Author’s note: Many of the books and authors mentioned here are well-known. There are dozens more from writers of various nationalities, and only a lack of space precludes complete inclusion. It is my hope, however, that any bookish reader with an interest in Orientalism may find something to enhance their interest with some works still to be discovered. The prevalence of British authors here does not indicate prejudice, but does reflect the books that are actually on my shelves.

There has been much debate about the authenticity, or otherwise, of Orientalism and its influence on socio-political thought. The books and authors figuring in this essay had, with the exception of Kipling, Lawrence and Gertrude Bell, no political axe to grind. Most of them were travelers who found the East, indeed, “other” than what they experienced at home. Their quest was a personal enthusiasm for the Orient. I would contend that their writings and translations had no relevance to a debate about socio-political attitudes based on worldly devices. The world of the spirit is likely to be more enduring and, as for this world, socio-evolutionary investigation would be more apt.   

The British may currently be retreating to their island home, but in earlier times they were inclined to leave their homes at the drop of a hat. Those with the wherewithal journeyed away to sometimes sunnier and definitely more exotic regions. One of the noticeably inherent vanities of the British, however, was founded upon the notion that they were never actually foreigners in whatever region they found themselves beyond their own coastline.

Sir Richard F. Burton must have had a horror of doing a proper job because he went to extraordinary lengths to avoid a nine-to-five existence. Even when being extremely erudite, he was also eloquently funny in a sardonic sort of way and his dealings with the Oriental mind were tempered by a perfect understanding of the conditio humana, which means the state we are all perpetually in. For his two-volume Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah, Sir Richard elected to travel by choosing a travel box to contain his necessities that was sturdy enough to withstand falling off a camel’s back twice each day. With a command of Farsi, Hindi, and Arabic, together with the dialects thereof, which he learned among tons of other languages and picked them up the way lesser mortals collect butterflies, he disguised himself as a wandering Dervish. He explored bazaars, frankly searching out the bizarre (which must surely be a derivative), and drinking countless cups of chai in his attempt to find rare manuscripts about Al-Islam.

The point of Sir Richard’s drop-out endeavor is that he certainly spent more hours daily than he would be required to submit to in a mundane job. There must have been the endless waits, the errant camel or donkey that refused to be moved, the aggravation of monetary negotiation. In 1856, Burton made clear his reasons for exotic travel. Notwithstanding his erudition, he was heard to maintain: “The gladdest moments in human life, methinks, is the departure upon a distant shore into unknown lands. Shaking off with one mighty effort the fetters of Habit, the leaden weight of Routine, the cloak of many Cares and the slavery of Home, man feels once more happy. The blood flows with the fast circulation of childhood…the glorious face of nature gladdens the soul”.

Many Orientalists went, quite obviously, in search of something ethereal, the atmospheric interludes in life that may offer a hint of the divine. If any reader has heard the hypnotic call to prayer from a muezzin, floating at dawn over palms at the edge of a jungle, they will know what I mean. The point is that although there may be a sudden crashing rise of birds, the voice itself does not shatter the silence. It really does float hauntingly as an isolated sound. The call to prayer heard in a city is often more strident but no less enchanting. One is struck by something stealthily all-encompassing, something impossible to ignore. Something that lingers in a suddenly pervasive brittle silence.

It was the likes of Wilfred Thesiger, whose Arabian Sands and The Marsh Arabs became must reads for devotees of the Arab experience. His memoir The Life of My Choice would seem to echo the sentiments of Burton. The intrepid Freya Stark gave us, among many other works, The Southern Gates of Arabia and Valleys of the Assassins. Her book Ionia is about the history of Asia Minor, Turkey today. She was heard to maintain, “I do like people who have not yet made up their minds about everything, who in fact are still receiving.” These resolute travelers fashioned the romantic notion of eccentric Brits plodding resolutely across an impossible desert on an understandably belligerent camel. Despite the political implications – which your correspondent suspects were sometimes a handy excuse – Gertrude Bell, who also translated Hafiz, and, of course, T. E. Lawrence, both seemed to be seeking the sort of satisfaction that only the delights of foreignness could offer.

Looming as one of those literary mountains that remains to overshadow all others is Charles William Doughty’s Arabia Deserta. Setting off from Damascus in 1876, the author endured the deserts of what were regions previously unexplored by travelers from the West. He found a way to become attached to the Hajj of his day and his account was couched in a somewhat archaic English. Initial publication was denied due to his inaccessible language but – and this is a personal view – if the first step in meditation is concentration then Arabia Deserta deserves to be approached with the sort of perseverance that can flower into the magic of immersion that great literature can offer. In this case one will feel the sand in one’s shoes and savor the odor of a camel train in all of its pungency. T. E. Lawrence defended and fostered further publication of Doughty’s recordings and also wrote a forward to an edition of the book. Charles Doughty, who was born in 1843, wrote his monumental work in 1888. Arabia Deserta eventually came to be known among discerning readers as being the finest travel book in the English language.

E. Lawrence’s The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, which became his magnum opus, was published in 1926. Lawrence was at first an archeologist who became enchanted with the Arab mind while passing through the Holy Land on foot. He felt a great affinity for the peoples he met in his travels, which can be sensed pervasively in his great work. The Seven Pillars of Wisdom tells of the political side to his nature but also relates of his unswerving affection for his Arab friends and his appreciation of Islam. By all accounts Lawrence was a man of some complexity. One senses a somewhat philosophical passion in his thinking. He adhered to what he would have likely maintained was “the rightness” of things – although capable of indulging in war. Well, many will have read the book, many more will have seen the movie. Whatever the outcome, we will be aware that this was Lawrence’s Arabia, a place in which he probably felt most at home.

We come, quite unavoidably, to Arthur John Arberry, a British orientalist who was born on May 12, 1905. His work was rooted in a profoundly scholarly endeavor and he cannot be counted among those who were simply fascinated by the exotic East as a travel destination. In his slim volume of biographies, British Orientalists, Arberry relates of the sustained passion for the Islamic world pursued by British academics, translators, travelers, and linguists of all stripes. This passion was inflamed at an early date and we read of a 12^th century philosopher, one Adelard of Bath, who preceded, according to Arberry, nigh on 100 others sharing similar enthusiasms. There were even more, of course, but Arberry names only the most prominent who made a solid contribution to Islamic studies. With more than 70 works to his own name, which includes his own translation of the Qur’an in which he attempted to retain the poetics of the Arabic original, Arberry was probably the most seriously academic of all Orientalists. One of Arberry’s most useful books is The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam – and other Persian Poets. Together with the Rubaiyat, in Fitzgerald’s first edition of 1859, and the fourth edition of 1879, the book offers samples of the works of twenty-five Persian poets – including Rumi, Saadi, Hafiz, and all of the others your correspondent has still to fully discover. Arberry’s The Islamic Art of Persia, is a wonderfully edited volume containing the writings of many Orientalists, which includes an essay by Vita Sackville-West who writes charmingly about Persia gardens.

R. A. Nicholson was a colleague of Arberry but his works are largely unknown to myself. In his Mystics of Islam Nicholson brings to light an expert appraisal of Sufism. Without demeaning his subject, the book is fashioned in a concise and easily understood way. A fascinating passage begins, “…seventy thousand veils separate Allah, the One Reality, from the world of matter and sense. And every soul passes before birth through these seventy thousand.” At the time of submission I can only offer Nicholson’s translation, from a different source, of a succinct burst of beauty by Hafiz of Shiraz, a poet Goethe proclaimed to be unsurpassed:

STRIFE

The calm circumference of life
When I would fain have kept,
Time caught me in the tide of strife
And to the centre swept.

Of this fierce glow which Love and You
Within my breast inspire,
The Sun is but a spark that flew
And set the heavens afire!

Edward William Lane’s Arabic-English Lexicon, a 3,064-page work from the 19th century, would appear to be something that could be a starting point for budding   Arabists. Lane is also credited with an acclaimed translation of A Thousand and One Nights. His most accessible work, however, and one often quoted by Burton, is his Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians, which was first published in 1836 and was to have several editions. The work is an astounding coverage of life in Muslim Egypt. Despite the obvious conclusion that what was modern in the 1800s is no longer pertinent today, Lane’s book covers what is indeed the very life of Egypt. His essays, chapter for chapter, are on characteristics and dress, infancy and early education, religion and laws, language and literature, ad infinitum. Lane addresses just about every conceivable aspect in his subjective social research. The work is further enhanced by the author’s own magnificently detailed engravings.

Rudyard Kipling’s works can be difficult to find in India today. His was an imperialist stance and he was a stout defender of the British army. Nevertheless, he came to write the famous… OH, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet, Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God’s great Judgment Seat;

But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth,
When two strong men stand face to face, tho’ they come from the ends of the earth!

The last line mitigates much that Kipling was accused of. Whether or not the British had good cause to be India will be debated until doomsday, and when Kipling published his poem, The White Man’s Burden, in 1899, he was accused of promoting the cause of imperialism. But Kipling did spread before us the magnificent panoply of the Indian subcontinent, and he was also recorded to have said, “Asia is not going to be civilized after the methods of the West. There is too much Asia and she is too old.” The Kipling Society in London maintains that he believed in British rule over India, but he did not hesitate to criticize the government savagely. It may be well to consider that Kipling was a man of his time and place. He was born in Bombay in 1865 of Anglo-Indian parents and he obviously knew and understood, and was largely sympathetic, to the colorful life around him. Only such experience could have made possible the publication of Kim, in 1901. Kipling produced an astonishingly varied wealth of works. He was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1907.

It has long been my personal love of good writing, despite having no special interest in the subjects at hand, which led me to R. H. Blyth’s inestimable Zen in English Literature and Oriental Classics, which was first published by the Hokuseido Press in Tokyo in 1942. Here is a survey to the finest detail of literature displaying the quality of the words transcending the confines of conventional literary usage. In this sense Blyth did not merely travel to the East but also sought echoes of the East in works of the West. Zen may be described variously as a fragrance, hint, nudge, or breeze that cannot be clutched though its effect can be observed, but with no sly wink seeking collusion, for therein is to be found the headache we call “mind.” Blyth’s works also include his investigations into Haiku poetry and Japanese culture. The writer’s approach to that indefinable essence of life that makes life itself agreeable, perhaps even acceptable, in its endless display of what could be called, to borrow and amend a phrase, the good, the bad, and the sometimes lovely.

