Kasym lives with his grandson and daughter-in-law in the steppes. These steppes, native Kazakh land, can present challenges, particularly in winter. A harsh climate and specific geographic characteristics make life difficult. For those who are not born and raised there, things may be even harder. Daily life, work, travel, and other activities require struggles against nature’s routines. Kasym shepherds a herd of sheep on the steppes through winter and fights with the hardships of the season. On the other hand, some visiting hunters, equipped with advanced modern technology such as a vehicle, weapons, and a navigation tool, get lost; some even die.

Extreme cold weather and wild animals, mainly wolves, challenge the herd and the old man; they face fatal dangers. His grandson, Erali, having not heard from his grandfather for longer than expected takes off to search for Kasym. Although Erali and the old man do not seem to be on very good terms with each other, Erali’s efforts in looking for Kasym reveal his love towards his grandfather. Local folks, along with some rescuers, join Erali in his endeavor. Kasym is able to use his knowledge of the native land, where he spent all his life, to survive against the cold and the wolves’ attacks. Constantly moving, he manages to help a surviving hunter as well. Days later, just as his hopes are fading, Erali finds Kasym, who outwits nature while the visiting hunters lose their battle against the steppes.

Some critiques emphasize the parallels between Shal and Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea, about an old fisherman’s fight for a catch while fishing. This may be so on the surface as both plots weave an old man figure against nature. Both may convey a deeper message, though – the advantage of the native. Kasym’s refined local skills allow him to fight the great steppes, while a team of non-natives turn helpless. As a man of dala, the great openness, Kasym knows every trick the winter in the steppes will play on him and is ready to hit back. Kasym’s grandson, Erali, who helped initiate the rescue, may, on another level, be considered the heir to the local knowledge. Aware of the challenges in the steppes, despite his young age, Erali, a native too, is worried that the old man may be in danger.

Shal is a successful depiction of life in the dala, the great openness, of Kazakhstan. Stories such as Shal inspire thoughts on globalization and cultural identity. The artistic sphere reflects on global and local issues and provides insight into human experience. Globalization stands as one of the major issues affecting local cultures. As the world globalizes, it raises questions of a shared global culture versus local identity. A global culture comes into being through various social and cultural processes, sharing a worldview, language, opportunities, and even food (Bird – Stevens, 2003; Khondker, 2004). Cultural identity is defined by concepts of common history, and shared experiences, practices, and culture codes (Hall, 1996). Cultural identity, which may be shared by a nation, a people, or a community – as well as a diaspora – may provide people with the power for survival. It is alive and it is reshaped through new experiences (Fanon, 2007).

Many worry that the cultural identity of communities is threatened by globalization, since a global culture has been thought to be against the idea of local culture. Many questions have been put forward: Would globalization pose threats to local knowledge? Should the local be protected against globalization? Do global agreements respect local identities?

Financial gains as well as the social impacts of globalization have been the topics of many discussions and talks. Contemporary developments in internet technology and communication, through the outreach they provide, as well as improved transportation, seem to support globalization. Social media helps send messages around the globe in an instant. We are able to learn the news around the world with just a click. The globe “becomes flat” (Friedman, 2006), as multi-national companies turn borderless. Websites sell products to international customers.

Globalization, as threatening as it may sound to some, serves the common good in many respects. Smart phones, tablets, and other electronic devices accompany individuals around the clock, with apps constituting a globally shared environment where global and local characteristics interact. For instance, travelers around the globe are able to track international and local flights in an instant, no matter where they may be. International locations such as airports offer services available and known to travelers around the globe. Global aid organizations such as Kimse Yok Mu or Doctors without Borders reach those in need of assistance around the world. Policies about certain issues such as global warming cover millions, even billions, of people. Through global efforts to protect the environment, awareness is raised among many people. Global values such as human rights protect vast swaths of people (Castells, 2005). Global interfaith and intercultural dialogue efforts reach communities that are trying to avoid conflict. Various groups, communities, and nations may come to understand one another and resolve conflicts through global dialogue efforts. Different experiences are shared by the global community.

