small in number, they are rich, influential and well respected. Among the society in which they live, mala’ appears to be the ultimate preservers of the status quo where they have the final say. According to the Qur’an, arrogance is the central characteristic of mala’ which gets in their way of accepting the religion:

“The leading ones among his people, who were arrogant and oppressed the others, said to those that they scorned, to those among them who were believers: “Do you really know and consider Sālih as one sent by His Lord with a message?” They replied: “We do indeed believe in what he has been sent with.” Those who were arrogant said: “What you have come to believe in we indeed disbelieve.” Then (without enduring any longer to see her as evidence of the truth of Sālih’s message), they cruelly slaughtered the she-camel, and disdainfully disobeyed the command of their Lord, and said: ‘O Sālih! Bring upon us that (punishment) with which you have threatened us, if you are of those sent (by God with the truth)!’” (Al-A’raf, 7:74−77)

Even though mala’ portrays itself as a completely sovereign and self-sustaining group, it necessitates the full obedience of jumhoor (majority of the society) in order to continue its existence. This is the main reason why mala’ has been the foremost opposing group towards the messengers of God. The message sent to people via prophets, and the notions attached to it (e.g. tawheed: accepting that there is no god but God, tasleem: surrendering to the God, tawakkul: reliance on God by accepting that He alone is sufficient for all the needs) in every way undermines the very existence of mala’. The particular teachings of the prophets that turned mala’ against them include:

• Wealth or genealogy does not reflect peoples’ positions before God
• No group of people is inherently superior or inferior
• Worshipping God does not require any mediators

Based on the verses of Qur’an and traditions of the prophets, the methods used by mala’ in order to alienate the prophets and their followers can be categorized and exemplified as follows [1]:

1. Fabricating misconceptions about the prophets, their messages and followers: Claiming that the prophets are wizards, liars and/or mad people. (7: 65-66, 109-110)
2. Ridiculing and mocking. (11:38)
3. Encouraging materialism and denying the afterlife. Using material tendencies to divert the attention of people from the teachings of religion towards worldly pleasures. (23:24, 25, 33)
4. Violence: Torturing and killing prophets and followers publicly or secretly, casting them out of their homelands. (7:121-124; 127)
5. Creating fear among the laypeople either through violence against the believers or through misconceptions (7:90; 7:88)

Mala’ in the present day

The intervention between individuals and high moral values, for the sake of personal interests, is still continuing to this very day, only changing its form. So Mala’ still executes a very subtle yet effective plan to protect the socio-economic status of the “privileged,” at the expense of depriving society of morals. In the modern times, thanks to the blooming ideas of freedom and democracy, it has been well accepted that social orders, in fact, sustain themselves much proficiently in the absence of an aristocrat group which is meant to rule the rest of the society. That is the main reason why, in today’s societies, it is not as easy to refer to a specific group as mala’ as it was in the past. However, according to some theories, mala’ has never ceased its existence. According to these claims, even though today’s democracies are designed in the best way to reflect the majority’s opinion on governments, mala’ has generated novel ways to control society without being exposed as a distinctive group. Mala’ of modern times prefer to perform its methods behind the scenes by simply making laypeople believe that it does not exist. It is not involved in matters openly as it used to be but rather reaches its objectives via manipulating majority thinking [2].

These theories might be quite stirring but they are still in need of conclusive evidence. On the other hand, if we re-examine Qur’anic verses explaining the tactics employed by mala’, we can easily notice that similar practices are still being used for various propaganda purposes, especially in the mass media. According to Noam Chomsky, institute professor* of linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the mass media is the ultimate milieu of spreading propaganda in the contemporary world. In his book Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda, Chomsky claims that in modern societies propaganda is the ultimate strategy employed by the elite clique to be able to pacify the masses and control them: “In what’s nowadays called a totalitarian state, or a military state, it’s easy you just hold a bludgeon over their (society’s) heads and if they get out of line you just smash them over the head. But as societies become more free and democratic, you lose that capacity. Therefore you have to turn to the techniques of propaganda. The logic is clear. Propaganda is to a democracy what the bludgeon is to a totalitarian state.” Chomsky summarizes the methodology of propaganda as follows: “The people in the public relations industry aren’t there for the fun of it. They are doing work. They are trying to instill the right (!) values. In fact they have a conception of what a democracy ought to be. It ought to be a system in which the specialized class are trained to do their work for the service of the masters, the people who own the society, and the rest of the population ought to be deprived of any form of organization because organization just causes trouble. They ought to be just sitting alone in front of the television set and having drilled into their heads daily the message which says the only value in life is to have more commodities, or to live like that rich middle class family you’re watching…” [3].

