Atheism or Theism: The Perspective of Said Nursi, Wipf & Stocks
By Hakan Gok
2018
9781532646799

The existence of God has been long debated in philosophical circles. Mankind doesn’t seem to have settled the question yet. Although scientific circles almost all agree on the assumption that the universe is not eternal and has a beginning, there seems to be no clear scientific explanation of the Big Bang. What was there before it? How did it happen? Is there a divine force behind it? Although theories such as the expansion of the universe are commonly agreed upon, there is still a major gap between the views on how life as we see it came into its current form.

Philosophers have gathered around two philosophical positions to explain the universe and human existence. Those who argue that the universe began with the Big Bang and life has come into existence as a result of some random events without any divine intervention are considered to be atheists. Others, who argue that the universe is the product of an all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-loving deity, are called theists. Arguably almost all thinking human beings are inclined towards one of these two positions, although the degrees and the specific philosophical positions are varied. While atheism had never been a trend almost until the seventeenth century, the theistic view, which was the mainstream thought, did not really concern itself much to bring evidence for the existence of God. Although there has been a very dynamic discussion on this topic in the last three centuries, one tends to accept belief in the existence of God as a matter of personal conviction rather than a result of empirical evidence.

Hakan Gok’s recent book is another fresh contribution to this everlasting debate. Gok explains the scene to the layman in his fairly extended introduction. It is, in a way, an executive summary of what has been said since the time of the Ancient Greeks. The book gives a special emphasis on the kalam version of the argument for the existence of God, in particular the views of Al Kindi, Al Farabi, Ibn Sina, Al Ghazzali, and Ibn Rushd. Although the kalam arguments sound fairly similar to that of the Western tradition, the reader can feel the flavor of Islamization of these common arguments. It is clear in Gok’s writings that there is a close correlation between Western and Islamic ways of arguing in favor of theism. The book also shows how Muslim philosophers, particularly the ones mentioned above, were influenced by the Ancient Greek tradition.

What is unique in Gok’s book is the fact that it examines Said Nursi’s approach to atheism and theism, as Nursi extensively did in the Risale-i Nur (The Epistles of Light). Gok tries to demonstrate that, like many of his predecessors, Nursi employed main philosophical arguments to prove that there is God and the universe is not the product of chance. The teleological argument, or the argument from design, which is the offshoot of the cosmological argument, is Nursi’s main proof to demonstrate the existence of God. Gok breaks down Nursi’s design argument and scrutinizes it thoroughly. Arguments from religious experience and from revelation appear in two different chapters in Gok’s book. The book seems to be at pains to demonstrate how Nursi gives a twist to these two arguments by focusing intensely on Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, and the Quran.

Gok’s book doesn’t only focus on proving that these two arguments make a compelling argument for believing in God, but also studies how Nursi answers the skeptical questions posed over time by many thinkers. It feels more like a defense of Nursi’s position than a systematic presentation of them as they appear in William Lane Craig and the like.

The moral argument is another Nursian way of proving the existence of God, as Gok’s book shows. Human beings are the best judges of any given situation. If all the philosophical arguments fail to convince them, their primordial conscience (wijdan) can lead them into believing in a creator-maintainer God. This, Gok claims, is what makes Nursi’s Risale-i Nur unique among many pieces written on the subject.

Gok’s book puts all the main theistic arguments, kalam arguments, and the atheist’s arguments into the same frame. Readers can clearly see all three positions and where Nursi sits on this spectrum. Gok does not only look at the historic arguments, but also analyzes recent ones. Specifically, he compares Nursi’s views in the Risale-i Nur with Richard Dawkins’s views in The God Delusion, Christopher Hitchens’s in God Is Not Great, and Daniel C Dennetts’s assessments in Consciousness Explained: Darwin’s Dangerous Idea and Breaking the Spell. In a well-balanced and fairly objective way, Gok puts the arguments against each other and encourages the reader to form their own judgement.

Atheism and theism are two colossal schools of thought. One should not expect Gok to settle all the scores in 270 pages. His work is easy to read and easy to understand; it merely rekindles one’s interest in independently reading and scrutinizing these thoughts while also making the subject more digestible for those who have an interest in them. Gok sums up Nursi’s position in the Risale-i Nur with a degree of critical analysis.

Each of the Nursian arguments certainly deserve further scrutiny. Yet Gok works to avoid bogging readers down with too many specific philosophical details. Among many books which have been published on the subject, Gok’s makes the subject more enjoyable and digestible for the general readership. It is a fresh contribution to the literature written on Said Nursi’s Risale-i Nur and the subject of theism and atheism.

However, a recent book, Islamic Science and Making of the European Renaissance, by George Saliba calls these arguments into question. This book prompted me to think more critically about this long, accepted argument. Can this prominent scholar of Islam or his famous book, Tahafut al-Falasifah, be held responsible, single handedly, for causing an age of decline in the scientific activities in the Muslim World?