At the same time, what we consider global may help define its opposite, the local. Tomlinson’s (2003) approach to globalization and cultural identity brings along a broader lens through which to view globalization and identity. Contrary to perceiving globalization as the destroyer of cultural identity, Tomlinson puts forward globalization to generate identity. People may tend to identify with their own community the most in the event of globalization; their shared values, sense of space, and cultural identity empower continuity (Widdis, 2006). In a sense, awareness of globalization brings about awareness of local cultural identity. As in Thai educational reform (Jungck – Kajornsin, 2003), local wisdom is brought back to provide a larger living arena for generations to come. Local wisdom lives on as gleaned from a cultural existence in a local surrounding. On another level, Dupuis (2014) looked into cultural management issues between Canadian and French environments. What he concluded may be valid for localities around the globe. He emphasized the differences in local cultures and the variability of interaction between any global force and local elements. Thus, global contribution may rely on local wisdom.

In 1984, Kundera wrote in The Tragedy of Central Europe that the identity owned by a people is reflected in its culture and the culture becomes an increasingly-owned value for people if their shared identity is threatened. When global activities threaten local identity, it will be protected and emphasized more. The impact of globalization on local elements deserves longitudinal investigation. Yet, today, whenever there is some discussion of globalization, locality is invariably involved and the local elements affected by global activities are on the agenda of those interested.

Similarly, European Union regulations, when evaluated as documents with global characteristics, are almost always mentioned along with respect for local elements. EU legislation ensures respect for locality. Tomlinson (2003) stated that cultural identity, which will not be easily shaken by globalization, is a powerful dimension of community life. Global activities, instead of threatening, may be highlighting the local identities that represent various forms of belonging – belonging to a land, belonging in a particular culture, or belonging to a community or group. For instance, there is no doubt that locals seem to have an advantage in their own territories when extreme locations such as deserts, poles, or glaciers are considered. Populations living in or around these territories possess localized knowledge, experience, and familiarity, all of which define their identities. It would take a foreigner, no matter how well equipped, years to attain and master such knowledge.

The interaction between globalization and local elements may be viewed from even more diverse angles. For instance, although conflict on the international level is more visible (than interdependence), global activities may indicate a dimension of interdependence (Pevehouse, 2004) between the local and the global, similar to the interdependence among states in the US or the interdependence among EU countries. In Wittgenstein’s words, interdependence is very much a part of the natural context:

“Just as we cannot think of spatial objects at all apart from space, or temporal objects apart from time, so we cannot think of any object apart from the possibility of its connection with other things.”

Various considerations of globalization and locality breed new concepts such as glocalization and grobalization. Glocalization refers to the interaction between the global and the local, with distinct outcomes in some geographic regions (Ritzer, 2003). Singapore may be one example where glocalization processes prevailed. Grobalization, on the other hand, is about growth and globalization concerns in a more corporate sense. Both glocalization and grobalization, and related concepts of hybridity and creolization, are worth further appreciation. They are hereby mentioned solely for the sake of suggestion.

Thus, in the Shal, Kasym’s story would have taken a different course if the visiting hunters had collaborated with him, the native. Shal offers a beautifully painted picture of struggles for survival on a harsh land where local knowledge, wisdom, and expertise are invaluable and global information may mostly be short of depth.

