The twentieth century was marked by failed utopias: Maoist China, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, and various fascist and communist states. Except for its inter-war militaristic period, Japan has been conspicuous for its absence.

Japan continues to baffle the world. How did a largely peasant feudal nation forcibly opened to the world only in 1853 manage to defeat Russia on the battlefield in 1905? How did a nation that was largely destroyed during World War II rise to such economic heights that by 1962 everyone was aware of the Japanese miracle? What transformed one of the most feared and brutal militaristic nations into a nation that now refuses to bear arms and only recently agreed to involve its soldiers in peace-keeping forces?

The ability to adapt

Japan emerged from its more than 200-year self-imposed exile only when Commodore Perry entered Edo (Tokyo) Bay in 1853 and forced it to do so. The new Meiji dynasty immediately announced the aim of returning to the events of antiquity and origins.(1) However, it simultaneously said that it would search for new knowledge throughout the world eliminate old customs and abuses, as if to immediately announce its intention to inaugurate a genuinely new beginning rather than arepetition.(2)

Even before this epochal date, the ruling Tokugawa dynasty had laid the groundwork for significant social change. For example, they had tamed the samurai, Japan’s traditional warrior ruling elite, into non-landed town dwellers who received government stipends. In short, they became bureaucrats whose loyalty was guaranteed only if the person in charge was efficient. The tradition of absolute loyalty to one’s clan lord was ended.

The four social classes of warrior, peasant, artisan, and merchant also were abolished, giving people freedom to find their own way in life. The former warrior elite was not threatened by this, for only it had the necessary knowledge to assume the high positions. But not all of them chose that path, for many participated enthusiastically in commerce, from which they had been excluded, and education. The increased social mobility and expanded horizons that this change ushered in was welcomed by all, especially the former elite.

Thus when the Meiji dynasty came to power in the newly opened Japan, it was able to abolish the last vestiges of feudalism quickly and without protest. More importantly, the former elite gave its loyalty to the Emperor willingly.

A few years after this, Japanese students were being sent to Europe and America to learn foreign languages and acquire modern knowledge and skills. Businessmen went abroad to visit factories and companies and buy products that they thought had potential back home. Japan’s reputation as a nation of intensely curious people was not long in coming. Within the space of almost 50 years, Japan went from being an isolated xenophobic warrior-dominated nation to one that was curious about everything non-Japanese, even to the point of being ridiculed by other nations.

Education and experience-based knowledge

Even before schools began to proliferate during the Meiji era, people known as technologists actively traveled the country to locate home-grown improved agricultural implements to make farmers more efficient. Such information was published and distributed widely. Local people would show how to use the new tools or methods, and the results convinced people to abandon traditional ways in favor of the new ones, which were more effective.

This represented a disguised challenge to the ruling order, for: Not only were the technologists saying, by implication, that men with enough intelligence and enterprise to alter their status and style of life might ignore the limitations placed on them by birth; they were also saying in effect that the pursuit of private interest by enough people would change society for the better by adding to the sum of human welfare and therefore that the good of society was not uniquely determined by the moral quality of the ruler but might in part well up from the selfish strivings of the masses.(3)

Entrepreneurship

In 1880, the government encouraged entrepreneurship in the national interest by selling its pilot plants to entrepreneurs, giving them exclusive licenses and other privileges, and often providing some portion of their capital funds.(4) These relations were unofficial and personal, as well as based on clan origins, marriages, and bribery. In 1881, the government attempted to manage such activities by creating the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce.

After WWI, rural Japanese flooded into the urban centers looking for salaried jobs. Working conditions were often hazardous and pay was low, but still they came, driven by the desire to have a better life than their parents. In addition, they wanted to experience first hand what they were reading in the books and magazines promoting the American way of life. They saved their money, got educated, and opened their own businesses.

Realistic planning based on accurate data

Another concern was advance planning and record keeping so people would know how long a certain task should take. Authors were discussing such matters in the field of agriculture as early as the seventeenth century. By the early nineteenth century, technologists were exhorting farmers to keep detailed records of what they did and what was the result, so that they could be compared with past and future results.

In 1930, the Temporary Industrial Rationality Bureau drew up plans for the control of enterprises, implementation of scientific management principles, improvements in industrial financing, standardization of products, simplification of production processes, and subsidies to support the production and consumption of domestically manufactured goods.(5) Basing themselves on the German version, Japan used cooperation and cartels, instead of competition to lower costs. The main goal was not profit, but to cooperate and develop in a way that made Japan able to compete with the developed countries.

