The spread of Islam would obviously not have occurred without its Prophet, Muhammad, who was able to win support for his spiritual and political status within Arabia in the early seventh century. After having claimed to receive divine revelations, Muhammad slowly acquired a small following and eventually some seventy families had converted to Islam. However, not all of his contemporaries were convinced of the genuineness of his message. This was especially true of the pagan rulers of his Quraysh tribe in Mecca. Consequent persecutions caused the early Muslims to flee to Yathrib, which was located 250 miles north of Mecca. Yet, what appeared to be a backward move for the early believers actually benefited them and their religion as the tribes around Yathrib were enthralled by Muhammad’s spiritual vision and pledged allegiance to the ummah (community). A series of conflicts between the Quraysh and Muslims climaxed in 630 when the Quraysh broke an earlier peace treaty that had been established. This saw Muhammad march upon Mecca with 10,000 men and take the city without bloodshed. He then destroyed the idols around the Kabah and rededicated it to God. By the time of Muhammad’s death in 632, as Karen Armstrong explains, “almost all the tribes of Arabia had joined the ummah as Confederates or as converted Muslims.” As history will show, this was not the end of this remarkable series of events. For unification of Arabia would not cease at the death of the founder of Islam but would rather dramatically gain momentum through his successors, the Caliphs.

With the combination of three important factors: unification, conquest, and religious zeal, the early Caliphs were able to consolidate Muslim rule in Arabia and prepare a launching pad for further conquests. This initial spread of Islam was so rapid that, as H. U. Rahman explains, “in less than one century after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD, Muslim rule covered more of the earth than had the Roman Empire at its peak.” This unification did not however happen overnight, and it must be emphasized that Islamic rulers always had much division to contend with. The first Caliph, Abu Bakr, had the difficult job of uniting all of the tribes that had forsaken their allegiance to the ummah after Muhammad’s death. Yet through political, theological, and at times military coercion, Abu Bakr was able to completely unify Arabia before his death in 634. Secondly, despite the assassinations of the next three caliphs – Umar, Uthman, and Ali – which characterizes the bloody period that ensued, the spread of Islam continued to gain momentum as successful military campaigns were carried out abroad. From 634–44, the Caliphate of Umar had conquered Jerusalem, controlled Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, and defeated the Persian Empire. Furthermore, in Uthman’s reign (644–50), Muslims conquered Cyprus, Tripoli in North Africa, and established Islamic rule in Iran, Afghanistan, and the Sind region. The above two methods of internal unification and successful conquest led to the establishment of the Islamic world during the seventh century, and the speed in which it accomplished this announced to the world that Islam was here – and here to stay.

The third explanation of the rapid spread of Islam throughout Arabia and beyond was – most importantly – the religious zeal of the leaders, soldiers, and general Arab population. Plainly put, without being fuelled with a sense that God was on their side, the Muslim conquests would have fallen far short of their eventual reality. Tamara Sonn explains that the basic tenets of Islamic faith captivated the people and structured Islamic life in Medina, and it was around these practices and core values that the early Muslim community was built. Francesco Gabrieli supports Sonn and places a heavy emphasis on religion as the principal factor underlying and motivating the Arab conquests. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any group achieving geographical expansion without a clear goal and purpose; for the Mongols of the thirteenth century it was a brutal ideological reason, whilst for the Muslims it was the feeling that they were being divinely guided.

Nevertheless the spread of a religious or ideological ideal can only be truly successful if those whom it is trying to gain submission from are disillusioned or unhappy with their own contemporary world. This was the case for the many thousands of people under Byzantine rule. We find that a great number gladly adhered to the conquering Islamic rulers and Quranic law as they found protection and benefits that had not been attained under Byzantine rule. Many minorities had become increasingly dissatisfied with the Byzantine regime due to their insecurities of being persecuted and instead came to favor the secure Islamic rulership who allowed autonomy for minority groups if their taxes were paid. The preference of many of the conquered peoples to favor Islamic rule enabled the Islamic Empire to remain politically stable, which is a prerequisite for any group wanting to expand its geographic borders.

