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		<title>The Anchoring Effect How Our Prior Knowledge Affects Our Perception</title>
		<link>https://fountainmagazine.com/all-issues/2011/issue-82-july-august-2011/the-anchoring-effect-how-our-prior-knowledge-affects-our-perception/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Louima Cunningham]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Jul 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Issue 82 (July - August 2011)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[anchor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[anchoring]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[asked]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cognition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cognitive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[decision]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[effect]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[estimate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Evaluation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[human]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[information]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[memory]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[months]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[people]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[person]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[prior]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[processes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[processing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Psychology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[resources]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[social]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://107.21.79.195/all-issues/2011/issue-82-july-august-2011/the-anchoring-effect-how-our-prior-knowledge-affects-our-perception/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Evaluations and decisions play an important role in our social life. As we want our evaluations to be accurate and decisions to be fair, so we also want the evaluations of others about us to be accurate and their decisions about us to be fair. But what if there are hidden psycho-social processes quietly working [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Evaluations and decisions play an important role in our social life. As we want our evaluations to be accurate and decisions to be fair, so we also want the evaluations of others about us to be accurate and their decisions about us to be fair. But what if there are hidden psycho-social processes quietly working in the human mind that affect these evaluations and cause them to be biased? What if these affect good-intentioned people and lead to serious consequences? What are those processes and what can we do about them? We better start by illustrating what we mean.</p>
<p>In a study conducted by social psychologists Tversky and Kahneman, people were asked to guess the percentage of African nations that were members of the United Nations. Two groups were first asked to estimate whether this number was lower or higher than a threshold: the first group was asked whether it is more or less than 45 percent and the second group was asked whether it is more or less than 65 percent. Then both groups were asked to give their estimates of the actual percentage. The researchers demonstrated that the group that was given the lower threshold estimated a lower value for the actual percentage of African nations that are members of the United Nations. The group that was given the higher threshold estimated a higher percentage. The pattern has held in other experiments for a wide variety of different subjects of estimation. A bias in the estimation of African members of the United Nations may not sound like a big deal, but how about decisions that affect people’s lives seriously?</p>
<p>Consider sentencing in court trials. Social psychologist Mussweiler and colleagues asked trial judges with more than 15 years of experience to consider sentencing demands made by non-experts in a legal crime case before issuing a final sentence. The two sentencing demands were 34 months and 12 months. The judges, despite their experience and despite the fact that the crime was the same, were influenced by the demands. Judges who considered the high demand of 34 months prior to their decision gave final sentences that were almost 8 months longer than judges who considered a low demand of 12 months initially. If prior exposure to a piece of information can make a difference as much as 8 more months in prison, then we ought to know what is going on. The examples above illustrate a psychological heuristic known as “anchoring and adjustment.” The heuristic suggests that when faced with a decision-making or estimation situation, people start with an anchor, or a reference point, and make adjustments to it to reach their final estimate. The anchor serves as a first approximation and then the person makes adjustments to it to reach a final estimate or decision. Why does the human mind utilize this heuristic? The answer is simple—we do not always have a whole lot of information to reach an accurate estimate or best decision.</p>