One deciding factor was that of historical continuity. For example, the people who had first formulated the relevant policies during the 1920s and 1930s were still there and hard at work in the 1950s. According to Johnson: This theme of historical continuity also draws attention to the fact that industrial policy is rooted in Japanese political rationality and conscious institutional innovation, and not primarily or exclusively in Japanese culture, vestiges of feudalism, insularity, frugality, the primacy of the social group over the individual, or any other special characteristic of Japanese society. Economic crisis gave birth to industrial policy.(6)

Women and government

Women were a critical factor in Japan’s early development. According to Koji Taira, Japan’s economic modernization, which meant the implementation of the factory system after the war [WWI], was ˜manned by women.’ (7)

The government also was an active player, for it designed policies to create a predominantly American lifestyle based on rationality, efficiency, and economies in the conduct of social life.(8) The consumption of everything new was encouraged: toys, food, clothing, attitudes, identities, and so on. This policy was directed at women, for It not only announced the end of the seclusion and isolation women had experienced as virtual prisoners of the household, it had consequences for their status outside family life, as larger numbers began pouring into the labor force, especially in those areas like learning, education, and sports that had been male

preserves.(9)

This challenge to Japan’s patriarchal culture and traditional gender roles was noted but subsumed by the government’s attempt to present, at least on the surface, a society marked neither by social divisions nor by gender difference and sexual differentiation.(10) Concern was raised about the harmful effects of such materialism, self-indulgence, loss of spiritual values, and traditional roles. In fact, even though some blamed the 1923 earthquake on such departures from tradition, the new trends continued with full official encouragement and support.

Adaptation of foreign concepts and methods

After its defeat and occupation in 1945, Japan did not blame its fate on non-fidelity to tradition, straying from Buddhist or Shinto principles, or other such abstract ideas. Instead, the Emperor, who until then had been worshipped, went on national radio and told the Japanese to unite your total strength to be devoted to the construction for the future to keep pace with the progress of the world.(11) And the Japanese listened.

When the American occupation force began to use Japan as a supplier for its efforts during the Korean War and began to give it technological knowledge and help, Japan set off with a vengeance to benefit from them. Its efforts paid off so well that by 1962 the world for the first time heard the phrase the Japanese miracle. Its wholesale invasion of the electronic and auto industries was a spectacular success.

From the ashes of WWII came a new policy: administrative guidance. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) established many informal rules that sought to restrict foreign access to the Japanese market until its nascent industries could compete. Its main proponent and representative, Sahashi Shigeru, went up against Singer Sewing Company and IBM-and won. He even told the IBM representative that we do not have an inferiority complex toward you; we only need time and money to compete effectively.(12) Calls by internal and foreign interests for economic liberalization were resisted, despite the distortions caused by administrative guidance (e.g., excessive investment in production facilities and overproduction of products), so that the new home-grown industries would not be swamped.

In the 1960s, MITI developed a policy of administration by inducement to deal with the dangers of economic liberalization that both internal and foreign sectors were demanding. The goal was flexibility to adapt to fast-changing situations and new challenges confronting the national economy. Thus, laws were intentionally vague so that a suitable interpretation could be found. In short, this meant committees of cooperating bureaucrats, industrialists, and financiers that would set investment rates, promote mergers, discourage new firms from entering given industries, and in general try to build an industrial structure on a par with those of the United Sates and West Germany, the two prime external reference economies.(13)

This policy, along with certain understandings when it came to banking and investing, was open to abuse and caused its own share of difficulties, but it succeeded brilliantly. Furthermore, a large share of the profits was reinvested in heavy industry and new technology so that Japan could keep up with the industrialized world.

Time management

Time management is fundamental to a modern industrialized society, for any industrial undertaking depends upon performing a set of specific steps in a predetermined chronological order. For the process to succeed, everything must be in place so that it can be used at the correct time. But for the process to be efficient, people must know how long each step should take.

Traditional Japanese society considered time to be communal, for that was the way the people organized their lives. Like any other crop, rice has to be planted and harvested at the appropriate times to be sold and feed the family. As mentioned above, technologists who sought to replace ineffective methods with new ones, often not from the same area, had been active for centuries. The value of time was recognized and linked to the family and the village as a whole. If it were neglected, the family farm could easily fail in this highly competitive environment, which was viewed as dishonoring one’s ancestors and often resulted in the family’s self-banishment from the village.

This attitude is still a feature of Japanese life. After WWI, working days of 18 hours were common and welcomed, provided that the workers were paid adequately. Often, there were complaints that the company was not letting the people work more hours. This has been ascribed to the traditional Japanese preference for income over leisure, which corporate Japan has harnessed it its benefit.(14)

Also, the fact that Japan is community-oriented enables practices that cannot be reduplicated in other countries: government and business working as partners instead of adversaries, businesses and unions agreeing on acceptable contracts instead of one side trying to lay down the law to others, increased production through willing teamwork and mutual cooperation instead of everyone looking out for himself or herself alone.

Conclusion

Japan, having almost no natural resources, never had the option of depending upon one or more natural resources or products to fuel its development. After its self-imposed isolation ended, Japan’s rulers realized just how weak the country was vis A vis the industrialized powers and so began to devise a strategy to equal and then surpass them. China lost its role as Japan’s source of inspiration practically overnight. But these strategies were always regarded as subject to change if the situation so warranted. Moreover, these strategies and any subsequent changes were enacted only after conducting a thorough and realistic analysis of what they had to work with and what challenges they had to face. In short, the Japanese were not afraid to try and learn from their mistakes or to change.

Other major factors in Japan’s successful development were the ability to see when traditions needed to be modified or reinterpreted, the desire to reach a broad social consensus on what should be done and how it should be done, and the constant appeal to rationalize each task so it could be done faster and more efficiently. Since failure was not an option, bureaucrats and businessmen did not appeal to tradition, what should be, a past golden age, and others heard from various quarters today.

What Japan had to work with was a government that had a realistic vision of what the nation could be, an already established foundation for an industrialized and modern society, and people who were anxious to see their country become a major power due to their skills, education, competitiveness, concern for quality, adapting existing technology for new uses, and will to succeed. Unfortunately, this cannot be said of many countries today.

In the 1960s, when one saw Made in Japan on a product, it was a source of laughter. No one laughs any more, for this phrase has become synonymous with quality and state-of-the-art technology and efficiency.

Footnotes

1. Harry Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 300.
2. Ibid., 301.
3. Thomas C. Smith, Native Sources of Japanese Industrialization: 1750-1920 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), 197.
4. Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), 85.
5. Ibid., 104.
6. Ibid., 114.
7. Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity, 12.
8. Ibid., 15.
9. Ibid., 17.
10. Ibid., 18.
11. Akio Morito, Made in Japan (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1986), 35.
12. Johnson, MITI, 246-47.
13. Ibid., 256.
14. Smith, Native Sources, 222.

The Need for Balance

Human beings are social creatures with a complicated network of relations. No one can be completely independent of this network, for each person’s survival depends upon it. Given this, a constant search for balance between these relations is necessary to avoid conflict. Classical Greek philosophers considered humanity a zo-on politikon-a political mammal, thus emphasizing the fact that every person is, in some way, a political actor.

For believers and Muslims, belief is an essential component of human existence. Even some agnostic humanists accept the possibility of a spiritual life and recognize its ethical merits. Given this, political and spiritual activities cannot be separated from human life or from each other. In other words, they have a holistic link. This concept also is found in a more specific Christian perspective and in the Islamic tradition. Among its European exponents have been Dag Hammarskjold, Thomas Masaryk, and Vaclav Havel.¹ Ms. Salima Ghezali and Prof. Abu Zaid are fine examples of active Muslim as meta-politicians.²

Before delving into this subject further, it is necessary to make the following points clear. First, a distinction must be made between policy and politics, between power plays and party strategy on the one hand and policy as a long-time approach to social problems on the other. As policy conforms better with the classical Greek concept of politeia (the government of the city/society or polis), I shall concentrate upon it.

Second, I use Islam not in the political context of Arabism, political rituals, or self-proclaimed Islamic states, but in its literal meaning of monotheism and belief in Divine Unicity and a coherent creation as explained in the Qur’an. In this spiritual context, every man and woman who reaches a certain age and is mentally competent is entirely and directly responsible for each of his or her acts.

Islam, in the context of this reality, means accepting this responsibility and using one’s God-given intellect and dignity to keep on the “just path” (the Shari‘a). There is no room for any human-made religious hierarchy (e.g., imam, ayatolla, caliph, amir³), or for fatalism or passivity, for personal responsibility means that one has to choose instead of be led by others.

Spirituality and Society

The well-known phrase al-Islam din wa dunya (Islam is spirituality and society) can serve as a starting point in the search for harmony between Muslim identity and political action. Din refers to Islam as a whole. Its most important points are Islam’s pillars, belief, duties, external principles (the Shari‘a), inner experience (Sufism), and striving against the ego (jihad). All of this, taken together, forms Islam-in-society. In this authentic Islam, no religious or secular hierarchy serves as an intermediary between believers and God. This fact, unfortunately, is often overlooked or ignored. Various people and groups have linked it to state structure, national community, political nationalism, tribal society, and even political party. All such attempts are abuses of Islam.

Dunya refers to human society as a whole. It is not a mono-religious community, but rather a society in which several religious and philosophical communities use their status as citizens to contribute to the well-being of all. An example of such a concept is found in European humanist organizations, whose members can be atheists, agnostics, or spiritual-without-specification.

There is no reason for Muslims to be prejudiced against such groups, for their adherents are neither anti-Islamic nor partisans of ignorance. Not being religious does not mean being against religion. These groups work for human dignity and responsibility just as Muslims do, although they approach it from a different perspective. Dunya is holistic, and its aspects (e.g., psychology, politics, art, science, sexuality, and history) interact intensively. Abuses have been just as numerous as corrections throughout the Muslim world’s 1,400-plus years of existence. Authentic Islam has not always been triumphant in the past, but it still carries the promise of a splendid future. It is in the hands of inspired, contemporary Muslims to decide.

Church and State

Europe remains suspicious about any attempt to unify religion and politics. This is quite understandable when one considers the traumatic history that such attempts caused in Europe. The first one involved the Muslim world directly: the Crusades.⁴ The “liberation of the Holy Land,” according to Roman Catholic scholars, was a nightmare for the Greek and Eastern Christian communities. Given the facts that the independent Crusader kingdoms fought each other and that Muslims lived in Jerusalem for 4 centuries before the Crusades, the official history of the Crusades turns out to be false. All of the involved communities were traumatized and left with feelings of mutual suspicion and hostility. Whatever good relations remained between Muslims and Christians were confined to mercantile elites, for the general populations remained hostile to each other.

Four centuries later, starting with Luther’s declaration in 1517 against the Catholic Church, Europe became a battlefield for Catholic and Protestant armies.⁵ The Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, which raged during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and was a period of incredible cruelty and massacre, lasted until the end of the Thirty Years War (1648). Millions of people were killed by warfare, famine, and disease-and yet nobody “won.” Out of this violence came the emergency measure to separate church and state. Gradually modified, this concept would become known as laicity during the French Revolution (1789-99).

Before laicity took hold, however, the concept of individual freedom of religion was negated by allocating different Christian denominations to different states. At that moment, the Ottoman State applied a more advanced form of multi-religious coexistence in a single state. The church hierarchy weakened throughout the nineteenth century, while the European states become more democratic. There was another chance to harmonize the link between religion and policy, this time in a democratic way.

The twentieth century witnessed the worst crimes against humanity in recorded history. These were carried out by systems and states that rejected all previously influential religious concepts. And so the perception of religion changed again, this time in a positive way. In this new trauma, people complained about the absence of religion as a moderating and peacemaking force. (O God, why were You absent in Auschwitz?) After WWII, laic states could keep their structure and renew their content. Nearly all European nations have adopted some form of laicity. But this does not mean that they are anti-religious or anti-Islam. If laicity and democracy are not yet perfect, they only need to be improved. There is no reason to criticize laicity as such. These governments are the expressions of their own imperfect democracy.

This process is determined by economic as well as cultural factors. Religious communities can contribute to the perfection of democracy if their own intra-religious dynamic is not usurped by any clerical power group. Only such a status will allow them to have democratic ties with other religious and philosophical groups and with society as a whole.

Muslim Communities in Europe

European Muslims live as dispersed minority communities in many European countries, be they constitutional monarchies, republics, or otherwise. Ballot systems differ, as does the size of the Parliament, terms of elections, and so on. Essentially, there is consultancy between the state and the population, as well as between the citizens themselves.

This concept of mutual consultancy (shura) is found in the Qur’an: The believers conduct their affairs in mutual consent (42:39). The Qur’an recommends a method for policy, not a political organization. The Prophet was not told to establish a state or name a successor. From the Traditions, we learn that he knew that his function was only to guide and protect his community. The title of caliph, based upon Qur’an 33:72, applies to all people as spiritual representatives and followers of God. It has no political function in authentic Islam, and this and all other titles are no more than human inventions.

Within the context of European society, shura can-and should-take the form of democratic commitment. European citizens and the Muslim community can reinforce each other during these years of broad general disgust with local and even national political institutions. As such people consider democracy corrupt, inefficient, or obsolete, Muslims can oppose this defection from democracy by pointing out that such a development might acutally make the situation even worse.

According to the Qur’an, Prophethood contains identical elements regardless of the Prophet. So, what was significant for Prophet Muhammad was significant for all other Prophets. Consider the case of Moses who, according to both the Bible and the Qur’an, was sent to guide and inspire his enslaved people. He went to Pharaoh and, accepting the risk of royal anger, called for moderation and justice. Indeed, Pharaoh rejected his demand and became even more cruel. After Divine intervention, Moses led his people on their long and dangerous journey toward the land where, according to God’s Promise, they would find freedom and justice.

The Jewish identity was formed during this journey. Moses did not offer a well-defined territory or become the head of a state. In fact, his authority was even challenged at times. The dynamism of Prophetic action was the main element in this journey, as it was in Prophet Muhammad’s emigration to Madina to establish the Muslim community in a welcoming atmosphere.

From a moral point of view, Vaclav Havel might be one of Europe’s most significant contemporary politicians.6 He represents a religious view in a discrete way, without stating membership in a particular religious community and certainly not claiming leadership. He is democratic in his methods, and considers religion only as a motivation to act. However, it really counts. He resembles his predecessor Masaryk, who was a philosopher and a litterateur before assuming political responsibilities. Although underestimated as a politician when compared with Churchill or de Gaulle, his life has been just as adventurous as theirs despite the much smaller size of his country.

European Muslim intellectuals and would-be politicians would be well advised to study the lives and decisions of Masaryk and Havel, for both escaped from the narrow-minded nationalism that has trapped so many Muslim Arab politicians. To them, nationalism meant preserving the local cultural heritage in order to strengthen the popular identity in face of oppression. This is a valuable gift to humanity, rather than a treasure to be guarded jealously. Havel began his political activity by writing a letter to President Gustav Husak to protest the injustice of the Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia. Husak, just like Pharaoh, rejected it. And so we ask: Is there a parallel between the actions of Moses and Havel? How significant is the fact that these two men, one a Prophet and the other a politician-philosopher, had no desire for power? Such questions might inspire Christians and Muslims. Also, didn’t Muslims consider the downfall of communism, to which Havel contributed greatly, a symbolic and even religious fact?

Conclusion

As European Muslims face problems that are usually identical to those of the entire population, isolation is a completely inappropriate solution. Maintaining cultural and linguistic heritages should be done by cultural, as opposed to political, associations. The current trend of Muslim involvement in several political tendencies without forming a Muslim political party needs to be reinforced. The emergence of a self-proclaimed Muslim party is not desirable, for its impact would be negative-other such parties would be formed by those who, for whatever reason, would view that party as not “Muslim” enough. This would engender isolation, quarrels, and maybe even violence. A far better solution would be to increase communication between existing parties and between politicians and citizens. Such an approach is Qur’anic in nature.

Whenever democracy is threatened by a politician or political ideology that pays no respect to internal democracy or promotes discrimination or racism, the best antidote is a good civic policy. Such a negative scenario is now developing in Belgium. Our local Muslim politicians should be the first ones to insist that a policy of justice and honesty be carried out by all democratic parties. This is far more efficient than legal action, ballot reforms or thresholds, alarmist attitudes, or pretending that the problem is not so bad. This does not exclude the possibility of lawsuits against politicians who try to win votes by racist appeals. In addition, exit polls on election day should be forbidden so that false information cannot lead to questionable results

Footnotes

1. Dag Hammarskjold (1905-61): Swedish economist, statesman, and secretary-general of the UN (1953-61) He is generally thought to have combined great moral force with subtlety in meeting international challenges; Tomaš Masaryk (1850-1937): Chief founder and first president (1918-35) of Czechoslovakia; Vaclav Havel (1936- ): Prominent Czech playwright, poet, and political dissident, who, after the fall of communism, was president of Czechoslovakia (1989-92) and president of the Czech Republic (1993- ).
2. Ms. Salima Ghezali: Algerian publisher of Al-Watan (The Nation) newspaper, courageous critic of both the Algerian military governnment and the anti-government armed Islamist groups, and recipient of the Sakharov Prize; Prof. Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid: Qur’anic scholar from Cairo whose interpretation of the Qur’an caused him to be prosecuted by Egyptian Islamists. Labelling him an apostate, they divorced him from his wife, Ibtihal Younes. The couple now lives in The Netherlands.
3. Imam: One who leads Muslims in prayer. Ayatolla: Sign of God, a religious title given to only the most exemplary Shi‘a theologians and religious scholars. Caliph: Successor (to the Prophet). As the Prophet’s spiritual/religious mantle is unique and therefore cannot be inherited, this title has come to mean a ruler. Amir: Leader, mainly in the political and moral sense.
4. The Crusades: A series of wars undertaken by European Christians between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries to recover the Holy Land from the Muslims.
5. Martin Luther (1483-1546): German priest and scholar whose questioning of certain Catholic practices led to the Protestant Reformation. He is a pivotal figure in both Western civilization and Christianity.

Bibliography

• Tariq Ramadan: To Be a European Muslim. The Islamic Foundation: 1999.
• John Esposito. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? 3d. ed. Oxford Univ. Press: 1999.
• Fatima Mernissi. Women and Islam: An Historical and Theological Enquiry. South Asia Books: 1998.
• Tomaš G. Masaryk: The Ideals of Humanity and How To Work. Ayer: 1970.

According to statistics, there were as many as 123,759 overseas students in publicly financed British higher education institutions in the academic year 1977/78 (BCSOS, 1977-78, pp.6-7). Following the introduction of full-cost fees, the number fell to 88,037 in 1979 and then to 56,121 in 1984 (OST, 1987, p.17).

Since the mid-1980s the number of overseas students has been rising gradually (see table below). According to the latest available detailed statistics, the total number of overseas students in publicly financed British higher education stood at 92,100 in 1991, an increase of 9 percent on the figure for 1990 (DFE, 1993, Tables 1 and 6). It must be noted that these figures do not cover private sector colleges, whose overseas students are almost as numerous as those in publicly-financed institutions. According to a 1985 study, the full-time equivalent number of overseas students was 86,500. The fact that the number of first-year higher education student numbers in 1991 rose by 16 per cent indicates that the growth in total numbers may have continued over the following years (DFE, 1993, Tables 2 and 3).

The majority of undergraduate students are privately financed, mainly by their parents. The post-graduate students are mostly financed by public bodies, such as overseas governments, as well as by international institutions, such as the British Council. The number of British government- funded overseas students and trainees in the UK was 17,400 in 1985. As well as regular higher education, a considerable number come to Britain for language courses, mainly private, and for other courses of which details are not available.

The status of English as the international language, combined with other comparative advantages of Britain (relatively to other student recruiting countries), such as its being technologically advanced and its extensive counselling programmes for overseas students, have helped it to draw sizeable numbers of talented post- graduates as well as undergraduates into its educational system. It seems that Britain is increasingly moving towards the idea of importing the ‘best and brightest brains’ as an energy source for its educational and other institutions (Chandler, 1989, p.7). This policy resulted in the doubling between 1980 and 1986 of the number of awards under the Overseas Research Students Awards Program (ORSAS). The holders of an ORSAS award, which covers the difference between home cost’ and ‘full-cost’ fees for a particular course of study, constitute approximately 20 percent of the post-graduate research students in British universities (Chandler, 1989, ph). The administration of foreign student policy in Britain, within the broad framework set up by the government, rests with the higher educational institutions and with the British Council as the ‘marketing arm’ of British higher education and culture abroad (Chandler, 1989, p.7).

Growing emphasis has been placed on the short-term economic benefits foreign students confer as ‘tourists’ bringing in foreign currency. British sources estimated the income earned from foreign students through the fees they pay and through their own and their families’ expenditures for food, clothing, accommodation etc., at more than 1 billion a year – one-sixth of total tourist expenditures (OST, 1987, p.78). The profit comes from the difference between the full-cost fees that foreign students pay and the marginal costs they represent. The figure is likely to rise as a result of the increase in fee levels and the increase in the expenditure.

In British educational institutions, overseas students have come to be viewed as an important source of income, and as ‘cheap postgraduate labour’ (Williams et al, 1987, p.9). Apart from the educational and foreign policy benefits that overseas students provide (see below), it is interesting to note that overseas students, particularly in technical and scientific fields, constitute a double financial benefit for the British institutions: firstly, because of the high level of fees they pay (around 8- 10,000), and secondly, by providing cheap post-graduate labour for research carried out by the universities. Otherwise, universities would have to employ or recruit from abroad research assistants, at salaries of around 15-20,000 annually. It is increasingly spelt out that a university or a polytechnic is the poorer if it does not have at least 5 percent of its students from overseas (OST, 1987, p.5).

The Further and Higher Education Act of 1992 allowed polytechnics and colleges to attain university status on the condition that their educational provision met specified standards. Following this, some 40 polytechnics and colleges have been granted university status recently (DPE, 1993, point 34). In addition to other educational considerations, it is likely that one of the underlying reasons for Parliament’s allowing this to happen is to attract more overseas students to institutions which they had once regarded as inferior to universities.

In addition to direct benefits, the eventual cost-benefits of overseas students in trade and diplomatic relations have become increasingly important. This was frankly stated by Sir Anthony Parsons as follows: ‘If you are thoroughly familiar with someone else’s language and literature, if you know and love the country, the arts, the people, you will be instinctively disposed to buy goods from them rather than from a less well-known source, to support them actively when you consider them to be right, and to avoid criticizing them too fiercely when you regard them as wrong’ (Parsons, 1984). With the realization that Britain is no longer a major economic and military power, emphasis has been put on a reassessment of national assets and a greater awareness of the influence which British cultural patrimony can exercise (Malcolm, 1987, p.38). The policy debate, both nationally and in educational institutions, has focused primarily on the financial as well as on the educational benefits of the presence of overseas students.

Among the educational benefits which overseas students bring are (OST, 1990):

a) contributing to cultural enrichment;

b) testing general intellectual assumptions;

c) contributing knowledge and experience to specific courses;

d) improving pedagogical provision and contributing to staff development;

e) raising academic standards among home students;

f) helping to maintain course viability;

g) helping to maintain research capability.

In particular, there are courses in many institutions which would not be viable due to low demand from home students. Sometimes whole departments depend on overseas students for this reason. Thus, overseas students can allow an institution to offer a range of courses, a variety of academic provision, to the benefit of home students whose choice might otherwise be limited. The proportion of post-graduate overseas students in publicly-funded higher education institutions in Britain was 33 percent in 1981 and 36 percent in both 1990 and 1991 (DFB, 1993, Table 1).

Secondly, the strength of British universities in research often determines the success of their links with commerce and industry, which in turn largely depends on their international reputation in the field. The severe shortage of British research postgraduates poses a threat to many research projects, particularly in laboratory subjects. Consequently, overseas research students, who are usually of very high quality, are a valued asset, as they often maintain an institution’s research capability, its academic reputation and financial security.

The level of human resources will undoubtedly become an issue of increasing importance for the UK as well as other student recruiting countries, as highly trained scientific and technical personnel continue to affect worldwide economic and scientific growth. Human resource needs will have to be met across national boundaries. Developed countries, also, require increasing numbers of highly trained and specialized researchers and technologists, who can originate new products and services.

In the discussion of overseas students policy, various idealistic and pragmatic arguments have been put forward. These arguments for the import of foreign students are closely interconnected in a way that reflects the reality. Phrases like ‘cultural diversity’, ‘internationalism’, ‘cultural diplomacy’, technology transfer’, ‘cultural transfer’, ‘money-making’, etc., are some of the symbolic explanations of that reality. One observer has commented: ‘The relations between North and South are not primarily those of obligation or charity, but of mutuality of interest and of interdependence. Britain has her own interest in ensuring that development takes place in a peaceful and orderly manner. As a nation living by trade and the selling of services, and as the holder of considerable investment overseas, Britain… has a stake in political stability abroad and the fostering of international understanding’ (Williams, 1982, p.16).