References

• Bird, A., – Stevens, M. J. (2003). Toward an emergent global culture and the effects of globalization on obsolescing national cultures. Journal of International Management, 9(4), 395-407.
• Castells, M. (2010). Globalisation and identity. Quaderns de la Mediterrania, (5), 183-189.
• Dupuis, J. P. (2014). New approaches in cross-cultural management research The importance of context and meaning in the perception of management styles. International Journal of Cross Cultural Management, 14(1), 67-84.
• Fanon, F. (2007). The wretched of the earth. Grove Press.
• Friedman, T. L. (2006). The world is flat [updated and expanded]: A brief history of the twenty-first century. Macmillan.
• Hall, S. (1996). Cultural identity and cinematic representation. Black British cultural studies: A reader, 210-222.
• Jungck, S., – Kajornsin, B. (2003). Thai wisdom” and glocalization: Negotiating the global and the local in Thailand’s national education reform. Local meanings, global schooling: Anthropology and world culture theory, 27-49.
• Khondker, H. H. (2004). Globalization to Glocalization: Evolution of a Sociological Concept. Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore.
• Kundera, M. (1984). The tragedy of central Europe. The New York Review of Books, 31(7), 33-38.
• Pevehouse, J. C. (2004). Interdependence theory and the measurement of international conflict. Journal of Politics, 66(1), 247-266.
• Ritzer, G. (2003). Rethinking globalization: Glocalization/grobalization and something/nothing. Sociological theory, 21(3), 193-209.
• Widdis, R. W. (2006). Globalization, Glocalization and the Canadian West as Region: A Geographer’s View. Acadiensis, 129-137.
• http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2182115/

Roughly speaking, the bulk of Central Eurasia consists of Central Asia and the Caucasus but also stretches to such regions as Turkey, the Turkic/Muslim regions of southern Russia, northern Afghanistan, southern Siberia, Tibet and Mongolia.[1] Largely due to Turkic influence, shaped historically by a tolerant understanding of co-existence as enjoined in Islam, this region has won prestige internationally for its peaceful efforts in this diverse geographical area.

Such leading U.S. universities as Harvard University, the University of Wisconsin at Madison, the University of California in Los Angeles, and the University of Indiana in Bloomington offer graduate courses on Central Eurasian studies and languages. The notion of a “clash of civilizations” promoted by Huntington[2] in the era of globalization has never been accepted by many people throughout Central Eurasia in their rich historical experiences of living in “mosaic societies.”

Pluralistic Islam at the heart of Eurasia

Unfortunately, for last couple of decades the experience of the diverse pluralistic Islam of Central Eurasia has been obscured by the political trends of Islam in the Middle East. The latter, rather than the former, has become the focus of most academic scholars of social sciences and humanities and media. Historically, while Turkey formed the western boundary of the Muslim world, Central Eurasia has largely represented the northern and north-eastern boundaries of the classical Islamic world. Islam in Central Eurasia emerged mainly through remarkable Sufi masters like Ahmet Yassavi, Korkyt Ata, Mevlana Rumi, and Baba Tukes. The merchant caravanserais of the Silk Road that traversed vast areas between the Middle East and China came into existence through peaceful means, and new Muslims in this area were very tolerant toward the many religions and cultures of their neighbors. Although the revelation of the Qur’an started in Arabia, most of its scholarly interpretations and the hadith compilations were compiled in Central Asia.[3] The greatest contributions to almost all areas of religious and positive sciences, engineering, art and culture were witnessed in this part of the world between the ninth and fourteenth centuries ce. The works of such outstanding intellectual figures as Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Al-Farabi (Alfarabius), Al-Khwarizmi still benefit

people all over the world. The largest library in the world in the thirteenth century ce was in Otrar (a city in present-day southern Kazakhstan), which was later totally demolished by Genghis Khan during Mongol invasion.

In the period between the seventh and thirteenth centuriesce, the Muslim world was ruled predominantly by Arab caliphs of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties. However, starting from the twelfth century up until the beginning of the twentieth century, Muslims of Central Eurasia of predominantly Turkic origin became the foremost rulers of the Muslim nations. Among them were the famous states administered by the Seljuks in Central Asia, the Golden Horde in Russia, the Baburides on the Indian subcontinent, the Mamluks in Egypt, and the Ottomans in Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East.