<p>Therefore, the mind sometimes needs shortcuts, especially under pressing circumstances. To understand this process, let’s have a look at the limitations of human cognition. Models of human cognition Cognitive psychologists and sociologists have worked to develop models of human social cognition. These models emphasize four aspects of our social cognition, which is the way we perceive others. The first is the role of prior knowledge versus information immediately available. For example, when we see a policeman directing the traffic, we use our prior knowledge in our perception. We may assume that he is carrying a gun and he has communications equipment to talk with his station. We deduce these features from our prior knowledge about the traffic police, even if we may not be in a position to observe that particular policeman’s gun or communications device. Relying on prior information in our judgments is called “top-down” processing as opposed to “bottom-up” or data-driven processing. Typically, relying on top-down processing, such as relying on stereotypes, requires fewer processing resources.</p>
<p>The second aspect is the limitation of our cognitive processing capacity. The human cognitive system is modeled to consist of our sensory organs, a sensory register (memory) that temporarily stores our perceptions of external stimuli, a short-term memory, a long-term memory, attention resources and executive control processes. When we receive information in the form of audio-visual or other sensory stimuli, they are processed by our cognitive system and transferred to our short-term memory. Through a process of encoding and categorization, the information is organized and stored in the long-term memory. A part of the long-term memory is “active” or readily accessible. Our further use of information in our long-term memory activates the information, and the lack of use deactivates it, making it less readily accessible. Our behavioral response results from our processing of information. According to this information-processing model of human cognition, the amount of information that can be processed by our cognitive system is restricted in terms of storage, flow and inference (Huitt, 2003).</p>
<p>The third aspect is the amount of cognitive processing that is determined by capacity (amount of free resources) and motivation. Factors such as interest, importance, and relevance determine the motivation to allocate more cognitive resources. We are more likely to devote more cognitive processing resources to subjects that are more interesting, important or relevant in our judgment. The fourth aspect is the interplay between automatic and controlled processing. Automatic processes require fewer resources. Given our limited processing capacity, time and other types of constraints have consequences for our cognitive processing. Under constraints, most individuals tend to simplify their processing by relying on less information, relying on automatic cognitive processes as opposed to conscious ones, or relying on prior information as opposed to information available in the circumstances. Anchoring is one such a simplification. The nature of the situation we are facing will determine which of these mechanisms will be selected. They will be reused or abandoned depending on whether they provide a sound basis for our responses to the social environment. If the simplifications lead to interpretations that harm us, we are likely to abandon them. If, on the other hand, there is no harm or there is a benefit, then we are likely to reuse those simplifications.</p>
<p>Anchoring effect Anchoring is defined as the effect of a prior judgment of an object, the anchor, on our future judgments regarding another object. These judgments may be about a numerical value, a probability, or even a moral or legal judgment. As an example, consider the situation where people are asked whether the population of a city is greater than or smaller than a value. Let’s say two groups of people are asked the same question with two anchors: Group A is asked whether the population of Houston is more than or less than 500,000. Group B is asked whether the population of Houston more than or less than 2,000,000. In this example, the values of 500,000 and 2,000,000 serve as anchors. Both groups are then asked: What is your estimate of the population of Houston? Experiments indicate that the people who were given the lower anchor on average give a lower estimate for the population and vice versa. How does anchoring happen? Cognitive psychologists tell us that human judgment is essentially relative or comparison based, even if we are not asked to make a comparison explicitly. So, in evaluating the present object or person, our minds search for an anchor. A particular anchor may be selected because it is readily accessible, because it is suggested to us, or “self-generated via an insufficient adjustment process” (Mussweiler et al). Our prior cognitive processing of the anchor increases the accessibility of anchor-consistent knowledge, which influences our subsequent judgments. For example, when we meet a person from a country, the first person we met from that country may become our anchor. If we had a positive experience with the first person, we are likely to interpret the actions of this new person with a positive light. While cognitive heuristics such as anchoring help us make quick decisions under constraints, they may also lead to errors. The price we pay for the economy provided by the heuristics is “systematically biased judgments under certain conditions.” (Bless et al., p. 24). For instance, a car dealer may offer you a very high price as an anchor and ask you to make a counter offer. Experiments have demonstrated that under such circumstances, the value of the initial offer has a significant effect on what people will be willing to pay for the final price of the car. If the initial offer is very high, the customer is likely to accept a higher negotiated price and vice versa. The anchoring effect can also be observed when we take a few characteristics of a person and consciously or subconsciously fit them to a stereotype.</p>