Turning back the clock to the infant stages of Islam, we find that the Muslims were fraught with political struggles for power. With factions developing within the Islamic world following Ali’s assassination (the fourth Caliph) in 661, the unity and prosperity of the new Islamic Empire became threatened. However, it was the way that the Muslims were efficiently able to get back on their feet and consolidate unity that saw these power struggles, which had the potential to dismantle Islamic hopes for expansion, averted. The Islamic world needed a leader who could unite as many of these factions together as possible, and this stability came with the establishment of the Ummayad Dynasty through Muawiyyah I. He ruled from 661–80 and was the first Caliph to move his capital away from Medina, transferring it to Damascus. However unpopular this move was, R. Stephen Humphreys explains that Muawiyyah I saved the Muslim Empire from disintegration as he was, “the only man with the political and military resources available to restore unity within the realm of Islam.” Although the Umayyad period is typically characterized by political and military success, the Umayyad rulers did not forget its founding religion. According to Karen Armstrong, Muawiyyah I was simply “a religious man and a devout Muslim.” Furthermore, a statement of Islam’s superiority to past religions was symbolically made through the establishment of the Dome of the Rock, which was completed at Jerusalem in 691 under Caliph Abd al-Malik. This spiritual construction shows that Islamic rulers could not go forward unless they acknowledged the close relationship between conquest and the Muslim religion, and this was done most emphatically with the construction of this monument.

Despite geographical consolidations made by the early Umayyad Caliphs, discontent remained within the Islamic world with several extremist groups emerging regularly in Islamic culture. This was perhaps a catalyst for Umayyad leaders having a more political conception of Islam than did previous rulers. Although the discontentment of factions within the Islamic world, such as the Shias, could not be eradicated, internal stability generally emerged at the commencement of the Umayyad Dynasty. Paul Lunde explains that the pacification of the central lands under early Umayyad rulers enabled them to focus primarily on conquest so that the spread of Islam could continue. Furthermore, according to Armstrong, conquest was able to be successfully waged during al-Walid I’s reign between 705–715 where the Umayyad dynasty reached its peak and the Muslim armies continued the conquest of North Africa, and established a kingdom in Spain. However, even though the Umayyad Dynasty had expanded its Islamic borders throughout the Arab world, its power soon declined, as internal friction had finally reached unmanageability. Then, the Umayyads – somewhat inevitably – succumbed to the overwhelming power of the Abbasids in 750.

Even though the overthrow of the Umayyad family by the Abbasids was horrific and angered many, this brutal act did not slow the continual geographical or economical gains of Islam. In fact, at the height of Abbasid power in 800 (who had moved the Islamic capital to Baghdad in 762) only Constantinople and Xian, the capital of the great T’ang China, rivaled Baghdad’s wealth. Although military might was the predominant vehicle of Islamic power, the strength of Muslims at the zenith of Abbasid power in the ninth century was represented through a great cultural renaissance which took place in literary criticism, philosophy, poetry, and science. This marked the beginnings of “Muslim genius” as individuals such as Abu Bakr Al Razi (864–925) studied medicine and uncovered unique contraceptive methods; and Abu Nasr Al Farabi (870–950) incorporated logic and politics into philosophy. As Armstrong explains, such was the grandeur of this era that the Muslim scholars made more scientific discoveries during this time than in the whole previously recorded history put together. Hence, these examples symbolize the prestige of the superpower Abbasid Empire of the old world, which asserted itself not only through military conquests but through cultural and scientific discovery.

However, despite the Abbasid period reaching new heights in regards to its geographical expansion, it too slowly declined in prestige from about 935 and would soon be unable to hold off a young and powerful group of Muslims in the centuries to follow: the Turks.

Before the success of one final Islamic Empire is discussed, it is important to reflect on several other specific reasons why Islam spread so rapidly throughout Arabia and to the whole world. Three of these deserve particular mention. First, the Caliphs and Muslim rulers were willing to use existing administrative structures to enforce laws, and it was not uncommon for non-Islamic officials to be used in high places within a conquered society. Second, there was seldom force or coercion used from Islamic forces once a military campaign was successful. As Francesco Gabrieli explains, the traditional theory of the conquests being characterized merely by Bedouin neophytes of Islam rushing from their desert birthplace to convert other nations with the sword has been completely dismissed by modern historiography. In fact, Arabs were quite content with their passive non-Muslim subjects known as dhimmis (those who were second-class citizens under Islamic law, yet protected under this status) and no real effort was made to convert them. This hands-off approach actually led to an increase in Islamic converts regularly throughout the Islamic Empire as individuals were pleased to make their own decision about religion, which is something that had not been afforded them under Byzantine rule.

Finally, further comparisons between Byzantine Christianity and Islam highlight how many became turned off by Christendom but enthusiastic and inquisitive about Islam. Christianity had become heavily clericized by the seventh century and appeared to be exclusive, whilst Islam appealed to individuals by offering unparalleled simplicity through its core principles. According to Abul-Fazl Ezzati, the five pillars of Islam, when compared to Christian orthodoxy, “replaced complexity of religious doctrines with simplicity, trinity with unity, empty theological discussions with concrete observation and fundamental analysis.” Moreover, the extent and rapidity of the success of Islamic military conquests had Muslims feeling that there was something divine aiding their cause. Zealous Muslims and their missionary activities always went hand in hand with the success of Islam and this sense of mission motivated Muslims to assist the expansion efforts in whatever way they could. Hence, Islam appealed to many contemporaries’ needs and with the lure of further expansion, many felt that Islam was the path for the future.