Francis Edward Younghusband’s The Heart of a Continent is a book in which the author elaborates on the difficulties of travel in regions comprising almost inaccessible terrain. He took himself off from India to China, the hard way, and then found an even more difficult way to come back via the Gobi Desert, Turkestan, the Himalayas, with a great deal in between, then the Pamirs, Kashgar and eventually back home (but hardly in time for tea). Younghusband was indeed a nice man, a stalwart Christian but one who allowed much scope in his thinking for other religions. Younghusband apparently suffered greatly from mosquitoes on the way out. I would suggest that there could be an interesting discourse about why God created mosquitoes. I was put straight by a restaurant waiter in Kerala who maintained that, “God chose the mosquito to be India’s heraldic beast.”

The Canadian Colin McPhee is possibly less known, but should be wider read. His A House in Bali was first published in 1944. It is a transcendent book, one that makes reading a deeply satisfying experience. The author was a highly talented composer and ethnomusicologist who studied with Edgar Varèse and became a jazz critic of note. There were collaborations with Benjamin Britten to make their recording of Balinese Ceremonial Music for Two Pianos. He was also a friend of Margaret Meade’s family and figures often in Meade’s memoir of her life and work. It is McPhee’s obvious sensitivity that charms the reader. These were the days before Bali became a tourist destination, and the author captures the lingering, slow-motion lapse of time, and the throb of the gamelan gongs which reverberate with an insistency across the hills of that lush island that he knew so well and so lovingly described.

H. V. Morton was a British writer of note. In 1934 he published In the Steps of the Master which ran to four editions. Although the book related his efforts to trace the passages of Jesus through the Holy Land, Morton was a man of fine sensibility and he records much of the life in Palestine with inclusion of his encounters with the Arab fellahin, the common folk within the population. What was Morton’s greatest talent, which he showed in all of his works, was his equal degree of quality of content and refinement of literary style. The author opens with the following passage as he approaches the Holy Land from Egypt. “As the sun goes down, a stillness falls over Egypt. Water channels that cross the fields turn to the color of blood, then to bright yellow that fades into silver. The palm trees could be cut from black paper and pasted against the incandescence of the sky. Brown hawks that hang all day above the sugar-cane and the growing wheat are seen no more and, one by one, the stars burn over the sandhills and lie caught in the stiff fronds of the date palms”. The book also contains nearly forty of the author’s own fine photographs, mostly black and white, but beautiful and exemplary images of the Holy Land.

Hizmet Movement (aka Gülen Movement) has always been given different names, which rely on and point to divergent underlying ontologies and understandings. Cemaat (Community), Hizmet (Service), Gonulluler Hareketi, (A movement of volunteers), and Gülenciler (Gülenists) are just a selection of terms often used to refer to the movement. Nowadays, people have come to view the movement in diametrically opposing ways, due to the recent political history of Turkey. On one hand, some praise it for its virtues, claiming that it is a movement promoting and prioritizing democratic values and standards and standing against a corrupt government, at a very high cost. On the other hand, those who criticize it accuse the movement of interfering in politics and even plotting coups against democratically elected governments, and they try to label it as a cult – especially when they cannot prove their accusations. Therefore, a great discrepancy is very likely to emerge between how a sympathizer of the movement sees and defines it and how an outsider sees and defines it, as current developments in Turkey have pushed the public to the edges and have led to increased polarization. Thus, in order to see whether the Hizmet Movement is a cult or not, one has to remove himself or herself from political polemics and try to be critical and strike a balance between how the movement perceives itself and how it is perceived by the outside world. In order to do so, let us first consider how “cult” is defined in the literature and then see whether these definitions match with the Hizmet Movement.

Even though the meaning of cult has changed, the term acquiring differing meanings over time, it is generally and publicly used in a derogatory way to refer to movements that are regarded as socially deviant due to their unorthodox beliefs and practices. During the 1930s, anti-cult movements usually viewed cults as a disparate form of heresy. Similarly, Christian scholar Walter Martin defined a cult as a movement that applies, and relies solely on, personal interpretations of the Bible, in denial of mainstream beliefs such as the Trinity, the Second Coming of Christ, the ministry and personality of Jesus, and the like. Accordingly, new religious movements that were not a part of, or splintered from, pre-existing sects—these include movements such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christian Scientists—have been considered cults. From a sociological point of view, Max Weber ascribed the emergence of a cult to the routinization of the charisma of a self-proclaimed religious leader. A great variety of cults exist today—doomsday cults, political cults, destructive cults, racist cults, polygamist cults, and terrorist cults. Cults have also long been accused of applying unorthodox measures, such as mind control and abusive sex, to govern their members and of having secretive organizational structures to accomplish their objectives.

Any attempt to draw a distinction between a cult and a mainstream religious movement is an utterly value-laden endeavor, as it requires one to assume a position of authority and judge what is an orthodox or unorthodox practice or interpretation of a religion. Also, it is analytically impossible to determine how much deviation or what sorts of differences render a movement deviant and get it labeled as a cult, because even sects of the very same religion sometimes are predicated upon utterly distinct theological positions. For example, consider the God conceptualizations of two Christian traditions, Unitarians and Catholics. Whereas the former believe in the physical and spiritual unity of God and reject the idea of the incarnation of God in human form, the latter hold to the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, which states that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are divine manifestations of God. Or, in a similar vein, consider the example of the Alawites and Sunni Muslims; some groups of the former consider Ali, the cousin of Muhammad, to be the incarnation of God, while the latter view him only as the third rightly guided Caliph and as totally human in nature.

Despite this opaque and slippery conceptual ground, we can still systematically consider whether the Hizmet Movement is a cult and possesses any of the general characteristics and features attributed to cults. Let me rise above the dichotomies by considering the criteria for a cult, embodied in the definitions given below, in relation to the Hizmet Movement—namely, deviancy (unorthodox religious rituals), unorthodox means of control (mind control, abusive sex), and the presence of a charismatic leader—to determine whether it is a cult or not.

We’ll begin with deviancy. Even though the movement has often laid great emphasis on the spiritual resurrection of Muslims and humanity, it has not attempted to reject or change the pillars of Islamic faith and the essentials of the religion. It has not proposed theologically novel conceptions of divinity or prophecy. Quite the opposite—the movement intellectually and theologically associates itself with the earlier mainstream of Muslim scholars, thinkers, and movements and derives its legitimacy from its embeddedness in classical Islam. The criticisms leveled at the movement have mostly involved matters relating to the interpretation of religious texts. Accordingly, the movement has been criticized for its strong promotion of intimate relations with the members of other Abrahamic religions, for its willingness to engage in open dialogue, and for its support of democratization, which is often labeled as pro-Westernism by other religious movements in Turkey. Hence, the movement’s existing practices and theological dispositions do not suffice to qualify it as a cult, as they do not exhibit patterns of divergence and differentiation from mainstream Islamic rituals and practices.

Second, with respect to the employment of unorthodox means to achieve desired political objectives—even though the movement has been accused of interfering in politics and having a secret agenda, no proof has been presented thus far indicating the use of unorthodox means to control its members or accomplish its secret agenda. Even the recent purge in Turkey, which resulted in the removal of hundreds of thousands of people from their positions and the imprisonment of a large percentage of them, has not led to the disclosure of evidence verifying the use of unorthodox methods by the movement.

Finally, in regard to charismatic leadership, it is an actuality that Gülen’s charismatic and strong leadership has been very appealing to the masses. However, his leadership has not been grounded in any divine status claims, such as those of a prophetic or messianic character. His charisma has rather been derived from his expertise and erudition in respect to the religious sciences and his intuitive leadership skills. His leadership and charisma cannot be said to be premised upon any sort of divine claim, as has been the case with most cults. Ahmadiyya and Bahaism can be seen as cult-like Islamic movements; their leaders have made actual divine claims. For example, the leader of the former openly claimed messiahship and introduced unorthodox beliefs and organizational structures in the nineteenth century, and the leader of the latter identified himself as the last Prophet, which openly contradicted the mainstream belief of Muslims that the Prophet Muhammad was the last Prophet and Messenger of God. Gülen is neither seen as a supernatural human being by his followers nor does he claim prophecy or messiahship. His charisma is derived more from his spiritual personality deriving from the fact that he has acquired an immense amount of knowledge in the religious sciences and has combined that knowledge with successful practice.

By offering insight in relation to three aspects of cults, this article offers a framework within which the Hizmet Movement cannot be treated as a cult or cult-like organization. Unless there is concrete evidence and universal acceptance of deviant behavior, unorthodox means of control, and leader’s use of charisma to assert any supernatural or divine powers, no social movement can be categorized as a cult movement.

What makes this event unique compared to other attempts at bringing people together to celebrate our heritages, our cultures, and our languages? For me it is the spirit of the philosophical rationale underpinning the organizers of the event: the Horizon Educational Trust, the Gauteng Provincial Department of Arts, Culture and Recreation of South Africa, the South African-Turkish Business Association, and the Turquoise Harmony Institute. What do they share in common that helps them to run a festival of diversity?

First, the festival is deeply focused on the “the diamonds” of the show: namely, the youth, who are students from a range of Turkish schools across the globe who came to showcase their experiences of dialogue, sharing the riches of their own cultures while embracing the opportunities for self-growth, discovery, and development as they learned to speak a common language of respect and value. Yes, there were the perfunctory speeches from dignitaries and sponsors. Yes, the organizers emphasized the role of Turkey offering not just bilateral South Africa-Turkey relations, but also access into the worlds where Turkish conceptions were sowing seeds across the international community. Yes, there was a nod to providing awards to the Mandela family in recognition of his contribution to world peace. But these speeches did not dominate the program; it was clear that the unexpressed agenda of the organizers was directed not towards scoring political points or grandstanding. The event was an opportunity to learn from others through appreciating difference and viewing “others” not as potential threats, a waging of supremacist ideological battles, or the harmful promotion of political factions. We, as the audience, were spectators of a new world in gestation.