<p>In such cases, we may misperceive their motivations or misunderstand their circumstances. Sometimes the anchor can be manipulated by some person other than ourselves, as in the case of the car dealer. Sometimes, we may pick the anchor unintentionally based on information obtained from the mass media. As the mass media tend to focus on rare events that tend to be negative, the stereotypes formed based on information solely derived from the mass media may be misleading (Said, 1997). What are some of the lessons we can derive from our discussion of the anchoring effect? For one, we need to point the mirror at ourselves and ask: Are we forming stereotypes of others that may be inaccurate? Are we influenced by the anchoring effect in our judgment of other people? To see whether we may have anchors for evaluating people of different backgrounds consider your initial thoughts about Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Americans, Russians, Asians, Africans, Mexicans, etc. Are these anchors based on scientific data or news media coverage of events or personal encounters with one or more individuals? It may be infeasible to try to collect encyclopedic information about every nationality, religion, or culture that we encounter. But in matters that impact our society we ought to do a better job of researching a diversity of resources. But perhaps a more important lesson is this—the anchoring effect is here to stay as part of the reality of human cognition. If we would like to provide accurate, reliable information to people about ourselves, our culture and values, we should reach them before they form a negative anchor or stereotype. If we would like our cultural background, religion, or values to be understood without distortion, we need to reach out to as many people as possible around us and interact with them. We need to hold conversations, and share meaningful experiences with them to anchor their future judgments in an accurate reference point. The anchoring effect is demonstrated to be pervasive and robust in psychology. It is not likely to disappear in the foreseeable future. However, we do have the opportunity to reach out and help form positive anchors for better human relationships.</p>
<h3>Further reading</h3>
<ul>
<li>Bless, H., Fiedler, K., Strack, F. 2004. Social Cognition, New York: Taylor and Francis.</li>
<li>Huitt, W. 2003. The Information Processing Approach to Cognition. Educational Psychology Interactive. Valdosta, GA: Valdosta State University.</li>
<li>Mussweiler, T., &amp; Strack, F. 2001. The Semantics of Anchoring. Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, 86, 234–255.</li>
<li>Said, E. 1997. Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, New York: Random House.</li>
</ul>
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>English Converts to Islam</title>
		<link>https://fountainmagazine.com/all-issues/1994/issue-7-july-september-1994/english-converts-to-islam/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Louima Cunningham]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Jul 1994 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Issue 7 (July - September 1994)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Belief]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[church]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cognitive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[concerns]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conversion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[converts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[distress]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[emotional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[english]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[god]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[islam]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[life]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[people]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[personal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[prior]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Religion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[religious]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[reported]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[turmoil]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://107.21.79.195/all-issues/1994/issue-7-july-september-1994/english-converts-to-islam/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The current number of English converts to Islam is estimated at around 3,000-5,000 and their number seems to be relatively increasing (McHugh, 1990:36). Converts range from local women who have adopted Islam to a greater or lesser extent of commitment upon marrying a Muslim (Ball, 1987: 21) to British intellectuals who are highly articulate in [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The current number of English converts to Islam is estimated at around 3,000-5,000 and their number seems to be relatively increasing (McHugh, 1990:36). Converts range from local women who have adopted Islam to a greater or lesser extent of commitment upon marrying a Muslim (Ball, 1987: 21) to British intellectuals who are highly articulate in expressing their views on a variety of matters (Johnstone, 1981: 181). Most converts came to know Islam through personal contact with Muslims and this plays a significant role in their conversion. The proportion of men to women is almost in balance. Many are middle-aged people who lived through the hippie generation of the sixties and seventies. Disgusted with Western materialism, they came to Islam in search of spiritual enlightenment. Sufism plays a significant role in the conversion experiences of many people to Islam. Sufi groups seem to be attracting more converts in comparison with other Muslim groups in Britain. Such a Sufi group is that of the North Cyprus based Naqshbandiyyah sheikh, Sheikh Nazim, who regularly visits Britain.</p>