Many orientalists argue that Ghazali’s Tahafut is responsible for the age of decline in science in the Muslim World. This is their key thesis as they attempt to explain the scientific and intellectual history of the Islamic world. It seems to be the most widely accepted view on the matter not only in the Western world but in the Muslim world as well. George Saliba, a Professor of Arabic and Islamic Science at Columbia University who specializes in the development of astronomy within Islamic civilization, calls this view the “classical narrative” (Saliba, 2007). However, interesting discoveries in the second half of the twentieth century by historians of science challenged many of the assertions of this classical narrative. An example of such discoveries is the strong connections between Ibn al-Shatir, a famous Damascene astronomer of the fourteenth century, and the Renaissance astronomer Copernicus (Roberts, 1957). If Ghazali had killed science in Islam in the twelfth century, then al-Shatir’s work from the fourteenth century could not have been so influential on Copernicus’s work. Saliba challenges almost all of the major tenets of the classical narrative on the basis of (1) a critical examination of historical evidence, some of which is quite recent, and (2) the results of his own long-term research in Islamic astronomy.

Saliba’s response to the question

In making his argument, Saliba first notes that most of the orientalists operate under the assumption that there must be a sharp conflict between religion and science. This paradigm is probably based on their European experience. To them, al-Ghazali represents the orthodox tradition in Islam and with Tahafut, written in the late eleventh century (between 1091 and 1095), they assume that orthodox religious thought won a decisive victory over rational, scientific thought. From that point on they assume that science in Islam declined, and the Islamic world did not produce anything significant in terms of scientific advancements.

Saliba argues that both of these assumptions are false. First, the European paradigm of conflict between religion and science does not really apply to the Islamic world. The religion of Islam encourages rational and scientific inquiry. Therefore, Muslims see no insurmountable contradictions between their faith and natural laws. Hence, studying religion and studying natural sciences does not create a conflict for Muslims.

Secondly, many of the scientists in the Islamic world were also religious authorities at the same time. A few examples among such scholars are Ibn al-Nafis, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi ,and Ibn al-Shatir who lived in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and made important contributions to such diverse scientific disciplines as mathematics, astronomy, medicine, physics and philosophy. In fact, these scholars were regarded primarily as religious figures by the general public with side interests in sciences. Early Muslim scholars did not hesitate to acquire scientific knowledge wherever they could find it, whether it be in Indian civilization, in Greek civilization, or in Persian civilization. Not only did they acquire these sciences through translation, but they also critically examined them in a comprehensive way. Making corrections and improvements and even introducing new disciplines, they showed a high degree of ownership and maturity. This led to a remarkable period of creativity and rapid advancements in many scientific disciplines in the Islamic world beginning as early as the eighth century (Saliba, 2007).

Contrary to the classical narrative, scientific advancements in the Islamic world did not stop or even slow down after Ghazali. Saliba gives many examples of sophisticated scientific achievements in the Islamic world well after Ghazali. Based on his life-long research in the area, he concludes that the golden age of Islamic astronomy was in the post-Ghazali period from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. Discoveries by Western historians of science in the second half of the twentieth century show that there are surprisingly strong connections between Copernicus (sixteenth century) and Muslim astronomers from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, such as Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and Ibn al-Shatir (Roberts, 1957; Saliba, 2007). These discoveries were shocking to many in the scholarly community who did not expect to find any transfer of knowledge from the Islamic civilization to Europe in the post-Ghazali period. Unfortunately, this new information has not been sufficiently digested by today’s scholars and does not yet generally appear in secondary sources.

Saliba also provides examples from other disciplines, such as medicine, that show that a high level of scientific production took place in more than one discipline in the Islamic world in the post-Ghazali period. How is it that such important scientific materials could have been overlooked by the experts? According to Saliba a major reason for modern historians of science to have missed the large amount of scientific production in Islamic world in the post-Ghazali period is the damage caused by the classical narrative. Most historians simply weren’t looking for it because the classic narrative stipulated that science in Islam was dead after Ghazali. Even though some new discoveries have been made, there are still many scientific works waiting to be studied from that period. As an example of these omissions, Berggren, the author of Episodes in the Mathematics of Medieval Islam, says that he used this title for his book as opposed to The History of Mathematics in Medieval Islam simply because “Such a book could not be written yet, for so much material remains unstudied that we do not know enough of the whole story” (Berggren, 1986).

The Content and the Method of the Tahafut

Even though Saliba’s arguments and evidence are quite convincing to doubt or reject the common narrative, I wanted to go straight to the source-the Tahafut-and have a closer look to see if it might be a book that can be held responsible for killing the science or scientific thought in Islamic civilization.

In Tahafut, Ghazali refutes twenty philosophical doctrines. Using a scientific, or in this context philosophical, method, he first explains those philosophical doctrines before criticizing them. His explanations were so comprehensive and so clear that he made them accessible to non-philosophers, and thus, his ideas became generally better known in the Islamic world. Next, he gave arguments to refute those doctrines. In doing so, he used the very same logical and philosophical principles and arguments that philosophers used in the first place to support their claims. Ghazali mainly argues that the philosophers who proposed the doctrines that conflict with religious principles failed to provide valid and rigorous proofs for their propositions. Hence, he attacked their methodologies using their own tools and principles.

An important point Ghazali makes in Tahafut is that he has no problems with the philosophers’ mathematics, astronomical sciences, or logic. He says (Marmura 2000, p. 11):

Regarding mathematical sciences, there is no sense in denying them or disagreeing with them. For these reduce in the final analysis to arithmetic and geometry. As regards to logical sciences, these are concerned with examining the instrument of thought in intelligible things. There is no significant disagreement encountered in these.

Therefore, it is clear that his views could not be used to justify a position against the study of mathematical sciences.

