Faith, especially in the form of religion, refers to a heavenly-inspired system that leads people to goodness, but on the condition that they believe wilfully.

Religion is a divine system or a corpus consisting of systems. The most eminent feature differentiating it from human systems is that it is ordained by God, based on scripture, the good example of the Messenger that it was revealed to, and on how scholars have interpreted both. Arriving at goodness by means of religion is an absolute blessing by God; yet every human contributes to it by his or her choices.

Wisdom, on the other hand, has been decribed in many forms. In the case of Islam, the Qur’an states that wisdom has been bestowed to the Prophet in addition to the Book.1 Because of this fact, many interpreters have said that wisdom and the Book are not one and the same. It is decreed in another ayah that, “whoever is granted the Wisdom has indeed been granted much good.”2 Since the Prophet’s sunnah – his traditions, including his words and silent approvals – specifies the general issues of the Book, generalizes the specific points, and restricts its absolute topics by particular conditions and clauses, it is a great and abundant fountain of goodness. Therefore, some hadith scholars thought it was the Sunnah that “Wisdom” was actually refering to. Besides, the details of daily prayers, fasting, and hajj were determined by the Sunnah.

At the same time, as pointed out by Bediuzzaman, wisdom has been interpreted as the attainment of certain truths of faith and the universe, which have been concealed behind material veils, through spiritual inspiration and discoveries. All we see are a door, some windows, and four walls around us; however, the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, decrees that, “I see what you do not see, and hear what you do not hear. The sky has resonated in such a way that you would laugh less and cry more if you saw what I see and knew what I know.” In this regard, reaching the veiled knowledge about the realm behind the physical world has also been considered wisdom.

This cognisance may take place through intuition or an expansion of the imagination, or through divination or direct witness. Whatever we know through rational deduction and certainty of knowledge (ilm al-yaqin) is endorsed by seekers of truth – first inwardly, in their consciences, and then outwardly, in their practices. This is another sign of abundance of goodness.

However, some have heaped the meaning of philosophy upon wisdom. There is a conflictual history between Islamic scholars and positivist philosophers. The struggle of Islamic scholars like Imam Ghazzali against philosophical deviance has become legend. Scholars like Ghazzali and Bediuzzaman used reason, logic, and other methods of philosophy to contest philosophers; so, if their efforts will be considered a part of philosophy, then it is certainly within the domain of wisdom.

One dimension of this conflict had to do with the literalists who interpreted all commandments exclusively and conducted them without question, even though this may have led to contradictions with other rules. Philosophers reacted to this movement, yet drifted to another extreme, where they went so far as to deny the essentials of faith. What we consider “wisdom” would be one that embraces rationality and logic in accordance with positive sciences and humanities, but is also in line with the overall message of the scripture as understood and practiced by the Messenger.

Searching for an accord between laws in nature and the regulations and laws of human life, and sensing and eliciting the concordance between the divine message and universe, are also considered within the territories of wisdom. Such a search for harmony between these dynamics is a key for success and serenity, both in this world and in the life to come after death. The science of jurisprudence in Islam and its applicative branches may be regarded as a vital manifestation of this correspondence and union. This science has been successful because it has been open to analogical reasoning and interpretation. Under current conditions, where such reasoning is missing, it is impossible to govern even the smallest district in any country.

After religion and wisdom, comes power. Unless the laws of wisdom and principles of faith and state are equipped with power, everything shall remain on paper and cannot evoke any sort of influence on people. Without power, how can the wisdom in minds and souls, and the piles of books in the libraries, transform into daily practice? As a matter of fact, we have been witnessing that it is not transformed, since those representatives of brute force who have turned their backs on scientific knowledge and absolute truth, and believe that they can sort out everything by power, have not let it be so; and it seems that they will not, either. In this regard, if a nation does not attach as much importance to power as as it does to wisdom, much of the performance of that nation in the name of national and religious values shall be uncertain. Besides, all three elements of religion, wisdom, and power must work together and in alliance. Otherwise, power not guided by faith and wisdom shall be a mere tool of cruelty and suppression; wisdom without faith shall be a wheel of intrigue; and faith not supported by legitimate power shall become just a mere “issue of conscience.” That is, the raison d’etre of faith and communicating it to people shall not be fully realized.