Propaganda

The methodology of modern day propaganda was introduced at the first quarter of the twentieth century by Edward Bernays (1891-1995), so-called father of public relations, whose marketing skills made him one of the most popular advertisers of the time. According to Bernays, an advertisement could make consumers want things they do not need if it is prepared with the right tools; the tools that are capable of manipulating human thinking [4]. Nevertheless, these techniques necessitated a profound understanding of consumer psychology. Even though Bernays was not a psychologist by training, he had a very robust source from which he could obtain intriguing ideas about the ways the human mind work: his uncle, Sigmund Freud.

Freud was not a big supporter of the United States and he would not hesitate to criticize America openly. However, by means of his nephew Bernays, his ideas have influenced US lifestyle profoundly. Freud believed that human beings were in fact irrational creatures controlled by their primal fears and unconscious, selfish and bodily desires. Based on this assumption, Bernays concluded that instead of being logically persuasive, advertisements had to link the mass produced goods to people’s subconscious in order to be appealing. One of Bernays’ first advertisement campaigns is a great example of how this new approach worked: George W. Hill, president of American Tobacco Company, hired Bernays in 1929 with the intention of convincing American women to smoke. This was not an easy task in the 1920s because in that era smoking was perceived as a masculine habit, one which was unthinkable for women. After discussing with various psychoanalysts, Bernays decided to start an advertisement campaign called “The torches of freedom” which portrayed smoking as a symbolism of free women [4]. To this end Bernays used mass media to distribute images of top models wearing the most fashionable outfits of the time to create a “free woman” image whose indispensable constituent was smoking cigarettes. The campaign turned out to be a triumph for the American Tobacco Company. Soon smoking became a central habit for modern American women. Ironically, American women became addicted to tobacco on their quest for freedom. Even today majority of advertisements targeting women are based on similar slogans.

Manufacture of consent

After his successful advertisement campaign with the American Tobacco Company, Bernays worked for other big US corporations such as CBS, Procter and Gamble, General Motors and General Electrics. His achievements in the marketing sector started to influence political thinkers as well, such as renowned journalist and political commentator Walter Lippmann (1889-1974). Lippmann believed that mobs could not be entrusted with decision-making, thus, in the interests of power, ordinary people (or in his own words “the bewildered herd”) needed to be managed by enlightened experts. In the art of democracy public management was supposed to be obtained not by force but by what he called the “manufacture of consent.” In his articles he defined this concept as follows: “… the manufacture of consent is capable of great refinements no one, I think, denies. The process by which public opinions arise is certainly no less intricate than it has appeared in these pages and the opportunities for manipulation open to anyone who understands the process are plain enough…The creation of consent is not a new art. It is a very old one which was supposed to have died out with the appearance of democracy. But it has not died out. It has, in fact, improved enormously in technique, because it is now based on analysis rather than on rule of thumb. And so, as a result of psychological research, coupled with the modern means of communication, the practice of democracy has turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than any shifting of economic power.”

The revolution indeed took place. As Lippmann has foreseen the techniques introduced by Bernays, it has been vastly used by world powers in order to manipulate communities’ thinking. One of the most infamous examples is for sure the Nazi Party’s anti-Jewish propaganda before and during World War II. Dr. Joseph Goebbels, who worked as the Reich Minister of Propaganda in Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1945, was a passionate admirer of Bernays even though Bernays had Jewish origins. He tried to meet Bernays several times in his lifetime. He even claimed that he had one of his books autographed by Bernays. Goebbels used propaganda techniques to psychologically prepare German society for the annihilation of Jewish people. Unfortunately, it was neither the first nor the last case where propaganda techniques were employed to alienate a group of people because of their race, nation or religious beliefs.