With this understanding in mind, we can finally return to the last great Islamic Empire of the ancient world through looking at the Ottoman Empire. Although Islam had by no means died out in terms of its expansion after Abbasid rule, it had clearly slowed by the fourteenth century. As Armstrong explains, from 935 onwards, “the caliphs no longer (wielded) temporal power but merely (retained) a symbolic authority. Real power now resided with the local rulers, who established dynasties in various parts of the empire.” Moreover, with the addition of the Mongol raids, which began in 1220, Islamic cities became desolate and the spread of Islam was curtailed for the first time in centuries as attention was turned to internal frontiers. However, a final thrust of Islamic expansion would occur through the Ottoman Empire, who slowly consolidated its own power in Anatolia, and by the late fourteenth century had begun to threaten Europe. One of the early Sultans, Murad I (1360–1389), had become the most powerful of the western Muslim rulers and this led to the name of the Ottomans symbolizing hope for a reunified Islamic empire. This hope was fueled by geographical gains made through military expansion by several Ottoman Sultans, such as Murad I (1421–1451), who asserted Ottoman power against Hungary and the West and by 1453 his successor, Mehmed II, who had conquered Constantinople, changed its name to Istanbul, and made it the Ottoman capital. Accordingly, the Ottomans had recommenced Muslim expansion and would look to achieve something past Islamic Empires could not – to successfully challenge Western Europe.

Ottoman expansion continued with Suleiman the Magnificent (1520–66) whose Empire, after conquering Hungary in 1526, had become the greatest power in Eastern Europe. It is important to note here that Suleiman saw the consolidation of Islamic values as the key to his military successes. As Jason Goodwin explains, Suleiman, “oversaw the most detailed codification of sultanic and Quranic law that had ever been known in an Islamic state.” Hence, although the Ottoman Empire did not represent all Muslims, it is clear that great Sultans such as Suleiman did not forget the founder of their religion as they saw themselves as a genuine continuation of early Islamic history. Justin McCarthy puts it clearly for us – “the base of the Ottoman Empire was Islam. Religion was intimately bound up with the ideology and legitimacy of the government … Their Empire was always styled a Muslim empire, one in the line of Islamic empires that had included the Umayyads, the Abbasids, and the Seljuks.” We see once again here, this time under the rule of the Ottomans, that legitimacy and support of a great Islamic Empire went hand in hand with a reflection on the spiritual past of the Muslim tradition.

Nevertheless, during the latter stages of Ottoman rule, the sultans began looking too far outwardly and neglecting inner spirituality, which deadened the degree of support that Muslims would give it. This empire fatally climaxed when the Ottomans looked to secure further lands in Europe. Their efforts fell horribly short, and they lost a vital battle to the coalition of the Holy League in 1683 at Vienna. When they were forced to humiliatingly sign the Treaty of Carlowicz in 1699, they had to yield Ottoman Hungary to Austria, which was the first major Ottoman reversal. Although the Empire did not crumble overnight, this point marks the end of Ottoman expansion – and indeed Islamic expansion – and the beginning of its slow decline.

The powerful Islamic dynasties and empires finally came to an end with the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Yet the legacy that both it and previous rulerships had left behind was remarkable geographical expansion, which had emanated from a small tribe in Arabia. The spread of Islam was orchestrated through the close connection of most Muslims and their leaders to an Islamic way of life, which gave them a sense of purpose for their conquests and expansions. It is important to understand that this was not always done smoothly; the overthrows of Islamic Empires did not always happen peacefully and blood was often internally shed in order to propel a fresher and stronger willed Islamic group forward. Although much internal strife was a common characteristic of the Islamic Empires, the historical reality shows us that enough of the Muslim population was willing to forget past disagreements and get on with a common cause of conquering peoples and gaining territory. Yet the key to all of this success was surely the religious foundation of the Prophet and the early Caliphs. Through future Islamic rulers regularly reminding their adherents of their Prophet and of his message, the Muslims felt as if they were part of something greater than themselves. Despite religious zeal fluctuating from time to time, Islamic faith would always seem to be reinvigorated which led to grand Empires being established and Islamic history being created.

Paul Kearns has a major in history and English from Monash University, Melbourne.

Notes

1. Karen Armstrong, Islam: A Short History, New York, 2000, p. 12.

2. Ibid, 23.

3. H. U. Rahman, A Chronology of Islamic History: 570-1000 ce, London, 1989, p. vii.

4. Tamara Sonn, A Brief History of Islam, Oxford, 2004, p. 23.

5. Armstrong, 2000, pp. 27, 29.

6. Ibid, p. xiv.

7. Sonn, 2004, p. 22.

8. Francesco Gabrieli, Muhammad and the Conquests of Islam, London, 1968, p. 104.

9. Sonn, 2000, pp. 25, 34.

10. R. Stephen Humphreys. Mu‘awiya ibn Abi Sufyan: From Arabia to Empire, Oxford, 2006, p. 84.

11. Armstrong. 2000, p. 42.

12. Ibid, p. 44.

13. Gerald R. Hawting. The First Dynasty of Islam: The Umayyad Caliphate AD 661-750, London, 1986, p. 2.

14. Paul Lunde. Islam, London, 2002, p. 52.

15. Armstrong, 2000, p. 50.

16. Lunde, 2002, p. 56.

17. Akbar S. Ahmed. Discovering Islam: Making Sense of Muslim History and Society, London, 2002, pp. 44-5.

18. Armstrong, 2000, p. 56.

19. Ibid, p. 54.

20. Gabrieli, 1968, p. 105.

21. Ibid, p. 115.

22. Abul-Fazl Ezzati. An Introduction to the History of the Spread of Islam, London, 1978, p. 43.

23. Ibid, p. 3.

24. Armstrong, 2000, p. xix.

25. Sonn, 2000, p. 78.

26. Patrick Kinross. The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, New York, 1979, p. 187.

27. Jason Goodwin. Lords of the Horizon: A History of the Ottoman Empire, New York, 1998, p. 83.

28. Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History to 1923, London, 1997, p. 106.

29. Armstrong, 2000, p. xxvi.

The rule of Muslims represents a particular period in Spanish history. It was at this time that a substantial part of Spain, known back then as Al-Andalus, came under the control of various Islamic groups. The entire period of Islamic rule lasted from the first conquest in 711 to 1492 when the Christian King Ferdinand reconquered Granada (La Reconquista), thereby extinguishing the rule of Muslims (Crow 1985, p.78).

The Umayyad prince, Abd-ar-Rahman I, established himself as Emir of Cordoba in 756, after the Abbasids supplanted Umayyad rule in Syria (Fletcher 2000, p.64). The Umayyad dynasty first ruled as emirs (756–929), then as caliphs (929–1031), but eventually fell to the invading Berber tribes of North Africa, the Almoravids (1090–1147) and then the Almohads (1147–1248) (Fletcher 2000, p.64). The Muslims of Spain ushered in a period of great creativity and scholarship, in which significant advances in poetry, art, music, calligraphy, botany, historiography, medicine, mathematics, and astronomy were made (Fletcher 2000, p. 65).

Maria Rosa Menocal argues that Al-Andalus was a peaceful society in which Jewish people were free to practice their religion without being subject to the threat of forced conversion or persecution. She further claims that the rulers of Al-Andalus not only gave the Jews the right to maintain their religious identity, they also offered them the opportunity to fully involve themselves in what was then a predominantly Muslim society. Al-Andalus is, therefore, a truly unique example of religious toleration and cultural interaction, one which stands above all others in Medieval Europe.

Menocal claims that the Jews of Spain, that is the Sephardic Jews, enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy as they were considered to be people of a particular status. They were members of the Dhimmi, or “pact,” whereby the Muslim rulers agree to protect and care for non-Muslims insofar as they accede to the laws and regulations of the state (Menocal 2002, p.29). Jews, like Christians, are particularly important to this contract as they are “People of the Book” (Ahl al-Kitâb), the book being the Torah or the Bible, both of which are considered to have been revealed by God in Islam (Lassner 1999, p.106). As monotheistic religions of the Abrahamic tradition, Islam, Judaism and Christianity share common ground.That Spanish Jews were treated with respect by their Islamic rulers is evidenced by the way in which they were permitted to be directly involved in the political process. Menocal refers to several Jewish people who rose to claim positions in the Umayyad dynasty, one such person being Hasdai Ibn Shaprut.

Shaprut served as vizier to Caliph Abd-ar-Rahman III (911–961), while also acting as the “prince” or nasi of his own religious community (Menocal 2002, p.79). Shaprut, through his skill and intellect, was able to secure a position of considerable influence and prestige, while retaining his role as a representative of the Jewish community. He served the Umayyad rulers in a variety of ways, including several stints as a foreign ambassador and general secretary (Glick 1979, p.172). Menocal claims that this was not an unusual occurrence or isolated event as Al-Andalus was in fact a “world brightly lit for Jews,” in which they were free to participate in the politics of the state (Menocal 2002, p. 84).