Notes

1. Surah Al-Baqarah, 2/129, 151, 231; Surah Âl-i Imrân, 3/164; Surah An-Nisâ, 4/113; Surah Al-Jumu’ah, 62/2.
2. Surah Al-Baqarah, 2/269.

However, a recent book, Islamic Science and Making of the European Renaissance, by George Saliba calls these arguments into question. This book prompted me to think more critically about this long, accepted argument. Can this prominent scholar of Islam or his famous book, Tahafut al-Falasifah, be held responsible, single handedly, for causing an age of decline in the scientific activities in the Muslim World?

Many orientalists argue that Ghazali’s Tahafut is responsible for the age of decline in science in the Muslim World. This is their key thesis as they attempt to explain the scientific and intellectual history of the Islamic world. It seems to be the most widely accepted view on the matter not only in the Western world but in the Muslim world as well. George Saliba, a Professor of Arabic and Islamic Science at Columbia University who specializes in the development of astronomy within Islamic civilization, calls this view the “classical narrative” (Saliba, 2007). However, interesting discoveries in the second half of the twentieth century by historians of science challenged many of the assertions of this classical narrative. An example of such discoveries is the strong connections between Ibn al-Shatir, a famous Damascene astronomer of the fourteenth century, and the Renaissance astronomer Copernicus (Roberts, 1957). If Ghazali had killed science in Islam in the twelfth century, then al-Shatir’s work from the fourteenth century could not have been so influential on Copernicus’s work. Saliba challenges almost all of the major tenets of the classical narrative on the basis of (1) a critical examination of historical evidence, some of which is quite recent, and (2) the results of his own long-term research in Islamic astronomy.

Saliba’s response to the question

In making his argument, Saliba first notes that most of the orientalists operate under the assumption that there must be a sharp conflict between religion and science. This paradigm is probably based on their European experience. To them, al-Ghazali represents the orthodox tradition in Islam and with Tahafut, written in the late eleventh century (between 1091 and 1095), they assume that orthodox religious thought won a decisive victory over rational, scientific thought. From that point on they assume that science in Islam declined, and the Islamic world did not produce anything significant in terms of scientific advancements.

Saliba argues that both of these assumptions are false. First, the European paradigm of conflict between religion and science does not really apply to the Islamic world. The religion of Islam encourages rational and scientific inquiry. Therefore, Muslims see no insurmountable contradictions between their faith and natural laws. Hence, studying religion and studying natural sciences does not create a conflict for Muslims.

Secondly, many of the scientists in the Islamic world were also religious authorities at the same time. A few examples among such scholars are Ibn al-Nafis, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi ,and Ibn al-Shatir who lived in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and made important contributions to such diverse scientific disciplines as mathematics, astronomy, medicine, physics and philosophy. In fact, these scholars were regarded primarily as religious figures by the general public with side interests in sciences. Early Muslim scholars did not hesitate to acquire scientific knowledge wherever they could find it, whether it be in Indian civilization, in Greek civilization, or in Persian civilization. Not only did they acquire these sciences through translation, but they also critically examined them in a comprehensive way. Making corrections and improvements and even introducing new disciplines, they showed a high degree of ownership and maturity. This led to a remarkable period of creativity and rapid advancements in many scientific disciplines in the Islamic world beginning as early as the eighth century (Saliba, 2007).

Contrary to the classical narrative, scientific advancements in the Islamic world did not stop or even slow down after Ghazali. Saliba gives many examples of sophisticated scientific achievements in the Islamic world well after Ghazali. Based on his life-long research in the area, he concludes that the golden age of Islamic astronomy was in the post-Ghazali period from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. Discoveries by Western historians of science in the second half of the twentieth century show that there are surprisingly strong connections between Copernicus (sixteenth century) and Muslim astronomers from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, such as Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and Ibn al-Shatir (Roberts, 1957; Saliba, 2007). These discoveries were shocking to many in the scholarly community who did not expect to find any transfer of knowledge from the Islamic civilization to Europe in the post-Ghazali period. Unfortunately, this new information has not been sufficiently digested by today’s scholars and does not yet generally appear in secondary sources.

