At the turn of the millennium, a delegation from Iraq comes to the World Trade Center in New York to strike a deal with their American partners for an emergency relief organization for the famine in Africa. On the itinerary is paying a courtesy visit to the President in return for his celebrating the new coalition government in Iraq after the recent elections. They will also attend an interfaith gathering to pray with members of different religions for lasting peace and prosperity for the entire world.

It did not happen like that. And we have been doomed to reflect over and over again for a decade on why and how the 9/11 attacks happened. Before the year 2000, Y2K seemed like a would-be doomsday; thankfully it was not, but it was regretfully replaced by terrorism and war.

As many contractions of anger, pain, and revenge as we have suffered, the past decade also laid before us opportunities to learn about the ‘other.’ No less intense than the destructive plots and crimes breathlessly aspiring for a ‘clash of civilizations’ have been the efforts for peaceful coexistence in dialogue. Perhaps unprecedented at this scale in the history of humankind, many devotees of dialogue from different cultures and religions have dared to commit themselves to overcome all prejudices and psychological boundaries in order to sit around the same table and respect one another.

This edition brings to your desk special coverage of the decade after 9/11. You will read striking memories and analyses from Branning and Kurucan, whose words help us find our own perspectives. Bishop Chane of America and Bishop Guntar of Norway—the most recent victim of brutal terrorism—are emphasizing the fact that religions were hijacked at 9/11 and in Norway ten years later. Tatari and Wilson explore Islam, the most defamed and misrepresented religion, vis-a-vis terrorism and war, which are often wrongfully attributed to it. Does the Qur’an sanction war, and how should we interpret certain verses that sound as if it does? What is the truth about jihad, is it really holy war?

The Fountain also features in this issue contributions expressing our need to promote dialogue for peaceful coexistence. Dr. Leap shares with us her positive engagement in dialogue with other religions. Bishop Demetrios reminds us of the good example of reconciliation between the Turkish and Greek communities in the U.S. Dr. Carroll is rightfully bringing in questions to ponder over: Can we revive historical incidents of dialogue, and how can we adapt them today? Are religions tolerant enough to respect other religions? Are we personally ready to embrace others as they are? Tosun and Angelone reveal a sincere friendship in poetry that cuts across wide distances and differences. Can America inspire peace and freedom after 9/11? Fatma Yilmaz believes it can, and explains why she is hopeful.

The darkest phase of the night is followed by the dawn.

•conquered and occupied two large Muslim countries (Afghanistan and Iraq)

•compelled a huge Muslim army to root out a terrorist sanctuary (Pakistan)

•deployed thousands of special forces to numerous Muslim countries (Yemen, Somalia, Sudan etc.)

•imprisoned hundreds of Muslims without recourse

•waged a massive war of ideas involving Muslim clerics to denounce violence and new institutions to bring Western norms to Muslim countries

•killed Osama bin Laden, the inspirational leader of Al Qaeda who carried out the 9/11 attacks.

Have these actions – which some have called, “World War IV” – made America safe?

In a narrow sense, America is safer and justice has been served. There has not been another attack on the scale of 9/11. Our defenses regarding immigration controls, airport security, and the disruption of potentially devastating domestic plots have all improved. This is the positive side of the ledger.

In a broader sense, however, America is not safe enough. Anti-American suicide terrorism rose rapidly around the world in the decade since September 11, 2001. In 2003, then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously asked, “Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrasas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?” As even a casual glance at the facts shows, the answer is a disappointing no. The negative side of the balance sheet is daunting.

September 11, 2001 was so devastating largely because it was a suicide attack in which 19 hijackers killed themselves in the course of killing 3,000 innocent people. So the key to tracking the threat is to focus on suicide terrorism, especially those inspired against Americans.

Look at the numbers. In 2000 – the year before 9/11 – there were 20 suicide attacks around the world and one – against the US Cole in Yemen – was anti-American inspired. By contrast, in 2010, there were well over 200 suicide attacks and about 90 percent were anti-American inspired – against US troops or those working with America – a ten-fold increase over the past decade.