To give the reader a sense of what kinds of philosophical doctrines the Tahafut is concerned with and aims to refute, a selected few out of the twenty are listed below (Marmura 2000, p. 10, 11). The list shows that the questions discussed in Tahafut concern some of the most fundamental issues in theology, particularly in the Islamic theology.

The first problem: On refuting their doctrine of the world’s pre-eternity.

The sixth: On refuting their doctrine denying the divine attributes.

The tenth: On showing that upholding a materialist doctrine and the denial of the Maker is a necessary consequence [of what they hold].

The twentieth: On refuting their denial of bodily resurrection and the accompanying bodily pleasures and pains in paradise and hell.

Concluding Remarks

When I discuss the question given in the title of this article with my colleagues, and I argue that it would be unfair to hold Ghazali or Tahafut responsible for the decline of science in Islam, I sometimes hear the objection that “perhaps the content or the method of Tahafut may not justify this conclusion, but this is not how people understood it.” But then, one must consider the evidence given by Saliba that there is a large amount of sophisticated scientific production in the Islamic world well after Ghazali, and there is still much more to be discovered. Considering the content of Tahafut and the scientific advances in post-Ghazali period, I have a hard time convincing myself that the classical narrative is the ultimate truth on the matter. This position is supported by the fact that it is usually not realistic to try to explain most major social and historical transformations in terms of a single person, a book, an event, or the like. According to Saliba, the decline in Islamic science was the result of a combination of many internal and external reasons that took place several centuries after Ghazali.

Finally, one may wonder why this question is important or relevant. After all, these things happened a long time ago, and we have to deal with the current realities. One answer would be that there are many lessons to be learned from the history. And of course if the correct version of the history is not available, conclusions will be flawed. If anybody is interested in reviving science and scientific activities in a society, there is much that can be learned from the early Islamic period when there was a remarkable rapid and widespread rise in science, as well as lessons from the later periods of Islamic history when the Islamic world fell behind in scientific production. Some researchers are beginning to realize how much damage the classical narrative has caused in understanding the general history and the development of the modern science. It is always useful to have a critical mind to question and reevaluate assumptions when they do not conform to the evidence.

References

• Berggren, J. L. 1986. Episodes in the Mathematics of Medieval Islam, New York: Springer-Verlag.
• Marmura, Michael E. (translator). 2000. Al-Ghazali The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahafut al-Falasifah) Provo: Brigham Young University Press.
• Roberts, Victor . 1957. “The Solar and Lunar Theory of Ibn al-Shatir: A pre-Copernican Copernican Model,” Isis 48:428-432.
• Saliba, George. 2007. Islamic Science and Making of the European Renaissance, Cambridge: MIT Press.

The rational attempt to combine philosophy and wisdom and the refutation of this possibility by human experience must have been matters that preoccupied Nursi’s thought for a long time. This must have prompted him to review his philosophical position and, consequently, reconsider the established view among Islamic philosophers that philosophy and wisdom are connected in an inclusive way, like siblings or in an associative way, like friends.

It is at this point in his life that the “New Said”² appeared. He shed his old philosophical guise and put on a new one, the robe of wisdom. Here we see the demise of Said the philosopher and the birth of the New Said. This radical transformation in the life of Said Nursi has two aspects; one critical and the other constructive. In this article, we will discuss the critical aspect. Said Nursi’s revolution and the criticism of the connection between philosophy and wisdom.

The critical aspect of this transformation can be seen in Nursi’s preoccupation with the criticism of the combination between philosophy and wisdom in its inclusive and associative forms. This was a triple criticism: logical, moral, and figural. This is not to be wondered at, because basically the sage does not stop at the logical criticism of views as does the philosopher. He goes beyond to the moral criticism of views, since he does not regard these views as abstract, but as linked to praxis and would thus re-evaluate them in accordance with their practical effects. He then goes a step further and examines the views from the point of view of their aesthetic value, thus producing a figural criticism.

We can start by showing how Nursi exercised such a triple criticism on the first connection between philosophy and wisdom (i.e., an inclusive connection). In the writings of Nursi, this inclusive connection is built on two basic principles: ¹) The Principle of Founding Tradition on Reason: this stipulates that tradition (i.e., transferred religious knowledge) should be interpreted on the basis of reason when it appears that it (i.e., tradition) contradicts reason. ²) The Principle of Using Reason in Tradition: this stipulates that rational concepts are means to the explanation of the facts of the tradition.

1. The criticism of the inclusive connection between philosophy and wisdom

a) Logical criticism: Said Nursi holds the view that the founding of tradition on reason, on which the inclusive connection is based, is a baseless option because reason is no less in need of foundation than tradition. Such a foundation cannot come by way of reason itself as long as this reason consists one of “that which is circulating among the people”³ and is not a new kind of reason of which philosophy has no knowledge.⁴ Moreover, this principle leads to the interpretation of tradition in a manner that becomes distorted as the reason known among people does not have the scope, objectivity, or freedom that are required for the understanding of tradition.⁵

Nursi also believes that the principle of using the concepts of reason to explain the meanings of tradition, on which the first kind of connection between philosophy and wisdom is based, does not exalt tradition but, rather, denigrates it by creating the impression that the rational bases are deeper and more stable than the bases of tradition. Moreover, reason is useless in defeating opponents, because it remains confined to warding off objections in an abstract rational way acceptable by the opponents. Reason does not, however, rise to presenting the facts of tradition in a manner that combines the heart and the mind and which could characterize these truths.⁶ It may, indeed, lead to the full distortion of these truths.⁷

b) Moral criticism: Nursi stresses that the adoption by the philosopher of the foundation of tradition on reason makes the heart ache with ills that are surmounted by arrogance as the philosopher creates a criterion for measuring the Revelation with his defective and limited mind, that is, speech with boundless perfection.⁸ He also stresses that the use of philosophical concepts in Qur’anic studies-particularly natural and metaphysical ones-leads those who do so to the deification of nature and the abandonment of the deification of the Creator.