<p>English converts have been the topic of a recent research. The research was based on formal interviews with 70 converts; 50 males and 20 females. Their ages range from 17 to 66 years. The major objective of this research was to observe and record the conversion phenomenon of English converts to Islam and to provide the reasons underlying them. The research endeavoured to understand the psychological and sociological roots of conversion, to find out converts’ background, and the conversion processes they went through. For this end the whole lifespan of the converts was examined.</p>
<h3><b>Religion of Upbringing</b></h3>
<p>English converts seem to have come from families where there was no strong identification with any religion. They mostly come from families that did not belong to a church, or, were not active participants in a church. Most describe their parents’ connection with the church in terms of ceremonial attendance like weddings and funerals. When classified according to religion of upbringing 51(73%) of the 70 were Church of England; 12 (17%) were Catholics; 3 (4%) were Methodists; 4 (6%) were Jews. Significantly, 17 (24.3%) had parents religiously heterogeneous such as mother being Church of England and father Agnostic, or mother being Catholic and father Church of England. And 5 (7%) described one parent being atheist or agnostic. 36 (51.4%) said that they had ‘no’ or ‘weak’ religious upbringing. 20 (28.6%) answered ‘normal’ while only 14 (20%) described it as ‘strong’.</p>
<h3><b>Religious Affiliation Prior to Conversion</b></h3>
<p>Converts were quite explicit concerning their general dissatisfaction with their previous religious beliefs. Only 8 (11%) mentioned that they were practising their religion of origin prior to conversion. 32 (46%) reported being nominal, weak or disillusioned with their old religion. 16 (23%) had no religion or were not interested in religion at all. And 14 (20%) were involved with a religious movement, such as Hare Krishna and Divine Light Mission, prior to conversion. As for ‘belief in God’, 58 (83%) reported that they believed in God, 9 (13%) lost their belief in God, while 3 (4%) were not sure if they believed or not.</p>
<p>As the above figures illustrate, it is interesting that for a significant number of converts’ rejection of the faith of their parents or culture did not imply a rejection of religion in general or loss of belief in God. 14 (20%) proceeded to explore other religious alternatives following their initial rejection of a particular faith. As for religious affiliations and belief in God prior to conversion, and what conversion meant for these people in terms of these areas, they may be classified into three groups:</p>
<p>1) Those who had no religious commitment for a long time or described themselves as nominal in their religion of origin. People who fall into this group form the vast majority (75%). For them conversion meant a religious intensification, not through the religion of childhood, but through a different religion.</p>
<p>2) Those who described themselves as religious for a long period of time, but became disillusioned later on and were on the brink of losing their belief in their religion prior to conversion. Around 12% fall into this group.</p>
<p>3) Those who lost belief in God after rejecting their religion. For them, conversion meant rediscovering belief in God and returning to the way of God. Around 13% fall into this category.</p>
<p>Wilson (1976: 19-21), in discussing the effects of secularization on modern society illustrates how moral control by religion gave way to modern society’s mechanical and bureaucratic devices, and how everyday life has been demoralized as human involvement in many areas of activity was replaced by technical controls. Arguing the decreasing role of the church in England, Wilson asserts that ‘people have what might be called an ‘office’ conception of the Church, a service facility that is well distributed over the land area of the country to be available when needed.’ The converts’ accounts confirm that over-secularization led them to seek an alternative way of life. They believe that Islam gave them a practical means of getting closer to God living a good life, and getting peace in ‘this secular environment’. They became interested in Islam in the first place because they felt that Islam has strong clear values on things they feel concerned about, not just the abuse of environment, but even things like homosexuality. Their revolt is not always directed against religious beliefs but against certain practices legitimized by Christianity and its Church. While giving their accounts on their previous life, the converts emphasized that they felt a need for a religion whereby they could orient their everyday life and they preferred Islam because it is a complete way of life not a compartmentalized religion confined to certain areas, as Sarah pointed out: ‘As an ex-Christian I now see Christianity as just a religion, but Islam, as I understand, is the way you live. It is a different approach. For instance, you can be a Christian and you can do almost everything, and you can say you are a Christian happily. But if you are Muslim, it is different, you are restricted in that matter.’</p>
<p>They felt that something was missing, and that was the influence of religion in their lives. Before coming to Islam they started criticising the existing religion and its culture and began having certain affinities and world views closer to that of Islam which eventually made a possible correlation between their views and Islam.</p>