Samuel Ibn Naghrela (Samuel the Nagid, or “prince”) also showed how a Jewish person was able to enjoy a position of power under Islamic rule. Born in 993, he pursued success in a number of fields including as a high-ranking official, poet, statesman and warrior. At thirty-four he was chosen as the first Nagid, or head of the Jewish community, and was later appointed as a vizier and prime minister of Granada (Menocal 2002, p. 104). Jewish people also served as viziers in Zaragoza, Seville, and Almeria during the Muslim rule (Perez 1993, p.10). They were also very active in the economy of Al-Andalus as they had “virtually unlimited opportunities in the booming commercial environment” (Menocal 2002, p. 85). Jewish people were allowed to pursue their vocational interests, and, in time, they came to dominate the financial and mercantile activity of the region (Glick 1979, p. 176).

Menocal attributes the success of the Jewish people in Islamic Spain to their willingness to assimilate, or be “Arabized.” Arabization is the process whereby the Jewish people of Spain sought to understand and to engage with Arabic culture-its language, art, tradition, and values- while still retaining their own sense of identity as a separate community. It is said that the potential for this style of acculturation was great because much of Islamic Spain was highly secular (Glick 1979, p.175). Therefore, the religious affiliation of the individual in Islamic Spain had far less importance, and thus far fewer consequences, than it did elsewhere.

The Jews of Spain excelled in many areas of their society, owing to the tolerance which they had been accorded by their Islamic rulers. They ensured a climate in which Muslims and Jews could live in a state of peaceful cooperation. This happened not by the imposition of one culture on that of another, but a cultural exchange wherein Jews were “able to openly observe and eventually enrich their Judaic and Hebrew heritage and at the same time fully participate in the general cultural and intellectual scene” (Menocal 2002, p. 87). Therefore it can be said that Spain, under the rule of Muslims, was quite tolerant of its Jewish population. The Jews, according to Menocal, did not have “to abandon their orthodoxy to be fully a part of the body politic and culture” (Menocal 2002, p. 86).

Maria Rosa Menocal offers a particular interpretation of this period, one that is certainly not shared by all. Bernard Lewis agrees that the Islamic rulers in Spain treated their Jewish counterparts with some degree of respect (Lewis 1984, p. 9). Lewis refers to the Qur’anic verse (11:62), “Those who believe [the Muslims], and those who profess Judaism, and the Christians and the Sabian, those who believe in God and the Last Day and act righteously, shall have their reward with their Lord,” as the injunction by which Muslims must treat Jews with tolerance (Lewis 1984, p. 13). But Lewis also sees the seeds of hostility and intolerance in the way Muslims treated Jews.

In reality, however, Jews, like Christians, were still defined by their supposed inferiority to that of the Muslim. They were possessors of a religion that was based on authentic revelation, but that incomplete or distorted. They had failed to realize God’s truth in its most perfect form, as it is in Islam.

Bernard Lewis does not limit his perspective to “religious inferiority.” He argues that Muslims restricted Jews’ movement into the wider community. According to him the poll tax, or jizya, a fixed tax that was to be paid by all non-Muslims to the Muslim rulers in return for certain immunities like not going to war, was a “symbolic expression of their (Jews) subordination” to the Muslims (Lewis 1984, p. 14). Restrictions, Lewis argues, were certainly not limited to fiscal servitude, but also applied to the way in which Jewish people conducted themselves in public and private life. A Jewish man could not enter into a marriage with a Muslim woman as that would make a Muslim subordinate to the will of a Dhimmi, though a Muslim man could marry a Jewish woman (Lewis 1984, p. 27).

Generally, the Jewish people were allowed to practice their religion and live according to the laws and scriptures of their community. Furthermore, the restrictions to which they were subject “were social and symbolic rather than tangible and practical in character” (Lewis 1984, p. 26). That is to say, these regulations served to define the relationship between the two communities, and not to oppress the Jewish population.

Norman Roth claims, much like Menocal, that the Jewish population was quite prominent in Spain during the Muslim rule. According to Roth, rarely did “Jews reach such prominent positions of power as they did in Al-Andalus” (Roth 1994, p. 79). This was due, in part, to the fact that they were perceived by the Muslims and Christians of Spain as being “neutral,” that is, without allegiance to either side (Roth 1994, p.79).

While Al-Andalus was a society in which Jews enjoyed a certain degree of freedom, particularly after the advent of the Almohads, Roth claims, some restrictions in clothing were strictly enforced (Roth 1994, p. 167). For instance, the Almohad ruler Abu Yusuf Yaqub (1184–99) made it compulsory for Jews to dress in certain colors (Roth 1994, p. 167), perhaps to distinguish non-Muslim citizens from the Muslims. According to Joseph Perez, the Almohads also instituted religious persecution and forced Jews to convert (Perez 1993, p. 12). In this way, Perez draws a parallel with this period and the one that was to follow, in which Jews were expelled from the newly reclaimed Christian Kingdom of Spain.

The rule of the Moors is a unique period of Spanish history, one that has received much attention from scholars and theologians alike. It was, according to Maria Rosa Menocal, a time in which Jews and Muslims lived a relatively peaceful existence. While the evidence suggests that Jews and Muslims did integrate to an extent, there are also some scholars who suggest that Jews were subject to persecution. Therefore, this period of history offers a lot to be learned for our modern times.

References

• Crow J, 1985, Spain: The Root and the Flower: an interpretation of Spain and the Spanish people, University of California Press, Berkley.
• Fletcher R, 2000, “Islamic Spain,” in Carr R, Spain: A History, Oxford University Press, New York.
• Glick T, 1979, Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
• Lassner J, 1999, “Abraham Geiger: A Nineteenth-Century Jewish Reformer on the Origins of Islam,” in Martin Kramer, The Jewish Discovery of Islam, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv.
• Lewis B, 1984, The Jews of Islam, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
• Menocal MR, 2002, Ornament of the World, Little, Brown and Company, Boston.
• Perez, J, 1993, History of a Tragedy, University of Illinois Press, Chicago.
• Ray, J, 2006, The Sephardic Frontier: the Reconquista and the Jewish community in Medieval Iberia, Cornell University Press, New York.
• Roth N, 1994, Jews, Visigoths, and Muslims In Medieval Spain: Cooperation and Conflict, Leiden, New York.

I argue against these claims, based upon strong empirical evidence indicating that war does not occur among democratic states, the so-called zone of peace. As democratic regimes replace authoritarian regimes, future generations will study wars as an obsolete part of history.

This article has three parts: tracing the roots of the democratic peace argument and providing supporting evidence, examining the three mechanisms offered to explain the absence of war among democratic states, and critically evaluating the democratic peace argument.

Does democratic peace exist?

One should define democracy before answering the above question. Democracy is a combination of two Greek words: demos (people) and kratos (rule)”rule by the people. In a direct democracy, citizens are directly engaged in the law-making process though a majority system. In a representative democracy, as we have today, citizens use their legislative powers through their elected representatives. Both types also require a constitutional framework through which the majority can exercise its power and through which the individual and collective rights of people are guaranteed.

The roots of democratic peace argument can be traced back to the German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) Perpetual Peace essay, published in 1795.(3) He argued that although state rulers decide to start a war, it is the people who suffer the consequences (e.g., the loss of money, property, and lives). Thus they are reluctant to engage in war. Since rulers of democratic states are accountable to the people, they are less inclined to initiate a war.

Kant also identified commerce as another reason for perpetual peace among democracies. Increasing trade leads states to realize that they have much to loose from conflict and thus reinforces their desire to avoid war. Finally, the existence of a pacific union prevents the outbreak of war between democracies. Such a union reinforces the idea that democracies have common goals and interests, and further mitigates the desire for armed conflict.

Michael Doyle, a former professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton and now assistant secretary general of the UN, revisited Kant’s perpetual peace argument.(4) He showed that, as Kant had predicted, there is no historical case of two democratic states fighting each other. Using the correlates of war data prepared by University of Michigan researchers, he listed all the democratic states and interstate wars occurring after 1815. He pointed out that although wars occurred between non-democratic states and between democratic and non-democratic states, there has been no war between democratic states since 1815.

Doyle listed three different factors to account for this: caution, respect, and interest. Democratic leaders are cautious when initiating military conflict, for otherwise their constituencies will punish them by removing them from power. Rulers of democratic states respect each other because they respect their populations. Democratic rulers may reason that military dictators will not respect the citizens of a democracy because military dictators do not respect their own people. Finally, the level of trade among democratic states is so high that they become dependent on each other. This interdependence decreases the utility of military force during disputes.

Supporters of the democratic peace argument have examined such long-term rivalries Argentina and Britain, Pakistan and India, Greece and Turkey to see whether being a democracy has had any impact on military hostilities between these pairs. Greece and Turkey provide an example of how dictatorships are more prone to war. They have fought three wars, but not when both of them were democratic. This also has been true with Ecuador and Peru, Argentina and Chile, and Brazil and Argentina, all of which have had bitter rivalries. The Falklands War between Argentina and Britain took place when Argentina was a dictatorship and resulted in the military rulers being replaced by a stable democratic regime.