c) Figural criticism: For Nursi, the philosopher who advocates an inclusive connection between philosophy and wisdom is like one who is walking through a tunnel or one who is seeking shelter in a cave,⁹ thus becoming a ghost who is invisible though his identity is known and his traces can be seen. He ends by suffocating in this tunnel before completing the journey. The standing of such a person, as defined in the Qur’an – the essence of wisdom – is that of the misguided.¹⁰

Hence, Nursi thinks that the two philosophers whom he frequently mentions, Al Farabi and Ibn Sina, are among those who are misguided,¹¹ because they advocated an inclusive link between philosophy and wisdom; a view similar to the sophistry of the Christians. Ibn Sina went further than Al Farabi¹² in enacting that view. Since Nursi was deceived by their cunning and believed that their view was true, he himself was on the verge of becoming misguided like them, but for the shining of God’s name Al-Hakim (the All-Wise) to guide him and correct his thoughts and deeds.

Acting on the principle of the inclusive connection between philosophy and wisdom leads a person to become weak in faith and argument, to cling to appearances, to become conceited and misguided.

We turn now to the second mode of connection between philosophy and wisdom, the associative one, to see how Nursi exercised his triple criticism. This mode, as we said, is based on three principles: astonishment, questioning, and proof-finding.

The criticism of the associative connection between philosophy and wisdom.

a) Logical criticism: Regarding the principle of philosophical astonishment,¹³ what actually happens is that philosophy does not act upon a sense of the wondrous and miraculous, but rather on that of the strange and anomalous.¹⁴ There is a wide gap between the two feelings. The first stems from the perfection of creation in things, while the second emanates from the imperfection in those things. Most of philosophical knowledge is built on what is familiar and ordinary. However, when it speculates on what is miraculous or supernatural, philosophy still takes the familiar (maruf) as its basis.

As for the principle of philosophical questioning,¹³ it is uncontrolled in its objectives concerning beings, thus falling into confusion and dissipation in every direction. Such an approach does not attain the required answers, leading the questioner to excessive perplexity or even great torment.¹⁵

Concerning the principle of philosophical proof-finding,¹³ the proof is a series of propositions under perpetual threat of invalidation. If we wish to ward off that threat, we have to supply proof for each of these propositions through another series of propositions that are, in turn, open to invalidation and so on. We have barely warded off invalidation from one series of propositions when we have to bring many others to it, and this process continues incessantly.¹⁶

b) Moral criticism: Since philosophical astonishment fundamentally is a sense of the strange and is never a sense of wonder, it leads the philosopher to two pitfalls: One is “blocking off the extrapolation of lessons”; if philosophy does not wonder at the ordinary and familiar, then it does not enable the philosopher to extrapolate lessons and wisdom from what is ordinary and familiar. The other pitfall is “opening the path to the denial of God”; if philosophy throws a veil of familiarity on things, it prevents the realization of divine power and the acceptance of its infinite graces.

Since philosophical questioning is an uncontrolled process, it leads to two things, both of which are fatal deprivations. One is “that it loses the mystery of the oneness of God.” Raising too many questions without guiding objectives or satisfactory answers betrays the fact that the question is deprived from the mystery of the oneness of God. Were the philosopher aware of that mystery, his questions would revolve on set goals and he would attain the answers to them within the framework of those goals that are derived from the oneness of God.¹⁷ The second is “the loss of the feeling of happiness”, because the philosopher, failing to find answers to his various questions or to achieve responses for his various demands, will find himself in great misery.¹⁸

Since philosophical proof-finding is a chain of propositions that is open to invalidation, it leads to two things, both of which are great evils. One is “clinging to the created causes rather than Creator.” Philosophy confines its evidence-seeking to created beings rather than the Almighty Creator or, as Nursi puts it, philosophy examines at these beings as names and not as particles.¹⁹ Inevitably, such an approach leads the philosopher to the worship of natural causes.²⁰ Second, is “clinging to the self alone.” Just as the philosophizing person examines beings in their natural causes, he also looks at himself in the same way; i.e. as an object,²¹ thus falling into self-worship.²²

c) Figural Criticism: For Nursi, the philosopher who advocates an association between philosophy and wisdom is like one who walks in a vast desert, subjected to terrors on every side, such as the fury of the sea, the danger of storms, or the darkness of the sky. These will scatter his dismembered body along the road and his condition will be like that assigned in the Qur’an to those on whom God’s anger descends.²³