True freedom

In 1990, Edward Bernays was named one of the 100 most influential Americans of the 20th century by Life Magazine. In his book Propaganda, Bernays describes the extent of manipulation quite frankly: “The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of. This is a logical result of the way in which our democratic society is organized. Vast numbers of human beings must cooperate in this manner if they are to live together as a smoothly functioning society. In almost every act of our lives whether in the sphere of politics or business in our social conduct or our ethical thinking, we are dominated by the relatively small number of persons who understand the mental processes and social patterns of the masses. It is they who pull the wires that control the public mind” [4].

Such means of social manipulation is indeed discomforting to consider, but remains a reality. In the contemporary world, the means through which propaganda spreads is stronger than ever. A single touch on our smart phones, let alone watching television or surfing the internet, can be sufficient to expose ourselves to a bombardment of manipulative advertisements, news and ideas. Consequently, the inevitable question that is raised is: “How is it possible to live and think freely without being controlled and manipulated by sources of propaganda?” Unfortunately, solution to this problem is not a trivial one. Rather than using logical arguments to modify society’s mindset, modern day propagandists try to change people’s lifestyles in order to influence their way of thinking. A quote credited to Prophet Muhammad’s companion, Umar ibn al-Khattab, underlines this threat quite successfully “He who does not live in the way of his beliefs starts to believe in the way he lives.” Perhaps, under such circumstances, the least we should do is to filter out materials that are intended to change our moral values bit by bit. In particular, elements of mass media tirelessly impose that an individual cannot be completely free unless he performs whatever he desires. Any external factor that prevents people from obtaining what they like is represented as a restriction to freedom. By doing so it is made sure that religious and moral disciplines do not interfere with people’s decisions and they are left alone with their yearnings. As a result, instead of becoming free men, society is being transformed into slaves of egoism and consumerism. In my opinion, being able to defy such threats depends on following the footsteps of the people who managed to reduce mala’s influence in the most effective yet peaceful ways, namely the messengers of God. Frugal but dignified lifestyles of prophets Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad (peace be upon them all) and alike should be our points of references instead of the characters displayed on billboards, movies and television series. We should constantly remind ourselves the moral teachings which state that true freedom can only be achieved by freeing ourselves from selfish desires.

*Institute Professor is the highest title that can be awarded to a faculty member at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

References

[1] Muhammad Alshareef. Perished Nations, online lecture series.

[2] Bernays, Edward. 2004. Propaganda, Ig Publishers.

[3] Chomsky, Noam. 2002. Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda, Seven Stories Press.

[4] Curtis, Adam. 2002. Century of the Self, BBC.

Of all the faculties and senses that man is endowed with, moderation is one of the most essential virtues. Moderation concerns all people within society, and can become an unattainable virtue unless all members of society have gained a sufficient level of straightforwardness in their thoughts and actions. That straightness of conduct can only be sustained if a sufficient number of people in that society understand, desire and practice the virtue of moderation.

John B. Watson and his colleague conducted an experiment if an emotion could be generalized from one subject to another subject similar to the first. He targeted a baby, called Little Albert, who had no fear of small furry animals like white rats at that time. To carry out their hypothesis, Watson and colleague presented a white rat for Little Albert to play with. But after a while, the researchers made a very loud disturbing noise whenever Little Albert attempted at reaching for the white rat. After several times the researchers paired the loud noise with Little Albert’s attempts at reaching that white rat, a time came to the point where Little Albert was scared of the animal on its own—without the loud sound. From that on, Little Albert generalized his fear to anything furry, including non-white rabbits and dogs. (Watson & Rayner, 1920)

From early years of childhood, we have directly and indirectly learnt how an excess and shortage of anything could be undesirable. No matter who an individual is or where he or she comes from, that individual knows that eating too much can cause a bloated feeling, eating too less can harm health, talking too much could hurt others, and so does not talking at all. Moderation is such a universal virtue that every individual from every religion, ethnicity, and background knows that a life lived in moderation always reaps the most benefits.