Each month, there are more suicide terrorists trying to kill Americans and its allies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other Muslim countries than in all the years before 2001 combined. Yes, these attacks are mostly (although not exclusively) focused on military and diplomatic targets. However, so too were the anti-American suicide attacks before 2001. It is important to remember that the 1995 and 1996 bombings of US troops in Saudi Arabia, the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and (as mentioned) bombing of the US Cole in Yemen in 2000 were the crucial dots that showed the threat was rising prior to 9/11. Today, such dots are occurring by the dozens every month.

American military policies have not stopped the rising wave of extremism in the Muslim world. The reason has not been lack of effort, lack of will among the American people, lack of bipartisan support for aggressive military policies, lack of funding, or lack of genuine patriotism.

No. American military policies are not failing for the standard excuses. Something else is creating the mismatch between America’s effort and the results.

What went wrong

America has been waging a long war against terrorism, but without much serious public debate about what is truly motivating terrorists to kill us. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attack, this was perfectly understandable. If toppling the Taliban was necessary to take out Al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan, so be it.

But, in an instant, there was also a great need to know, or perhaps better to say, to “understand” the events of that terrible day. A simple narrative was readily available and a powerful conventional wisdom began to exert its grip. Since the 9/11 hijackers were all Muslims, it was easy to presume that Islamic fundamentalism was the central motivating force driving the 19 hijackers to kill themselves in order to kill us. Within weeks after the attack, surveys of American attitudes show that this presumption was fast congealing into a hard reality in the public mind. Americans immediately wondered, “Why do they hate us?” and almost as immediately came to the conclusion that it was because of who we are, not what we do.

The narrative of Islamic fundamentalism did more than explain why America was attacked. It also pointed toward a simple, grand solution – one whose ambition only made it seem all the more worthy in light of the trauma of that terrible day. If Islamic fundamentalism was driving the threat and if its roots grew from the culture of the Arab world, then America had a clear mission: to transform Arab societies – with Western political institutions and social norms as the ultimate antidote to the virus of Islamic extremism.

The only problem: Islamic fundamentalism is not the main driver of suicide terrorism. What drives this phenomenon more than any other single factor is foreign military presence – which inspires wave after wave of individuals to join terrorist groups in order to carry out suicide attacks in the hope that these would end the foreign presence in their lands.

On September 11, 2001, the United States had deployed over 12,000 combat forces to countries on the Persian Gulf (5,000 in Saudi Arabia and 7,000 in other countries along the rim). We now know that these troops were the principle rallying cry of Osama bin Laden in his efforts to mobilize volunteers for suicide attacks against the United States and that the martyr videos of the 9/11 hijackers – their last video will testimonials – prominently justify their actions as in response to Western military control of the governments on the Arabian peninsula. Further, escalation of American combat forces in the region for the Iraq war directly fueled still further anti-American suicide terrorism.

Hence, the grand solution became the grand catalyst for more anti-American inspired suicide terrorism than ever before.

What we know

Vast new research on suicide terrorism has produced important new knowledge. Here is a summary of what we know:

•Occupation causes suicide terrorism

Over 95% of all suicide attacks are in response to foreign occupation

•The more occupation, the more suicide terrorism

As America has occupied two large Muslim countries, Afghanistan and Iraq with a total population of about 60 million, total suicide attacks worldwide have risen dramatically – from about 300 from 1980 to 2003 to 2000+ from 2004 to 2010. Further, 90% of all suicide attacks are now anti-American.

•Indirect occupation is the equivalent of direct occupation

The US compelled Pakistan to deploy 100,000 troops against the Taliban in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Pakistani suicide attacks escalated dramatically.

•Ending occupation can end suicide terrorism even without transforming Muslim countries

Since Israel withdrew its army from Lebanon in May 2000, there has not been a single Lebanese suicide attack. Since Israel withdrew from Gaza and large parts of the West Bank, Palestinian suicide attacks are down over 90%. Since America and its allies began withdrawing from Iraq, suicide attacks are also falling fast.