The Golden Horde’s legacy of tolerance toward Christian, Jewish and Buddhist communities laid the foundation for the flourishing of Moscow and the Russian

Empire, which became heir to the Golden Horde’s legacy.[4] Saray, which was the capital of the Golden Horde from thirteen to fifteen centuries, and which was located very close to the border of modern-day southern Russia and western Kazakhstan, became a center of intercontinental diplomacy as envoys and ambassadors representing princes and popes sought audiences with the Muslim khans of the Golden Horde.[5]

Dialogue between world religions in Central Eurasia in the modern secular context

After more than two hundred years of Czarist rule, the ex-Soviet Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan, being one of the most diverse countries in the world, the home of 120 ethnic groups and many world religious communities for the last seventeen years became the active initiator of peace, dialogue, integration and reconciliation initiatives across not just the Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union, but also the larger international community. After independence, to ease tension among superpowers Kazakhstan’s government decided unilaterally to dismantle the huge nuclear arsenal left as the Soviet legacy of the cold war. Following the breakup of the USSR, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbaev’s proposal to form a “Eurasian Union” was praised by many leaders across Russia and the ex-Soviet republics. The late pope John Paul II met Nazarbaev in Astana on September 11, 2001.

Muslim–Jewish dialogue in Central Eurasia

In 2002 Kazakhstan served as the facilitator of Islamic– Jewish dialogue in Eurasia, an event which took place in the new capital, Astana. At the conference, thirty rabbis from various countries noted that the only way forward in the relationship between Muslims and Jews is through constructive dialogue. They also expressed their wish to see Kazakhstan as a center of Muslim–Jewish dialogue.[6] The fact that the headquarters of the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress (EAJC) was placed in Almaty, the largest city in Muslim Kazakhstan, at a time when there is growing instability in the Middle East, is a sign of the huge potential of the mutual trust between Muslim and Jewish communities in Eurasia.[7] Alexander Mashkevich, the head of the EAJC, considers Kazakhstan a unique example of cooperation and peaceful coexistence between various peoples and religions. He also noted that the largest synagogue in Central Asia, which was opened in Astana, best characterizes Muslim Kazakhstan as the land of inter-ethnic peace and inter-confessional harmony.The latest phase of this dialogue at the First International Conference of Peace and Accord was held in Almaty the previous year. Presidents of the leading Jewish organizations of the United States, leaders and plenipotentiaries of the states of Central Asia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, and members of the leadership and the Council of Rabbis and Central Asian Muslim leaders condemned terrorism and declared that there are no antagonistic contradictions between Judaism and Islam.

Dialogue between world and traditional religions at the heart of Eurasia

At a time when some dark forces are trying to bring about a clash of world religions and civilizations, Central Eurasia offered an unprecedented challenge to these dangerous trends by initiating a series of high profile civic activities bringing together members of the clergy of world and traditional religions in the heartof Eurasia in Kazakhstan’s capital Astana in 2003 and 2006.[8] A unique role model for intercultural communication and dialogue, Kazakhstan, with a number of other countries of Central Eurasia, showed the whole world that traditional values can be reconciled with liberal norms in the formation of a successful, peace-loving, civil, mosaic society. Leading Turkish Islamic scholar Fethullah Gulen, active promoter of interfaith and intercultural dialogue, valued this significant interfaith event in Eurasia highly and said, “The only way for humankind to solve its problems is by way of dialogue: meeting, learning and talking to each other…With all my heart I state that all these initiatives done out of pure intentions will serve to establish peace and stability in the region, to improve relationships among nations and also to build lasting peace on the whole planet.”[9]

Dialogue Eurasia: “DA”

A number of Turkish people are working to pave the way for dialogue in the Eurasia region.[10], [11] Diyalog Avrasya (Dialogue Eurasia), a publication of the Dialogue Eurasia Platform, has been the voice of common sense in seventeen countries, from Moldavia to Mongolia, since its founding in 2000. A bilingual quarterly published in Turkish and Russian, DA adopts an approach to conflict with reconciliation, using the slogan, “Dialogue starts with ‘DA’” (“Da” in Russian means “yes” in English). DA representatives recently gathered in Istanbul and discussed the latest developments in the Eurasia region. DA stressed that its ideology is knowledge and love, and that convergence, compromise and understanding constitute the backbone of their policy. Renowned Kyrgyz writer Chingiz Aytmatov, who passed away recently, also served on the journal’s advisory board; he described DA as “the business card of Eurasia.” Garnering great interest in the countries where it is published, DA also brings together Eurasia’s famous writers, intellectuals and civil society volunteers. In addition, opinions and essays of leading politicians frequently appear in the journal.

Interestingly, present and past dialogue efforts in Central Eurasia go hand in hand with positive trends in education, which for the last decade or so, has experienced quite a renaissance.[12] Hopefully, dialogue efforts combined with excellence in education will yield great fruits in the future in this important region of the world, which will benefit the whole of humanity again as during the region’s golden ages between the ninth and fourteenth centuries. There is hope that the dynamism of inter-cultural diversity which has prevailed for centuries on the Eurasian continent with its multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic and multi-religious characteristics will gain momentum in future again.

Dr. Zhandos Utegulov is researcher at University of Nebraska–Lincoln.

Notes

1. http://cesww.fas.harvard.edu/

2. Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72(3): 22-49.

3. Ali Unal, Alphonse Williams eds. Advocate of Dialogue: Fethullah Gulen, 2000, The Fountain Publications.

4. http://www.accd.edu/sac/history/keller/Mongols/states3.html

5. Janet Martin. Medieval Russia, 980-1584, CUP, 2008.

6. http://www.jewishsf.com/content/2-0-/module/displaystory/story_id/19476/edition_id/395/format/html/displaystory.html

7. http://www.eajc.org/publish_gen_e.php?rowid=40

8. http://www.religionscongress.org

9. Interview with Fethullah Gulen in Kazahstanskaya Pravda, Sept 15, 2006.

10. http://www.zaman.com/?bl=culture&alt=&trh=20061206&hn=38940

11. http://www.interfaithathens.org/article/art/10081.asp

12. Ismail Demirkan, Aksar Beketov. “Islam, Science, and Free and Open Inquiry,” Physics Today, January 2008, p. 11.

THE CASPIAN PIPELINE DECISION

After the break-up of the Soviet Union and the emergence of independent states, the Caspian region has become a magnet of interest for different powers, including China, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the United States. Five states border the Caspian Sea: Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have vast oil resources around the Caspian Sea, while Turkmenistan has significant natural gas reserves. However, as the region is landlocked, pipelines have to be constructed to transfer these resources to external markets. Since these three states have neither the expertise nor the financial resources for oil exploration, extraction, and transfer, they have to rely on foreign investment. After the pipeline is in place, the cash flow generated by oil and gas exports will be of great importance in the economic development of these states.

But not so fast. The situation has proven to be a very complex one involving the status of the Caspian Sea, regional disputes, and the conflicting economic and political interests of the countries involved. Due to the complexity of the decision and the billions of dollars at stake, the Azerbaijan International Operating Company’s (AIOC) feasibility report was delayed three times last year, which also delayed any decision of the final pipeline route.’1 This article investigates some of the issues surrounding the Caspian oil pipeline debate.