Not just on trivial daily matters, moderation can address any issue that has significant relations to human life. Moderation is related to healthy lifestyles, satisfactory life outcomes, healthy relationships, and many more. But one aspect of humankind that is faced everyday—yet it seems to be ignored most of the time—is the mindset, way of thinking, or the cognition. We can have times when there is a “shortage” of the mindset, but more problematic is the instances when some individuals choose to adopt an extreme way of thinking.

Consider the case of Little Albert above, because of one tragedy Little Albert generalized his feelings and fear that anything furry was scary. Probably because that white furry rat seemed to produce such a loud scary noise, Little Albert thought, “so, anything furry MUST be scary too…” This is one example where way of thinking can be extreme. Moderation does not seek to moderate this extreme way of thinking, rather it seeks to moderate way of thinking generally so it is not as extreme.

How moderation is related to prejudice

As mentioned above, moderation can address many issues, and this includes prejudice. Prejudice is defined as the way we see others—the social orientation that is based on a membership of a particular group (Brown, 2010). To understand prejudice, one has to note that prejudice comes from a generalized attribution or characterization (or what is commonly known as a stereotype). Prejudice is the emotional aspect of stereotypical thinking. Like Little Albert, the infant generalized his prejudice to anything furry, and although Albert’s reaction to those furry objects was dramatic, our modern prejudicial reaction is usually more subtle and hidden.

In relation to the issue of prejudice, moderation is synonymized to being fair-minded—a way of thinking that employs the middle point between two extremes. Prejudice is, in its basic form, a way of thinking that is located in one extreme. The extremity comes from the aspect of generalization of prejudicial mindset in its beholder’s way of thinking. But where do these thoughts come from? People’s tendency to generalize their observation of a trait of a person to his or her group members always comes from the external sources.

One study supported the notion that people obtain prejudicial thinking from external sources (Aboud, 1976). The research method involved asking participants to seek information on three fictitious groups. Prior to seeking information, the participants were shown statistics of certain traits related to these groups. This was done to “set” the minds of the participants on the traits that were more likely to be shown by the members of these groups. Consequently, when seeking information on the groups after shown the statistics of the groups, the participants were more likely to “confirm” what they had been told from the statistics, allowing a generalization to occur in their mindset.

Availability heuristics and their role in prejudicial thinking

Why do humans generalize more than they should, or at all? Perhaps it is because of the information they can readily and superficially obtain from the target of their prejudicial thinking. Stereotypes are always something people can see directly, such as weight, skin color, and intelligence shown through behavior and many other characteristics. These sets of readily available information seem to be more important because there is one type of heuristics, availability heuristics that is present in the human mind to help them judge on frequency or probability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).

To understand heuristics, consider the two images below that we come across very often. How do you know which gender is which symbol? The existence of heuristics allows us to manage this world in a more simplified and helpful way. Society uses symbols that represent certain group of people to give certain information. No matter where we are, our brain is integrated with the understanding that “skirts” are something only women would wear—it is how, by using that heuristic, we know that the first symbol tells us that it is a women’s place, or belongs to women, or can only be used by women—depending on where we see the symbol.

Heuristics are tools to help people make a cognitive decision on something such as deciding who someone is, if he or she is a righteous person, or what leads to a particular event, or how a certain event happens. Availability heuristics is the tool used to make a judgment when it comes to the frequency of probability that something occurs to that particular target. For example, one may judge the traits of people in community A, after seeing the behavior of a few members of community A. Availability heuristics help people simplify judgment to the most simplified information they can get in mind, and that information can come from various sources, such as a personal experience like the one in the Little Albert case, and others like the statistics given in the study described above.

Availability heuristics can be useful in some situations, such as estimating voting behavior in an election period, or predicting divorce cases for a particular year, but sometimes it has a negative consequence. Prejudice partly comes from the use of availability heuristics and blind “compliance” to such judgment. In this case, availability heuristics are a form of excess of the use of limited information offered to the human mind prior to judgment because blind belief to such heuristics can lead them to generalize. This is an extreme way of thinking that would go against the very nature of moderation itself.

Labeling and availability heuristics

Availability heuristics can be so powerful that sometimes people do not even realize that it is affecting their way of thinking. This is due to the excess use of labeling to simplify and categorize objects. Labeling affects human judgment and interpretation toward something or someone (Jussim, Nelson, Manis, & Soffin, 1995). Labeling is one of the sources of availability heuristics because labeling comes from the traits of physical attributes that people see from the individuals that they label. For example, individuals are labeled as doctors after they are seen wearing a white coat with a stethoscope around their neck, or a man is labeled as dangerous when walking in the dark with a hooded jumper on. Once labeling happens, individuals who conform to the traits and physical attributes that resemble the labels are stereotyped and these stereotypes become the readily available information to serve as a tool to form availability heuristics.

Labeling is not all inaccurate, but the negative consequence of labeling happens because people are too focused on the external traits of a target of the label. People seem to readily judge that a person in a white coat is a doctor, or that a man who has a hood on while walking in the dark is dangerous. These are all the external qualities of the person in a white coat and the man with a hood that people focus on to make a judgment, and eventually they have prejudicial thinking against these targets.

When discussing the topic of faith, Benjamin Franklin said, “Faith is confirmed by the heart, confessed by the tongue, and acted upon by the body.” This definition of faith is in parallel with the definition given by various religions. It emphasizes the importance of both external (confessing and acting upon) and internal aspects (believing) of spirituality. One cannot have one aspect without the other. Moderation involves professing your faith internally, such as believing and keeping your motivation, and externally, such as taking care of your appearance in line with your faith, and being concerned about what you say and do. This means that you do not just focus on either one aspect alone, but prove your stand by maintaining your faith, internally and externally.

In relation to prejudice, labeling happens due to focusing more on the external aspects of traits, like the group members’ appearance, behavior, and even intelligence (as it can be seen from their way of thinking and speaking). But we often neglect to remember that there are interior aspects of those individuals—the aspects that are dismissed from the factors of being labeled. These interior aspects can be different across individuals, thus labels alone could not make an entirely accurate judgment on an individual.

Conceptual frameworks of the relationship between moderation and prejudice

As discussed, prejudice comes from many factors that are not in line with the concept of moderation and this can be prevented by allowing the right way of thinking to be our habit. Moderation is a middle pathway to prevent prejudice. One way to do so is by understanding that while the outside of a person can tell something about him or her, the inside parts can be important too. Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual framework on how moderation can address prejudicial thinking.

Figure 1 shows a continuum of the way of thinking with moderation in the middle and “indifference” and “prejudicial thinking” on each extreme end. Prejudicial thinking, in one extreme, focuses only on the external aspects of a group of people, by which the aspects are used to make a judgment if the group is “good” or “bad.” These judgments are then used to make a generalization. On the other hand, indifference is shown when people have a neutral attitude; too much of it that they do not care about what is happening around them.

Moderation is located in the middle. It is neither prejudicial nor indifferent. People with a moderate way of thinking consider both the external and internal qualities of individuals to make a fair judgment. Each judgment is different across individuals because he or she knows that even if an individual belongs to a certain group, that individual does not have to be the same as the other members of that group. People with a moderate way of thinking know that tolerance needs to be exercised whenever needed, without any unfairness to any individuals who belong to a certain group of people.

Conclusion and a suggestion

When making a judgment or decision on a target’s attribution, it is important to examine the extent to which heuristics or the person’s dependence on readily available information—also known as availability heuristics—affects their judgment. Heuristics can be useful to help people organize, manage, and simplify their thoughts, but it should be supervised so that it is only used in moderate levels. Whenever one feels the need to make a quick judgment, he or she should break it by “educating” the self. Educating the self in its simplest form can be to ask, “What if I am judged that way? Would I like it?” By educating yourself, you make a psychological and mental reminder that to quickly judge means to unfairly treat that individual, which is something you would not want happen to you.

Another way to hinder the potential formation of prejudice is to empathize. By putting yourself in the target’s own shoes, you will be able to see how unfair stereotypes can be to a particular individual. Self-serving bias is a social cognitive error in which you are more likely to view positive events as a result of your own doing and negative events as the consequence of an external factor (Miller & Ross, 1975). This is viewed by psychologists as an error in thinking about other people, but interestingly, this can actually help in reducing prejudice. Prejudice can occur because you fail to attribute a person’s behavior or trait fairly, because he or she is simply another person you cannot relate to. Therefore, by empathizing with a person, you would more likely start to view that behavior through your own lens. By doing that, “self-serving bias” can begin and that is equipped with the ability to also consider your own internal attributes. Therefore, there will be a balance between focusing on internal aspects because it is you, and focusing on external aspects, because it is others.