•Empowering local groups can reduce suicide terrorism

In Iraq, the surge’s apparent success was not the result of increased US military control of Anbar Province, but rather quite the reverse – the empowerment of Sunni tribal leaders for their own security, commonly called the Anbar Awakening.

•Taking power away from local groups can escalate suicide terrorism

In Afghanistan the ISAF’s expansion strategy, designed to exert more central government control over the Pashtun tribes in the Western and Southern provinces, caused a resurgence in the Taliban and an increase in the number of suicide attacks.

The tide is turning

The oxygen for America’s strategy is, fundamentally, how we understand the root cause of the terrorist threat we face. In recent years, the intellectual climate has begun to change. In January 2010, a Zogby poll found that 27% of Americans now believe that the “most important factor” motivating terrorists to attack the United States is that they “resent Western power and influence” compared to 33% who still think the main motive is “make Islam the world’s dominant religion.”

American military policies are also changing. The United States started to draw down military forces from Iraq in 2008, has already removed 100,000 troops, and is on schedule to end its commitment of heavy combat forces there next year. Since their peak in 2007, suicide attacks in the country have fallen by over 80 percent and the country is more stable today than at any point since America conquered the country in 2003.

In Afghanistan, President Obama announced in July his plan to remove about a third of US forces from the country over the next year and to continue drawing down thereafter. If so, there is good reason to expect that suicide attacks will soon begin to decline significantly there as well.

Fortunately the US does not need to station large ground forces in either Iraq or Afghanistan to keep them from being a significant safe haven for Al Qaeda or any other anti-American terrorists. This can be achieved by a strategy called “Off-Shore Balancing” that relies on over-the-horizon air and naval forces and rapidly deployable ground forces, combined with empowering local groups to oppose the terrorist groups. No matter what happens in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US will maintain a significant air and naval presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean for many years, and those forces are well-suited to striking terrorist leaders and camps in conjunction with local militias – just as they did so successfully against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in 2001.

Above all, to truly move beyond the war on terror, it is important for scholars, policy intellectuals, government leaders, and the public at large to continue to educate themselves about the factors that lead to suicide attacks like 9/11. The more we know, the fewer mistakes and the better our policies – and the more we can all live our lives in peace.

Robert A. Pape is Professor and Director of the University of Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism and author of Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It (2010).

In this issue the article on “The Adaptation in the Senses” points to the fact that the human body is blessed with an ability to adapt to the surrounding conditions by way of which our senses get used to changing climate, light, and even pain. This feature of our body is a mercy, considering that if we could not adapt to circumstances, life would be torture. Could this be the reason bombings and civilian sufferings in Iraq do not irritate me-because I have been watching or reading about it for more than five years now and my senses are adapted to being exposed to the same play on the Iraqi stage?

While voicing a strong longing for the lofty and colorful life of centuries ago, the lead article is a consolation for the victims of all times as it reminds the reader of how joyous enthusiasm was once achieved: “We believed as long as we could employ our willpower up to its potential all problems could be overcome as a result of divine help. We always managed to discover contentment in our soul and proceeded on our course.” In such a state of psychology no misfortune can shake any individual or community.

In this issue you will meet Ottoman Women: Myth and Reality, a book which won the Benjamin Franklin best book in history award in May 2008. Its description of the legal rights and social status of Muslim women in the nineteenth century will shatter life-long prejudices about harem life. Another writer, Dr Salik, takes us on a space journey to discover planets orbiting other stars where scientists hope to test theories developed on planet creation. Thomas C. Smedley offers an interesting pattern of engaging with foreign cultures as a result of his personal experiences with the Turkish community in the USA. Smedley says that by practicing role reversal, a person of good will can overcome the barriers of language, religion, and nationality.

Ramadan mubarak! We wish this holy month of Islam may be a means of peace and joy for all peoples of the world.