Saliba also provides examples from other disciplines, such as medicine, that show that a high level of scientific production took place in more than one discipline in the Islamic world in the post-Ghazali period. How is it that such important scientific materials could have been overlooked by the experts? According to Saliba a major reason for modern historians of science to have missed the large amount of scientific production in Islamic world in the post-Ghazali period is the damage caused by the classical narrative. Most historians simply weren’t looking for it because the classic narrative stipulated that science in Islam was dead after Ghazali. Even though some new discoveries have been made, there are still many scientific works waiting to be studied from that period. As an example of these omissions, Berggren, the author of Episodes in the Mathematics of Medieval Islam, says that he used this title for his book as opposed to The History of Mathematics in Medieval Islam simply because “Such a book could not be written yet, for so much material remains unstudied that we do not know enough of the whole story” (Berggren, 1986).

The Content and the Method of the Tahafut

Even though Saliba’s arguments and evidence are quite convincing to doubt or reject the common narrative, I wanted to go straight to the source-the Tahafut-and have a closer look to see if it might be a book that can be held responsible for killing the science or scientific thought in Islamic civilization.

In Tahafut, Ghazali refutes twenty philosophical doctrines. Using a scientific, or in this context philosophical, method, he first explains those philosophical doctrines before criticizing them. His explanations were so comprehensive and so clear that he made them accessible to non-philosophers, and thus, his ideas became generally better known in the Islamic world. Next, he gave arguments to refute those doctrines. In doing so, he used the very same logical and philosophical principles and arguments that philosophers used in the first place to support their claims. Ghazali mainly argues that the philosophers who proposed the doctrines that conflict with religious principles failed to provide valid and rigorous proofs for their propositions. Hence, he attacked their methodologies using their own tools and principles.

An important point Ghazali makes in Tahafut is that he has no problems with the philosophers’ mathematics, astronomical sciences, or logic. He says (Marmura 2000, p. 11):

Regarding mathematical sciences, there is no sense in denying them or disagreeing with them. For these reduce in the final analysis to arithmetic and geometry. As regards to logical sciences, these are concerned with examining the instrument of thought in intelligible things. There is no significant disagreement encountered in these.

Therefore, it is clear that his views could not be used to justify a position against the study of mathematical sciences.

To give the reader a sense of what kinds of philosophical doctrines the Tahafut is concerned with and aims to refute, a selected few out of the twenty are listed below (Marmura 2000, p. 10, 11). The list shows that the questions discussed in Tahafut concern some of the most fundamental issues in theology, particularly in the Islamic theology.

The first problem: On refuting their doctrine of the world’s pre-eternity.

The sixth: On refuting their doctrine denying the divine attributes.

The tenth: On showing that upholding a materialist doctrine and the denial of the Maker is a necessary consequence [of what they hold].

The twentieth: On refuting their denial of bodily resurrection and the accompanying bodily pleasures and pains in paradise and hell.

Concluding Remarks

When I discuss the question given in the title of this article with my colleagues, and I argue that it would be unfair to hold Ghazali or Tahafut responsible for the decline of science in Islam, I sometimes hear the objection that “perhaps the content or the method of Tahafut may not justify this conclusion, but this is not how people understood it.” But then, one must consider the evidence given by Saliba that there is a large amount of sophisticated scientific production in the Islamic world well after Ghazali, and there is still much more to be discovered. Considering the content of Tahafut and the scientific advances in post-Ghazali period, I have a hard time convincing myself that the classical narrative is the ultimate truth on the matter. This position is supported by the fact that it is usually not realistic to try to explain most major social and historical transformations in terms of a single person, a book, an event, or the like. According to Saliba, the decline in Islamic science was the result of a combination of many internal and external reasons that took place several centuries after Ghazali.

Finally, one may wonder why this question is important or relevant. After all, these things happened a long time ago, and we have to deal with the current realities. One answer would be that there are many lessons to be learned from the history. And of course if the correct version of the history is not available, conclusions will be flawed. If anybody is interested in reviving science and scientific activities in a society, there is much that can be learned from the early Islamic period when there was a remarkable rapid and widespread rise in science, as well as lessons from the later periods of Islamic history when the Islamic world fell behind in scientific production. Some researchers are beginning to realize how much damage the classical narrative has caused in understanding the general history and the development of the modern science. It is always useful to have a critical mind to question and reevaluate assumptions when they do not conform to the evidence.