Moderation is indeed a virtue that can help us develop and grow as a well-adjusting human being. By employing moderation in every aspect of our lives, we can see that moderation can address almost any issue, including prejudice. Moderation is the middle and the most proper pathway of thinking.

Taufik Mohammad, PhD, is a senior lecturer in Universiti Sains Malaysia.

References

• Aboud, F. E. 1976. The effect of stereotype generalization on information seeking. Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science , 8, 178-188.
• Brown, R. 2010. Prejudice: Its social psychology. Oxford: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
• Jussim, L., Nelson, T. E., Manis, M., & Soffin, S. 1995. Prejudice, stereotypes, and labeling effects: Sources of bias in person perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 228-246.
• Miller, D. T., & Ross, M. 1975. Self-serving biases in the attribution of causality: Fact or fiction? Psychological Bulletin, 82, 213-225.
• Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. 1973. Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology, 4, 207-232.
• Watson, J. B., & Rayner, R. 1920. Conditioned emotional reactions. Journal

“Good grades pay off literally. Teachers have long said that success is its own reward. But these days, some students are finding that good grades can bring them cash and luxury gifts… Baltimore schools chief Andres Alonso last week promised to spend more than $935,000 to give high school students as much as $110 each to improve their scores on state graduation exams… The most ambitious experiment began in September, when seven states-Arkansas, Alabama, Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Virginia and Washington-won spots in an Exxon/Mobil-funded program that, in most cases, pays students $100 for each passing grade on advanced placement (AP) college-prep exams.” (USA Today, 01/27/2008)

The above is just one example of how some educators have developed additional incentives to motivate their students in hopes of them increasing their performance in school. A majority of students have gone through educational systems in which such rewards are present, albeit not as extreme as in the example above. In such systems, money, student awards, honorary degrees or advanced placement opportunities aim to improve student performance and motivation toward meeting expected goals through increased competition. Some of these rewards may not be tangible: simple praise, public appreciation and positive feedbacks are examples of intangible or verbal rewards. Both tangible and intangible rewards are advocated and implemented by many educators. Today they constitute a crucial part of our educational system. The reasoning behind rewarding or praising students is simple: If one reinforces a behavior by bestowing a reward for it, it is believed that behavior is more likely to be developed and maintained by the recipients of the reward, but is this really the case?

Some psychologists, known as behaviorists, believe that human nature is utilitarian: behaviors are influenced by their consequences. The use of reinforcement and punishment to control and manipulate human behavior reflects this view. The former allows educators to increase the likelihood of a behavior, while the latter is employed to decrease its likelihood. They argue that one can improve and nurture a particular behavior through reinforcement. An educator with a behaviorist point of view, therefore, believes that learning can be achieved in part by reinforcing desired behaviors with rewards, medals, degrees, grades or praises.

Even though these concepts have been valued and applied widely by many educators for decades, there are some psychologists and educators that do not agree with the current use of either tangible or verbal rewards for educational purposes. Their reasoning is based in part on motivation theory. According to motivation theory, people are motivated by either extrinsic or intrinsic drives. Extrinsic motivation is defined as any reinforcement to support, develop or maintain a behavior provided by external conditions, such as rewarding a student with money or an award. Intrinsic motivation, in contrast, implies doing an activity for its own sake because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable. The most important distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation lies in their source: an internal (intrinsic) versus external (extrinsic) source of motivation. Money, praise, awards or promotions are examples of external motivators, which are used to nurture some behaviors, while inner willingness and ambition, are sources of intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000).

There are educators who advocate motivation theory but disagree with the idea of rewarding their students since they believe that external rewards undermine intrinsic motivation. As students are extrinsically rewarded, they are more likely to lose their intrinsic motivation to sustain their behavior. Empirical studies have shown that students who did not receive any tangible rewards previously will begin to associate their behavior to rewards they have been given, eventually leading students to neglect performing an activity for its own sake when there is no reward present.