Biological weapons (BWs), defined as infectious bacterial or viral agents used to harm others, have a long history2: Primitive peoples used arrows poisoned with biological toxins from animal and plant extracts, and also poisoned their enemy’s water supply with fecal extracts. Medieval warriors besieging the Russian city of Kaffa catapulted plague-infected corpses over its walls. Europeans knowingly gave smallpox- or measles-infected blankets to Native Americans, who had no resistance to these diseases. BWs reportedly were used during WWII. Over time, BWs have come to include biologically derived toxins and poisons.3 Among the most dangerous agents are smallpox, botalinum toxin (Btx), anthrax, and ricin.4 Some are highly lethal, while others incapacitate the host or primarily harm animals and plants. Today, many countries are believed to fund such research.

BWs Become a Modern Issue

Japan started the first offensive biological weapon program in 1918 with Unit 731, a special army unit dedicated to BWs production and experimentation. In 1931, it moved to Man-churia, China, where it conducted experiments on Chinese people and actually attacked several cities with different BWs until 1942. At least 10,000 Chinese died during those experiments. In 1942, the U.S. learned of this program and started its own. By 1969, it had weaponized the agents causing anthrax, botulism, tularemia, brucellosis, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, and Q fever.5

In 1969, President Nixon declared that the U.S. unilaterally renounced first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical agents and weapons, and unconditionally renounced all methods of biological warfare. Henceforth, the U.S.’s biological program would research only strictly defined measures of defense, such as immunization. All stockpiles were ordered to be destroyed. The U.S. and 165 other countries have signed the Biolog-ical and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC), and 144 countries have ratified it.6

But the BWC cannot be effective if it cannot be enforced. For example, the USSR signed it but continued its programs. In 1979, at least 66 people died after an accidental anthrax release from a plant near Sverdlovsk. Soviet authorities denied any BWs production, but years later President Yeltsin confirmed that anthrax was being researched at that time.7 Yeltsin further asserted that all such programs were stopped and that stockpiles were being removed. However, evidence suggests that part of the offensive programs continue.8

The USSR’s demise (1991) led to the spread of BWs production information. According to Margolis, some of the 60,000 scientists and technicians formerly employed by its biological warfare establishment reportedly are working in Iraq, Israel, Iran, Syria, and Serbia, all of which already have extensive arsenals of biowarfare weapons. India also may have received substantial Russian aid.9

Iraq announced its BWs program in 1995. Fortunately, such agents were not used during the Gulf War, possibly due to fear of nuclear retaliation. The UN destroyed whatever it could find of Iraq’s BWs program in 1996.10 China, Iran, Taiwan, Syria, Cuba, North Korea, Egypt, Israel, and Libya are suspected of having similar programs.11

Why Would Anyone Use BWs?

In the eyes of nations or groups that put their own ideology or interests above all other considerations, including human life and future generations, such weapons might appear attractive. Consider the following points:

BWs probably are more effective on a per-quantity basis than more conventional weapons. Just 8 ounces of Type-A botalinum toxin, “the most lethal substance known,” could kill every living creature on Earth.12 One gram of anthrax contains 100 million lethal doses, and a few kilograms can kill as many people as died at Hiroshima.13 Generally speaking, several kilos of a biological agent can have the impact of several tons of nerve gas. BWs are extremely effective because they are highly toxic and are living organisms that multiply in and infect target hosts.

Producing chemical and nuclear weapons requires sophisticated equipment and highly trained personnel; BWs require only a modest level of education and investment. Kathleen C. Bailey, a former assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, is “absolutely convinced” that a major biological arsenal could be built with $10,000 worth of equipment in a 15×15 ft. room.14

For example:

To infect 1 sq. km., it would cost approximately $2,000 using conventional weapons, $800 using nuclear weapons, $600 using chemical weapons, and $1 using biological weapons. Any nation with a reasonably advanced pharmaceutical and medical industry can mass produce BWs.15

Weaponized anthrax probably could be produced in a small house, apartment or RV for less than $100,000. The program could be run by perhaps less than a dozen technicians with the equivalent of a BS degree led by one supervisor with a Ph.D. The relevant basic knowledge for most biological weapons-grade microbes is freely available, and equipment and chemicals can be obtained from dozens of suppliers.16