References

• Berggren, J. L. 1986. Episodes in the Mathematics of Medieval Islam, New York: Springer-Verlag.
• Marmura, Michael E. (translator). 2000. Al-Ghazali The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahafut al-Falasifah) Provo: Brigham Young University Press.
• Roberts, Victor . 1957. “The Solar and Lunar Theory of Ibn al-Shatir: A pre-Copernican Copernican Model,” Isis 48:428-432.
• Saliba, George. 2007. Islamic Science and Making of the European Renaissance, Cambridge: MIT Press.

The Fountain: There are many types of philosophies as well as many traditions in the history of philosophy. Scholars for instance distinguish “ancient philosophy” from “modern philosophy.” So how do you locate “Islamic Philosophy?”

Oliver Leaman (O. L.): Trying to define Islamic philosophy is very tendentious, but then definitions as a whole are a problematic area in philosophy. In my view, Islamic philosophy is not necessarily done by Muslims, nor does it have to deal with religious issues. It is that style of philosophy that developed in the Islamic world roughly around the time of al-Kindi which persists today in what is now the Islamic world and indeed further afield.

The Fountain: If it is a separate tradition, what are its characteristics?

O. L.: I don’t think it has any characteristics that have remained the same over time. For example, today in the Arab world there is a protracted debate by philosophers on the nature of Arab civilization, its links with Islam, and how it relates to other civilizations. That is not a debate that existed in the early centuries of Islamic philosophy at all, but reflects the relatively recent experience of colonialism, the modern concept of the state, contemporary political events and so on. Philosophy like everything else has its fashions, and Islamic philosophy rolls with the times, which is why it still survives.

The Fountain: How do you view the relationship between Islamic philosophy and Islamic theology?

O. L.: Many of the issues that have been discussed by Islamic philosophers are religious, and also relate to the theology of a particular faith, i.e. Islam. It is not always easy to know how to distinguish between philosophy and theology, since both are abstract and conceptual investigations into complex issues. Some of the early thinkers like al-Farabi and Ibn Rushd drew a sharp distinction between philosophy and theology, arguing that philosophy is demonstrative and starts from principles that are themselves provable as true, while religion merely starts with beliefs that are accepted, but need not be true. Even if they are right, though, they agreed that the argument forms followed by both are the same, so a sharp distinction between Islamic philosophy and theology is not likely to be very helpful.

The Fountain: As compared to systematic philosophers such as Aristotle, Descartes, Kant on the one hand, and non-systematic ones such as Nietzsche and Wittgenstein on the other hand, how do you evaluate al-Ghazzali’s position?

O. L.: Al-Ghazali is just as systematic as any other major thinker, albeit one has to take him in relation to each stage of his life and thought, since he changed radically from one time to another. The same could be said of Kant, of course, who had a critical and a pre-critical period, and indeed some have argued a post-critical period also.

The Fountain: Did he engage in a philosophical activity in the “Inconsistencies of Philosophers?”

O. L.: I would classify the Tahafut al-falasifa as philosophical, like most of his works. It not only deals with philosophical topics but attacks them philosophically. Had he been operating theologically only he might have pointed to the beliefs of the philosophers and classified them variously as kufr and bid`a, and so condemned them on religious grounds, but in fact he does not limit himself to this at all, he mentions the theological objections to the philosophical principles and then seeks to refute the latter using the methods of those with whom he is arguing. If that is not philosophy then I don’t know what is.

N.M.: Did Islamic thought influence the Western thought?

O.L.: There is evidence of Islamic philosophy influencing Western thought in the medieval period. We know that the works of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd were translated into Latin and played a significant role in France and Italy, for instance, significant enough for Ibn Rushd’s views to be banned in 1270 and 1277 by Bishop Tempier at the University of Paris. Ibn Rushd was interpreted as arguing that philosophy and religion are contrary to each other, but nonetheless are both true, and so we have to accept them both, albeit as valid for different areas of our lives. Philosophy is for us as rational thinkers, and religion for us as social and emotional beings. This hardly presents a very flattering view of the role of religion, and it did not go down well with the Church. The popularity of Ibn Rushd for many centuries gives credence to the idea that he played a significant role in fostering the development of secularism in Europe.