The simplicity and genuineness of the hosts came through on multiple levels, but especially in how they promoted the view that cultural dialogues are easily communicated beyond linguistic specifics. The universal languages of arts, music, and dance speak volumes. The festival program directors marked each individual presentation with an evocative introduction translating the songs they rendered and offering connection with the message of the colors of a rainbow world, enriched by our diversity. Whist they hinted at the countries of origin of the performers, they were careful not to set any one up as “exotic others” against some normative hegemony, or in a competitive ascendancy. Each performance was afforded a dignity in its own right and the young stars rose spectacularly to the occasion with confidence and committed expertise. They exuded that this was a festival, not a competition; a celebration of dialogue of selves, not egoistic performances.

Notably, the program was also consciously planned to bring different performers onto the same stage in simultaneous coupled or multiple-group renditions, showing that it is not uniqueness alone that is to be valued, but one’s ability to stand alongside, and in concert with, other perspectives and points of view. We saw Romanian and Georgian songstresses hold back-to-back performances with South African backing vocals. We were mesmerized by a heartfelt Whitney Houston song, “I Am Nothing Without You” performed by an Australian teenager wearing traditional Islamic dress. We witnessed the choral singing of Turkish and South African songs by enthusiastic students on a full stage. A duo of a lanky African American and a suave South African Durbanite executed a spirited “Stand By Me” performance. An elegant impersonation of Adele’s “Someone Like You” by a Catholic girl from the Philippines sent shivers down one spine and brought tears to most eyes:

I wish nothing but the best for you…

The penetrating, almost operative gusto of “Je t’aime” by a pint-sized French lass celebrated the wonderful potential young people possess. Mozambican sisters, and Netherlander siblings, and Madagascar soloist performers continued to show the spirit of the festival by singing in Portuguese, Dutch, and Turkish. Audience members fervently waved randomly distributed miniature flags from all participating countries. Each member of the audience was randomly assigned arbitrary custodianship of these nationalistic symbols. The “We are the World” popular mantra brought all solo performers alongside the whole starry cast in a memorable display of togetherness. A South African dance group exhibited their pot pourri of traditional Turkish folkdances. Local variations of kwaito music and gumboot dancers culminated in a costumed celebration of all performers: North, South, East, and West in a rousing reinterpretation of the Southern anthem, Shoholoza. A tribute from the whole student group to both Mahatma Gandhi (in Gurathi) and Nelson Mandela (in isiXhosa) demonstrated the lessons of these international icons of harmony and commitment to social justice, through quiet, yet powerful engagement and dialogue. The celebratory pictures of their historical lives, presented in a back-to-back sequence, were a tribute by themselves. What a collage of possibilities peppered with the spice of smiles!

The music genres spanned both traditional and modern forms. It was quite evident that the star performers (ranging in age from early to late teens) were selected as exemplars of exceptional artistry. Each performance was reinforced by graphic slides depicting scenes from the performers’ home countries. Natural fauna and flora, cultural and architectural monuments, and significant people or groups formed the worldwide educational tour via the panoramic backdrop visuals. Some graphics told visual stories of evolving forms and features of the worldwide community. The program saw the presentation of singers performing their own and other cultural languages. They adapted costume styles from different settings outside their home countries. The kaleidoscope that emerged was a festival of variety: where people of different groups exchanged dress styles, languages, and dance choreographs to communicate the possibility for the dialogical space that a new cultural movement can embrace.

South Africans are perhaps skeptical of this kind of multicultural celebration due to apartheid. In such a form of cultural celebration, different cultures are placed alongside each other as enclaved entities, highlighting the “boundaries” of one’s beliefs, a celebration of otherness. Such divergence produced a “multi-cultural” endeavor that promoted a political hierarchy of perspectives which took on racialized proportions with disastrous effects.

In present times however, many proponents of the “new era” of cultural affirmation in post-apartheid South Africa see cultural celebration as an attempt to assert a new regime of hierarchies with one cultural form replacing the previously powerful forms. This is also more often associated with the representations of political power which silence those who differ from the majority perspective, the new master narrative, or dominant worldview. How different is this from multi-cultural apartheid?

By contrast, the Turkish school movement inspired by the international Hizmet philosophy of “service to humanity” is characterized by a worldview that celebrates the interdependent common ground across all cultural expressions. Their outward manifestations may differ, but cultural representations highlight the similitude of our humanity, and our quest for dialogue, love, and tolerance. This is embodied by the writings and teachings of a key founder of the Hizmet Movement: Fethullah Gülen. In this version of “inter-culturalism,” the attempt is to develop individuals who are conscious of their own self and their heritage, but not in service of a protectionist or preservationist agenda. From this firm position of self-strength, one is able to reach out to the world of others. We see in others, too, our agenda for our common quests. Our reaching out is a service to realizing peace and harmony – which is a goal sorely needed in a war-torn, politicized and ideologized world, which often uses religious beliefs as rallying points for promoting hostility, supremacy, and divergence. Sometimes these separatist agendas are disguised econometric plots, too! Cultural affirmation is not a hearkening to a fossilized past, but a recognition that our habits and routines can mutate and extend through dialogue and exchange; our borders can be more inviting and more welcoming.

A third kind of cultural engagement is “juxta-culturalism” which merely tolerates different groups walking alongside each other, never interconnecting. This is sadly the lived experiences of many who pursue only a narcissist nationalistic myopic agenda, seeing only the boundaries of geography and politics as the border of their selfhood. This produces expressions of xenophobia which does not recognize the inherent commonality of all human beings. We are all created equal in the eyes of God. Our nationalist identity is only a man-made demarcation, dividing one set of people from another. It is more commonplace that many individuals in our modern global society, live outside the borders within which their forefathers were born. We may draw our cultural roots from one geographic space, but live in another context altogether.

Human history has been replete with stories of crossing borders, migrations due to the ravages of political, economic, or natural disasters. Not all of these journeys are tales of joy. More likely, the fragile settled communities interpret the visiting migrant culture as undercutting the nationalistic goals of their society. Open hostility is unfortunately sanctioned as the appropriate response to keep the outsiders from penetrating our “safe world.” So, which version of cultural affirmation did the festival of language and culture promote?

I think that a version of “trans-disciplinary culturalism” emerged as the young stars of the show interacted to generate a positive energy of harmony by crossing over to the other side. Their own past matters; they remained rooted on their own river banks. But they were confident enough to swim across to the other side. The young performers were firmly grounded in the here and now of the present 21^st century, with all its influences: technology, media, and new musical and art forms, which they transported across the global village. And they dared us to dream of the possibility of building a new, shared cultural world. Their message was simple: we are simultaneously of the past, in the present, and eager to create the future. This movement across time and space, culture and geography, history and identity, are not threatening but enriching.

One of my lasting impressions was the emotional image of students embracing each other at the end of the show: this was the world in dialogue with each other. They had made a connection with those around them that would live on in their lives for many years. They will become the ambassadors of the new world order. The official festival song reverberates:

I saw a luminous future in my dream one night.
Lights were silent pouring down everywhere.
It was like a harmoniously working clock.
Dark nights had gone away.
A new world!
A new world!
They were building a new world.
Everywhere sparkled like the skies.
They were building a new world.

After the ceremony, I chatted with a young 12 year-old Albanian youth to congratulate him on his commanding and welcoming stage performance. He simply smiled broadly.

“No English. Me speak no English.” He smiled and held my hand, clutching his Albanian costume in one hand, his proud flag in another, and his infectious energy pouring out. Despite his lack of English skills, he was able to communicate via his open-hearted spirit.

What a festival of cultures and languages! Not essentialized, but harmonized. It was an expression of joyous humanity.

And there we found our God.

But now I think: was he from Albania or Afghanistan? Why do I not know these countries and their foreign flags? But does it matter?

His heart sparkled.

Reflections on the “13^th International Festival of Languages and Culture”
www.iflc.co.za
“Colours of the world”
18 March 2015
Nelson Mandela Theatre, Braaamfontein, Johannesburg

Michael Anthony Samuel is a professor of education at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Education, Durban, South Africa.

Abu Hanifa (d. 767 CE) is considered a leading scholar of Islamic law and his thoughts led to the formation of the Hanafi school of Islam, which has the greatest following among schools. Abu Hanifa’s time was an era of intense political and social mobility. While new conquests brought in new cultural and religious components, the political authority aspired to disseminate an official form of Islam; at the same time, new groups and formations emerged to respond to changing conditions. Unfortunately, these conditions led to some groups being radicalized. Abu Hanifa’s stance against radicalism was exemplary and his arguments are still worthwhile today.

His political attitude

Abu Hanifa represents the prototype of an independent scholar. He was wary of state power, believing that it corrupted intellectual honesty in the interest of preserving power; thus, he did not hold an official political position. This was a brave stance, as he was seriously persecuted for it. Yet his independence allowed him to see radicalism – on both sides of the political spectrum – for the danger that it was.

Understanding of Islamic jurisprudence

Abu Hanifa is considered the pioneer of the school of sound opinion (ray), which advocates seeking solutions to social-judicial problems by using reason together with religious essentials and scholarly comparison (qiyas). Deductive reasoning (ijtihad), juristic preference for the better (istihsan), and acceptable custom (urf) have an important place in his understanding of Islamic jurisprudence. We can infer that he also believed in the necessity of taking social and psychological realities into account when making religious judgments; this was what he did in practice.

Abu Hanifa did not choose a reductionist approach by restricting himself to the frame of religious essentials, but produced solutions to the questions he faced—or could possibly face—by benefiting from the sources mentioned along with the Qur’an and Sunnah. It is possible to define his approach to jurisprudence as an understanding that places humanity in the center; his views expanded the domain of legitimacy and accepted components of historical and cultural heritage that do not contradict the spirit of religion and belief of Divine oneness, such as local customs and practices. This broad perspective ran contrary to radical beliefs. Because the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence does not disregard real problems in life, it is more capable of solving them.