Amabile, Hennesey and Grossman (1986) examined the influence of rewards and perceptions of activity on creativity. In their study, children were rewarded with the opportunity to take pictures with instant cameras after they completed a task requiring creativity. For young children this reward was pretty attractive. The perception of the activity was manipulated by calling the activity “play,” “work” or by not specifying its nature. They found that children with the perception of play but without the promise of a reward showed a higher degree of creative performance than other children who were promised a reward. It appears that the “label” of the activity and the existence of rewards influences the creative performance of children. Another phenomenon considered in this study was the variation of the children’s behavior in activities in which they were given choice and no choice at all. The authors showed that in activities where participants were not given options, rewarded participants outperformed non-rewarded participants while non-rewarded participants were superior to rewarded participants in choice situations. There were three educational implications discovered as a result of this study:

1. The way a teacher presents an activity or responsibility counts! The presentation of an activity as “play” is correlated with higher performance than if it is presented as “work” or if its nature is not specified.
2. Rewards may undermine activities requiring intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is important for creativity. Biographies of inventors show that inventions are the result of perennial attempts and thus require a high degree of intrinsic motivation. Therefore, educators need to think twice about whether rewarding their students encourages or suppresses creativity in a given situation.
3. Rewards are detrimental when people have intrinsically chosen to do something, but not necessarily when an action is required of them. This point leaves some room for rewarding students. A good portion of the educational curriculum might be outside of students’ interests. For those kinds of activities, rewards may work to motivate them to participate in these activities, however, if students choose an activity, and if they have already had the motivation to do it, rewards will most likely not improve their performance.

This study shows that educators need to answer the following three questions before deciding whether rewards should be used:

1. Do the students already have intrinsic motivation to complete this activity?
2. Did the students choose to complete this activity?
3. Has someone else already asked or encouraged them to complete this activity?

Another study by Mueller and Dweck (1998) revealed the influence of praise on performance. In a culture of appreciation, praise is expected to encourage people and motivate them to be more successful. This study questions whether praising students is necessary and how praise can affect students. The authors of this study designed six experiments to examine the effects of praise for intelligence and praise for effort and how they influenced the participants. The authors discovered that when praising students for their intelligence the students’ achievements and motivation were lower than those students who were praised for their effort. Children whose intelligence was praised cared more about performance goals while children whose effort was praised cared more about learning. Moreover, the students whose intelligence was praised displayed lower levels of task persistence and enjoyment, increased low-ability attributions, and worse task performance when they experienced failure than children praised for their effort. Another crucial result of the study concerns the concept of intelligence. The same group of students, who were praised for their intelligence, considered their intelligence to be a fixed trait whereas the other group considered it a flexible trait. While the first group (students who were praised for their intelligence) tried to look smart even by sacrificing learning, the second group (students who were praised for effort) attempted to learn new things even if doing so was difficult or risky. Another interesting result was in the discrepancy in performance between the two groups of students when they encountered difficulty in their tasks. The study found that the performance of the students in the first group was impaired in comparison to the second group whose performance increased.

Considering the controversy surrounding rewarding versus not rewarding, the authors of this study focused on the issue of “what to praise.” Praising some traits such as intelligence, ability or creativity might be detrimental for the traits’ continuity in students while praise for endeavoring towards utilizing their intelligence; creativity or any other ability appears to increase the likelihood of learning. This issue raises some serious questions about the current practices of gifted education. Today, most education systems in the United States and other countries “identify” gifted students through tests and other means of determining intelligence, some even group students in separate classes. These students are well aware why they are being treated in this way. In other words, the system itself is continuously providing implicit rewards for the students identified as gifted. From Dweck’s point of view, this policy would impair learning because the student’s performance is not rewarded, while their “intelligence” is.

Another important question raised in this study is the “appropriate time of rewarding.” In research by Kamins and Dweck (1999), the influence of praise and criticism was observed in several ways: when directed variously toward the person performing an activity, toward the process of the activity itself, and toward the activity’s outcome. In their research some of the participants were praised with “I’m very proud of you”; some as “That’s the right way to do it,” whereas others were told: “You found a good way to do it, can you think of other ways that may also work?” When these groups were compared, the researchers found that the process-praised group was superior in rating the products of their work in comparison to the outcome-praised group. It was also noticed in that participants that were members of the process-praised group had increased self-esteem and were more persistent than the other groups. Those findings were the same when criticism was used in place of praise. The lesson to take from this research is clear: we should provide feedback, praise or criticism, about the process rather than the person and the end product.

There are other side effects of rewarding students. When we reward, we actually teach two different things in a very subtle way. First, we teach the student to do something for the purpose of another thing rather than for its own sake. Second, we teach the student not to do anything for free. Both of these have important drawbacks: we kill their enthusiasm and intrinsic motivation because they have been given another reason to do their activities and we implicitly redirect their valuation to external things that then could cause them to undervalue the task itself. This means that they will no longer repeat the same behavior when the rewards are discontinued. There is a paradox here. On the one hand, behaviorist psychologists defined learning as an overt change in behavior. Since the behavior (or learning) fades away later along with the rewards, we cannot argue that rewards did make a permanent influence on behavior. On the other hand, by using these methods we teach students to be independent individuals who do not care about others. Especially in today’s conditions, when many jobless, homeless, and hungry people are trying to survive all around the world, self-centered individualism should not be the desired outcome of education. Infusing people with seemingly innocent notions of “money talks” or “There ain’t no such thing as a free lunch,” might function as a rationale for unethical and socially irresponsible behaviors. Educators should not bolster a self-centered individualism by excessively rewarding students. Such rewarding may contribute to the kind of irresponsibility that allows for the kinds of unwise decisions that lead us to the current recession.

The overall point that I have advocated in this article is not an argument strictly against rewarding. Rather, knowing more about the individual, the conditions, and possible consequences related to rewards are vital for an effective education. How can this be achieved? An example is the treatment of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) toward a child who was making fun of the Adhan (the Muslim call to prayer). He approached one of them and praised one of them by saying, “What a beautiful voice that you have.” Caressing his hair, he continued by asking the boy “Would you mind to give the call to the prayer in the masjid with such a beautiful voice?” He took the child to the masjid and this child, known as Abu Mansura, later became a well-known muezzin (the individual who makes the Muslim call to prayer). This example stands as evidence of the importance of rewarding. On the other hand, in traditional Sufi thought, the purpose of praying and good works is not merely entering Heaven or avoiding Hell, instead, acquiring the acceptance and approval of God is seen as the ultimate goal for a person. Such a purpose may not apply to everyone, because the majority of people may need a tangible reward to do something, just like majority of students want to achieve a certain goal primarily in order to gain rewards, however, higher levels of spirituality can be developed toward an overarching goal that can be achieved by only a select few. Therefore, these two examples do not in fact conflict. The messages derived from educational and psychological literature, as well as religious teachings, seems to converge, even though rewards may help most people to perform better, rewarding is not helpful and even detrimental to a minority group of people who already display high levels of motivation and ambition to achieve.

As a result, rewarding is not necessarily helpful or detrimental. Educators should give up applying their ready-made methods to all students. Ideally, intrinsically motivated students should not receive external rewards because this would switch their focus to material prizes. When needed, educators should try to provide feedback directed toward the process rather than the outcome or the person. Also, they should foster student’s efforts rather than their ability. The decision about rewarding should be based on knowledge regarding the person to be rewarded, the target or direction, and even the timing of the reward. Otherwise, for some individuals the rewards might produce an effect diametrically opposed to its intended purpose.

References

• Skinner, B. F. 1953, Science and Human Behavior. New York: The Free Press.
• Kamins, M. L. & Dweck, C. S. 1999. “Person versus process praise and criticism: Implications for contingent self-worth and coping.” Developmental Psychology, 35, 835-847.
• Mueller, C. M. and Dweck, C. S. 1998. “Intelligence praise can undermine motivation and performance.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 33-52.
• Ryan, R. M. & Deci, E. L. (2000). “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic Definitions and New Directions.” Contemporary Educational Psychology, 25, 54-67.
• Amabile, T. M., Hennessey, B. A. & Grossman, B. S. (1986). “Social Influences on Creativity: The Effects of Contracted-For Reward.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 14-23.