RESERVES

First, just how much oil is lying under the Caspian Basin? Early estimates of around 200 billion barrels predicted that the region would be another Persian Gulf.2 However, exploratory oil wells turned out to be disappointing. A conservative study by the James Baker Institute estimates proven reserves at 15 to 30 billion barrels.3 On the other hand, some experts argue that these numbers are misleadingly low. A reasonable estimate would be somewhere between 60 and 100 billion barrels. More than half of these reserves lies under Kazakhstan, and most of the rest lie elsewhere.4

Two main oil pipelines will be built and brought on line to serve the region up to 2010. At the present time, the only pipeline that has reached the final stages of negotiation is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline for oil from Kazakhstan to the Russian port of Novorossysk.5 After this, the decision concerning the main oil export pipeline route from Baku (Azerbaijan) to a port, from where the oil will be transferred to external markets by tankers, gets complicated. There are competing proposals for this route from Baku, which include6:

• Novorossysk: To the north, a main oil export pipeline across Daghestan and Chechnya to Russia’s port of Novorossysk.

• China: To the east, there is a proposal to build an oil pipeline from eastern Kazakhstan’s Uzen field to western China as part of an overall $9.5 billion deal supported by CNPC, China’s state oil company CNPC.

• Supsa: To the north again, this route links Baku to Supsa, a Georgian port on Black Sea.

• Ceyhan: To the west, oil pipelines transiting from Baku to Ceyhan with links to cross-Caspian lines from oil and gas fields in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The route originates in Baku, enters Georgia, and reaches the southern Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan through eastern Turkey.

• Iran: To the south, an oil pipeline from the Caspian states across Iran, to a new port on the Gulf of Oman. Shipping oil by tankers or another alternative from Tabriz to Ceyhan has also been proposed by Iran.

All of these pipeline options are technically possible; most are commercially feasible at some volume. We now turn to the specifics of those routes.

THE ALTERNATIVES

China: This route has not been considered seriously by either the states or the companies. First of all, Chinese companies cannot provide competitive deals, possibly due to the recent economic recession. Second, the pipeline will be much longer and more expensive than the other alternatives. Third, China is primarily linked with Kazakhstan, and for transferring oil from Azerbaijan to Kazakhstan (or directly to China) some real challenges remain: the pipeline has to pass either under the Caspian Sea (which is itself highly questionable, given the debate over the Caspian Sea’s status) or pass through disputed territories. Fourth, Asian markets are not the best place to export oil, since European markets will probably pay more.7

Supsa: For early oil, TEKFEN (a Turkish construction company) began construction of a 380 km. pipeline from Baku to Supsa. But as this pipeline, completed and opened in April 1999, will not be sufficient for the main export, a larger one along the same route should be built. Should this route be chosen, it will be the shortest route and, not surprisingly, the cheapest. Its price tag is $1.2 billion.8 The construction cost may be lower if the pipeline passes trough Armenia, rather than going around it. However, the long-lasting conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia makes this unlikely.

On the other hand, Georgia is not an ideal pipeline-transit country. Since achieving its independence in 1991, numerous territorial conflicts and separatist movements have taken place, all of which increase the risk of pipeline sabotage and other political risks. Russia currently supplies military support to Abkhazia in its independence struggle against the Georgian government.9 With the reestablishment of Russia’s extensive military basing rights in Georgia, the support apparently ceased, but most experts argue that Russia is still supporting, either directly or tacitly, regional instability to block pipeline alternatives through Georgia and to promote its own route (Novorossisk).

Another problem with the Supsa route relates to the Bosphorous Straits of Turkey. According to the 1936 Montreux Convention, tanker passage through the Straits is free. However, Turkey points to tightening political and physical constraints, as well as sharply increasing tanker accidents threatening the environment in Istanbul,’10 its most populated city. Turkey can certainly make the passage extremely difficult for tankers within the convention, by requiring extensive precautionary measures and removing their passage priority, causing tankers to wait for days before passing through the Straits. Most experts argue that Turkey is using the straits as a political lever to promote its own route (Ceyhan). But still, this uncertainty adds another variable to the calculation of pipeline companies.

Novorossisk: The 452 km. pipeline,11 which is estimated to cost $2 billion,12 starts at Baku, reaches the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossisk across Daghestan and Chechnya. Although cheap, this pipeline still faces the Straits problem mentioned above.

Although avoiding Georgia, this route has its own problems. Disagreements on distributing transit fees between Russia’s central and regional authorities may hinder negotiations. Russia does not have a particularly bright history regarding pipeline management. Moreover, the transfer may be subject to frequent disruptions due to instability in the north Caucasus. If Russia decides to bypass Chechnyian territories by an extension through Daghestan, there will be an added risk of pipeline sabotage by the Chechens.13 All these, when added to overcrowded port facilities and poor weather conditions at Novorossisk, make this route even less attractive.

Furthermore, there are political and economic factors to consider. From an influence point of view, most Central Asian republics have been under Russian influence for centuries. They still have economic, cultural, and military ties with Russia, which is anxious to maintain its influence in these republics for both security and economic reasons. Those republics dependent on Russia will pose much less danger, not to mention benefits from economic relations. On the other hand, the Central Asian republics want to be less and less dependent on Russia and discover their own identity by stepping out of the shadow of a now-defunct empire. Not surprisingly, the Azerbaijan government has expressed its reluctance concerning the Novorossisk route more than once. From a strategic point of view, Russia wants to keep her monopoly for oil transfer in the region so that it can be used as a strategic lever in the future. Economically, transit fees will be more than welcome in an economically depressed Russia. Furthermore, Russia will be able to purchase at lower rates than those in the international markets.

Ceyhan: The total length will be approximately 1,730 km (468 km in Azerbaijan, 225 km in Georgia, and 1,037 km in Turkey14). It is also an expensive alternative; estimates place its total cost at around $3 billion. The latest feasibility study, undertaken by a German company, put a price tag of $2.3 billion.15 The oil will serve to offset Turkey’s energy shortages, as well as giving it the economic advantage of transit fees.

The Ceyhan route has been favored by Azerbaijan, which wants to avoid giving Russia any influence over its resources. Azerbaijan is also seeking to avoid the proliferation of political Islam (from Iran) in Azerbaijan, thus undermining the possibility of an Iranian route. As for the Supsa route, it has the same Straits problem mentioned above. Thus, President Haydar Aliyev has repeatedly and publicly expressed his willingness for the Ceyhan route.14 However, his final decision will depend on the AIOC’s feasibility report. It is therefore considered unlikely that he will insist on Ceyhan route, if companies find the Ceyhan route to be economically less attractive. After all, the companies and not Azerbaijan are going to pay for the construction. The final route decision therefore will be a joint decision of the AIOC and President Aliyev.

The United States has also been publicly favoring the Ceyhan route.16 The reasoning is as follows:

• The pipeline goes directly into the Mediterranean Sea, thus avoiding straits and the Persian Gulf. This will serve to of the supply of energy, which is an American goal. So far, a significant number of major fields lie in the Persian Gulf; unfortunately, the United States does not have the best of relations with some of the states in that region. Russia already has control over Kazakh oil and it would be unwise to leave Azeri oil to the Russian monopoly.

• Turkey has been the United States’ ally in the region for a long time, and is closer to United States than Russia and Iran.

• As a democratic country and a supporter of free-market economies, Turkey’s influence on the Central Asian republics would be much more positive than that of Russia and Iran. The proliferation of Iranian-style political Islam may be particularly dangerous, whereas Turkey’s secular version of Islam is much more preferred, according to the Clinton administration.

From a security viewpoint, the Turkish Army has been securing eastern Anatolia since 1998 against the activities of the Kurdish terrorist organization PKK. The organization’s leader Abdullah Ocalan was recently captured in Kenya, which has considerably improved the prospects for regional security. On the other hand, Georgia’s problem with instability is also valid for Ceyhan.

Iran: Iran has proposed several routes. In general, those routes are less expensive than Ceyhan but more expensive than the other alternatives. There are no acute instabilities in the region. However, American sanctions directly affect Caspian pipeline development in Iran, notably through the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). The goal of the 1996 law is to press for a change in Iran’s foreign policy, which was widely criticized as being supportive of terrorism and weapons proliferation as well as undermining the Middle East peace process. In practical terms, the ILSA prohibits direct foreign investment in Iran’s energy capability and infrastructure, and applies to America business as well as third parties.17

The United States remains strongly opposed to an Iranian route. As mentioned, such a route is not in the best interest of Azerbaijan either, due to the concerns of Iranian-style political Islam.

CONCLUSION

In recognition of the growing stress on the Ceyhan route, Georgia has aligned with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the United States to push for the Ceyhan alternative. On the other hand, Armenia has aligned with Russia and Iran to oppose the Ceyhan route (or for that matter, any route) that will benefit Azerbaijan (its enemy). The Armenian government argues that Azerbaijan will use the money from oil exports to increase its military build-up against Armenia. Iran and Russia are opposing the Ceyhan route, for rules out their own routes. As clearly seen, Russia, Armenia, and Iran have no common interest whatsoever, except blocking the Ceyhan route to promote their own conflicting interests.

On the other hand, companies are in an awkward situation. The United States and Azerbaijan are increasing their political power on the companies for the Ceyhan route, whereas companies find this route more expensive when compared to other options. They also argue that current proven oil reserves do not justify the construction of such an expensive pipeline. They say that the oil found may never be able to fill the pipeline. Another factor is that oil prices are at their lowest level in 20 years. The expenses will not be justified unless oil export profits justify the main export pipeline expenses. Thus, they are playing a wait-and-see game, to see whether more oil will be found or whether oil prices will increase. The debates around the Caspian pipeline are likely to continue next year, and a win-win deal involving all the Caspian states seems nowhere near.

FOOTNOTES

1. David Filipov, “Caspian Port’s Oil Gush Trickling,” Boston Globe, 10 February 1999, sec. A, p. 1.
2. R. E. Manning and J. A. Meyers, “Dream of Oil Drives Diplomacy,” Los Angeles Times, 1 November 1998, sec. M, p. 2.
3. The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, “Unlocking the Assets: Energy, and the Future of Central Asia and the Caucasus. A Political, Economic and Cultural Analysis,” Rice University Research Report (April 1998): 1.
4. The Energy Information Administration, “International Energy Outlook: 1998,” Research Report (1998): 34. http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo98/home.html
5. Heslin, S., Key Constraints to Caspian Pipeline Development: Status, Significance and Outlook. Research Report for The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University (1998): 4.
6. Ibid., 4, 5.
7. The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, “Unlocking the Assets,” 3.
8. http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/contract/cox7l803.htm
9. H. Cemal, “Petrol Cografyasinda Yeni Kavsak Noktasi Turkiye,” Sabah Turkish Daily Newspaper, 3 October 1998.
10. Heslin, Key Constraints to Caspian Pipeline Development, 16.
11. “Kazakhstan Approves an Oil Pipeline Study,” Journal of Commerce, 30 October 1998, sec. A, p. 10.
12. Cemal, “Petrol Cografyasinda Yeni Kavsak Noktasi Turkiye.”
13. Heslin, Key Constraints to Caspian Pipeline Development, 7.
14. “Five Nations Endorse Caspian Oil Pipeline,” San Francisco Chronicle, 30 October 1998, sec. A, p. 14.
15. “Baku Ceyhan’a bir adim daha,” Yeni Yuzyil Turkish Daily Newspaper, 7 July 1998.
16. “Four Former Soviet Republics Join Turkey on Pipeline,” The Orlando Sentinel, 30 October 1998, sec. A, p. 20.
17. “U.S. Has Impact on Pipeline Route from Caspian Sea,’ Wall Street Journal, 30 October 1998, sec. A, p. 17.
18. Heslin, Key Constraints to Caspian Pipeline Development, 17-19.