Abu Hanifa viewed education and debate as essential to his jurisprudence. He would bring a certain problem – some of them contemporary, and some hypothetical – to the attention of his students, each of whom was an expert on an Islamic discipline such as tafsir, hadith, and fiqh; he would let them discuss that matter in detail, follow the discussions with patience, and come to a conclusive judgment according to the strength of the arguments. But he would still tolerate the opposing thoughts of his disciples, such as Imam Muhammad and Abu Yusuf, and let those thoughts come to life. All of their opposing thoughts were recorded, and people acted upon most of them.

We can accept Abu Hanifa’s educational method as a pluralist and democratic one, which also teaches how to forbear different opinions with patience. It shows the value of viewing an issue from different points of view. Despite its value, there were some groups that did not support Abu Hanifa’s methods.

His understanding of belief

Some groups had formed prior to Abu Hanifa as extensions of the extremist Kharijites. They not only directly declared believing Muslims who sinned were apostates, but they also attacked them and tried to exterminate them in the name of religion. The Kharijites even declared Caliph Ali – and many other devout believers – apostates. Though the Kharijites were the most violent, other groups – including the Mutazilites – also persecuted certain religious groups when they came to political power. Unfortunately, this act of dividing society into groups inevitably led to more violence.

According to one definition, it is possible for religion to be a dividing or uniting factor within a society. It can be a great force for good when it is kept separate from the political machinations of power. In his work Fiqh al-Akbar, Abu Hanifa defined the concept of religion (din) in terms of its contents by saying, “Religion is the title given to the entirety of religion, faith, submission, and religious judgments.” Abu’l Muntaha, the scholar who annotated this definition, states that the word religion has different uses, sometimes meaning belief, sometimes submission, and sometimes as the Divine judgments conveyed by a certain Prophet. However, at his answer to the question directed to him about the difference between religion and religious law, Abu Hanifa he expressed that he saw a difference between them. He did not only acknowledge this difference, but also gave a religious and rational explanation for it.

According to Abu Hanifa, religion (din) and religious law (shariah) are separate concepts. He accepted religion as the principles to be believed in – namely, the belief of Divine unity, and faith in the existence and unity of God. Religious law, however, is a body of judgments related to different aspects of human life such as worship, interpersonal relations, and the like. Abu Hanifa interpreted the Qur’anic verse meaning, “I have not created the jinn and humankind but to worship Me (exclusively)” (Dhariyat 56), in the sense of, “So that they know Me and acknowledge my Oneness.”

He believed the origin of religion is the belief in the unity of God. Obviously, this definition is based on the distinction between the essence of religion and what it necessitates. Here, belief is the absolute condition of religion, because a person belonging to a certain religion is a matter of accepting the essential teachings of that religion, rather than observing the acts of worship commanded by that religion.

Abu Hanifa came to this conclusion about religion by considering the fact that the essentials of belief brought by the Prophets are the same, but there are certain differences on other issues, such as worship. The Prophets of God did not belong to different religions. None of them commanded their people to forsake the religion of the previous Prophets, since their faith is the same. On the other hand, every Prophet invited their people to follow the law they conveyed, as decreed by God Almighty for that specific people, not necessarily following the exact law conveyed by the previous Prophets. There were many different codes for different peoples. It is for this reason that God Almighty states, “(For each community) …We have appointed a clear way of life and a comprehensive system (containing the principles of that way and how to follow it). And if God had so willed, He would surely have made you a single community (following the same way of life and system surrounded by the same conditions throughout all history)” (Maedah 48).

The faith of Divine oneness is always the same and religion does not change from one Prophet to another in this sense; it is the systems and their rules that change. If “religion” were fulfilling everything God commands and avoiding everything He forbids, then a person who fails to observe only one command or commits one forbidden act would be an apostate. As such, the legal judgments between fellow believers such as marriage, receiving an inheritance, attending a funeral, and the like would be invalid. However, it is having belief that makes them lawful between fellow believers. Other commands come after having accepted religion. If the commanded acts were faith itself, then God would not call His servants believers until they fulfilled the acts He commanded.

In order to support the point stated above, Abu Hanifa asserted the fact that when believers are excused from certain acts at certain times, they are still considered to have faith: a menstruating woman who abandons the daily prayers, a man who has a valid excuse abandons the Ramadan fasting, or a poor man who cannot give the alms of zakat are still considered believers. If such observances were identical to having faith, failing to observe them for some excuse would have the same meaning. However, it is impossible to make such a claim. According to Abu Hanifa, there is no complete relation between faith and deeds, since they are separate things.

Abu Hanifa stated that the following verses and others of similar meaning also point to the same fact:

“Tell those of My servants who believe that they must establish the Prayer in conformity with its conditions…” (Ibrahim 31); “O you who believe! Prescribed for you is retaliation in cases of (deliberate, unjust) killing…” (Baqarah 178); “O you who believe! Remember and mention God much” (Ahzab 41).

If the commanded acts were identical with belief or faith (iman), then God would not address people as believers until they fulfilled those acts. In addition, God Almighty separates having faith and good deeds in other verses as well:

“Except those who believe and do good righteous deeds…” (Asr 3); “No! Rather, whoever submits his whole being to God (and does so) as one devoted to doing good, aware that God is seeing him, his reward is with his Lord, and all such will have no fear, (for they will always find My help and support with them), nor will they grieve” (Baqarah 112); “But whoever wishes for the Hereafter and strives for it as it should be striven for, being a believer…” (Isra 19).

This distinction proves that faith is not the same as deeds. Believers observe the prayers, fasting, zakat, Hajj, and they make remembrance of God owing to their faith – but they are not considered to have faith for having observed these. This proves that they do good deeds after having faith (iman) already.

In his letter to Uthman al-Batti, a scholar from Basra, Abu Hanifa stated this view with reference to different proofs. He used the following example: an indebted man firstly acknowledges his debt and pays it afterwards, but not vice versa. His acknowledgement of the debt is not for having paid the debt, but his paying is for having acknowledged the debt.

Abu Hanifa did not believe that a person who sins is out of the sphere of faith; nor are they an apostate. He expressed this point, saying, “Those who have acknowledged the direction to turn for worship are believers. I cannot count them as having forsaken faith owing to some command they do not observe. As for one who abandons some obligatory acts in spite of having faith, that person is a believer, but a sinful one (he is not a disbeliever).”

Abu Hanifa argued that what would make one an unbeliever is not committing a forbidden act, but considering it lawful; not abandoning an obligatory command, but considering it unnecessary.

Abu Hanifa also pointed out that real believers commit sins not by considering them lawful, but by giving in to their carnal soul. When asked, “If God is dearer for a believer than everything, why does a believer rebel Him? Is it possible for a person to rebel while having sincere love for God?” the great imam replied, “Yes, a child loves his father, but sometimes disobeys him. The situation of a believer is the same…He commits sins not owing to a lack of love for God, but for giving in to the feeling of lust or something similar.”

Some claimed that this stance aligned Abu Hanifa with the school of Murjia, whose adherents believed that sins would not nullify one’s faith, but Abu Hanifa soundly argued that it is not possible to guarantee anything in matters of faith:

“We cannot say that sins do not harm a believer at all. Similarly, we cannot say that a person who commits sins will not enter Hell. Neither can we say our good deeds are accepted and our evil deeds are forgiven… However, who commits good deeds in conformity with all of the conditions of validity…and dies as a believer without nullifying those deeds, then God does not let those deeds be in vain, but rewards them.” We need to clarify at this point that by this definition Abu Hanifa did not refer to an argument as if religion was a matter of conscience only; religion for him is a comprehensive system of life that concerns all aspects of believers’ existence.

While founding the most developed school of Islamic jurisprudence, Abu Hanifa defined religion with reference to its essence, pinpointing the difference between religion and other factors related to religion. His definition of religion as the faith of Divine oneness is very important in terms of maintaining social unity. Such a definition does not lessen the importance of religion’s other requirements. Moreover, the political and social conditions of his time called for such a definition. For this reason, Abu Hanifa made a definition that referred to the essence of religion and aimed to maintain unity in society by counteracting the tendency to easily condemn those with different opinions.

This is valuable even today, as taking belief in Divine unity as the basis of religion allows followers of different monotheistic religions to meet on common grounds. In the Qur’an, God Almighty addresses Muslims in the person of the Prophet and demands them to call People of the Book to a common word between them: “O People of the Book, come to a word common between us and you, that we worship none but God, and associate none as partner with Him, and that none of us take others for Lords, apart from God” (Al Imran 3: 64).

Conclusion

When Abu Hanifa’s world of thought and understanding of life are studied, it’s clear that his viewpoint valued differences and did not permit persecution. This perspective still bears significance in terms of peaceful coexistence in today’s societies. Such a magnanimous attitude can help to combat radical attitudes and inclinations for violence.

Who gives them the right to abuse the pure name of “Islam”? How can it be so easy to establish a self-claimed state built on blood and skulls and name it an “Islamic” State? How can such heinous murderers claim that they are establishing a state of “peace” – as the true name of Islam means? How do they expect us to think they are serving Islam as they hold black banners with the name of the Prophet in one hand and a cut-off head in the other?

There are many questions to ask: where are they getting their support from? Who is pushing them from behind and giving them the confidence to grin broadly as they slaughter a human being? Where are the arms coming from? Who is funding them? Who is giving them political and logistical support?

Islam is not being hijacked by blood-thirsty terrorists alone. There is a bigger threat that has crept up on Muslim societies for over a century, where Islam has been abused for political aspirations at the expense of its true message. When a religion is made an instrument in political rivalry, it becomes the property of the party that can best package it at rallies and debates. Such a positioning is ontologically against the nature of religion, which by definition should be appealing and welcoming to all. The seductive aspect of political activism and competition drives even pious believers to do whatever is necessary to win elections, to beat other parties, and subdue their electorates, who are heathens to be corrected and enslaved. What follows is the corruption that comes with power and fame, and which drags the new ruling elite into hypocrisy. They are now in a conflict between the need to preserve their assumed Islamic identity on the surface and the untamed carnal desires for even more power, wealth, and lust that roil beneath the surface. The former is needed to continue their legitimacy and to use it as a veil over their dirty business, while the latter has by now become a whirlpool they cannot get away from.