The Fountain: Is the tradition of Islamic thought alive today? Can we mention theologically or philosophically mature works in this area?

O. L.: I started off responding to the question of what is happening in the area today, and then had to stop since the list of books and thinkers was getting so long. In my view, the most fruitful work today takes place in Iran, where ishraqi philosophy is being combined in productive ways with analytical philosophy to produce a highly original form of thought. Persians have always been predominant in Islamic philosophy; when the subject went into a decline in the rest of the Islamic world it continued to be part of the curriculum in Iran, and there is a very long and indeed unbroken tradition in Iran of philosophical work.

The Fountain: How do you evaluate oriental studies so far? Do they represent the Western interest in Islamic thought?

O. L.: I don’t think Western philosophers are interested in Islamic philosophy, with a few exceptions. The kalam cosmological argument is important in analytical philosophy of religion, and as its name suggests, it comes from Islamic philosophy. Some of the major thinkers in the mashsha’i tradition like Averroes (Ibn Rushd) and Avicenna (Ibn Sina) are known by those interested in medieval philosophy, but otherwise not.

It is not clear to me that we should divide up philosophy into different regions of the world, since those regions constantly work on each other and produce a common philosophical climate. For example, the Christian and Jewish world became in the Middle Ages fascinated with Islamic philosophy, but Islamic philosophy itself earlier on enthusiastically studied and incorporated Greek philosophy.

The Fountain: Let’s talk about the interaction between the Western and Islamic thought. Can Islamic thought bring new perspectives to contemporary Western thought and in what sense can Western thought may be useful for people who try to revive Islamic thought?

O. L.: What is western thought? Ibn Rushd, Ibn Bajja, and Ibn Tufayl, some of the major Islamic philosophers, lived in Spain, which seems quite far west to me. St. Augustine lived in North Africa; does that mean he was an African philosopher? What we call Western philosophy has produced interesting work which other philosophers should study, in just the same way that those in the West should know about more than just their tradition of thought, if there is such a thing.

The Fountain: The University of Kentucky is organizing an international graduate student conference in September this year. You are the coordinator of this conference. Is this conference unique in the US? What was your motivation and target in organizing such a rare and original conference?

O. L.: We wanted to organize a graduate conference on Islamic philosophy because there are a lot of people in the world working in this area, but often they do not come into contact with each other. In the United States in particular graduate students might be working in the area in a department where they are the only person with that interest, and it would be good if people could come together, share views and maintain contact with those in the same field afterwards.

The Fountain: What is your current research about?

O. L.: My current work is on the notion of whether there is a Qur’anic logic and if there is, what is it? The Qur’an constantly calls on its hearers and readers to reflect, ponder, consider what the Book says, and the suggestion is that we are supposed to understand rationally the arguments in the text. I am interested in how those arguments are structured and how far they can be regarded as valid arguments at all.

The University of Kentucky is organizing a conference on contemporary issues in Islamic philosophy and theology. All graduate students, and those of equivalent status, are eligible to present papers at the conference. For further inquiries please visit http://www.uky.edu/AS/Philosophy/events.htm

According to the Islamic perspective, there are three types of information sources:

Knowledge obtained through the five senses or relating to these senses. These include, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching. For example, something that is seen is there, and something that is felt through touching exists.

According to the trend which accepts only this source of information, anything beyond the perception of these senses cannot be a subject of knowledge. This positivist trend has lost its influence over recent decades; however it was widely popular at the beginning of the twentieth century.

The second source of information is the “mind.” When the “mind” is mentioned, an unbiased decision-making entity, capable of evaluating matter within its pure form, and competent of making an objective decision is implied. The importance of a non-degenerate, unbiased, non-oppressed, functional mind is undeniable for information. In the modern world, rationalism is the representative of this tendency. Since its emergence, Rationalism has always advocated the “mind” as the only source of information. However, even rationalism is not sufficient to achieve true knowledge.