If we compare this figural criticism of the associative mode with the previous figural criticism of the inclusive mode, we will find that those who advocate figural criticism are worse off than those who propound the latter. The fact that the former walks on the face of the earth or under the sky – the symbol of Revelation – and the sun – the symbol of light – indicates that his challenge of the divinity of the All- Wise is far greater than the arrogance of the other philosopher who only seeks a path under the ground, where there is no sun and no sky. Also, the fact that the associative advocate”s dismembered body is thrown by the sea onto the side of the road indicates that his deed is like that of a Pharaoh and he, therefore, deserves the same fate in dying and becoming a lesson to others.²⁴ The other philosopher, the advocate of the inclusive mode, is only seen as a ghost. Hence, his body will not be left behind for people as a lesson, but only his traces will serve that function. Consequently, the great peripatetic philosopher, who is only sparingly mentioned by Nursi, Ibn Rushd, is counted by him among those who are an object of God”s wrath,²⁵ because he advocated an associative mode between philosophy and wisdom and acted accordingly. In this, Ibn Rushd became a renegade, like the rebelling Jews.²⁶ Nursi was also deceived by Ibn Rushd’s cunning and held his opinion to be true. Thus, he also was in danger of being exposed to God”s wrath but for the name of God the Merciful (Al Rahim) shining on him to guide him to the Straight Path. Acting on the principle of association between philosophy and wisdom leads to a person”s losing insight and awareness and failing to admit God”s graces. Such a person will neither be happy, nor saved.

* This is an abridged version of Prof Abdel Rahman’s article which was published in Hira (issues 3 and 4, 2006), a quarterly magazine in Arabic (www.hiramagazine.com).

Notes

1. . This study institutes a basic move in terminology: the word ‘philosophy’ is used to designate the knowledge posited by man, thus speaking of ‘human philosophy,’ but not employing the term ‘Qur’anic philosophy.’ On the other hand the term ‘wisdom’ is used here to designate knowledge revealed by God.
2. . Nursi was actively involved in the social and political life before World War I. After the war he perceived that a religious revival was possible only through an intellectual enlightenment using sciences and spiritual illumination through faith, worship, and good morality. He later called this change of perception as the transition from the Old Said to New Said.
3. . We find this description in the following passage: ‘I saw God”s laws as mountains hanging from the sky. Anyone who clings even to a part thereof will ascend and be happy. I say that anyone who goes against those laws, relying on the mind circulating among men in an attempt to reach the paths of heavens through earthly means, is a fool like the Pharaoh who wanted his minister Haman to build him a tower (of clay to reach the sky).’, The Arab Nuri Mathnawi, p. 165.
4. . He says: ‘It is an established principle that if reason and tradition contradict one another, reason would be deemed the basis and the tradition would be interpreted accordingly. But for this to proceed, the reason should be a genuine one.’ The Polishing Stone of Islam, p. 29.
5. . He says: ‘Know you philosophizing person who upholds reason over tradition and who accordingly interprets the tradition that you distort the tradition as your mind, made rotten by vanity and the immersion in philosophical matters, was not capacious enough for the tradition… Your mind is your shackle and by tradition you are transported.’ The Arab Nuri Mathnawi, p. 190.
6. . He says: ‘In this way, they do not manage to give the true image of Islam conforming to that form of action. They graft the tree of Islam with the twigs of wisdom, which they think deep-rooted, as if they are thus strengthening Islam. But triumphing over the enemies through this mode of action is not of much weight. Also this mode implies some denigration of Islam. Therefore, I abandoned this method and actually demonstrated that Islam”s foundations are so profound and well-established that the deepest bases of philosophy cannot reach them, but must always remain superficial in comparison to them.’ Writings, pp. 569-570.
7. . The Polishing Stone of Islam, p. 35-36.
8. . He says: ‘How ignorant is he who grew vain with the philosophical arts rendering them the criterion for the sacred studies of the Qur’an.’ The Arab Nuri Mathnawi, p. 77. Elsewhere, he says: ‘I have witnessed the growth of the philosophical science in the growth of sickness and seen the growth of sickness in the increase of rational science. For the moral illnesses are conducive to rational sciences just as the latter breed illnesses of the heart.’ Ibid., p. 158.
9. . The symbol of the ‘cave’ in Said Nursi The Sage has the converse significance of the ‘cave’ in Plato and the ‘vault’ in Descartes. For Plato, those who descend into the cave are the ignorant who know only the shadow of things, compared to the philosopher who knows the essences of things themselves (The Republic. Book Seven) For Descartes, they are the blind people who live in utter darkness, compared to the philosopher who lives in bright light (An Essay in Method. Part Six). For Nursi, on the other hand, the one who seeks shelter in a cave is the philosopher himself, whom Plato deems as the truly knowledgeable person, and whom Descartes holds to be the truly insightful person.
10. . He says: ‘Thus, the first path is that of the misguided, described in the Qur’an as the ‘stray’. This is the path of those who fell to the idea of Nature and adopted the ideas of naturalists…’ Words, p. 650.
11. . He says: ‘This earth is “nature” and “natural philosophy”. The tunnel is the path taken by the people of philosophy with their ideas in a bid to reach the truth. The footprints I saw were those of famous philosophers like Plato and Aristotle. The voices I heard were those of cunning ones like Ibn Sina and Al Farabi… Yes, I found sayings and tenets by Ibn Sina in several places, but these voices totally ceased; in a sense he could not make progress. He suffocated.’ Words, p. 648.
12. . Signs of Miraculousness, p. 36.
13. . The ground for the view of associative connection between philosophy and wisdom is the belief that philosophy acts on three principles that are not found in wisdom: One, the Principle of Astonishment: the philosophical act has its origin in the feeling of astonishment vis A vis the effects left on the psyche or the things on the horizon. Two, the Principle of Questioning: the philosopher poses one series of questions after another series, looking for answers to them. Three, the Principle of Proof-finding: in proving its tenets, philosophy relies on intellectual evidence that may attain the highest degree of certainty.
14. . He says: ‘The philosophy reached by man veils the miracles of divine might and the marvels of the Almighty”s mercy by the curtain of uniformities, causing a failure to see the signs of (God”s) oneness under these regularities and these great blessings. It does not show them nor indicate them. However, if philosophy perceives some special peculiarities that depart from custom, it directs its attention and concern to them.’ Annexes, p. 358
15. . He says: ‘If that mind becomes confounded in the mire of misguidance and the denial of God, it becomes an instrument of torture and a cause for disturbance in its combination of the sad pains of the past and the terrible fears of the future.’, Illuminations, p. 19.
16. . He says: ‘The difference between my path in the distilling of benefit from the Qur’an and the method of thinkers and philosophers is that I dig wherever I am and water comes out. They, on the other hand, insist on laying pipes and ducts to bring the water from afar. They build long chains and ladders to the Throne above to bring down the water of life. As they rely on these causes, they have to place millions of proof-keepers all along these lengthy roads to preserve them from the destructiveness of the devils of illusions.’ The Arab Nuri Mathnawi, p. 170.
17. . He says: ‘With the secret of the oneness of God, the sealed secret of the perplexing questions is uncovered. From whence comes the flood of existing beings and the train of creatures? Whither is fate? Why did they come and what are they doing…’, Illuminations, p. 14.
18. . He says: ‘But for the oneness of God, man would have been the most wretched of creatures, the lowest of beings, the weakest of animals, and the saddest and most tortured and pained of sentiments. Illuminations, p. 18.
19. . He says: ‘The Qur’anic view of beings makes them like particles; i.e. they express a meaning that resides elsewhere. They express the epiphany of the Best Names and the Supreme Attributes of the Great Creator that are manifested in beings. On the other hand, the dead look of – materialistic – philosophy mostly views the beings as names [whose meaning resides in them] and its foot thereby slips into the slough of nature.’ Annexes, p. 90.
20. . He says: ‘As for philosophy, it looks at existing beings from the point of view of their aspects that regard their entities and their causes.’ The Arab Nuri Mathnawi, p. 77.
21. . Words, p. 646.
22. . He says: ‘The misguided people of this age ride on the “ego” that roams with them in the valleys of loss. The righteous people cannot serve the Truth except by abandoning the ego. Even if they are right and correct in their use of the ego, they have to leave it behind so that they will not look like the others, because then they would be, like them, suspected of self-worship.’ Writings, p. 549.
23. . He says: ‘The second path alluded to – ‘those who are the objects of God”s anger’ – is that of those who worship causes and consider that creation and creating are the acts of intermediaries, which alone, in their view, are effective. They want to reach the Truth of truths and God, the Exalted, through mind and thought alone like the peripatetic sages.’ Words, p. 650.
24. . This an illusion to the Qur’anic verse: ‘Today we save your body alone to make you a sign for those who come after us. Many are heedless of our signs.’ The Sura Yunus, verse 29.
25. . Nursi avoids mentioning Ibn Rushd by name – contrary to what he did with Al Arabi and Ibn Sina – but he refers to him by referring to the quality he was famous for; i.e. as ‘the Cynic’, since he is the greatest exegete of Aristotle. We do not wish to go into the reasons that led him to such circumspection here. It is enough to say that he may have done so in kindness to Ibn Rushd and as a gesture of politeness to his contemporary followers.
26. . The Signs of Miraculousness, p. 36.

The Fountain: There are many types of philosophies as well as many traditions in the history of philosophy. Scholars for instance distinguish “ancient philosophy” from “modern philosophy.” So how do you locate “Islamic Philosophy?”

Oliver Leaman (O. L.): Trying to define Islamic philosophy is very tendentious, but then definitions as a whole are a problematic area in philosophy. In my view, Islamic philosophy is not necessarily done by Muslims, nor does it have to deal with religious issues. It is that style of philosophy that developed in the Islamic world roughly around the time of al-Kindi which persists today in what is now the Islamic world and indeed further afield.

The Fountain: If it is a separate tradition, what are its characteristics?

O. L.: I don’t think it has any characteristics that have remained the same over time. For example, today in the Arab world there is a protracted debate by philosophers on the nature of Arab civilization, its links with Islam, and how it relates to other civilizations. That is not a debate that existed in the early centuries of Islamic philosophy at all, but reflects the relatively recent experience of colonialism, the modern concept of the state, contemporary political events and so on. Philosophy like everything else has its fashions, and Islamic philosophy rolls with the times, which is why it still survives.

The Fountain: How do you view the relationship between Islamic philosophy and Islamic theology?

O. L.: Many of the issues that have been discussed by Islamic philosophers are religious, and also relate to the theology of a particular faith, i.e. Islam. It is not always easy to know how to distinguish between philosophy and theology, since both are abstract and conceptual investigations into complex issues. Some of the early thinkers like al-Farabi and Ibn Rushd drew a sharp distinction between philosophy and theology, arguing that philosophy is demonstrative and starts from principles that are themselves provable as true, while religion merely starts with beliefs that are accepted, but need not be true. Even if they are right, though, they agreed that the argument forms followed by both are the same, so a sharp distinction between Islamic philosophy and theology is not likely to be very helpful.

The Fountain: As compared to systematic philosophers such as Aristotle, Descartes, Kant on the one hand, and non-systematic ones such as Nietzsche and Wittgenstein on the other hand, how do you evaluate al-Ghazzali’s position?

O. L.: Al-Ghazali is just as systematic as any other major thinker, albeit one has to take him in relation to each stage of his life and thought, since he changed radically from one time to another. The same could be said of Kant, of course, who had a critical and a pre-critical period, and indeed some have argued a post-critical period also.

The Fountain: Did he engage in a philosophical activity in the “Inconsistencies of Philosophers?”

O. L.: I would classify the Tahafut al-falasifa as philosophical, like most of his works. It not only deals with philosophical topics but attacks them philosophically. Had he been operating theologically only he might have pointed to the beliefs of the philosophers and classified them variously as kufr and bid`a, and so condemned them on religious grounds, but in fact he does not limit himself to this at all, he mentions the theological objections to the philosophical principles and then seeks to refute the latter using the methods of those with whom he is arguing. If that is not philosophy then I don’t know what is.

N.M.: Did Islamic thought influence the Western thought?

O.L.: There is evidence of Islamic philosophy influencing Western thought in the medieval period. We know that the works of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd were translated into Latin and played a significant role in France and Italy, for instance, significant enough for Ibn Rushd’s views to be banned in 1270 and 1277 by Bishop Tempier at the University of Paris. Ibn Rushd was interpreted as arguing that philosophy and religion are contrary to each other, but nonetheless are both true, and so we have to accept them both, albeit as valid for different areas of our lives. Philosophy is for us as rational thinkers, and religion for us as social and emotional beings. This hardly presents a very flattering view of the role of religion, and it did not go down well with the Church. The popularity of Ibn Rushd for many centuries gives credence to the idea that he played a significant role in fostering the development of secularism in Europe.

The Fountain: Is the tradition of Islamic thought alive today? Can we mention theologically or philosophically mature works in this area?

O. L.: I started off responding to the question of what is happening in the area today, and then had to stop since the list of books and thinkers was getting so long. In my view, the most fruitful work today takes place in Iran, where ishraqi philosophy is being combined in productive ways with analytical philosophy to produce a highly original form of thought. Persians have always been predominant in Islamic philosophy; when the subject went into a decline in the rest of the Islamic world it continued to be part of the curriculum in Iran, and there is a very long and indeed unbroken tradition in Iran of philosophical work.

The Fountain: How do you evaluate oriental studies so far? Do they represent the Western interest in Islamic thought?

O. L.: I don’t think Western philosophers are interested in Islamic philosophy, with a few exceptions. The kalam cosmological argument is important in analytical philosophy of religion, and as its name suggests, it comes from Islamic philosophy. Some of the major thinkers in the mashsha’i tradition like Averroes (Ibn Rushd) and Avicenna (Ibn Sina) are known by those interested in medieval philosophy, but otherwise not.

It is not clear to me that we should divide up philosophy into different regions of the world, since those regions constantly work on each other and produce a common philosophical climate. For example, the Christian and Jewish world became in the Middle Ages fascinated with Islamic philosophy, but Islamic philosophy itself earlier on enthusiastically studied and incorporated Greek philosophy.

The Fountain: Let’s talk about the interaction between the Western and Islamic thought. Can Islamic thought bring new perspectives to contemporary Western thought and in what sense can Western thought may be useful for people who try to revive Islamic thought?

O. L.: What is western thought? Ibn Rushd, Ibn Bajja, and Ibn Tufayl, some of the major Islamic philosophers, lived in Spain, which seems quite far west to me. St. Augustine lived in North Africa; does that mean he was an African philosopher? What we call Western philosophy has produced interesting work which other philosophers should study, in just the same way that those in the West should know about more than just their tradition of thought, if there is such a thing.

The Fountain: The University of Kentucky is organizing an international graduate student conference in September this year. You are the coordinator of this conference. Is this conference unique in the US? What was your motivation and target in organizing such a rare and original conference?

O. L.: We wanted to organize a graduate conference on Islamic philosophy because there are a lot of people in the world working in this area, but often they do not come into contact with each other. In the United States in particular graduate students might be working in the area in a department where they are the only person with that interest, and it would be good if people could come together, share views and maintain contact with those in the same field afterwards.

The Fountain: What is your current research about?

O. L.: My current work is on the notion of whether there is a Qur’anic logic and if there is, what is it? The Qur’an constantly calls on its hearers and readers to reflect, ponder, consider what the Book says, and the suggestion is that we are supposed to understand rationally the arguments in the text. I am interested in how those arguments are structured and how far they can be regarded as valid arguments at all.

The University of Kentucky is organizing a conference on contemporary issues in Islamic philosophy and theology. All graduate students, and those of equivalent status, are eligible to present papers at the conference. For further inquiries please visit http://www.uky.edu/AS/Philosophy/events.htm

Although, there is a lack of theoretical and philosophical background to understand the homeschooling movement I would like to use some philosophy of

teaching theories to understand and analyze counter-culture and controversies in Mitchell L. Stevens’ book. The author tries to offer a broad understanding in the North Eastern American states in the homeschooling movement. The author focuses to answer why the homeschooling families walked away from one of the most central institutions of modern life and what do those families think about conventional schools. Stevens continues by saying that We inherit traditions of meaning that help define what we think and lend words to what we fell. I wanted to learn about the intellectual traditions from which home schooling had grown (Stevens, 2001, p.15). When I reviewed the book I wanted to discover what kind of inherited tradition and mentality he found or didn’t find in the book while I was writing this paper. The author’s perspective about the homeschooling movement seems to be more narrative and insightful than theoretical and philosophical, which a sociological study is supposed to rely on.

On the cover of the book Stevens talks about the great successes of home schooled children, their making headlines by winning national spelling bees and excelling at elite universities, but he does not extend the argument far enough. He does not talk about the experiences of these children, their feelings and ideas about being home schooled, or the structure of their educational curriculum. Although he mentions some studies about those children by saying that home schooled children are academically successful and remarkably well socialized he does not explain how and why homeschooling brings these results. This shows that Stevens is more concerned with the adult movement in homeschooling than with how it will affect the children’s world contrary to the title of the book.

While the book states that the vast majority of homeschooling parents were conservative Christian or evangelical Protestant there are some exceptions to that which make the movement harder to understand. These exceptions include families who are atheist, gay or single parent rather than all conservative Christian. I see a shift toward theories based on a postmodern approach because many parents have become skeptical about other types of modern schooling. Homeschooling families place great emphasis on their children’ showing initiative and being physically and psychologically healthy. For homeschooling families’ modernism does not have a capacity to fulfill the needs of young children because there is so much influence of commercial culture, including overly sexualized and secularized materials. While homeschooling families unmask the secular political ideology in regular public schooling, they come with their hidden agenda (religious or non-secular education) unlike in postmodernism. This is because postmodernism gives great emphasis on individual intention. Hlebowitsh says that postmodernists stress the value of individual initiative, the recognition of human intention, the unmasking of political ideology in knowledge, the taming of social control mechanism in the school, and the general idea that society is marked by conflicting interests of class, gender, and culture (Hlebowitsh, 2001, p. 119). Postmodernism is skeptical to see things as all good and perfect, but homeschooling families are pretty sure what they want out of home schooling. According to many homeschooling families, in this modern world individuals are not conscious about God and the importance of family ties, especially mother and child/children, are uniquely important. Consequently, the movement in the book seems to be not so new and very similar to early colonial New England School tradition in terms of its being exclusive and based on Bible lesson plans. In chapter three, entitled Natural Mothers and Godly Women, Stevens recalls Dame schooling that is based on women educators (widowed or unmarried) in the New England early colonial era. These women did not necessarily train to be a teacher but taught to read the Bible and lessons based on its Scriptures, which is very similar to the homeschooling movement today. Stevens book fails to do this, or describe some other types of historical ties behind the movement. I wonder if he intents to make this connection on page 15 by using the term inherit tradition in the homeschooling movement.

In the Homeschooling Journal, Debra Strayer (Stevens, 2001, p.66) says that:

As teaching parents, we are presented with a huge array of educationally important things to serve our children. Many things are considered essential, such as phonics and math. Many are deemed very important, such as writing and science, with our study of the Bible as the central diet. As we consider the many things our children simply must have, we tend to eliminate those things that are cumbersome and difficult to schedule

In this quote Strayer expresses the feelings of many homeschooling families by saying that other types of schooling are more heavily weighted on unnecessary courses and scheduling than core subjects’ courses. The homeschooling families like to eliminate those things from their children’s learning experience. While they make these arguments on the surface they tend to be subject-centered rather than child-centered. This is similar to one of the conservative philosophies of teaching theory, which is essentialism. In this type of teaching philosophy learning is primarily based on the transmission and protection of common core cultural knowledge. This common culture relies on the values of Western civilization and the ideal learning experience is strictly based on academic discipline. While those statements translate the homeschooling movement, the author does not tend to make any type of historical or philosophical connection to interpret and understand the movement. Because these parents do not count on their children’s ideas and feelings, they ignore the real view of their children and they only think of molding them into the shape that they want them to be. Thus, parents, not the children, have the authority to make the choices and offer selections.

According to Rousseau, who is the father of the child-centered approach, children are best educated in a free environment and schools tend to destroy the natural learning process. Having an educational agenda undermines the individual’s natural and spontaneous learning process. As is seen in this statement, what Rousseau proposed with child-centeredness was totally different than what homeschooling families intend to do. I think the author needs another term instead of child centered at page 88. I believe those children are successful because of subject or discipline centeredness of homeschooling movement but not because of the child-centeredness of the movement.

Although I find Stevens book very enlightening, I see some gaps in terms of its theoretical and philosophical background. The author perceives homeschooling as a new social movement, but the question about what type of new social movement stays unclear and/or unanswered. I also realize this gap comes from the nature of the homeschooling movement. Even though, I try to understand Stevens’ book based on some teaching theories, it is hard to frame the movement because of a wide range of homeschooling families’ backgrounds and their expectations from the movement. Stevens’ book offers a very insightful approach to understanding homeschooling families. One of the strongest sides of his book is its vast range of homeschooling designs and the richness of his survey sample distributions. In terms of his methodology, this increases the accuracy of the information he provides through surveying. This shows that the author reached out to many homeschooling families and learned a lot about their world. Finally, I find Stevens successful in his ability to reflect his experiences insightfully with homeschooling families behind the movement.

References

• Hlebowitsh, Peter S., (2001). Foundations of American education (3 ed.). Wadsworth T. Thomson Learning. Belmont, CA
• Stevens, Mitchell L., (2001). Kingdom of children: Culture and controversy in the homeschooling movement. Princeton University Press. Princeton, New Jersey