A live weapon needs only a small sample for mass production. Some agents exist naturally in the soil or can be ordered from a biotech company. Various researchers have claimed that Saddam Hussein used the latter method to acquire his original anthrax culture.17 BWs are hard are to detect in the production phase, for most bioweapons can be produced in hidden and/or mobile conditions.18 When detected, the place can be quickly cleaned and transformed into an ordinary pharmaceutical research or biology lab. Furthermore, such anti-terrorist sensor systems as metal detectors, x-ray machines, trained dogs, or neutron bombardment cannot detect BWs.19

Damage is confined to people (and possibly other living things), thus leaving infrastructure intact20; the sheer terror caused by such a threat21; ensuing governmental panic22; and the time lag between release and detection makes identification and apprehension very remote.23 But BWs also have certain drawbacks, among them:

The need for effective delivery. Most biological agents infect through inhalation. Too-large particles are caught in the respiratory system; too-small particles are exhaled. To stay in the lungs, the particle should be between 1 and 5 Angstroms. In fact, a BW attempt in Japan failed because the dissemination tool was ineffective.24

Even if disseminated, the desired result is far from certain. Most biological materials, including spores, are destroyed by exposure to ultraviolet light and drying. Agents released in the air may disperse in unexpected ways due to changes in wind patterns. Rain may wash the agents out of the air before they reach their target. Also, BWs can turn around and infect those who released them.

BWs’ live nature is a two-edged sword. The disease spreads easily, but no one can know when it is safe to live in the infected area. An agent’s lifespan is a major concern, for it can become part of the local microflora and thus threaten any military follow-up activities for an unknown length of time.25

Vulnerability to Attack

BWs have two main uses: on the battlefield and on a civilian population. Battlefield Use: BWs have several drawbacks here, such as high dependence upon external conditions, delayed effects, possible self-infection, uncertainty over when an infected area is safe enough to return to, and neutralization by vaccination or protective clothing. Use on a Civilian Population: This is the true horror, for civilians would not be prepared for such an attack and the resulting epidemic would be very hard to control. If the attack is covert, authorities would be unable to identify the source and unaware of the attack until infected people start showing up in the hospitals. When they finally identified the agent, the infection would be widespread. If a vaccine did not exist, health professionals would be unable to offer much help. The U.S. considers itself very vulnerable to such an attack and is working to protect itself.

Given that BWs are not hard to obtain, why have they not been used on civilian populations so far? The main reasons seem to be fear of a reprisal attack and of alienating the public to one’s cause. Potential users apparently feel that the disadvantages far outweigh the advantages. But as they may not always feel that way, the U.S. and other nations are studying how to prepare their national health care infrastructures and personnel to deal with such an event.

A Recent Development

On July 26, 2001, the Washington Post announced that the U.S. would withdraw from the BWC on the grounds that a newly proposed protocol “would not prevent cheating, and could encourage espionage against the U.S. pharmaceutical and chemical industries.” One wonders if other countries will follow suit.

Conclusion

Many Web sites discuss this vital issue, such as: www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/: strengthening the BWC; www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil/about_us/general.html: Department of Defense focal point for data related to Chemical Warfare/Chemical and Biological Defense technology; www.asanltr.com/: specializes in nuclear, biological, and chemical defense and protection issues; www.geocities.com/nbclinks/: gateway for nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare data on the Web; and www.seanet.com/~gtate/cwoff.htm: gives access to various chemical warfare-related Web pages.

All religions condemn such horrific weapons on the grounds that all life is inherently sacred and worthy of respect. However, realpolitik, greed for profits, ideological conflict, and the need to assert or maintain control of natural and other resources deafens many governments and people to the appeals of religion.

Unfortunately, one nation’s and even one group’s decision to head down this path causes others to follow for the sake of self-preservation. We are well-advanced on this path, and no one can say where it will end

Footnotes

1. Rod Hafemeister, “Vaccines Will Not Suffice Fight Vs. Anthrax Needs Other Ammo,” Belleville News-Democrat (28 Dec. 1997). Online at: www.militaryreporter.org/anthrax.html.
2. R. E. Hurlbert, Microbiology 101, “Chapter XV, Adden-dum: Biological Weapons; Malignant Biology,” Washington State Univ. 1997). Online at: www.slic2.wsu.edu:82/hurlbert/micro101/pages/101biologicalweapons.html.
3. Henry E. Hardy, “Biological Weapons FAQ v. 0.44,” (1999): Online at: www.ocean.ic.net/ftp/doc/disaster/bio/biowfaq.html.
4. Partial online list: www.fas.org/nuke/intro/bw/agent.htm.
5. Thomas W. McGovern and George W. Christopher, Biological Warfare and Its Coetaneous Manifestations. Online at: www.telemedicine.org/BioWar/biologic.htm.
6. http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/bw-btwc-mainpage.html.
7. F. A. Abramova et al., “Pathology of inhalational anthrax in 42 cases from the Sverdlovsk outbreak of 1979,” Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, no. 90 (1993): 2291-94; G. W. Christopher et al., “Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective,” J Am Med Assoc, no. 278 (1997): 412-17.
8. Eric Margolis, “Another Doomsday Clock Is Ticking, Ticking,” Foreign Correspondent (20 June 1999). Online at: www.foreigncorrespondent.com/ archive/doomsday.htm.
9. R A. Zilinskas, “Iraq’s biological weapons: The past as future?” J Am Med Assoc, no. 278 (1997): 418-24.
10. Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project Web Page: www.stimson.org/cwc/bwissues.htm.
11. Margolis, “Another Doomsday,”(20 June 1999).
12. Robert H. Kupperman and David M. Smith, “Coping with Biological Terrorism,” in Brad Roberts, ed., Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future? (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), 35-46; Wayman C. Mullins, “An Overview and Analysis of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism: The Weapons, Strategies and Solutions to a Growing Problem,” American Journal of Criminal Justice 16:2 (1992): 95-119.
13. M. Asperilla, “Bioterrorism: The threat of the future.” Online at: www.sun-herald.com/2000/fron9.htm.
14. L. Cole, “The Specter of Biological Weapons,” Scientific American. Online at: www.sciam.com/1296issue/ 1296cole.html#1.
15. Ibid.
16. R. E. Hurlbert, “Biological Weapons: Black Biology,” Focus on Microbiology Education Newsletter (Spring 1998). Online at: www.microbelibrary.org/newsletter/nltrs98.htm.
17. For this and other claims of how the U.S. helped Iraq obtain the necessary ingredients for both biological and chemical weapons, consult Mark Phythian and Nikos Passas, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam’s War Machine (Northeastern Univ. Press: 1996); Alan Friedman, Spider’s Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq (New York : Bantam Books, 1993).
18. Hurlbert, Microbiology 101 (see footnote 8).
19. Robert S. Root-Bernstein, “Infectious Terrorism,” Atlantic Monthly (May 1991): 44-50.
20. Stanley L. Wiener 1991. “Terrorist Use of Biological Weapons.” Terrorism 14:2, (1991): 129; “Chemical and Biological Weapons and Terrorism,” in Susan Flood, ed., International Terrorism: Policy Implications (Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, The University of Illinois at Chicago, 1991), 65.
21. Robert H. Kupperman and Darrell M. Trent, Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1979).
22. Harvey J. McGeorge, “Reversing the Trend on Terror,” Defense & Foreign Affairs 16:4 (April 1988): 16-22.
23. Jeffrey D. Simon, Terrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons: A Discussion of Possibilities R/3771-AFMIC (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1989): 10; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: 1994), 483.
24. The ease of dissemination remains controversial. A detailed summary of the BWs delivery scenarios can be found in Ron Perver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the Open Literature. Online at: www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/miscdocs/purv_e.html#tab2.
25. Dr. Dane Jones. Online at: www.calpoly.edu/~drjones/ biowar-e3.html.