What is more dangerous is the fact that religion becomes a rather ceremonial cultural aspect of life. Thus, its injunctions towards good morals and virtue, and its basic tenets like belief in an omnipotent God and the judgment day, are reduced down to myth. As the lead article in this issue reads, “truth was slaughtered innumerable times; on top of that, those who slaughtered it did so for another presumed truth.”

We would have rather talked about the content of the magazine in this editorial; however, the current events in the Middle East are so desperate that we felt a need to draw attention to the heartbreaking developments there. We condemn all sorts of violence, regardless of faith and race, but especially when perpetrated under the name of a heavenly religion. We hereby honor the memory of all the victims, including our colleague James Foley, and offer our condolences to their families and loved ones.

Undoubtedly, throughout history these states engaged in war with other states. A crucial point to understand is that war has always been a form of engagement between states caused by political, economic, or militaristic reasons. Therefore, in a hostile relationship where long-term dominance and its benefits play a major role, it would be wrong to call such conflicts religious wars solely because the opponents have differing religious identities. Such conflicts are embarked not for religious dominance but for political dominance. Additionally, it is possible for Muslims to be attacked solely for religious differences (this still happens today). In this case, it is natural to react to the attack by defending oneself and one’s religion, for, in fact, it actually becomes an obligation for Muslims to defend their religious freedom (22:39-41), themselves (2:190), and those being oppressed (Haleem 65).

Jihad, a crucially controversial concept in Islam, is often misunderstood by many Westerners, and even some Muslims. Whenever the word comes up, what comes to mind is an armed struggle by Muslims against non-Muslims, such as fights, clashes, and holy war. Jihad is a very comprehensive and dynamic term that can take on different forms, depending on historical circumstances and the needs of Muslims (Heck 95).

The word jihad comes from the Arabic root “j-h-d” and its dictionary meaning denotes doing one’s best, struggling against every kind of difficulty. In a religious context, it refers to the struggles one faces for the sake of God. In the words of Gülen “Jihad is … the inner struggle of a believer against all that stands between the believer and God” (Gülen 191). As Campanini clarifies through al-Ghazali’s teachings, there are two meanings for jihad. “The ‘great’ jihad is the struggle for self-purification, in order to conquer the evil inclinations of character and behavior, while the ‘small’ jihad corresponds to war” (Campanini 54). Delving deeper into the former category for purposes of clarification, the great jihad refers to a person’s struggle to overcome destructive obstacles within the carnal self such as feelings of resentment, hatred, envy, arrogance, and haughtiness – feelings that Islam orders followers not to harbor.

The following explanation for why jihad is confused with terrorism can be made: for the Muslim world, the 20^th century was one that was full of oppression and colonialism. Dating back further, to the 19^th century, a majority of Muslim lands were struggling for independence. In these battles and wars, Islam was conceived as a means to unite and mobilize people. During these wars, jihad was naturally the most frequently used concept. The war was against these invaders and colonizers, and the people were fighting to protect their country, their people, and their religion. Religious concepts – Qur’anic verses and the sayings and practices of the Prophet – were the main motivational factors driving Muslims during their hard struggle. Muslims called these wars, which were carried out in legitimate self-defense, jihad; however, there is a barrier between war and jihad in Islam that needs to be clarified.

The primary source of information in Islam must be the Qur’an; thus, I will refer to the Qur’an and its usage of the word jihad. Jihad is used in three verses in the Qur’an in the imperative form, as “jahid” and “jahidu,” to mean fighting against non-Muslims.

The other verses that contain jihad refer to its greater meaning, the personal struggle against feelings raised by the carnal self. Actually, the Qur’anic verses concerning war are mostly expressed by the word qital (fighting) rather than jihad (Haleem 64). In terms of the etymological meaning of qital, the relative context of the verses in which it is used and the events on which these were revealed support the fact that this word was mostly used in expressing war in the Qur’an. To give a few examples[1]:

Fight in God’s cause against those who fight against you, but do not exceed the bounds (set by God), for surely God loves not those who exceed the bounds (Baqara 2:190). But if they break their pledges after their treaty (with you) and assail your religion, then fight with those leaders of unbelief – surely they have no trustworthy pledges – so that they may desist (from aggression) (Tawba 9:12-13).

Reading these verses raises an important question: would it be wrong to identify jihad with war, or to give an emphasis to the aspect of war? The simple answer is no, for almost all of the verses related to jihad and qital were revealed in a situation of warfare. Furthermore, it would not be possible to interpret other verses in the Qur’an referring to the great jihad, such as striving with wealth (4:95, 8:72), without these terms’ relation to the aspect of war. This is the very point where the concepts of jihad and qital intersect.

When people devoid of the necessary knowledge of history and Qur’anic commentary methods interpret Qur’anic verses concerning war, they often take it out of context, ignoring the previous verse and subsequent ones, thereby presenting Islam as a religion that gives no value to non-Muslims. This is absolutely wrong. I shall support my argument with a few Qur’anic verses that are commonly misinterpreted:

… kill them wherever you come upon them, and drive them out from where they drove you out. Disorder (rooted in rebellion against God and recognizing no laws) is worse than killing. Do not fight against them in the vicinities of the Sacred Mosque unless they fight against you there; but if they fight against you (there), kill them – such is the recompense of the (rebellious) unbelievers. (Baqara 2:191)

To understand a Qur’anic verse correctly, two essential things need to be kept in mind. First, the verse needs to be considered both independently and within its context. Second, the event for which the verse was revealed needs to be considered. If we consider the above verse with its previous and subsequent verses, we understand that there is an armed group that does not want to let the Muslims live. Thus, God allows the Muslims to put up a legitimate defense, and particularly commands them not be on the side that starts the fight. Furthermore, God reminds them that they should accept any possible offers of peace from the other side, no matter the stage of war.

This verse refers to the idolaters of Mecca, who tortured every Muslim they could, declared a boycott on all relations with Muslims, sent them into exile, drove them out of their homes, tried to force them back to paganism, and when Muslims began to gain power after settling in Medina, the idolaters constantly violated their peace treaties. When the verse is considered in this light, one may even ask the question: why did the Muslims even wait for a revelation to defend themselves – isn’t it common sense to strive to survive?

Let’s take a look at another commonly misinterpreted verse: “…seize them and kill them wherever you find them; and do not take to yourselves any of them as confident, nor as helper” (Nisa 4:88). This verse is often known to be quoted separately to detach it from its context. When one reads this verse as I have presented it, one sees the image of a ruthless and aggressive Muslim, sword in hand, ready to fight. However, as we experienced with the previous verse, reading the context (Nisa 4:88-91) alone will suffice in giving us a better idea behind this verse. After reading the context of the verse, we see that the people mentioned here are the hypocrites of Mecca and Medina. They pretended to be on the sides of the Muslims, but they were not sincere in their faith. Moreover, these hypocrites took every opportunity to act against the Muslims. An additional point to emphasize with this passage is not the command to kill, but the command by God to accept peace if it is offered. Thus, Muslims are not to be on the side that starts a war, but if they are attacked by an enemy, they are allowed to defend themselves.

These were just two examples of verses that are often misinterpreted when stripped from their contexts. These misinterpretations lead to the misinterpretation of Islam and obfuscate the true meaning of jihad. We can also give examples that clarify the meaning of jihad from secondary sources, such as the Prophet’s sayings, or hadiths. God’s Messenger was the conveyor of the Qur’an; therefore it is impossible for his words or practices to contradict the Qur’an in any way. When we look at the Prophet’s sayings on the topic of jihad, we see the same truth behind it.

One example that often comes up when jihad is mentioned is as follows: on returning to Medina after a battle, God’s Messenger told his companions: “We are returning from the lesser jihad to the greater one.” After having fought a battle in which many Muslims had lost their lives, the Companions were surprised to hear this statement from God’s Messenger. When they asked what the greater jihad was, he explained that it was fighting the carnal self (Ajluni, Kashf al-Khafa, 1:424).

An additional example is what the Prophet told a Companion who asked for permission if he could join a military campaign. The Prophet asked the man whether his parents were alive, upon which the man replied affirmatively. The Prophet said in return: “You perform jihad by serving them” (Bukhari, Jihad, 138). God’s Messenger had a plethora of other cases in which he used the word jihad in a wider non-militaristic sense. Two more of these sayings are: “The most virtuous jihad is speaking up for truth in the face of injustice,” (Abu Dawud, Tirmidhi, 13) and, “The most virtuous jihad is speaking up for the truth before an unjust and cruel ruler” Abu Dawud, Malahim, 17). More importantly, the gravity of this form of jihad is strengthened when looking at one of the statements of the Prophet: “Whoever dies trying to protect his property from a usurper dies a martyr” (Abou El Fadl, 123).

Hitherto, we have looked at jihad in a theoretical sense, using definitions interpreted from the Qur’an and the Prophet’s sayings to reveal its true nature. It is not unreasonable for the reader to wonder how the Prophet acted in times of warfare to further dispel notions of jihad being considered a “holy war”; after all, there were wars and battles in which the Prophet was present. To give a brief account of the Prophet’s example in this light, let’s consider the Battle of Badr. The enemies of the Muslims in the Battle of Badr were the Meccan pagans, who were afraid that the Prophet was amassing enough supporters to pose a strong threat to the Meccans. Consequently, the Meccans sent a letter of ultimatum to their allies in Medina, appealing for the exile and the execution of the Prophet and his followers.[2] These harsh letters caused great upheaval in Medina; however, the actions that the Prophet took quickly eliminated the anxiety of the people of Medina.

The first of the Prophet’s actions was to sign a pact of truce with nearby tribes. The essential elements that he signed with the neighboring tribes were aimed at preventing the neighbors from assisting the Meccans against the Muslims. The Meccans proved to be determined, and despite all of the Prophet’s actions aimed at holding peace, the Meccans wanted to fight. When everyone knew that the battle was inevitable, the Prophet made a last attempt by sending Umar with an offer of peace[3], which was refused and provided the spark for the Battle of Badr. Similarly, when looking at accounts of the other battles of the Prophet – Uhud, Khandaq, and Khaybar – one sees that God’s Messenger always strived to maintain peace and worked to avoid engaging in the Western, ill-defined “jihad” – the spread of Islam, the taking of lives of non-Muslims, and the acquisition of new lands.