Another source of information is “authentic narration.” Authentic narration should be understood in two ways. Firstly, it is knowledge that has been transmitted by a number of different people and accepted as true. For example, a narration about a continent or a country to which one has never been is an authentic narration. To illustrate further, for a person who has never visited the continents of Australia or America, any accurate information, or first-hand information, obtained is of this type. It is possible that we may not have visited or seen these places, however millions of people live on these continents and hundreds of thousands of people visit these continents every year. The information gathered from these people is so powerful and trustworthy that anyone who has not seen these places cannot doubt their existence.

Secondly, authentic narration can also be considered to be that of “Divine Revelation.” In other words, this would consist of the Divine Books revealed to the messengers by God Almighty, where the revelations were brought by the Angel Gabriel (pbuh).

Human beings are not capable of seeing or hearing everything that exists, and thus they are not capable of knowing everything that exists. The mind cannot comprehend everything that exists. There are so many things that exist but which are not sensed through our senses or understood by our minds, or even, if the mind does understand them, can never be sensed or reached. Hence, the human being can only learn these facts through the teachings of a Divine Being whose knowledge, power, and will surround everything. We can only learn the things He knows to the extent that He teaches us in His Divine Books; in this way we become knowledgeable of those matters.

In order to discover the wonders of the universe and to achieve a better and more accurate knowledge with our five senses and mind, we must make evaluations under the light and wisdom of Divine revelations. Only when manipulated to work under these principles will science be able to accomplish its task of producing the fruit that it should.

Otherwise, partial falsification or incorrect interpretations of the Divine Books is inevitable. Moreover, if only the senses and experience will be the basis of information, then one will be forced to say “I do not believe in anything other than what I see, hear…” This is tantamount to rebelling against everything that the mind puts forward. In fact, if only sensory information is taken as the basis of knowledge, then people will be forced to search for compatibility between their deduced knowledge and the universe that is Created by God Almighty. In such a system, whatever facts agreed with their theorems would be true, anything else would be false. However, as God says in the Qur’an: “We did not take the human beings as witnesses to the creation of the Heavens and the Earth” (18:51). When the Divine revelation is not taken into consideration, every explanation is no more than a theorem or a guess.

Unfortunately, because only the first two types of sources were accepted, many Divine Revelations were rejected. With the progress of science, their validity has once again been proved. For example, the stages of an embryo in the mother’s womb have been well defined. When Omer Khayyam, who was an extreme rationalist, was asked about these verses, his response was to comment against the Qur’anic truth by commenting that the verses were not meant literally. Some other scholars thought that a person can only have faith in the “resurrection,” as it cannot be understood by the mind; however, Said Nursi has explained it with a simple analogy. The resurrection is like the spring that follows the winter. We do not have any actual sensory knowledge that this will happen, we know from observation and reasoning that the spring will come. Since some people only trust in the two types of sources, they had to twist what they read in the Divine Book, even the fundamentals of faith . For example, through the influence of philosophy, Farabi and Ibn-i Rusd, even though they were geniuses of their time, considered the Divine Revelations and the prophethood as being man-made concepts.

Some thought that philosophers were higher in status than the Messengers of God. The All-Knowing God was aware of how the Messengers would perform their duty of conveying the message; i.e. with an extraordinarily superior performance. This is why they were given the prophethood in advance; yet philosophers could not see this fine nuance. Moreover, it can be concluded that philosophers are only translating what Aristotle had earlier said to suit their time.

If the Islamic World is considered as a whole, it can be seen that not everybody fell into these traps. Zehravi, Ali Kuscu, Jalaleddin Devvani, Gelenbevi and many others, did not fall into these traps; they were very religious, and they were very influential in their times. People like Molla Husrev and Al-Harazmi, with their work in sciences that led their fields of study for many centuries, even in the West, were still able to maintain their faith without experiencing any conflict and lived for the most part as religious, pious people.

In conclusion, it would be proper to say that all sources of information must be handled together if one is to achieve an end result. Discriminating between these information sources and taking them discretely will open up pitfalls for humanity. The same pitfalls will continue to open if the same mistakes are repeated. Humanity will have to say “True” to those things it claimed as “False” the day before. However, using the Divine Revelations as the foundations of knowledge, and surrounding and framing them with the information attained from the senses and mind is the only path that will lead us in a true direction.