Like inter-state conflicts, civil wars provide another set of empirical support for the democratic peace argument. Democratic states rarely experience civil wars. Why would any group launch a war to control a state when they could pursue their goals peacefully through electoral participation? Democratization is, then, a way to prevent civil wars. Dean Babst and William Eckhardt conducted a 42-year study of all independent countries from 1950 to 1991. Their study found that although 90 percent of dictatorships have experienced some form of civil war, no civil wars occurred in democratic states during that period.(5)

The end of the cold war

The end of the cold war popularized the idea of democratic peace. However, there were some differences about the new world order that was to replace the cold war. Robert Kaplan predicted a coming anarchy,(6) in which a state’s control over its population vanishes and different armed groups create an anarchic environment. Samuel Huntington saw a coming clash of civilizations,(7) in which states belonging to different civilizations would fight each other. John Mearsheimer defined the new world order as back to the future,(8) in which the superpowers’ departure from Europe would create a power vacuum that various European countries would seek to fill through conflict. The democratic peace argument offered an alternative model for the new world order.

American officials upheld the democratic peace argument. In 1992, Secretary of State James Baker said: The cold war has ended, and we now have a chance to forge a democratic peace, an enduring peace built on shared values”democracy and political and economic freedom. The strength of these values in Russia and the other new independent states will be the surest foundation for peace”and the strongest guarantee of our national security”for decades to come.(9) Similarly, President Clinton declared in his 1994 State of the Union Speech: Ultimately the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other.(10) And at the height of the crisis in Haiti in 1994, he supported military intervention on the grounds that: Democracies here are more likely to keep the peace.(11)

The idea of democratic peace is not new to American foreign policy. Woodrow Wilson made a similar argument as early as 1917: A steadfast concert of peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith w/in [a concert]. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer to the interest of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.(12)

Two explanations

There are two key issues here. First, democratic peace does not mean that democratic states are peace-lovers, for democratic states do initiate war with authoritarian states. In addition, pacifist public opinion cannot explain democratic peace, for such a situation would lead to democratic states having peaceful relations with all states, whether democratic or not. Therefore any explanation for democratic peace must account for the absence of war between democratic states and the persistence of war between democratic and non-democratic states.

Second, correlation does not mean causation. Correlations establish empirical and observable regularities between two variables (democratic states and war), but do not explain the underlying mechanisms causing the observed empirical regularity. For example, there has been no war between states having McDonald’s restaurants. This perfect correlation, however, does not mean that McDonald’s restaurants lead to peace (the so-called McDonald’s peace theory). Clarifying underlying mechanisms prevents explanations based on spurious correlations.

Researchers offer two mechanisms to explain peace among democratic states: normative and institutional.

Normative: Normative democratic peace researchers assume that decision-makers use conflict resolution tools developed in domestic politics when dealing with external problems and expect other decision-makers to follow a similar strategy. As a result democratic leaders, when dealing with a democratic state, try (and expect other democratic leaders) to establish consensus through nonviolent means to solve external problems. While dealing with non-democratic leaders, however, democratic leaders tend to resort to violence easily because they expect authoritarian leaders will use violent means.(13)

For example, when dealing with Hitler or Stalin, democratic leaders inferred that they would use negotiations to gain time for military preparations, for these leaders did not come from a culture where problems were solved through negotiations. Thus, democratic leaders do not expect to reach a negotiated agreement with authoritarian leaders.

Institutional: Institutional democratic peace researchers argue that democratic institutions cause peace among democratic states. In democracies, the presence of checks and balances and high levels of public involvement in the political process constrain state leaders and prevent hasty decisions. These constraints also slow down the decision-making process. As a result, third parties have time to intervene among democratic states and help them solve their problems peacefully.

Democratic leaders do not fear a surprise attack when they have a problem with other democratic states, because they are aware that those states have democratic institutional mechanisms. Since there is little, if any, constraint in an authoritarian state, authoritarian rulers can make quick decisions. Therefore democratic rulers fear a surprise attack by an authoritarian ruler. Furthermore, since authoritarian rulers know that democratic leaders are constrained, they tend to push democratic leaders for more concessions. Such a tactic might escalate a crisis into a war.

Lastly, democratic rulers are elected and are cautious about using violence, for they can be punished by their constituencies. Authoritarian rulers do not have to worry about elections.(14) For example, Saddam can start a war quite easily because he needs no one’s approval and is not affected by the outcome. So far, Saddam has launched and lost two wars, both of which inflicted enormous misery on Iraqi people”and yet he remains in power. In democratic countries, however, people punish rulers who start wars without their approval by not re-electing them.

Problems

The democratic peace argument is not immune from problems.(15) First, there is no one definition of democracy, for researchers use different data sets with different codifications to measure levels of democracy. Various definitions (e.g., free elections, at least one peaceful transfer of power, universal suffrage, free press, free expression, and human rights) make it harder to test democratic peace argument. It also can cause one researcher to codify a given country as democratic while another will classify it as authoritarian.

Second, there is no consensus on how to define war. This is important, for even though democratic states did not openly fight each other, they did conduct covert operations against other democratic regimes and brought less-democratic regimes to power. For example, the US and Britain overthrew the democratically elected Mossadegh government in Iran in 1953 and replaced him with the less-democratic Shah. Similarly, the CIA helped overthrow the democratically elected Allende government in Chile in 1973 and replace him with the authoritarian Pinochet.

Third, democracies have been quite rare in history. Therefore, chances for a war between them were low. The geographical distribution of democratic countries further weakens the importance of the democratic peace argument. For example what is chance of democratic New Zealand fighting democratic Spain?

Only after WWII did the number of democracies begin to increase. During this period, however, all democratic states were allies. Thus skeptics argue that security concerns rather than regime type explains democratic peace. Mearsheimer for example, argues that European democracies may experience another war after the end of the cold war.

From democratic peace to perpetual peace

Overwhelming evidence indicates that democracies are better in terms of providing internal peace for their citizens and can serve as the building blocks of a global and perpetual peace. Democratic norms and institutions provide a strong basis for peace among democratic countries. At the turn of the twentieth century, there was only a handful of democratic states; there were 22 by 1950. By 2000, according to Freedom House criteria, 85 counties had governments that came to power through free elections and respect basic human rights and the rule of law. As the number of democracies increases, the zone of peace will expand.

The end of the cold war provided the opportunity to design a new world order. After more than a decade, it seems we can claim that the US foreign policy establishment believes in the democratic peace argument and actively supports democratization throughout the world. Time will show the success of these efforts. 

Footnotes

1. The author can be reached at.
2. Charles Kagley and Eugene Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 7th ed. (St. Martin’s Press: 1998), 347.
3. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, (1975). Online at: http://home.freeuk.com/ethos/kantperpe.htm.
4. Michael Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Philosophy & Public Affairs 12 (Summer 1983): 205-35
5. Dean V. Babst and William Eckhardt, How Peaceful Are Democracies Compared with Other Countries? Peace Research (1992).
6. Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy (Vintage Books: 2000).
7. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
8. John Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War, International Security 15, no. 1 (1990): 5-56.
9. Entire speech online at: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/ b920615.htm.
10. Entire speech online at: http://www.crisny.org/government/us/ us.sotu94.html.
11. The Economist (1 Apr. 1995).
12. Entire speech online at: http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1917/ wilswarm.html.
13. Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
14. Ibid.
15. For critiques of the democratic peace argument, see David Spiro, The Insignificance of the Democratic Peace, International Security 19 (Fall 1994): 50-86; Joanna Gowa, Democratic States and International Disputes, International Organization 49 (Summer 1995): 511-22; and Mearsheimer, Back to the Future.

Together with Abu Jafar al-Mansur and Ma’mun, Harun al-Rashid was one of the most celebrated rulers of the ‘Abbasids. He ruled over a very vast land stretching from Morocco to China and from Abyssinia to the Caucuses. Although he was not as famous for justice and piety as Mahdi, he was also a just and upright man.

Once he visited the renowned scholars and saints among the people one by one. Dissatisfied with the advice and manners of welcome he received from some of the scholars, he finally knocked at the door of Fudayl ibn ‘Iyad.

Fudayl had lived on plundering. Since he had a powerful gang and himself was very good at fighting, travellers had been much afraid of him. However, he had later repented of what he had been doing and become a much renowned saint of the time.

Fudayl opened his door to the Caliph and without inviting him in, warned him severely. He reminded him of the Day of Judgement and gave him other advice. When one of the men escorting the Caliph attempted to stop Fudayl, the latter reprimanded him, saying: ‘It is you and those like you who seduce the rulers. You do whatever they wish and agree with whatever they order and decree.’ Harun al-Rashid was greatly moved by Fudayl’s warnings and wept for a long time.

Harun al-Rashid was once doing Hajj (pilgrimage) when a man from amongst the crowd called him, saying: ‘O Commander of the Believers! Would you please listen me for a short while? The man was ‘Abdullah a grandson of ‘Umar Bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. The Caliph took him aside and the following exchange ensued between them:

– O Commander of the Believers! How many people do you guess there are here doing pilgrimage?

– So many as only God knows their number.

– Now, beware O Commander of the Believers! All of those who are shedding tears are doing so out of the fear that they may be unable to account in the Hereafter, each for his own deeds. However, you will be called to account for both your own self and all of those people.

This led the Caliph to think deeply for a while. Then he requested the pious scholar to continue. The scholar added:

– By God, O Commander of the Believers! If a man neglects to do his own duty and wastes his own property, the Almighty will punish him. But, have you ever thought what will happen to him if he, as a ruler of innumerable people, neglects to do his duties with respect to the peopie and wastes public property?

This time the Caliph could not help but weep heartfelt tears.