The mutuality of need, rather than any other single factor, and rather than concepts of either obligation or opportunity, determines the continued importance of foreign students and of constructive and realistic foreign student policies (Chandler, 1989, pp. ix-x).

This ‘mutuality’ is a fairly one-sided benefit fully exploited by the receiving countries. Despite the fact that each individual student, more or less, pursues his or her aim and achieves the qualifications necessary, this success is, nevertheless, bound to remain on a micro level. The governments of the sending countries, in general, lack policies to channel and co-ordinate these endeavours into a single, sound, overall mechanism at a macro level in their own countries. The sending countries must, therefore, formulate appropriate policies and implement them. How that’s to be done is a separate question beyond the scope of the present discussion.

Terrorists aim to get a lot of people to pay attention to their cause; they don’t necessarily want a lot of people dead. Since they have neither large armies nor economic power, the terrorists’ political hopes lie in the success or failure of their propaganda (Livingstone, 1988, p.120). However, to get attention terrorists must terrorize, must escalate violence in order to capture or recapture headlines (Jenkins, 1985).

The state’s response to terrorism can be categorised as ‘legitimate’ ‘suppressive’ or ‘concessionary’. ‘Legitimate’ measures include the whole range of legal procedures and punishments, special but ‘irregular’ counter-terrorist forces assisted by special courts, special rights of surveillance and arrest, very specific media restrictions, visa controls, etc. ‘Suppressive’ measures can include punitive military strikes against the terrorists (if they can be located) or military or economic or diplomatic sanctions against foreign powers alleged to be supporting the terrorists, intensive propaganda campaigns, extensive media restrictions, etc. ‘Concession’, obviously, involves negotiating some sort of deal with the terrorists.

The state’s counter-terrorist strategy has four major aspects: deterrence; intelligence (early warning); defence; retaliation. Deterrence works on the assumption that the terrorists can be persuaded that the costs of their policy exceed the benefits. Typically, however, terrorists do not have identifiable assets against which the state can take or threaten action. Deterrent action is therefore usually directed against foreign powers allegedly involved in assisting or supporting the terrorists. Apart from the diplomatic and legal complications which may result from such deterrence, the state must also calculate how far action against the foreign power really would affect the terrorists themselves.

lntelligence aims primarily at early warning of what are by their very nature surprise military attacks. ‘Humint’ or covert human intelligence depends on infiltrating terrorist cells, a more hazardous and difficult task than against other types of enemy organizations. Also, information collected about terrorist activity is usually limited in quantity and quality.

Active defence, pre-emptive arrests or military strikes, depends on identification and early warning. Passive defence consists mostly of so-called ‘target hardening’, that is, making potential targets harder to reach and harder to damage. The financial costs of protecting embassies, airports, individual official or private buildings, are very high. Also, protective measures can seriously interfere with the operations of such institutions. Finally, target hardening can encourage terrorists to move to ‘softer’ targets, terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, at any time, whereas the state cannot secure everything, everywhere all the time. The terrorists, in short, retain an edge over state security forces and security measures (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1989, pp.417-18).

The political cost of retaliation against foreign powers allegedly supporting terrorists can be very high unless there is strong proof of such support (Ofri, 1984). Also, as above noted, retaliatory action of this kind may not always impinge upon the terrorists themselves and may, conceivably, exaggerate the importance of their cause and enhance support for it. It is worth noting, in this context, that the international law surrounding counter-terrorist action is problematic. First of all, it is vague. Secondly, three principles of international law have often worked in favour of terrorist groups and their supporters: the right of self- determination, the right of asylum, and the rule of non-interference in the affairs of other states.

The role of the mass media is a crucial one. The terrorists need publicity since their goal is to win support for their cause. The media generally see their role as checking or criticizing the state: in theory, not being on the side of the state can mean being on the terrorists’ side. State imposed media blackouts certainly do not work. Experts on terrorism have pointed out that this policy only forces terrorists to escalate violence until they do get the media attention. The state, therefore, aims to get the media on its side–to encourage media to focus on the horrors of terrorist acts, and to deny exposure to the terrorists’ cause. Extensive anti-terrorist media-coverage can be of great benefit to the state in providing the background which allows it to plan and carry out retaliatory or other measures, in particular to obtain special legal powers which the public might otherwise resist (Clawson, 1987).

‘The state sponsorship of terrorism’ is an accusation that has been exchanged between various states. For example, the US has accused the former Soviet Union, Cuba, Libya, Iran, North Korea and Syria among others, of the practice and has itself been accused of sponsoring terrorist activities in Vietnam, Chile, and Nicaragua, and, as an ally of Israel in many other places (Kegley and Witkopf, 1989, pp.418-19). The historical fact is that ‘terrorists’, according to the definition of one ideological or political purpose are, according to another, ‘freedom fighters’. There is no coherent or generally accepted set of criteria by which the terrorists can be defined as such. However, acts of terrorism can be identified, and it is generally accepted that such acts should be prevented and/or punished. The difficulty lies in how to do so.

The terrorists are hoping to provoke an over-reaction from the state so that it will appear repressive. But if the state is to counter terrorism effectively it may have to take strong and unpopular action, given that a weak response will give an impression of weak government. One way out of this dilemma is for the sate always to act through the normal processes of the courts and not be panicked into any hasty suspension of civil liberties.

One approach is vigorous police action against terrorists, short of a full military commitment but not altogether excluding military involvement–for example, commando-style raids to seize hijackers, relieve hostages, etc. Overt and full-scale military action against terrorists is more controversial–for very good reasons. The record of what might be termed cross-border, military, punitive responses to terrorist actions is not particularly encouraging. For one thing, the motives and consequences of such actions are liable to misinterpretation. Incursions into a foreign country by the forces of one power may provoke another power which has interests or ambitions in that country. Also, such incursions, however honourably motivated, may legitimize similar incursions by others which claim, falsely, the same motive of combatting or punishing terrorism. For example, only five weeks after the US raid on Libya of 14-15th April 1986, South African forces attacked a series of targets in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Botswana, arguing that they were terrorist centres. Then, there is the difficulty of choosing the targets of such military-punitive raids. It is not at all easy to select suitable targets since relatively few potential targets are indisputably associated with terrorism (Freedman, 1986. pp.l9-22).

Although there is considerable evidence that military retaliation does deter terrorism to some degree, military force is certainly not the answer to every terrorist challenge. Both politically and militarily, the army is a crude instrument. It, at least partly, legitimizes terrorist demands to be treated as political or military prisoners rather than as criminals. Army involvement heightens public tension and creates a feeling that the situation is getting out of hand. What can a state then do to combat terrorism?

One is never sure, where, when, how terrorists will attack. The state should use special intelligence and anti-terrorist units rather than the army. Such units must operate, and be seen to operate, within the law and under the control of legitimate authorities of the state. If not, these units may themselves be labelled terrorist and lose public support for the state’s policy. Given that such units must be ‘undereover’, public supervision of their work is bound to be a difficult and delicate task.

A ‘no concession to terrorists’ attitude, although painful in hostage situations, has been proven to be effective. Following the experience of Irish security forces in 1975, a policy of ‘no deals’ and ‘no assaults’ in a hostage situation was found to work. The tactic used is to wear down the resistance and the morale of the terrorists. Negotiating with or giving in to terrorist demands is generally perceived by the public as weak government and leads to anxiety about what the next concession is going to be (Wilkinson, l988, p.l3l).

Domestic or internal acts of terrorism can usually be traced to minority groups who perceive themselves to be excluded from the political or economic rights and privileges enjoyed by the majority. It is self-evident that the legitimacy of the power and authority of the state will be challenged by grieved parties if their grievances cannot be redressed through the normal political channels. Similarly, international terrorism can flourish where the international system fails to satisfy the aspirations of people whose national or ethnic or religious-cultural rights (or hopes) are denied and, often, denied brutally. Terrorism is, insofar as one can generalize, the weapon of the desperately weak: the despair and the weakness need to be addressed if the causes of the problem, as well as its symptoms, are to be eradicated. The sad reality is that, despite the existence of international law, that law is relatively ineffective in controlling the ‘competition for power’ between powerful states. Sometimes overtly, sometimes covertly, terrorism is used as an instrument of foreign policy. To the extent that a foreign policy may be shared by a number of states, these states may agree to poll information and resources in the fight against terrorism (Borg, 1988, pp.11-12). But international co-operation achieved in this way is limited to the states who support or share foreign policy objectives–once the objectives are not shared, the co-operation becomes a pretence, terrorism again finds an ideological space to inhabit and a cause for which to seek attention and support. 

References 

• Borg, P. W. (1988) ‘The evolution of US. anti-Terrorism policy’ in Livingstone and Arnold (1988).
• Clawson, P. (1987) ‘We need more but better coverage of terrorism’, Orbis.
• Freedman, L.(1986) Terrorism and International Order, Routledge, New York.
• Jenkins, M. (1985) ‘Will terrorists go nuclear?’, Orbis.
• Kegley, C. W. And E.R. Wittkopf (1989) World Politics, St Martin’s Press, New York.
• Livingstone. C. Z. (1988) ‘New media strategies for addressing terrorism’ in Livingstone and Arnold (1988).
• Livingstone, C. Z. and E.T. Arnold. (1988) (eds) Beyond the Iran-Contra Crisis, Lexington Books.
• Ofri, A. (1984) ‘Intelligence and counter-terrorism’. Orbis.
• Wilkinson, P.(1986). Terrorism and the Liberal State, Macmillan, London.