Now that the true definition of jihad has been clarified using the Qur’an and accurate interpretations as a primary source and the Prophet’s sayings and actions during warfare as a second source, we have to consider some broader questions. When is jihad complete? How can we accept one interpretation as the proper one? Why is jihad so misunderstood by some Muslims? Does it play to their advantage to intentionally misrepresent it? Lastly, does violent jihad justify terrorism?

Jihad, as mentioned earlier, has two meanings: the “great” jihad – corresponding to self-purification in the path of God, comparable to the Christians’ miles Christi (Peters 206) – and the “small” jihad – corresponding to war. The former type of jihad is essentially never complete; it is everlasting throughout one’s life, for situations that necessitate “great” jihad emerge everyday in a Muslim’s life. In example, if we look at the citizens of Syria today who are opposed to the ruthless oppression of their dictatorial leader, we see that they experience jihad everyday, for the Prophet has stated that, “The most virtuous jihad is speaking up for the truth before an unjust and cruel ruler.”[4] And the tens of thousands of Syrians who have already lost their lives in the face of injustice in Syria’s conflict have died martyrs, for the Prophet has stated that “whoever dies trying to protect his property from a usurper dies a martyr” (Abou El Fadl, 123). If we consider the “small” jihad in this question, we can say that it is intermittent, experienced by Muslims whenever they need to engage in warfare for self-defense to protect their country and their religious freedom.

When faced with the question of the accuracy of interpretations, one cannot bluntly state that one interpretation is more accurate than the other. When presented with a similar question, John Esposito, a Professor of Religion at Georgetown, pointed to a Surah from the Qur’an, which recalls how “God made humankind into nations and tribes for you to get to know one another not that you may despise one another.”[5] These words support a language of religious plurality, a concept that is contrary to religious extremism. Esposito further argued that there is no central authority in Islam or Christianity who can speak for all Muslims or for all Christians. Although the Pope is the central authority for Roman Catholicism, he does not speak for the Orthodoxy or for Protestantism. Every denomination has its own individual religious authority. Islam, similarly, supports the idea of ijtihad, the individual interpretation of the Qur’an. The important point in this question behind interpretations is the broadening of the base of religious authorities. Esposito argues that although this diversification may lead to more chaotic situations, it also serves as a check for religious authorities who legitimize illegitimate wars. Therefore, this system of checking can prove beneficial in stopping wars, though it may pose more problems in other aspects of interpretation.

Earlier in the paper, I gave an example as to why Westerners might misunderstand jihad; this poses the inevitable question: why is it misunderstood by Muslims? More specifically, does it play to their advantage to intentionally misunderstand it? Rahman describes the true meaning behind the propaganda slogan “Islam was spread by the sword” in his book Major Themes of the Qur’an. He writes: “What was spread by the sword was not the religion of Islam, but the political domain of Islam, so that Islam could work to produce the order on the earth that the Qur’an seeks” (Rahman 63). However, Rahman also points out that armed jihad was often used by later Muslims whose primary aim was territorial expansion and not the worldview they were asked to establish by God. This, unfortunately, answers the question posed above with a yes; it does play to some Muslims’ advantage to intentionally misinterpret jihad for selfish reasons: territorial expansion, political power, and economic benefits, all under the pretext of “religious duty.” These kinds of interpretations of Qur’anic verses and hadiths outside of their more important contexts render the practice of religion astray, allowing selfish extremists to justify their illegal behaviors. However, it is important to note that their justifications behind their actions are largely unaccepted by the greater Muslim community around the world, those who know the distinction between the two jihads and how to apply them in their lives.[6] This brings us to the final question: does violent jihad justify terrorism?

In the Muslim world, there is and always have been radical thoughts and political ideologies; the same is true in Christianity, Judaism, and other religions. However, it is wrong to identify the thoughts and the beliefs of radical groups with religion. One of the focuses of this paper was to emphasize the importance of using the Qur’an and the statements of the Prophet to seek answers in Islam, and the aforementioned radical thoughts are not found in either. Nonetheless, there are still those who commit terrorist acts “for God” or “in the name of religion.” These terrorists also believe in Islam. This leads to a paradox: on one hand, we have Muslims who commit terrorist acts, and on the other hand, we have a religion that forbids these acts. If we view this paradox from the lens of Muslims, we do not see a paradox at all; it is merely a situation that is generated by a wrong perspective. If we take a look at all perspectives – the political, economic, historic, cultural, moral, and humanistic – we see that there is a perceptible dichotomy between religion and terrorism, and are able to consequently establish that terrorism does not stem from religion, but that it has other political, economic, and cultural roots. Therefore, jihad does not justify terrorism; nothing in Islam does, for terrorism is essentially forbidden in Islam.

In conclusion, jihad is a crucial concept in Islam due to the wide misunderstanding it causes amongst people around the world and the concept’s import in Islam on a global scale. While the term Islamic Terrorism – an oxymoron within itself – is inaccurate in all aspects, its existence is not the issue; its degradingly common usage, especially in the media, advertises a negative Muslim image to non-Muslims, imbuing a subconscious belief that all Muslims are terrorists. The reverse of this scenario often happens in the Muslim world as well, especially after the Iraq War and the War in Afghanistan. These wrongful representations of both sides do nothing but aggravate tensions between the two sides, which leads to further conflict and a discordant world. Instead, if books or news reports that clarify the true meaning of jihad and other misunderstood concepts of various religions and their applications were broadcasted for the world to hear, we would not witness as much religious conflict around the world as we witness today. What a beauty that sight would be: a harmonious society of people living with a plurality of religious beliefs.

References

• Abdel Haleem, Muhammad. 2011. Understanding the Qur’an: Themes and Style. I.B. Tauris.
• Abou El Fadl, Khaled. 2001. Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Campanini, Massimo. 2011. The Qur’an: Modern Muslim Interpretations. London: Routledge.
• Gülen. M. Fethullah. 2012. Toward a Global Civilization of Love and Tolerance, NJ: Tughra Books, p. 191.
• Hamidullah, Muhammed. 2011. Islam Peygamberi. Beyan Yayinlari.
• Heck, Paul L. 2013. “Jihad Revisited.” The Journal of Religious Ethics 32.1 (2004): 95-128. JSTOR. Web. 22 February.
• Peters, F. E. 2003. Islam: A Guide for Jews and Christians. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Rahman, Fazlur. 2009. Major Themes of the Qurʼan. University of Chicago Press.
• Ünal, Ali. 2006. The Qur’an with Annotated Interpretation in Modern English. NJ: Tughra Books.

[1] The reader may also refer to (Tawba 9:36) and (Tawba 9:5) for additional examples on the usage of qital that were omitted due to their length.

[2] Hamidullah, Muhammad, Islam Peygamberi, I, p. 217.

[3] Hamidullah, Hz. Peygamber’in Savaslari (Wars of the Prophet), p. 55–92.

[4] Abu Dawud, Tirmidhi 13.

[5] “Who Speaks for Islam and for Christianity?” Voice of America News, 2008.

[6] This is also true in other non-religious cases. When Timothy McVeigh caused the Oklahoma City Bombing and resulted in the death of 168 people, he thought he had legitimate reasons to do so; however, a majority of the people did not accept his thoughts as sound justification behind his actions.

M&B: Your area of study is social ethics. In what way your approach to environmental problems is different than an ecologist, environmental scientist, or a purely religious scholar?

Dr. Hadsell: As social ethicists, when we look at the question of the environment we look at other questions in the human social world. So for example questions of peace and conflict, questions of population, questions of rich and poor within countries, questions of rich nations and poor nations, north and south, east and west so forth. In every case the goal is also to get the science right, to get the data right. So if you’re looking at issues of north and south for example what is the north what is the south what are the relationships we’re talking about are those political relationships? Are those economic relationships? How are political relationships related to economic relationships and culture and language and history and so forth? And when we therefore turn our attention to the environment we’re doing the same thing. We’re asking “whose environment?” According to whom what aspects of the environment. We also look at how are the environmental questions are being raised today. We look at issues of global warming and our use of natural resources accelerated use of natural resources and so forth. The social ethicist will say how these environmental issues are related to other issues that we know something about? That is how are they related to political issues, to economic issues to historical cultural interactions and so forth?

While some environmentalists takes the environmental issue as an object in itself and see it from their own perspective, a social ethicist will say as we look at the environment how is that question embedded in all of these other questions? They want to know the data about the environment the scientific data about the use of the consumption of natural resources and the acceleration of global warming and who is using the most resources? They want to know all of those things but they drive that discussion also from the philosophical religious side of things and ask from a religious perspective from a Christian perspective from a Muslim perspective let’s say, what is the human responsibility here? What does scripture tell us about the proper relationship between humans on the one hand nature on the other and God on the other? What is this relationship between these 3 things?

M&B: It seems like many different factors must be taken in to considerations.

Social ethics is really a composition of a number of things including sociology, political science studies of the social world, sometimes cultural anthropology as well as the more philosophical and religious area of ethics. And if you put those all together you have what is really called social ethics. People often work out of traditions, for example one can be an ethicist who’s interested in the social world and political issues in the social world out of a Muslim perspective or out of a Christian perspective or out of a Hindu perspective and so forth. There are also a humanist perspective so there are various approaches and they can be grounded religiously or not. That is religious people using scripture and faith but also then drawing upon as I said political science, history, sociology, cultural anthropology. When you put that together then it really is what in the United States we call the discipline of social ethics.

M&B: What are the challenges in working in such a diverse multicultural setting?

Multicultural settings are challenging be cause the history of human relationship with the environment varies with the cultures and religions. Different cultures approach nature in different ways and have a history with nature that is specific and different from other cultures.

In the United States and in our school Hartford Seminary we have a lot of cultures interacting as well as religions interacting. So you get a wide spectrum of perspectives and a wide spectrum of experiences and each perspective and each experience may assume that its own perspective is the normative one because of course it comes out of their own experience. It’s very important to think and to discuss these questions of the human relationship with nature across cultures and across religions to check the tendency for each perspective to blow its own perspective up and to call it common sense and to assume that its common to everyone.

M&B: Not only there are various religious and cultural settings but also geography seems to be an important factor when we approach to environmental problems.