<p>Some of those who were involved or became interested in new religions were in search of an alternative to the secular way of life with a strong reaction to the materialistic and secular perspective of the society. Garry, for example, became a Zen-Buddhist in a university when he came to believe that spirituality was lacking in the teaching system. Yet Garry found Zen-Buddhism monastic, not encompassing the social dimension of life. He said: ‘It could answer personal questions, but it couldn’t answer global questions.’</p>
<h3><b>Socio-demographic Factors</b></h3>
<p>Contrary to the assumption that most of the people who join an alien religion or so-called new religious movement are dropouts from society, converts to Islam can in no way be seen as such. On the contrary, their educational and work careers are quite normal. They achieved significantly higher levels of education than those typical for their population as a whole. 60 percent had at least a bachelor’s degree. Indeed, 20 percent had advanced graduate degrees. Converts to Islam tend to come from the middle class section of the society. 46 (66%) associated themselves with the middle class, while 24 (34%) identified with the working class. They seem to have a wide range of occupations which vary from taxi drivers to university lecturers. As for marital status, 40 people were single at the time of conversion. 23 were married or engaged (14 to Muslims, and 9 to non-Muslims), and 7 were divorcees.</p>
<h3><b>Emotional and Cognitive Concerns</b></h3>
<p>A significant number of the testimonials covered accounts on troubled lives before entrance into Islam. The pre-conversion life of nearly half of the converts (48.6%) was judged to contain emotional distress. For them this period of their lives seems to have led them to look for something. For one fifth of the sample the emotional turmoil that characterized their descriptions of their childhood and adolescence was also apparent in the immediate antecedents to the conversion experience. Their unhappiness was, in most cases, caused by parental marriages which either ended up in divorce or nearly broke up, and they described it as the major trauma of their lives. 13 (18.6%) divorced or had a broken relationship before conversion and this caused long-term emotional turmoil and anxiety. Some converts said that they were grateful to God to have experienced such distressful incidents because it was these events that sparked them into thinking about religion.</p>
<p>The conversion experience may be related to emotional turmoil or personal distress experienced in the immediate preconversion period. However, the accounts of the converts to Islam suggest that conversions did not occur as a direct result of the emotional turmoil or personal distress, although 34 (48.6%) reported emotional distress prior to conversion. It may be associated with conversion, but it is not necessarily a predisposing condition. In the preconvert there may be an unconscious conflict, and a psychological set, but these factors, alone, in many cases, are not enough. There must be a current force which lights the fuse. That fuse took the form of cognitive and existential questions. The course that the pre-conversion period takes in many cases is that the emotional turmoil or personal distress of the individual leads him to a stage where he develops cognitive concerns.</p>
<p>Cognitive quest, for the converts to Islam, contained concerns or preoccupation with political, social, and moral issues, and religious doubts. Existential concerns cover questions like ‘What is the meaning and purpose of my life?’, ‘How does one deal with the fact that he is going to die?’, and ‘What should one do about his shortcomings?’. 33 (47.1%) reported preoccupation with cognitive concerns. They reported feelings of aimlessness, lack of purpose or direction and meaning, and of incompleteness, which mainly arose out of cognitive and existential concerns. These people believe that the cognitive problems that used to bother them are met by conversion to Islam because it offered them a complete philosophy of life; it proclaimed the responsibility of man, a future life, and a day of judgement. It answered their questions like ‘What is man’s place in the universe?’, and ‘What is his relationship with the world around him.’ Cognitive quests also revealed ambiguities in one’s belief system. These ambiguities were anchored during adolescence, but revived later in life when one became actively involved in life situations and felt an urge to have a faith, or a need to return to religion. Until this stage of their life these people seemed not to have bothered about religion, but at this stage when these needs became more manifest they re-questioned their previous beliefs and as a result they either felt confused or they decided to give them up entirely. The ambiguities with regard to their previous religious beliefs, namely Christianity, centred around some basic concepts of Christianity and its theological implications such as Trinity, Jesus being the Son of God, original sin, atonement theory, and the intercession of the clergy. Some criticisms also focused on perceived hypocrisy in mainstream churches and their incapacity to lead the people in moral issues.</p>
<p>(to be continued)</p>
<h3><b>References</b></h3>
<ul>
<li><em>BALL, H. (1987) Why British Women Embrace Islam?, Leicester: Muslim Youth Educational Council.</em></li>
<li>JOHNSTONE, P. (1981) ‘Christians and Muslims in Britain’, Islamochristiana, No.7, pp.67-99.</li>
<li>MCHUGH, F. (1990) ‘Allah’s English Daughters’, Telegraph Weekend Magazine, 31 March, pp.34-S.</li>
<li>WILSON, B. (1976) Contemporary Transformation of Religion, Oxford: Clerandon.</li>
</ul>
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