For nearly a century, chlorine has been used to disinfect drinking water. The use of chlorine in water started when John Snow used to purify the cholera-causing water of the Broad Street Pump, in London. After seeing that chlorine curbed deaths from cholera, Great Britain started chlorinating their public drinking water. Then chlorination began in New Jersey, and after that it was soon used throughout the United States. Measuring the benefits and risks, it’s clear that the advantages of adding chlorine to drinking water outweigh the potential dangers. Scientific research also shows that the benefits of chlorinated water are more than the risks from THM’s and other by-products (Health Canada, 2004).

There continue to be many people in developing countries who do not have access to clean water. In some parts of the world, people collect water from available sources and store it in containers without treatment and further protection from contamination (Sobsey, Handzal & Venczel, 2003).

Sobsey, Handzal & Venczel (2003) conducted an experiment to see the effects of chlorine when added to a container with contaminated water. These experiments were conducted in Bangladesh and Bolivia. Community families were divided into two groups: intervention (household water chlorination and storage in special container) and control (no intervention). The results in Bangladesh were: in the intervention households, only 12.9% of the containers were E.coli positive; in the control households, 55.2% of containers were E.coli positive. The results were equally stark in Bolivia: only 33.7% of intervention households were contaminated by E.coli, whereas 93.8% of control households were contaminated.

There was also a decrease in the diarrhoeal illness in the experimental findings for samples in both countries’ households where the water was treated with chlorine. During the eight-month trial period, the mean diarrhea incidence rates of children younger than five years old in Bangladesh was 20.8 episodes/1000 days in the intervention group and 24.3 episodes/1000 days in the control group. In Bolivia, where the experiment lasted for six months, the mean diarrhea episodes/person for all age groups was 0.21 for the intervention group 0.38 for the control group. 43% of all cases of diarrhea were preventable by the intervention (Sobsey et al., 2003).

The study noted other successes. In some countries, like Saudi Arabia, chlorine was used in household tanks, which resulted in a 48% reduction of diarrhea; and in India, chlorine was used in earthenware, which resulted in a decrease of cholera cases, from 17% to 7.3%. (Sobsey et al., 2003).

In another study, Coulliette, Enger, Weir & Rose (2013), evaluated the effect of chlorinated HaloPure beads on the reduction of bacterial pathogens with concurrent sewage contamination. They estimated the risk reduction of waterborne typhoid fever and cholera within a hypothetical community of 1000 people treating their water with the chlorinated HaloPure beads. Seeded well water resulted in log10 reductions of 5.44 for S. Typhi and 6.07 for V. cholera (Coulliette et al., 2013). In well water with 10% sewage and seeded bacteria, the log10 reductions were 6.06 for S. Typhi and 7.78 for V. cholera (Coulliette et al., 2013). If an individual drinks from the contaminated water that was taken from the water source that had fecal material leaked into it, the risk of disease according to the Monte Carlo analysis would be a median of 0.21 for typhoid fever and a median of 0.11 for cholera (Coulliette et al., 2013). If that same water was treated, then the result would be: median of 4.1*10^-7 for typhoid and a median of 3.5*10^-9 for cholera (Coulliette et al., 2013).

These are important results: in developing counties, diarrhea is one of the greatest health issues. Arnold & Colford JR. (2007) conducted a systematic review of all studies that measured diarrheal health impacts in children and the impact on water quality of point-of-use chlorine drinking water treatment. Of the 10 studies that were analysed, nine of them showed a reduction of diarrhea in children. Across the 10 studies, the intervention led to an 80% reduction in the proportion of stored water samples with detectable E. coli (Arnold & Colford JR, 2007).

Water chlorination has been a very useful strategy for treating contaminated water for years. Currently, chlorination is the only method that disinfects the pathogens from the point of treatment to the point of consumption. As the scientific research above indicates, the benefits of chlorinating water supplies, particularly in the developing part of the world, is essential for disease prevention and reduction. Water is an essential element for life, and clean water is what keeps us alive. Although chlorine in large doses can be harmful for our health, it can also be a lifesaver. Nothing on earth is created without reason. Chlorine has obviously been created to directly benefit humanity.

References

• Arnold, B. F., & Colford JR., J. M. (2007). Treating water with chlorine at point-of-use to improve water quality and reduce child diarrhoea in developing countries: A systemic review and meta-analysis.The American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 76 (2), 354-364.
• Coulliette, A. D., Enger, K. S., Weir, M. H., & Rose, J. B. (2013). Risk reduction assessment of waterborne Salmonella and Vibrio by a chlorine contact disinfectant point-of-use device.International journal of hygiene and environmental health,216(3), 355-361.
• Sobsey, M. D., Handzel, T., & Venczel, L. (2003). Chlorination and safe storage of household drinking water in developing countries to reduce waterborne disease.Water science and technology : a journal of the International Association on Water Pollution Research, 47 (3), 221-228.
• It’s Your Health – Drinking Water Chlorination [Health Canada, 2004]. (n.d.). Retrieved June 5, 2013, from http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/iyh-vsv/environ/chlor-eng.php

Those who consider religion merely a matter of conscience are corrupting religion by way of interpretations that contradict a faith’s Divinely ordained nature; by restricting the practice and wider influence of faith, they are preventing the individual, domestic, and social benefits and prosperity that God promises, but are contingent upon faith. However, religion is not only an inner conviction: it is a whole set of principles – ethical, filial, social, and legal in nature – believers are expected to fully observe. For those who subscribe to the faith, these disciplines are binding, with serious consequences for ignoring them. The principles of religion cannot be ignored, nor are the consequences of ignoring them to be taken lightly. Worldly order and balance, as well as individual and domestic peace and prosperity, depend upon these principles. The fruits of faith are eternal bliss in the world beyond.

Unfortunately, many rulers have ignored or distorted these fundamentals of faith. They have interrupted when believers wanted to practice their faith, and tyrannized people’s consciences, making it impossible for them to live in accordance with their beliefs.

Meanwhile, although some states governed under religious jurisprudence may appear to act liberally towards those who adopt a particular religion, it is almost impossible to say they act the same towards those who believe any religion or system of belief. Throughout history, Muslim rulers, those who have truly practiced Islam, have respected all religions, as well as all other philosophies. They have engaged in dialogue with peoples from all walks of life, and have treated other faiths with kindness.

Unfortunately, there have been other Muslim rulers, those who have misunderstood Islam, and rulers in general, no matter what religion they follow, who have ruled with hostility, hatred, discrimination, and fanaticism. And just as they have shrunk their own personal horizons, they have diminished the heavenly immensity of faith, turning belief into a system of oppression instead of a system of relief. They have employed hatred, anger, and jealousy against their coreligionists, and oppressed the “others” with violence, war, and many other various means of barbarism.

Today, there are many secular and liberal systems in which religion is separated from the state. Although governments under these systems claim to provide religious freedoms, it is no secret that many of them impose disbelief by force and treat religion and the faithful with intolerance. When such oppressive regimes dominate the fate of an entire nation, it becomes commonplace that the peace and stability of the people are threatened, and the society is ruled by intimidation. When people of faith have lived under such leaders, their struggle has been for the freedom of conscience against crude power. This campaign for freedom is an ancient one, and unfortunately, in this fight some clergymen took sides with the power, did not abstain to act like those who were against faith, and oppressed their fellow community.

Throughout history, many communities have suffered from violence and discrimination at the hands of their racist leaders. Divinely inspired faiths, which promise peace and security, have been turned into means of conflict and oppression by these leaders. Such a distortion of faith always resulted in the eventual destruction of the oppressors.

During the Crusades, great crimes were committed in the name of Jesus, peace be upon him. Though there is no doubt those “crusaders” thought they were doing good, by committing atrocities, they were misconstruing Jesus’ message of compassion and love. They claimed to be his followers, but they invented many groups of “others” and marginalized them in an illusory attempt to please Jesus and to be rewarded with heaven. The Crusades, of course, are not the only example of such violence committed in the name of religion. Many people have been murdered, throughout history, for opposing a state’s “official” religion. Such violence and unrest eventually led thinkers and philosophers to take action. Their foundational premise of action was that a religion sent by God would not command people to harm and kill one another. The growth of science helped to bring about reforms, which were quite effective at dividing religious and state affairs. Unfortunately, this split has gone too far, moving from the state, into the personal. The word of God was replaced by the word of humanity, and faith was once again shrunk and imprisoned to the individual’s inner conscience, as if it was just an ordinary theory.

Religious belief, by definition, can only maintain heavenliness when practiced in accordance with the principles prescribed by God, not by the limits defined in any kind of ideology or legal system. Indeed, in addition to the freedom of personally practicing religion, believers need to be free to express their faith, either verbally or in writing or in any other medium, without being punished. There is no freedom of faith and conscience when restrictions are imposed on religious practice, whether it is in the public or private sphere.

At the present, it appears that the Western world has mostly solved its own problems after experiencing long periods of turmoil with regards to secularism or laicism. Nevertheless, secularism, i.e. the separation of church and state was never considered as the one and only irrefutable solution to all the world’s problems, but rather as a means of reconciliation and a warranty for the freedom of faith and conscience. We can argue that in many countries where secularism has been defined as such, both religion and secularism have existed without conflict, even perhaps with some sense of mutual support. In some other countries where secularism is being used to oppress religion and religious practice, this is mainly because these countries fail to bring a scholarly definition to secularism, or that those in power are radically opposed to religion and all of its aspects, or because of other sources of power which strive to generate chaos in the country.

We can all agree that religious believers should not infringe upon the rights of others, but the state should also not infringe upon the rights of believers to practice their faiths. To do so would impact the divinity of religion and will generate false interpretations of religion based on foreign concepts. Such a development has the potential to cause serious problems at the global level.

Muslims believe that Islam is a perfected system of worship and ethics, and a spiritual journey leading to Paradise and eternal bliss. Muslims also believe that Islam lays out guidelines for solving individual, filial, economic, administrative, and social problems. It is not fair to ignore these qualities, which can contribute to social peace and security, as well as to dialogue and understanding among nations. Islam – despite Muslims’ shortcomings in its practice – is a universal faith of perfection and excellence, and undoubtedly one of its most significant aspects is that it recognizes the religions of truth and Prophets of the past. Islam refers to members of all the religions of truth as the “People of the Book”; not only did Islam recognize members of other religions, but also immediately implemented regulations in terms of safeguarding their rights. Since the very beginning, the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, treated members of other religions with extreme tolerance. He was very delicate regarding this matter, and constantly encouraged his followers to behave in the same manner, calling upon them to be a nation that would be an example to others. Muslims always complied with this appeal, and, with the exception of the harsh and fanatical stances of certain illiberal, inhumane individuals during certain periods, have to a large extent acted with tolerance. The Qur’an clearly defines how Muslims should behave: “There is no compulsion in the religion. The right way stands there clearly distinguished from the false…” (Al-Baqarah 2:256).

“There is no compulsion in religion” refers to methods of reasoning while engaging with others. Some scholars even interpret the verse as meaning no aspect of religion can be forced on others. Thus, based on this commentary, religion can never rely on force; it is a matter of personal choice. As opposed to coercion, Islam has always pledged to protect others from oppression and ensured that every group could freely practice their chosen faith. Furthermore, Islam recognized oppression not only as disrespectful to the individual, but also to the spirit of religion; indeed, coercion or oppression is disrespectful to humans, for it infringes upon free will, which is what separates humankind from other creatures. It is also disrespectful towards religion, as faith is based upon sincerity, and a heart freely accepting faith. Belief and religious duties that are not recognized in the heart are not accepted. Indeed, just as belief imposed upon people with force or oppression is not faith, those who express such “faith” are not believers. If anything, such individuals are hypocrites, and the behavior and actions they perform in the name of religious duties are nothing but ostentation.

Religion is a source of prosperity and kindness. It is not an unpleasant thing that people can only accept by compulsion. In this respect, enforcing religion and religious issues rather than explaining the topic of faith in a civil manner may cause antipathy towards religion. In the very same section where the Qur’an prohibits compulsion, it also delineates the right path from the wrong based on the evidence through external and internal proofs, on the divine messages and legacy conveyed by God’s messengers, and on the teachings and guidance of faithful teachers.

Our predecessors who appreciated this used evidence and persuasive methods laid out by religion in an attempt to convey matters regarding faith and religion. They did not try to force others to join their faith, and everyone lived in accordance with their own faith. People were free to express themselves and never encountered any juridical or administrative problems. Amidst this atmosphere of tolerance, no one was subjected to any kind of oppression with regards to freedom of belief. People were not expelled from their homes or countries, or tried by the courts. People followed the religion of their choice, and were under constant protection on the condition that they abided by their pledge and fulfilled their responsibilities as citizens. Those who broke their pledge and did not fulfill their duties as citizens, who attempted to divide and destroy the nation, who openly rebelled against the legitimate rule and committed terrorist attacks, or who oppressed others, were punished according to their crimes. Peace was upheld.

In the Islamic faith, not only did Muslims act in this manner regarding freedom of faith and conscience, they did not also try to coerce people regarding worship or social relations. In fact, even during times of conflict, Islam granted the right of residence to those who agreed to pay the prescribed taxes, and never intervened in another group’s beliefs or religious practices. As for those who persisted in fighting against the Muslims, following their defeat, they were also granted civil rights in return for taxes, and were left to question their own actions. In addition, Islam enforced the same rules for those who were defeated in battle as those who voluntarily came and asked for the protection of the state, and everyone was allowed to benefit from all the privileges of citizenship, on the condition that they would cause no harm to the state or its citizens.

This immense tolerance displayed by Islam in the name of the freedom of belief and conscience is by no means limited to those who sought refuge in its guardianship alone; Islam has constantly guarded the same values throughout the world. It came to the aid of the aggrieved, helped the oppressed, supported those who fell, and continuously enforced the truth. Islam has opposed the oppression of souls everywhere it has reached, and prepared the foundation for the voluntary acceptance of faith in people’s hearts. By virtue of this agreement, it has prevented the people from being forced into following a religion, philosophy, or ideology against their own will, and whenever possible prevented all kinds of oppression. Wherever it has been, Islam has secured the public peace and tranquility among a vast body of various communities, and stimulated respect for the principle messages of all the Prophets.

Islam places a high priority on freedom of conscience and faith due to its history. The rightly guided caliphs gave great importance to freedom of conscience, and since it was granted to minorities during the period of the Prophet, they enforced it with the utmost sensitivity. In later periods, this practice was maintained without any changes or deviations. From the periods of the Umayyads and Abbasids, to the eras of light, and to the Ottoman period – with few exceptions – all Muslim administrations granted minorities the right to practice religion, perform religious rituals, and educate their children as they wished. Minorities were also free to assemble and join various foundations and societies in efforts to maintain their cultures. They could restore their old places of worship and construct new ones, and nothing was demanded from them in return, except that they abide by the general laws and regulations of the country.

In the context of their age, the Umayyads and Abbasids from Damascus, the Andalusian Muslims, and the Ottomans can all be classified as a model in this respect. Paving the way for the Renaissance, they introduced the West to many things in terms of knowledge and insight; they not only fulfilled their duties of faith, but also did not interfere with the beliefs or cultures of others, and for centuries displayed an exemplary form of administrative conduct. But unfortunately, following the destruction of their states, they were slaughtered, and none were granted the right to remain in the region. Their people had to go through invasions, colonization, interventions, embargos, and oppression, in terms of freedom of faith and conscience.

I believe that all of these constitute, and will continue to constitute, a good example of the stance of past civilizations in terms of the freedom of faith and conscience. I am aware that, in the interest of dialogue, we should not inflame passions, but I also believe that while pointing out problems it is also important to emphasize the good aspects of our past. This is especially important today, since oppression continues. Although I am not certain that cautioning against such behavior will awaken the local and international oppressors to their mistakes, I certainly have no doubt that responding to them in this manner is a duty incumbent upon us all.

Discussions over personal liberty and government intervention are as old as modern governments, as J.S. Mill’s writings show.

John Stuart Mill was among the many philosophers, both before and after, who attempted to determine when government intervention in the private lives of individuals was legitimate. The authoritarian regimes of 19^th century Europe triggered thinkers to study citizen’s rights and state powers. Mill attempted to regulate the actions of these authoritarian regimes by distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate government intervention in his book On Liberty. Mill’s ideas were one influence among many on the structure and laws of the modern nation state. Using his ideas on freedom and government as a starting point, we can discuss psychological harm, human fallibility, and social responsibilities.

Mill, in On Liberty, identifies two mechanisms for determining legitimate government intervention: the harm principle and utilitarianism. The harm principle states that government can only legitimately interfere with the actions of individuals if the actions of the individuals harm others against their will. Thus, if an action does not harm another against their will, the government cannot interfere. Notice that an individual can harm themselves or even other people with the appropriate consent. Effectively, the harm principle constitutes an absolute bar to government intervention on unharmful private action.

The second mechanism, utilitarianism, comes into play after government intervention is considered to be legitimate due to harmful consequences of private actions. At this point, the government must do a utility calculation, or a cost-benefit analysis, in which it must determine whether government intervention will result in more harm than the private action it will attempt to stop. If the analysis indicates that government intervention will result in more harm, government intervention would be considered illegitimate, and vice versa. Thus, while the harm principle constituted an absolute categorical bar, the utilitarianism mechanic requires a case-by-case determination of the legitimacy of government intervention.

In order to apply the harm principle it is important not only to know what the principle is, but also what constitutes harm. The broader the definition of harm becomes, the larger the pool of actions that the government can interfere with becomes. In general, the classification of physical damage to body and property as harm is generally accepted by society as well as by Mill. However, the definition of harm can include things other than just physical damage. In order to properly apply the harm principle, it must be determined whether psychological harm and failure to act can be classified as harm, warranting government intervention.

Psychological Harm

Can feeling distress, being upset, or experiencing psychological harm due to another individual’s actions be categorized as harm? If one were to accept distress as harm, then the definition of harm has effectively been broadened to include every instance in which one feels discomfort or is upset by another’s action, expanding the sphere of legitimate government intervention.

Mill does not determine distress or psychological harm to be harm. The distress or psychological harm Mill refers to is one originating from a disagreement of values between two individuals. For example, one individual may like the color blue while another dislikes it. The distress, anger, resentment, or any other negative feelings the other may feel when the first wears a blue shirt is the psychological harm that Mill refers to. A more consequential example would be the distress that a Democrat may feel about the ideas expressed at a Republican rally. The views expressed at the rally are clearly contrary to the individual’s beliefs, yet the distress originating from this ideological difference cannot be categorized as harm. If it was categorized as harm, then the government could intervene whenever actions or speech was contrary to the ideology and beliefs of the most powerful or the most vocal.

Mill, in On Liberty, states that “unless we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors, and to say that we may persecute others because we are right and they must not persecute us because they are wrong, we must beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice the application to ourselves” (1). Here he attempts to stop the use of the harm principle in attempts to impose beliefs or one’s own moral values on others. He argues that imposing views on another is wrong, because one would not want others to impose their views on them. Additionally, Mill emphasizes the fallibility of human reasoning and preferences, stating that despite one’s conviction in one’s own position in an argument, there is always the possibility of error.

Admittance of the fallibility is not only a sign of humility and recognition of possibilities, but also a very real demonstration of understanding one’s own limitations inherent in being human. This principle has been recognized and applied by many scholars and thinkers in addition to Mill, like Socrates and Said Nursi. For example, in The Republic, Plato quotes Socrates as exclaiming “[a]s for me, all I know is that I know nothing” (2).

Similarly, Said Nursi demonstrates the same recognition of the fallibility of human beings in his Risale-i Nur and attributes true knowledge only to God. This is clearly displayed in his use of text from the Quran at the beginning and ending of all the chapters in The Words. Thus, Nursi begins his work by drawing from what he considers the true source of knowledge and ends with that same infallible source.

Lastly, English philosopher Thomas Hobbes seems to support Mill’s position against persecution by arguing in Leviathan that “do not that to another, which thou wouldst not have done to thyself” (3). Hobbes’ view is in effect a version of the golden rule, limiting social interaction to only actions one would deem acceptable if done to him/her. In congruence with Hobbes’s golden rule, Mill argues that imposing one’s views on others is wrong, and that feeling upset due to the failure of others to conform to those views is not harm. Thus, even if the actions of an individual upset or cause psychological harm to others, the government cannot legitimately interfere.

Failure to Act

Though Mill prevents distress or psychological harm from being used to legitimize government intervention over an individual’s actions, he permits failure to act to be classified as harm. In situations where a failure to act causes a negative or harmful outcome, government intervention would be legitimate. For example, the government may prosecute a firefighter if his negligence allowed a building to burn down. However, classifying failure to act or inaction as harm is dangerous, because people are not capable of infinite actions in a moment. The jurisdiction of government intervention is expanded tremendously by this classification. Why would Mill, who constructed a mechanism for limiting government intervention, expand government power in this way? And what restraints can be applied to the failure-to-act classification?

Socrates’ ideas, as expressed in The Republic by Plato, provide some insight into answering the previous questions. After examining Plato’s views in The Republic, it is possible to claim that Socrates would agree with Mill in including the failure-to-act as harm. His definition of a just society is a society in which everyone is doing their job or role in society (4). From this, one can assume that a just action within a society would be whatever action is in accordance with the job of the individual as determined by his soul and position in society. Thus, failure to perform one’s job would then be classified as an unjust action by Plato, open to government intervention for the restoration of social justice.

Socrates’ view seems to emphasize the nature of the action that the individual is failing to do. If the failure to act involved the failure to do one’s job in society, then the failure to act would be considered unjust. On the other hand, if the failure to act involved inaction about an issue that was not the individual’s responsibility, then it is possible to conclude that the failure to act in this instance is not an unjust action. Thus, this approach distinguishes between a firefighter who chooses not to stop a fire from a regular citizen who chooses not to stop a fire. The firefighter neglects his responsibility, opening him to criminal prosecution, while the regular citizen’s inaction is not open to prosecution. By allowing the failure to act to be considered as harm, Mill avoided conflicting with the conditional nature of determining whether the failure to act is just or unjust as extrapolated from Plato’s views.

Socrates’ and Mill’s analysis regarding the failure to act is based solely on the legal and formal responsibilities of the individual. The police have a responsibility to stop crime, and parents have a responsibility to take care of their children, etc. Each nation’s unique constitution and laws make legal responsibilities country-specific and unique. For example, many European states, like Germany and France, require citizens to provide assistance to persons in danger (5). However, the duty to rescue those in peril does not exist in other countries, like the United States (6). Of course, most people call the authorities for help and attempt to provide first-aid, but the fact remains that in most of the United States, there is no legal obligation to rescue. Each country determines the legal responsibilities of its citizens, some choosing to expand and some choosing to restrict the extent of responsibilities.

For many people, informal responsibilities extend beyond formal responsibilities; these are often based on the individual’s religion, culture, and ethics. While government intervention may not be legitimate for failures of informal responsibilities according to Mill, informal responsibilities constitute an important piece of the society. For example, children have an informal responsibility to care for their parents, especially during their old age. If children ignore this responsibility, the government cannot and should not intervene. After all, the government is not the ultimate solution for every social problem, and each member of the country may not believe in the same informal responsibilities due to different culture, religion, and ethics. Instead, the true solutions to failures in informal responsibilities are education in social values and decency, social structures, communities, and institutions.

Mill’s principles on government intervention in the lives of free people provided a platform to discuss psychological harm and social responsibilities. Government can provide solutions for certain social issues, but not for all. In recognition of this, Mill wrote of an alternative limited government to the authoritarian regimes of his time. In this alternative, conflicting and controversial ideologies could co-exist, and government would only regulate formal responsibilities. The burden rests on the society to care for the informal responsibilities.

Notes

1. Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty, 155
2. Plato, The Republic, (Plato 354c, book 1)
3. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Pt. 1, Ch. 15, para. 35
4. Kara, Mahmut. “Rethinking Plato: Philosophical Idealism and Political Totalitarianism.” Fountain Magazine, April-June 2001.
5. Weinrib, Ernest J. “The Case for a Duty to Rescue.” The Yale Law Journal , Vol. 90, No. 2 (Dec., 1980), pp. 247-293 Published by: The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc. URL:<http://www.jstor.org/stable/795987>.
6. Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959)

Cultural differences have a potential to trigger conflicts at all levels, and the response each society gives to these conflicts depend on what they hold most dear as a foundational norm: independent existence of individuals or social interdependence. This calls for awareness in differences and discussion to benefit from cultural diversity.

Michael was having a problem with his neighbor next door. He decided to seek advice from his coworkers on the issue. Paul suggested that he express the problem openly right away, and, if that wouldn’t help, to take the neighbor to the court. Akihiro, on the other hand, warned him not to get too serious, and recommended him to write a letter which talks about their good memories in the past and how pleasant their neighborhood was. The backup plan in this case would be to invite a mutually respected neighbor of theirs to mediate the situation.

Of course, Michael has many other options to address the given problem. Yet, it is interesting to note the differences between the suggestions of the two coworkers. One party is focused on the issue per se and pursues a direct approach; whereas the other is concerned about the relationship and follows indirect/accommodating means to handle the situation. This article is intended to provide a better understanding of these two main approaches in conflicting situations. Since the responses to unease are generally situational, we may not judge whether any of the resolution efforts are good or bad, but rather, look closely on their rationale respectively.

Cultures differ on various aspects of life. Naturally, the approach of their members to conflict will also vary depending on the value they place on issues of interest and dominant cultural characteristics. A close examination of these features in a given society will give an idea on how its members would respond to conflicting situations in general. Given the growing interconnectedness of societies today, such knowledge of cultural tendencies might help in the development of strategies for conflict resolution and prevention.

Societies that promote independent existence of individuals are referred to as individualistic, and those which assume a great deal of social interdependence are grouped as collectivistic cultures.¹ Prior to discussing responses to conflict in these two types of cultures, it may be better to highlight some examples of their interpretations which will provide hints about their foundational norms.

He who hesitates is lost. (American expression)

Strike while the iron is hot. (American expression)

More haste, less speed. (Chinese expression)

A deliberate inaction is better than a blind action. (Chinese expression)

Different cultures may have different viewpoints about the same issue. This affects the responses of their members and the methods they favor in various situations. Existing theories in social sciences, which generally reflect social values of individualism and autonomy, may be inadequate in societies that do not share the same values and foundational norms, and vice versa. Such a cross-cultural analysis requires an understanding of the prevalent cultural values and norms in a given society.¹ These shared values, through which cultures develop and continue, are communicated in a variety of ways. One technique that commonly appears is the use of proverbs or sayings, and such quotes throughout the commentary will provide a general idea about some differing characteristics of these two cultural approaches.

Rather than criticizing or promoting any specific cultural aspect, this piece aims to discuss another dimension of multicultural approach to serve to break the stereotyped images (if any) about different cultures, and to help accept everybody as they are in a world of cultural diversity. Once we have a broad picture, we will further look into how interpersonal conflict is handled, and conclude with some overarching suggestions to foster mutual understanding in cases of unease.

Two’s company, but three’s a crowd. (American expression)

If you congregate, you live. If you scatter, you die. (Korean proverb)

One who leaves the herd, gets snatched by the wolf. (Turkish proverb)

One palm makes no applause. (Chinese proverb)

Two widely held worldviews have become evident in the cross-cultural literature as variables on which most cultures vary: individualism which objectifies the self, and collectivism which submerges the self to emphasize the group. A middle course in the de bate between those who claim the primacy of society and those who emphasize the primal significance of the individual would state that there is no society without an individual; and also that no individual can survive without society.² These concepts do not necessarily form opposite poles and may coexist due to the enormous intercultural mix, yet one approach may still have dominance to the other in a given culture.³

“The freedom to be an individual is the essence of America.” (Marilyn vos Savant)

“It is hard to be an individual in Japan.” (Haruki Murakami)

In individualistic societies, a person is an autonomous entity defined by a somewhat distinctive set of attributes, qualities, or processes; and these internal attributes determine the behavior. Yet, in collectivistic societies, a person is an interdependent entity who is part of the encompassing social relationships. This is not to say that a person in such a society lacks unique attributes, but rather that these are not primary forces that guide the behavior. In such societies, behavior is a consequence of being responsive to others and origins of behaviors are relationships and social harmony.³

He who converses not knows nothing. (English proverb)

He, who knows, does not speak. He, who speaks, does not know. (Lao Tzu)

In Western cultures, a highly verbal individual is perceived more positively, whereas in Eastern cultures perceptions for highly verbal individuals may not be that positive. Traditionally, communication apprehension has been attributed to a weak sense of identity and is viewed as a deficiency; but on the contrary, this reticence may be due to politeness or a tendency to preserve harmony in collectivistic cultures, depending on the social context.

Stand up for your own rights. (American expression)

Unless you blow your own horn, who will? (American expression)

Once you preach, the point is gone. (Zen phrase)

Mature rice plants bow down lower. (Korean expression)

According to individualistic point of view, communicators can get things done by being assertive. On the other hand, from the collectivistic standpoint, people are expected to preserve group identity and may be discouraged from asserting themselves as individuals. Therefore, it will not be a true assumption to attribute this lack of assertiveness to some negative traits such as low self-esteem, shyness, disinterest, or ignorance.³

Cultural dimensions of conflict resolution

“The practice of peace and reconciliation is one of the most vital and artistic of human actions.” (Nhat Hanh)

Keeping all the above examples in mind, now let’s briefly compare and contrast responses to conflict in individualistic and collectivistic societies:

Since individuals’ self-articulated interests are of utmost importance, individualistic perspective frames conflict as the divergence of interests or issues, which limits the focus of solution efforts solely to reconciling the differences in interests between parties. Yet in collectivistic cultures, social harmony is a critical aspiration and community involvement is likely even in interpersonal matters. Then, a deeper and wider analysis that will address the concerns of both types of approaches should better view conflict as a situation and place the situation to the heart of any resolution endeavor.¹

“He who wants to persuade should put his trust not in the right argument, but in the right word. The power of sound has always been greater than the power of sense.” (Joseph Conrad)

The one who raises his/her voice has already lost. (Japanese proverb)

Members of individualistic cultures tend to prefer direct/dominating/prompt communication styles, since they deem open discussion as the best way to deal with their interpersonal problems. On the other hand, individuals in interdependent societies are less likely to “express negative emotions (such as anger) to confront each other, and to use verbal aggressiveness and open discussion in conflict situations. They may avoid reactions to their relational problems that can potentially cause further conflict”. Among them, the stress is not so much upon the individual and his/her interests, but on the maintenance of the collectivity and the continuation of harmonious relationships; conflict is viewed as damaging to social fabric and relational harmony, so it should be avoided as much as possible. This naturally leads to the adoption of high compromising and avoiding behaviors and a relatively low preference for competing and assertive postures which emphasize the value they place on maintaining social harmony rather than personal interests in conflict interactions.³

“Peace is not absence of conflict; it is the ability to handle conflict by peaceful means.” (Ronald Reagan)

There is a natural tendency to avoid conflicts as much as possible. While it is a major strategy to preserve harmonious relationships in Eastern cultures, Western societies may view accommodation efforts as giving up critical values and personal rights. Furthermore, according to the Western approach, people will prefer to avoid conflict only if their stake in an issue is not high enough to get involved, whereas collectivist cultures actually utilize it as a social remedy.³

In collectivistic societies, “understanding is seen not as the result of putting meaning into words, but rather as the greater understanding of shared perspective, expectations, and intimacy”, and avoidance is utilized as a strategy to handle the conflict. Besides expressing the discomfort indirectly/nonverbally in a polite and educating way, non-confrontational communication modes in problematic situations include, but are not limited to: “(a) the use of management to prevent a conflict before it happens, (b) expression of conflict emotions like anger or frustration by non-communication, such as ignorance or silence, (c) pretense of being harmonious in peoples’ presence, even though parties are actually avoiding each other, (d) management of conflict using a third party, (e) tendency of directing accusations against oneself.”³

Cultural differences in third party intervention

“The Believers are but brothers; so make peace and reconciliation between your brothers… ”⁴

How, when, and why a third party interferes has been the central focus of conflict resolution studies. Models on interpersonal conflict that assume a great deal of individual autonomy and privacy in interpersonal matters hardly speak about engaging one’s social network into a conflict, however interpersonal conflict intervention in a collectivistic setting will not take place only between contending individuals and the intervener, but is likely to engage other entities (e.g. extended family members) almost in any given conflict. This involvement of others, with the purpose of securing, improving or sustaining a resolution, can be added strength for conflict intervention and resolution.¹

“Washing one’s hands of the conflict between the powerful and the powerless means to side with the powerful, not to be neutral.” (Paulo Freire)

Western literature on interpersonal conflict intervention generally undermines the adjustment of the involvement style depending on the stage of the disagreement. However in collectivistic societies, “third parties are expected to function in a reconciliatory mode, unless clear injustice or deviance takes place. In this case, third parties should get actively involved in restoring justice and eliminating deviance before returning to the reconciliatory role.” Consultation may be utilized “when relationship issues (perception and attitudes) are not suitable for mediation, and to help parties clarify their underlying needs (security, or identity for example) and interests tied to such needs. Mediation, on the other hand, aims at negotiating certain substantive issues, based on a clear understanding of relationship issues and parties’ own needs and interests.”¹

Adhering to the common good while not favoring any of the parties has good intentions, yet the mediator may face difficulties in modern diverse societies, where notions of common good may be too diverse and vague; focus being on the individual. Material resources are often the codes used, thus legal procedures are vital parts of the resolution in these societies, and mediators are expected to be professionals who are knowledgeable of legal procedures. Thus, actions in a resolution process are task-oriented. Conversely in collectivistic societies, where the main focus is on social harmony and social norms/values form the basis of a solution, mediators are generally seniors (in terms of age or hierarchy) who are knowledgeable of cultural norms. Some codes mainly used by interveners in these cultures include honor, dignity, unity, future of the next generations, religious values, and tradition of forgiveness.^1,5

Speaking of religion and its role in conflict, one’s voluntary sacrifice from his/her rights in some conflicting situations, repelling evil with what is better,⁶ and forgiveness has been encouraged for thousands of years by major world religions.⁷ “Adherents of these religions have claimed that forgiveness yields numerous emotional and spiritual benefits, and can dramatically transform one’s life.”⁸ Hence, it may be useful to explore their resources, which are rich with conflict intervention principles, values and models, in a way that would prepare them for contemporary practice. For instance, it is stated that reconciling a dispute between two parties is a charity,9 and that “kind words and forgiving of faults are better than charity followed by injury.”¹⁰

The most beneficial approach for the involved parties in a conflict situation would be an attempt to address fully the concerns of both parties and to find mutually satisfactory solutions to the cause of the conflict. This collaborative approach is of utmost importance and most viable, particularly when the issues are critical and maintaining an ongoing relationship is important. For an effective assistance, third parties involved in mediation processes should carefully study the needs and values of contending parties and have cultural awareness in order to provide mutually satisfactory resolution options regardless of the society they operate.

Considering that disagreements could be resolved much easily when parties are aware of corresponding needs/values and interests/concerns, getting to know one another would be an important basis for any resolution endeavor. Therefore, the more we exchange ideas without prejudice, the more we’ll understand each other. Although some disagreements yield positive outcomes and new ideas, intense conflicts generally drain energy and resources. Hence, it is heartening to observe that peace studies such as conflict resolution are blossoming, despite some scholars expecting a “clash of civilizations” and some claiming that we are at the “end of history.” Contrary to the arguments that define life as a series of struggles for limited resources, this relatively new field of social sciences will help humanity make the best out of its potential and reach a better state of living. Comprehensive resolutions which are globally applicable to disagreements in-between individuals, organizations, or nations overall, call for good deeds, positive motives, and pure intentions without self-interest. Tolerance, forgiveness, altruism, compassion, submission to ethical/moral codes, fairness, openness of hearts and minds, and welcoming people as they encompass some of the universal means to cure conflicts at various levels.

References

1. Abdalla, Amr. 2000. “Principles of Islamic Interpersonal Conflict Intervention: A Search within Islam and Western Literature.” Journal of Law & Religion 15, no. 1. 151-184.

2. Nasr, Seyyed H. 2002. The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity. San Francisco: HarperCollins.

3. Kim, Min-Sun. 2002. Non-Western Perspectives on Human Communication: Implications for Theory and Practice. Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Sage Publications.

4. Qur’an, 49:10.

5. Abu-Nimer, Mohammed. 1996. “Conflict Resolution in an Islamic Context: Some Conceptual Questions.” Peace and Change 21, no. 1. 22-40.

6. Qur’an, 41:34.

7. For some of the Qur’anic verses on interpersonal forgiveness and reconciliation not mentioned in the text, the reader may refer to 2:280; 3:134, 4:128, 135, 149; 24:22; 25:63; and 42:37, 40, 43.

8. McCullough, Michael E., Kenneth I. Pargament, and Carl E. Thoresen. 2000. Forgiveness: Theory, Research, and Practice. New York: The Guilford Press.

9. Bukhari, Sulh, 11; Muslim, Zakat, 52.

10. Qur’an, 2:263.

There has been strong opposition to the idea. The issue was discussed in the U.S. and Europe as long ago as the early 20th century. In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Diamond v. Chakrabarty that: ‘anything under the sun made by man’ is patentable. The court considered a distinction between a product of nature and a product of human invention or intervention as the decisive factor, rather than the distinction between sentient life and insentient matter. In ex Parte Allen, the Board of Appeal held that an oyster was patentable because it had been genetically altered by human intervention. In the end of the U.S. Patent Office ruled non-naturally occurring non-human multicellular living organisms, including animals, to be patentable. More recently, in 1988, Harvard University was granted a patent on a transgenic mammal named ‘Once Mouse’.

Is the situation any different in Europe? In Germany, inventions in the field of biology were not, in principle, excluded from patent protection, the Federal Supreme Court decided in the Red Dove. The European Patent Convention or EPC, signed in Munich and ratified in 1977, came into force on 1 June 1978 in the member states. Article 53 of the EPC provides that European patents shall not be granted in respect of:

a. inventions, the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to ‘public order’ or morality, provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the contracting states;

b. plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals. This provision does not apply to microbiological processes or the products thereof.

This article contains three exceptions to patentability of plant and animals.

1. Animal varieties and plant varieties.

2. Essentially biological processes for the production of plant and animals.

3. Inventions which are contrary to ‘public order’ or ‘morality’.

1. What is the meaning of the term variety?

This question was debated by the Examining Division’s decision (EPOR 4 (1990)) in regard to Once Mouse. The application was made by Harvard University for a patent for a genetically modified animal which was to be used to cure cancer.

The application was refused:

a. on the grounds of non-reproducibility under Article 83 of the EPC. Although the application was based on claims related to all non-human mammalian animals, actual tests had only been done on mice: it could not be assumed that the same manipulation could be successfully performed on other mammals without inventive skill; and,

b. on the grounds that the legislators had intended to exclude animals in general from patentability under Article 53 (b).

However the Board of Appeal did not see any reason to limit the claims under Article 83. Also, the Board did not agree with the Examining Division’s interpretation of Art 53 (b) as excluding animals as such from patent protection. They pointed out that the legislators must have intended the phrase ‘animal varieties’ to be more narrowly construed than ‘animals’. The Board, therefore, held the question to the Examining Division.

On reconsideration, the Division decided that ‘Once Mouse’ did not fall under the terms of the ‘variety’ exemption. It concluded that in relation to Article 53 (b) claims directed to non-human mammals generally did not fall within the scope of the terms ‘animal variety’, (race animale).

The ‘variety’ exemption was also considered in the Giba-Geiy Case by the Technical Board of Appeal.

In- this case, the claimed invention satisfied the requirements of patentability but the Examining Division refused to grant a patent because the subject matter fall into scope of the Art. 53 (b).

Contrary to the Division’s view, the Europe Patent Office (EPO) Technical Board argued that 53(b) excludes only plant varieties and it is clear that ‘plant’ is different from ‘plant varieties’. According to the Board, ‘plant variety’ means stability of characteristics within specific tolerances after every individual propagation or propagation cycle. The Board of heed that 53(b) excludes ‘only the plants or their propagating material in the fixed form of the plant variety.’

2. Another problematic clause under Article 53(b) concerns ‘essentially biological processes for the production of plants and animals’ which are excluded with the proviso that ‘this exclusion does not apply to microbiological processes or products thereof’.

Two main question arises here. Firstly: what differentiates ‘essentially biological processes’ from ‘microbiological processes’?

Llewelyn has assumed that ‘an essentially biological process could be defined, most simply, as one where natural methods are the dominant influence’. The EPO defined ‘essentially biological process’ as dependent on the extent to which there is technical intervention by man in the process. If such intervention plays a significant part in determining or controlling the result the process will not be an ‘essentially biological’ one.

It has been held by the EPO Board, in the context of plants in Lubrizal/Hybrid Plants, that the meaning of ‘essentially biological process’ must be judged on the basis of the essence of the invention, taking into account the totality of human intervention and its impact on the result achieved.’ Human intervention may also mean that the process is not ‘a purely biological’ one even though the intervention made by only a trivial contribution.

The Draft Directive established a new and different approach, namely that a distinction must be made between naturally occurring substance itself and the product in a useful form, which results from human intervention in isolating it from its natural environment.

Art 53(b) says that ‘essentially biological processes’ are not patentable but the Draft Directive provides that this only covers traditional biological breeding activities thereby and rescues the interventions in ‘essentially biological process’ from non-patentability.

The most significant element of Article 53(b) is its inclusion of the products of microbiological processes. This means that a plant or animal produced by a ‘microbiological process’ falls outside the scope of the exclusionary provision of Art 53 (b) and is therefore patentable. It could be said that the aim was specifically to enable products of microbiological processes to be patented, i.e. all genetically engineered plant and animal.

Again, the problem is one precise definition. How does one decide that a process which has been carried out is a ‘microbiological’ one? EPO guidelines explain that ‘microbiological’ covers the processes used by micro-organisms and processes used for producing micro-organisms. Also, ‘micro-organism’ includes material such as plasmids and viruses (which have been used to create new plant genetic matter) and cell lines. All such process are patentable. The Draft Directive similarly rules (in its Article 5) that processes which either use or operate upon a micro-organism, or result in a micro-organism, should be considered microbiological and thus eligible for patent. It goes further: ‘the word micro-organism shall be interpreted in its broadest sense as including all microbiological entities capable of replication, e.g. as comprising, inter alia, bacterium fungi . . . and cells.’

3. The third exception is on the grounds of immorality. Art 53 (a) provides that a patent should not be granted in respect of inventions, the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to ‘Public Order’ or ‘morality’. In other words, if the public considers an invention ‘immoral’ a patent would not be granted.

But, the Examining Division ruled in regard to ‘Once Mouse’ that irrespective of whether the public considered it moral or immoral, such inventions incontrovertibly assisted mankind in the care of ‘widespread and dangerous’ diseases. The Technical Board of Appeal pointed out in its recommendations to the Division that the possible suffering to animals and risks to the environment should be balanced against the invention’s usefulness in meeting human needs (diagnosis, treatment, food supply for a rapidly growing world population) on the other hand. The Division stated that ‘the invention would reduce the overall level of animal suffering by reducing the number of animals used in conventional animal testing.

Considerable doubts remain. Whether or not ‘Once Mouse’ may help save people dying from cancer, who is to guarantee that mice or other animals will not be manipulated to which achieve a cure for baldness or other trivial (but commercially ‘compelling’) purpose. What is the excuse for creating a very unhappy, transgenic rat to cure a widespread but non-lethal condition such as acne?

Genetic engineering should be the subject of general legislation rather than ‘patent law’ especially in respect of ‘immorality’. 

Conclusion

The development of new features in plants and animals using microbiological methods is a long, difficult, expensive process with no guarantee for success. Therefore patents which have been granted by appropriate and competent bodies need to cover not only the first generation of the altered animals or plants but also their progeny which are then the result of natural breeding: and this was allowed in the claims of the Harvard Patent.

Despite strong arguments on several grounds, a new invention related to living matter should not be prevented from securing a patent. It is also our view that the distinction between patentable and non-patentable should be made on the basis of human intervention (especially in relation to microbiological processes) rather than on the basis of sentient or insentient matter.

However the patentability of human life or any part of human life must always be regarded as unacceptable in principle because human life should not be subject to commercialism: it would open the way to a new form of slavery.

• References
• CHRISRIE, A. (1989) ‘Patent for plant innovation’ EIPR, 3.
• CORREA, C. (1992) ‘Biological resources and intellectual property rights’ EIPR, 5.
• NOTT, R. (1992) ‘Patent protection for plant and animals’ EIPR, 3, p.79.
• PAVER, M. (1992) ‘All animals are patentable but some are more patentable than others’, Patent World, March, 9.
• WHAITE, R.& JONES, N. (1989) ‘Biotechnological patent in Europe’, The Draft Directive, EIPR, 5.