In the United States for several decades there was an assumption that the environment is an issue that is of concern to white rich people. And that the rest of the American population or maybe the rest of the global population outside of north America and Europe for example don’t have the luxury of thinking about environmental issues. Of course that’s not true. The environmental issues such as global warming are going to affect most directly the very people who, once thought, shouldn’t care about the environment because they have other things to worry about like getting food on the table and so forth.

So these issues are complex and I think in recent years the environmental movement has become more able to think across cultures and across specific social classes for example and nations to think about the environment in more subtle ways. In the United States one of the things we’ve started talking about already 10 years ago is for example the issue of environmental racism. That is African Americans in the United States and inner cities of the United States may think of the environment as being something that people in the suburbs who are worried about who want to protect their trees or their streams or you know the kind of natural environment that they have and the reason that they’ve moved out into the suburbs in the first place. Whereas there are many environmental issues going on right in the inner cities which is often the place where the dirtiest processing plants are located. Many environmental issues are very close to home to a variety of cultures and a variety of income groups. The environment is far too important for global humanity to leave it up to one group as an issue for that particular group. It has to be an issue that is on the agenda for all of us from our own perspectives because we all get hit with these environmental issues. They’re moral issues for all of us and we need to have that conversation across these groups.

M&B: You said that the environmental problems hits the communities who depends on nature first. On the other hand the ones who are doing the pollution actually do not depend on nature so much. Do you think this adds another layer of responsibility or accountability to the problem?

I think it’s very true that the people around the world who are already vulnerable often already poor and often already living very close to nature. I think about people in the Pacific Islands for example. They are the people who are most immediately affected by changes in the environment as we see with the studies about the rising sea level in relationship to global warming. Many the people who will be most immediately affected are people who live as fishermen for example in villages who can’t protect themselves and can’t protect their villages and their livelihoods from the effects of global warming.

So yes, it’s very much the case that the people who are already vulnerable are the people who are poor and don’t have a lot of political participation or representation. The people who don’t have a lot of control over their lives are the people who will be most immediately affected by global warming. The people who live in big cities and lives removed from nature in the sense that they don’t know where their food comes from it’s shipped in from wherever all around the globe. They live in heated buildings and air conditioned buildings and they drive cars and so forth. They may not understand the complexity of the environmental issues and they may think themselves to be less vulnerable to questions like global warming.

I think one of the challenges of social ethics pertaining to the environment is to get the people in the cities who feel separate from nature and from the processes of nature to understand the direct although sometimes hidden links they have with the natural world and how their lifestyle and their consumption of resources effects the natural world and how the depletion of nature will in turn affect them and their lifestyles and even in big cities.

M&B: In what way religious traditions or ethical approaches could motivate them to take a new look at the nature?

I think that the sense of the sacred is a very important concept for the environmental movement. I think that as religious people the worldview of religious people is that everything that is given by God is endowed with a kind of sacred quality. So that all of the resources given by God should be approached with a sense of respect and honor the same kind of sense of respect and honor that we give towards sort of classically sacred moments or objects. It’s very much the case that many people in the environmental movement even if they are secular people, they have an experience with nature, an intuition of something bigger, grander and outside of human control and domination.

Many people, even if they’re secular, they sense in nature a kind of sacredness and it brings them that sense that they have even if they can’t talk about it in religious terms or don’t choose to talk about it in religious terms. I’ve met a number of people for whom direct experience with nature has brought them back into religious exploration in religious traditions because they’ve sensed a presence of the sacred in nature. And it takes them into an exploration in their own traditions or new traditions for them. It’s very clear that nature and the sacred are in many ways connected.

Unfortunately there is also a sense in which the leveling of the human perception and imagination in an extremely secular spirit so that the only measure is the human. To think that there are no measurements, no dimensions outside of the human is an impoverishment of human imagination and leads to a disregard for the intrinsic value of nature. Nature is not simply a reflection of what it does for me or how I can use it but that the things of nature are intrinsically in and of themselves valuable.

M&B: Do you think interfaith dialog is an important step to solve environmental problems?

I do think that when we think about religious plurality there are varieties of ways to structure conversations across different religious groups. And some people really want to spend their time talking about religious doctrine. That’s what they like to do and they really want to spend their time talking about religious doctrine and I think that’s a wonderful occupation, its time very well spent, and those people ought to spend their time doing that.

There’s other people who want to work together inter religiously not so much on the issues directly of religious doctrine, but on other issues. They want to problem solve together and they want to attack together across religions questions that are facing all of us. And it is for those kinds of people that the environmental issues are good possibilities for bringing people together across religious traditions to work together on environmental challenges. That is how Hindus or Buddhists or Christians or Muslims or Jews, each formed by and carrying with them their religious values can come to a common table and think together about environmental challenges and work together on those environmental challenges.

And I think that’s a very interesting way to work and it is a way that in some ways will go farther than either political conversations – specifically political conversations – or specifically doctrinal conversations; this is a different way of working together and I think it can be very positive.

Almost every society eventually creates an “other”that serves as such for certain political, economic, or social purposes. And in most cases, the identification of this “other” rests on a simplistic “us versus them” dichotomy: we are “good” people, and they are “bad” people. Because this simple dichotomy is more mythical than real, the maintenance of this myth requires a continuous pumping of misinformation into the public realm. Misinformation is not necessarily incorrect information; it is also purposeful manipulation of reality. Each society foregrounds the good acts of its own people and backgrounds their bad acts while foregrounding the bad acts of “others” and backgrounding their good acts. Thus, we all accomplish giving our own communities a delusional sense of moral and cultural superiority over others, which eventually turns the material conflicts between us and others into moral conflicts between good and evil.

The common “good Westerners-bad Muslims” dichotomy results in manipulation of the information provided to the people in the West about both Muslims and Westerners themselves. This is why in some of the Western media, evil acts of Muslim people are almost always associated with Islam while noble acts of Muslim people such as Mr. Osman are either ignored or associated with their nationality rather than their religion. In the same vein, evil acts of Western people such as those who gassed the nursery of a Muslim mosque in Ohio while about 300 people were praying inside in September 2008 are largely ignored by some of the mainstream Western media, for it goes against the “good Westerners” image.

A striking example that is used as evidence to the evilness of Muslims is the degree of support for terrorism among Muslims. Authors from Sam Harris to Robert Spencer have sought refuge in Muslim support for terrorism when they wanted to denounce Islam. Some surveys reveal that there are some Muslims who justify killing innocent people in certain circumstances. According to the respectable PEW institution’s surveys, 10 to 50 percent of people in different Muslim societies (with an average of 20-25%) often times or sometimes justify suicide bombing of civilian targets to defend Islam. Such findings are construed as evidence to both the belligerent nature of the religion of Islam and the evilness of the Muslim mind. Yet another truth that goes uncovered in some of the Western media is the fact that there is comparable support for terrorism among Western people as well. According to a 2007 survey by World Public Opinion, for example, 24% of Americans find “bombing and other types of attacks intentionally aimed at civilians” often times or sometimes justified. But such surveys never find a place in the some of the mainstream American media because they go against the common “good American-bad Muslim” dichotomy.

The problem of misinformation is not unique to the West. It is equally problematic in Muslim societies. Most Muslims have known the United States and Americans through the lenses of Vietnam, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and the like. But few of them are aware of such programs like Peace Corps or Volunteers for Prosperity because such good American acts go against the mythical “bad Americans-good Muslims” dichotomy in the Muslim world. Similarly, most Muslims have memorized many non-Muslim names for their brutal acts against Muslims, but very few Muslims are familiar with Muslim names who are held responsible for the crimes against humanity. Whereas the former figures confirm the mythical “good Muslims-bad non-Muslims” image, the latter contradicts it. Therefore, the former examples have been highlighted in the Muslim media and the latter has been ignored.

On the forefront of this universal misinformation campaign are two institutions: the media and governments. The media loves sensational, flashy news because such news pumps up their ratings. Consequently, the media capitalize on overstated evilness of some other people and the existential threat they pose to “our” society. In the same vein, our governments love the existence of “external threats to our national security,” mythical or real, because it allows them to divert public attention from failed domestic policies to international politics and also to implement certain political and military agenda that they could not have carried out without a foreign threat. John Mueller, a professor of political science from Ohio State University, estimated that “the lifetime chance of an American being killed by international terrorism is about one in 80,000-about the same chance of being killed by a comet or a meteor.” Yet whereas no sane American is obsessed with the adversity of a meteor falling on his/her head, many have been made to obsessively think, fear, and guard themselves against a terrorist attack by some evil others.

Most of us have been misinformed about other societies to some extent. We are all, therefore, in need of a therapy of knowledge refinement. But how do we do that? Personally, I think there are two effective ways/channels of refining our knowledge and acquiring authentic information about other societies. First, we need to diversify our sources of information by reading multiple and multi-national news papers or portals. Second, we need to diversify our pool of friends and include in it as many people from “other” societies as possible. Nothing is more powerful than a concrete counter-example when it comes to destroying a myth. As we diversify our sources of information and befriend people from other societies, we will realize that “we” are not as “good” as we are told we are, and “they” are not as “bad” as we are told they are, which will hopefully help us re-appreciate the essential commonality between all of us: humanity. Hopefully, we will then also realize that the major struggle is not between “good” us versus “bad” them but rather between the good people and the bad ones among us all. We need to find ways of testing or confirming knowledge we get from the media and not forget that the media is owned and operated by people, who, like us, have many presumptions, biases, priorities, or simply misconceptions, that can spill over when they are “reporting.”

Kaan Kerem has a PhD in political science. He is a freelance writer on philosophy and scientific thought.

It is indeed a tremendous challenge to come to terms with the perplexity of religion and politics in our time. As acts of terrorism are wreaking havoc in many parts of the world, people turn to religion both to find the cause and the healing. Questions abound. Can religion be a source for tolerance and reconciliation in the 21st century, or is it a breeding ground for hatred and violence? Is religion being hijacked from inside by misguided believers and by cynic political extremists? Grand theories of conspiracy against specific religions or political systems instill anxiety among ordinary people.

As the 9/11 tragedy in the USA is indelibly inscribed as a watershed in world history, so will 22.7.2011 for ever be remembered as a massacre that changed Norway. The first was a heinous act of people who misrepresented Islam to punish and humiliate a world power seen to be responsible for the suffering of millions of Muslims around the world. The other was directed against the State itself and the political leadership of Norway, by a person who used Christian imagery to express his hatred of Muslims. The perpetrator sees Norway’s multiculturalism and open society as submission to a dangerous and foreign religion. He saw himself as true crusader for a Christian Europe. I believe it is fair to say that none of the perpetrators of these tragic events genuinely represent the religion they profess. Their unspeakable acts of violence against fellow human beings constitute a crime not only against humanity, but against God under whatever name.

These watershed events are reminders that to unravel the perverse mindset of extremists one has to go beyond personal faith and beliefs and look to other constitutive factors of psychological, social, cultural and political nature. Such factors do not provide an excuse for the horrendous acts of terror, but they indicate the complexity that needs to be addressed in curing this cancer in the body of humanity. But also collective and individual perceptions of oppression, marginalization and disrespect, feed a legitimate sense of loss and betrayal that offers a breeding ground for fanaticism and revenge. No single historic religion is without a history of inbred violence, be it Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, or others.

While the reaction in the USA and some European countries after 9/11 was crusader language and large-scale cancellation of fundamental civil and political rights, the reaction in Norway, eloquently and consistently expressed by the Prime Minister and other political leaders, and hailed by the vast majority of the population, has been to call for an even more inclusive democracy, and more respect of human dignity and human rights for all. The message was clear; the way forward is not revenge, nor curtailing of fundamental freedoms, but increased openness to a more multicultural and multi-religious society. Religious leaders and communities have reacted in unison against the exploitation of their faith and spirituality using hatred and fear. They join the call for tolerance and mutual respect. In all honesty, it has to be added that some pockets of conservative Christians have expressed sympathy for the opinions of the terrorist, although not for his criminal acts. The same goes for some politicians on the far right of the political spectrum.

It is my humble opinion that the reaction of official Norway sets a standard for others to follow in countries where far-right ideologies and fundamentalist religious movements and individuals threaten to destabilize society. A model of reconciled diversity is the only way to the future in our globalized world. This is the message of our youth, those who lost their lives and those who barely escaped. They are the victors. Terrorists will always be the losers. This is the spirit of Norway. The political battle to sustain this legacy will show the strength of our nation.

Dr. Gunnar Stalsett, Bishop emeritus of Oslo
Former Vice Chair of the Nobel Peace Prize committee
Moderator of the European Council of Religious Leaders, Religions for Peace

“[The Gulen Movement] educates and socializes individuals without individualizing and politicizing the social.” (p. 152)

The Gulen Movement (hereafter GM), as it is usually referred to in English, has attracted the attention of “critical public minds and scholarship” throughout the world in recent years for two important reasons. First, Fethullah Gulen’s ideas and praxis demonstrate the potential role of religion in reshaping the present violent, conflict ridden world into an inclusive, humanistic society and world order based on the principles of pluralism, intercultural dialogue, and mutual living. Second and more important, Gulen, through his twin tools of Islamic hermeneutics and public actions, particularly in the field of education, has restored the “humane face of Islam” in the public eye—something that was lost due to centuries of a radical, positivist, secular and Orientalist narrative of Islam and more recently due to acts of violence in the name of Islam—and has demonstrated the complementarity of Islam and modernity. This reconciliation of faith and reason—both in terms of theory and action—solves a conundrum that has plagued the Islamic scholars for long.

Çetin’s Gulen Movement: Civic Service Without Borders is an important contribution to a chain of literature that has surfaced on the GM in recent years. The title itself is an indication that the author sees the movement in transnational perspective and attempts to uplift the movement from “its narrow Turkish national location,” which is otherwise a dominant trend in the scholarly writings on the GM. Though the author did locate the emergence of GM in the national-political context of modern Turkey, the “Islamic civil ethic” or “service ethic”—what is called hizmet in Gulen’s Islamic philosophy—has inherent potential to outgrow the originating national-political context.

No scholarly work on Islamic movements in modern Turkey is possible without a reference to the background of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi and his work. Nursi was a remarkable scholar of twentieth-century Turkey who, through his Risale-i Nur collection of epistles on Qur’anic thought, preserved the religious spirit in the secularizing society. However the near absence of reference of Nursi’s work in this book is surprising. This may be partly due to author’s approach and methodology that treats GM as social phenomenon rather than a religious phenomenon. This approach helps the reader to understand Gulen and the Hizmet movement that has flourished around his ideas and inspirations as a transnational social service movement. Çetin thus circumvents misperceptions that are very likely to arise from exclusively religious labels and associations. The Islamic dimension of the GM comes through the inspirational and motivational dimension of Islamic history and Islam-inspired values that Gulen utilizes in constructing a non-violent, peaceful, multicultural world. All this is done without having an exclusively “Islamic project,” which is otherwise the hallmark of political or cultural-social Islamic movements throughout the world.

The strength of Çetin’s book lies in his comprehensive treatment of the GM. This is one of the first scholarly works that provide a detailed description of diverse features within the GM. Most of the previous works on this subject matter has dealt with one or another aspect of the GM. This integrated approach helps in enriching the understanding of the full breadth of the movement. Using the framework of multi-causality, or what author called “syncretic perspective,” Çetin first examined the dominant social movement theories (particularly, Resource Mobilization theory, Political Opportunity theory and Frame theory) and found them inadequate in explaining a faith-based movement such as the GM in non-Western societies. These theories, according to the author, suffer from the limitation of a political economy perspective that does not take into consideration the role of a “subjective idea” or at best treats it as a “dependent variable” in the emergence of a particular social phenomenon or movement. But this restrictive theoretical framework is incapable of comprehending the non-conflictual, voluntary, philanthropist, altruist, faith-based GM as political economy theories primarily operate on the “principle of selective cooperation and opposition” to state actions. The author strongly contends that the GM has registered a strong social presence (in people’s consciousness) through chains of study centers, publishing houses, periodicals, training and scholarship, institutions for preparatory courses for university entrance exams, healthcare facilities, dormitories for the students, aid to poor and vulnerable sections of society, press and media organs and other socio-educational public institutions. This social position was established before the GM became highly visible in the public sphere in Turkey and Çetin rejects the perspective that links the emergence of the GM with the recognition and tacit support of state institutions, particularly in the 1980s, a period marked by “Islamic-Turkish synthesis nationalism.” Rather, the author exposes the politics of the elite, or what he called the “protectionist group,” in the name of “secularism” and “nationalism” in order to perpetuate its hold over the resources of the country and to this end long throttled the emergence of the democratic potential of Turkish society. It was Gulen’s Islamic mediated ideas, viewpoints, ethical and moral messages and the GM’s plethora of associated educational and social activities, which were/are conducted with sensitivity to “due process of law” and legal diligence, that gradually brought a shift in normative-cultural meaning of life that focuses on the cooperative instincts of human beings, the value of living together, dialogue and respect for multiple identities, which in turn also affected people’s perceptions and norms of “politics” and “development” and in the process refashioned the public space and revitalized and consolidated the process of democratization.

Çetin tries to envision—though more elaboration is needed—Gulen’s humanitarian ideas as an alternative theory for constructing a human society based on principles of cooperative instincts, the ethics of self sacrifice, and the compassionate behavior of human beings—a theory over against the modernist assumption that treats human beings as primarily selfish, egoistic, conflictual, hedonistic, and violent, naturally needing to be controlled and disciplined through coercion and indoctrination in order to create the kind of order found in the mechanized, contractual human society. This partly also explains why Gulen’s philosophy, like that of Mahatma Gandhi, does not evoke the perception of the “other.” Unlike many contemporary Islamic movements, Gulen does not see the West as the “threatening other” but a source of many positive values that Muslims need to reflect upon.

Combining the framework of a “material-ideational matrix” with an outsider-insider perspective and drawing largely from an empirical investigation based on interviews and questionnaires, the author seeks to explain both the emergence of the GM primarily as a “cultural actor” and also its multifaceted dimensions: democratic, participatory, peaceful, non-violent, insistent on working within the legal framework of the political system, voluntary and autonomous participation, lacking any organizational power, non-political, non-ideological, absence of any central text, non-requirement of formal membership, no ritual, no insignia, etc. In summary, the movement aims at the moral and ethical transformation of the individual self in the light of Islamic values and norms in order to sensitize the individual self about the “goodness” of collective civil action without politicizing the same or stimulating an expectation of material gain. The quotation by Çetin as highlighted in the beginning of this review best captures the mood, orientation, and thrust of the GM.

A cursory reading of this book gives an impression that Nursi’s search for “unity of heart and mind” has found a place in the GM. However, since this book studies the GM from a social movement theory, it does not deal with the key concepts or doctrine of Fethullah Gulen or even his philosophy of education—the most important dimension of the GM upon which rests the creation of Gulen’s “golden generation” that will shape the future world. The notion of hizmet, or ethic of service, is an Islamic value as old as Islam itself, exemplified in the institution of waqf. What, therefore, explains the re-emergence of an ethic of service as a central category in Gulen’s Islamic thought and the wider dissemination and acceptance of this value as an “everyday Islamic working value?” In this regard, the book does not address the question of “how and why?”—the agency, processes and reasons for the emergence of the GM—but describes and narrates only the “what?” about the movement.

No single book is sufficient to cover all aspects of a social phenomenon as global as the GM; thus, having read this book, the reader is still left with some difficult, unanswered questions: Why will the moral and ethical values which are deeply embedded in Gulen’s notion of hizmet, philanthropy, altruism, and voluntarism resonate with large masses in today’s context? Is the GM a postmodern phenomenon? Is it an Islamic movement, a social movement, or something in between? Is it a class-based or multiclass phenomenon? What is the dominant social base of this movement? Has the GM adopted the postmodern conceptions of life process that reject nation-centered discourse and focus on people-centered discourse, which, in turn, might partly explain its success and appeal?

Despite such questions unaddressed, the book is a must-read for all students and scholars who have an interest in discourse about social change.

Anwar Alam
Professor and Director, Centre for West Asia Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi