Undoubtedly, throughout history these states engaged in war with other states. A crucial point to understand is that war has always been a form of engagement between states caused by political, economic, or militaristic reasons. Therefore, in a hostile relationship where long-term dominance and its benefits play a major role, it would be wrong to call such conflicts religious wars solely because the opponents have differing religious identities. Such conflicts are embarked not for religious dominance but for political dominance. Additionally, it is possible for Muslims to be attacked solely for religious differences (this still happens today). In this case, it is natural to react to the attack by defending oneself and one’s religion, for, in fact, it actually becomes an obligation for Muslims to defend their religious freedom (22:39-41), themselves (2:190), and those being oppressed (Haleem 65).

Jihad, a crucially controversial concept in Islam, is often misunderstood by many Westerners, and even some Muslims. Whenever the word comes up, what comes to mind is an armed struggle by Muslims against non-Muslims, such as fights, clashes, and holy war. Jihad is a very comprehensive and dynamic term that can take on different forms, depending on historical circumstances and the needs of Muslims (Heck 95).

The word jihad comes from the Arabic root “j-h-d” and its dictionary meaning denotes doing one’s best, struggling against every kind of difficulty. In a religious context, it refers to the struggles one faces for the sake of God. In the words of Gülen “Jihad is … the inner struggle of a believer against all that stands between the believer and God” (Gülen 191). As Campanini clarifies through al-Ghazali’s teachings, there are two meanings for jihad. “The ‘great’ jihad is the struggle for self-purification, in order to conquer the evil inclinations of character and behavior, while the ‘small’ jihad corresponds to war” (Campanini 54). Delving deeper into the former category for purposes of clarification, the great jihad refers to a person’s struggle to overcome destructive obstacles within the carnal self such as feelings of resentment, hatred, envy, arrogance, and haughtiness – feelings that Islam orders followers not to harbor.

The following explanation for why jihad is confused with terrorism can be made: for the Muslim world, the 20^th century was one that was full of oppression and colonialism. Dating back further, to the 19^th century, a majority of Muslim lands were struggling for independence. In these battles and wars, Islam was conceived as a means to unite and mobilize people. During these wars, jihad was naturally the most frequently used concept. The war was against these invaders and colonizers, and the people were fighting to protect their country, their people, and their religion. Religious concepts – Qur’anic verses and the sayings and practices of the Prophet – were the main motivational factors driving Muslims during their hard struggle. Muslims called these wars, which were carried out in legitimate self-defense, jihad; however, there is a barrier between war and jihad in Islam that needs to be clarified.

The primary source of information in Islam must be the Qur’an; thus, I will refer to the Qur’an and its usage of the word jihad. Jihad is used in three verses in the Qur’an in the imperative form, as “jahid” and “jahidu,” to mean fighting against non-Muslims.

The other verses that contain jihad refer to its greater meaning, the personal struggle against feelings raised by the carnal self. Actually, the Qur’anic verses concerning war are mostly expressed by the word qital (fighting) rather than jihad (Haleem 64). In terms of the etymological meaning of qital, the relative context of the verses in which it is used and the events on which these were revealed support the fact that this word was mostly used in expressing war in the Qur’an. To give a few examples[1]:

Fight in God’s cause against those who fight against you, but do not exceed the bounds (set by God), for surely God loves not those who exceed the bounds (Baqara 2:190). But if they break their pledges after their treaty (with you) and assail your religion, then fight with those leaders of unbelief – surely they have no trustworthy pledges – so that they may desist (from aggression) (Tawba 9:12-13).

Reading these verses raises an important question: would it be wrong to identify jihad with war, or to give an emphasis to the aspect of war? The simple answer is no, for almost all of the verses related to jihad and qital were revealed in a situation of warfare. Furthermore, it would not be possible to interpret other verses in the Qur’an referring to the great jihad, such as striving with wealth (4:95, 8:72), without these terms’ relation to the aspect of war. This is the very point where the concepts of jihad and qital intersect.

When people devoid of the necessary knowledge of history and Qur’anic commentary methods interpret Qur’anic verses concerning war, they often take it out of context, ignoring the previous verse and subsequent ones, thereby presenting Islam as a religion that gives no value to non-Muslims. This is absolutely wrong. I shall support my argument with a few Qur’anic verses that are commonly misinterpreted:

… kill them wherever you come upon them, and drive them out from where they drove you out. Disorder (rooted in rebellion against God and recognizing no laws) is worse than killing. Do not fight against them in the vicinities of the Sacred Mosque unless they fight against you there; but if they fight against you (there), kill them – such is the recompense of the (rebellious) unbelievers. (Baqara 2:191)

To understand a Qur’anic verse correctly, two essential things need to be kept in mind. First, the verse needs to be considered both independently and within its context. Second, the event for which the verse was revealed needs to be considered. If we consider the above verse with its previous and subsequent verses, we understand that there is an armed group that does not want to let the Muslims live. Thus, God allows the Muslims to put up a legitimate defense, and particularly commands them not be on the side that starts the fight. Furthermore, God reminds them that they should accept any possible offers of peace from the other side, no matter the stage of war.

This verse refers to the idolaters of Mecca, who tortured every Muslim they could, declared a boycott on all relations with Muslims, sent them into exile, drove them out of their homes, tried to force them back to paganism, and when Muslims began to gain power after settling in Medina, the idolaters constantly violated their peace treaties. When the verse is considered in this light, one may even ask the question: why did the Muslims even wait for a revelation to defend themselves – isn’t it common sense to strive to survive?

Let’s take a look at another commonly misinterpreted verse: “…seize them and kill them wherever you find them; and do not take to yourselves any of them as confident, nor as helper” (Nisa 4:88). This verse is often known to be quoted separately to detach it from its context. When one reads this verse as I have presented it, one sees the image of a ruthless and aggressive Muslim, sword in hand, ready to fight. However, as we experienced with the previous verse, reading the context (Nisa 4:88-91) alone will suffice in giving us a better idea behind this verse. After reading the context of the verse, we see that the people mentioned here are the hypocrites of Mecca and Medina. They pretended to be on the sides of the Muslims, but they were not sincere in their faith. Moreover, these hypocrites took every opportunity to act against the Muslims. An additional point to emphasize with this passage is not the command to kill, but the command by God to accept peace if it is offered. Thus, Muslims are not to be on the side that starts a war, but if they are attacked by an enemy, they are allowed to defend themselves.

These were just two examples of verses that are often misinterpreted when stripped from their contexts. These misinterpretations lead to the misinterpretation of Islam and obfuscate the true meaning of jihad. We can also give examples that clarify the meaning of jihad from secondary sources, such as the Prophet’s sayings, or hadiths. God’s Messenger was the conveyor of the Qur’an; therefore it is impossible for his words or practices to contradict the Qur’an in any way. When we look at the Prophet’s sayings on the topic of jihad, we see the same truth behind it.

One example that often comes up when jihad is mentioned is as follows: on returning to Medina after a battle, God’s Messenger told his companions: “We are returning from the lesser jihad to the greater one.” After having fought a battle in which many Muslims had lost their lives, the Companions were surprised to hear this statement from God’s Messenger. When they asked what the greater jihad was, he explained that it was fighting the carnal self (Ajluni, Kashf al-Khafa, 1:424).

An additional example is what the Prophet told a Companion who asked for permission if he could join a military campaign. The Prophet asked the man whether his parents were alive, upon which the man replied affirmatively. The Prophet said in return: “You perform jihad by serving them” (Bukhari, Jihad, 138). God’s Messenger had a plethora of other cases in which he used the word jihad in a wider non-militaristic sense. Two more of these sayings are: “The most virtuous jihad is speaking up for truth in the face of injustice,” (Abu Dawud, Tirmidhi, 13) and, “The most virtuous jihad is speaking up for the truth before an unjust and cruel ruler” Abu Dawud, Malahim, 17). More importantly, the gravity of this form of jihad is strengthened when looking at one of the statements of the Prophet: “Whoever dies trying to protect his property from a usurper dies a martyr” (Abou El Fadl, 123).

Hitherto, we have looked at jihad in a theoretical sense, using definitions interpreted from the Qur’an and the Prophet’s sayings to reveal its true nature. It is not unreasonable for the reader to wonder how the Prophet acted in times of warfare to further dispel notions of jihad being considered a “holy war”; after all, there were wars and battles in which the Prophet was present. To give a brief account of the Prophet’s example in this light, let’s consider the Battle of Badr. The enemies of the Muslims in the Battle of Badr were the Meccan pagans, who were afraid that the Prophet was amassing enough supporters to pose a strong threat to the Meccans. Consequently, the Meccans sent a letter of ultimatum to their allies in Medina, appealing for the exile and the execution of the Prophet and his followers.[2] These harsh letters caused great upheaval in Medina; however, the actions that the Prophet took quickly eliminated the anxiety of the people of Medina.

The first of the Prophet’s actions was to sign a pact of truce with nearby tribes. The essential elements that he signed with the neighboring tribes were aimed at preventing the neighbors from assisting the Meccans against the Muslims. The Meccans proved to be determined, and despite all of the Prophet’s actions aimed at holding peace, the Meccans wanted to fight. When everyone knew that the battle was inevitable, the Prophet made a last attempt by sending Umar with an offer of peace[3], which was refused and provided the spark for the Battle of Badr. Similarly, when looking at accounts of the other battles of the Prophet – Uhud, Khandaq, and Khaybar – one sees that God’s Messenger always strived to maintain peace and worked to avoid engaging in the Western, ill-defined “jihad” – the spread of Islam, the taking of lives of non-Muslims, and the acquisition of new lands.

Now that the true definition of jihad has been clarified using the Qur’an and accurate interpretations as a primary source and the Prophet’s sayings and actions during warfare as a second source, we have to consider some broader questions. When is jihad complete? How can we accept one interpretation as the proper one? Why is jihad so misunderstood by some Muslims? Does it play to their advantage to intentionally misrepresent it? Lastly, does violent jihad justify terrorism?

Jihad, as mentioned earlier, has two meanings: the “great” jihad – corresponding to self-purification in the path of God, comparable to the Christians’ miles Christi (Peters 206) – and the “small” jihad – corresponding to war. The former type of jihad is essentially never complete; it is everlasting throughout one’s life, for situations that necessitate “great” jihad emerge everyday in a Muslim’s life. In example, if we look at the citizens of Syria today who are opposed to the ruthless oppression of their dictatorial leader, we see that they experience jihad everyday, for the Prophet has stated that, “The most virtuous jihad is speaking up for the truth before an unjust and cruel ruler.”[4] And the tens of thousands of Syrians who have already lost their lives in the face of injustice in Syria’s conflict have died martyrs, for the Prophet has stated that “whoever dies trying to protect his property from a usurper dies a martyr” (Abou El Fadl, 123). If we consider the “small” jihad in this question, we can say that it is intermittent, experienced by Muslims whenever they need to engage in warfare for self-defense to protect their country and their religious freedom.

When faced with the question of the accuracy of interpretations, one cannot bluntly state that one interpretation is more accurate than the other. When presented with a similar question, John Esposito, a Professor of Religion at Georgetown, pointed to a Surah from the Qur’an, which recalls how “God made humankind into nations and tribes for you to get to know one another not that you may despise one another.”[5] These words support a language of religious plurality, a concept that is contrary to religious extremism. Esposito further argued that there is no central authority in Islam or Christianity who can speak for all Muslims or for all Christians. Although the Pope is the central authority for Roman Catholicism, he does not speak for the Orthodoxy or for Protestantism. Every denomination has its own individual religious authority. Islam, similarly, supports the idea of ijtihad, the individual interpretation of the Qur’an. The important point in this question behind interpretations is the broadening of the base of religious authorities. Esposito argues that although this diversification may lead to more chaotic situations, it also serves as a check for religious authorities who legitimize illegitimate wars. Therefore, this system of checking can prove beneficial in stopping wars, though it may pose more problems in other aspects of interpretation.

Earlier in the paper, I gave an example as to why Westerners might misunderstand jihad; this poses the inevitable question: why is it misunderstood by Muslims? More specifically, does it play to their advantage to intentionally misunderstand it? Rahman describes the true meaning behind the propaganda slogan “Islam was spread by the sword” in his book Major Themes of the Qur’an. He writes: “What was spread by the sword was not the religion of Islam, but the political domain of Islam, so that Islam could work to produce the order on the earth that the Qur’an seeks” (Rahman 63). However, Rahman also points out that armed jihad was often used by later Muslims whose primary aim was territorial expansion and not the worldview they were asked to establish by God. This, unfortunately, answers the question posed above with a yes; it does play to some Muslims’ advantage to intentionally misinterpret jihad for selfish reasons: territorial expansion, political power, and economic benefits, all under the pretext of “religious duty.” These kinds of interpretations of Qur’anic verses and hadiths outside of their more important contexts render the practice of religion astray, allowing selfish extremists to justify their illegal behaviors. However, it is important to note that their justifications behind their actions are largely unaccepted by the greater Muslim community around the world, those who know the distinction between the two jihads and how to apply them in their lives.[6] This brings us to the final question: does violent jihad justify terrorism?

In the Muslim world, there is and always have been radical thoughts and political ideologies; the same is true in Christianity, Judaism, and other religions. However, it is wrong to identify the thoughts and the beliefs of radical groups with religion. One of the focuses of this paper was to emphasize the importance of using the Qur’an and the statements of the Prophet to seek answers in Islam, and the aforementioned radical thoughts are not found in either. Nonetheless, there are still those who commit terrorist acts “for God” or “in the name of religion.” These terrorists also believe in Islam. This leads to a paradox: on one hand, we have Muslims who commit terrorist acts, and on the other hand, we have a religion that forbids these acts. If we view this paradox from the lens of Muslims, we do not see a paradox at all; it is merely a situation that is generated by a wrong perspective. If we take a look at all perspectives – the political, economic, historic, cultural, moral, and humanistic – we see that there is a perceptible dichotomy between religion and terrorism, and are able to consequently establish that terrorism does not stem from religion, but that it has other political, economic, and cultural roots. Therefore, jihad does not justify terrorism; nothing in Islam does, for terrorism is essentially forbidden in Islam.

In conclusion, jihad is a crucial concept in Islam due to the wide misunderstanding it causes amongst people around the world and the concept’s import in Islam on a global scale. While the term Islamic Terrorism – an oxymoron within itself – is inaccurate in all aspects, its existence is not the issue; its degradingly common usage, especially in the media, advertises a negative Muslim image to non-Muslims, imbuing a subconscious belief that all Muslims are terrorists. The reverse of this scenario often happens in the Muslim world as well, especially after the Iraq War and the War in Afghanistan. These wrongful representations of both sides do nothing but aggravate tensions between the two sides, which leads to further conflict and a discordant world. Instead, if books or news reports that clarify the true meaning of jihad and other misunderstood concepts of various religions and their applications were broadcasted for the world to hear, we would not witness as much religious conflict around the world as we witness today. What a beauty that sight would be: a harmonious society of people living with a plurality of religious beliefs.

References

• Abdel Haleem, Muhammad. 2011. Understanding the Qur’an: Themes and Style. I.B. Tauris.
• Abou El Fadl, Khaled. 2001. Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Campanini, Massimo. 2011. The Qur’an: Modern Muslim Interpretations. London: Routledge.
• Gülen. M. Fethullah. 2012. Toward a Global Civilization of Love and Tolerance, NJ: Tughra Books, p. 191.
• Hamidullah, Muhammed. 2011. Islam Peygamberi. Beyan Yayinlari.
• Heck, Paul L. 2013. “Jihad Revisited.” The Journal of Religious Ethics 32.1 (2004): 95-128. JSTOR. Web. 22 February.
• Peters, F. E. 2003. Islam: A Guide for Jews and Christians. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Rahman, Fazlur. 2009. Major Themes of the Qurʼan. University of Chicago Press.
• Ünal, Ali. 2006. The Qur’an with Annotated Interpretation in Modern English. NJ: Tughra Books.

[1] The reader may also refer to (Tawba 9:36) and (Tawba 9:5) for additional examples on the usage of qital that were omitted due to their length.

[2] Hamidullah, Muhammad, Islam Peygamberi, I, p. 217.

[3] Hamidullah, Hz. Peygamber’in Savaslari (Wars of the Prophet), p. 55–92.

[4] Abu Dawud, Tirmidhi 13.

[5] “Who Speaks for Islam and for Christianity?” Voice of America News, 2008.

[6] This is also true in other non-religious cases. When Timothy McVeigh caused the Oklahoma City Bombing and resulted in the death of 168 people, he thought he had legitimate reasons to do so; however, a majority of the people did not accept his thoughts as sound justification behind his actions.

As recounted in the Qur’an (14: 34–41), Abraham left his wife Hagar and son Ishmael in the valley of Mecca on God’s command. There was the Ka’ba there, but it had been destroyed in time. When Ishmael was young, Abraham re-constructed the Ka’ba together with him. Because of the sanctity of the Ka’ba, people began to settle around it, and this is how Mecca appeared as a town and a center of pilgrimage and trade connecting merchants on caravans from Syria and Jordan, all the way to Abyssinia (Ethiopia). Organized in tribes, Mecca suffered from racial fanaticism and feudal warfare for centuries, leaving women without a value as they could not take part in wars.

In a larger context, the Byzantium and Persian Empires were in constant conflict and intermittently fought for over sixty years, which exhausted their respective peoples. There was a desperate need for a message that prioritized peace over war, a message that celebrated freedoms and rights for everyone regardless of color, race, or gender. And came the Prophet from Mecca, who taught and promised all of these. He was not alone in his mission, and his closest Companion was Abu Bakr.

Also called As-siddiq (“The Upright” in Arabic), Abu Bakr was approximately two years younger than the Prophet. Before embracing Islam, he was known as Abdul Ka’ba (the servant of Ka’ba), then the Prophet changed his name to Abdullah (the servant of God).

Among the youth, frolics, dissipations and frivolities were very common behaviors, but Abu Bakr was completely different. He had a very disciplined life. Once he was asked if he had drunk wine in his days of ignorance. He said he had never touched the wine because he had wanted to keep his reputation and respectability. This shows that he enjoyed a good reputation and respectability even before Islam (Ibn al-Athir, 1280).

He did not receive a formal education as many other Arab men, but he was a keen observer; he was continually observing what was going on around him. He had a very good memory. He could recite verses if he heard them only once. He attended poetical events (Ibn al-Athir, 1280).

Abu Bakr traveled to different countries including Abyssinia, Yemen, and Syria. These business trips brought him wealth, experience and broadened his outlook on life. He became one of the richest businessmen of Mecca. Accordingly, his social importance increased among people. He was hardworking, generous, friendly, truthful, committed. He had a lot of influence among his friends and acquaintances. As a trader, he was always fair, he never deceived people. He would visit the sick; he gave alms to the poor (at-Tabarî, 1987). One day the Prophet asked his people, “Is there anyone here who visited a sick one today?” Abu Bakr said, “I did.” “Is there anyone who fasted today?” Abu Bakr said, “I did.” “Is there anyone who participated in a funeral?” Abu Bakr said, “I did.” “Is there anyone who assisted someone who was poor?” Abu Bakr said, “I did.” Then the Prophet said, “Whoever does these four deeds in one day is counted among the people of heaven.”

While Abu Bakr was still young, he volunteered for an office which decided the blood money for the killed or injured. It was like a judge or magistrate’s office. He always satisfied both sides with his fair decisions. (at-Tabarî, 1987).

When God’s message was revealed to Muhammad, the first man to believe in him was Abu Bakr. On the day that he stated his belief, he gave his decision quickly and without hesitation showing he had complete trust in Muhammad. The Prophet admired his acceptance of Islam with the words, “Except Abu Bakr, everyone I have invited to Islam has experienced some period of hesitation. But Abu Bakr accepted my invitation without any hesitation” (Bukhari, 870). In fact, Abu Bakr had always doubted the validity of idolatry and had no enthusiasm for worshiping idols.

When Islam began to spread in Mecca, Meccan polytheists inflicted torture and intimidation on the believers, forcing many of them to immigrate to Abyssinia. Yet, Abu Bakr did not leave. He preferred to stay with the Prophet to support him in his time of need. And he was going to be the company to the Prophet in the Hijrah, his historic journey to Medina, which would transform the course of history forever.

Later when the battles of Badr and Uhud took place between Muslims and the Arab pagans, Abu Bakr, along with a few other companions, was entrusted with the Prophet’s safety. When Mecca was at last subdued in 630 AD, all the tribes of Arabia were convinced that Muhammad was a messenger sent to them by God. They stopped resisting and sent delegates to Medina proclaiming their allegiance to him. While he was busy receiving delegates, he entrusted Abu Bakr to preside over the pilgrims. This incident proved of vital importance later when a caliph was chosen after the death of the Prophet (Ibnal-Kathir, Isma’il, 1932).

His leadership

The Prophet made a pilgrimage two years after the conquest of Mecca. This would be called the “Farewell Pilgrimage,” as the Prophet became ill on his return to Medina and died two weeks after the illness. During the last days of his illness, he could not lead the prayers in the Mosque. He gave instructions to his wife Aisha to tell her father Abu Bakr to lead the prayers. This was taken by the Muslims as another sign to choose Abu Bakr to be their caliph after the Prophet’s departure (Ibn Hisham, 1992).

When the Prophet died in 632 AD, many people, among whom was ‘Umar bin al-Khattab, were shocked and refused to believe that he died. But Abu Bakr, steadfast as usual, addressed the bewildered masses and convinced them that Muhammad was no more than a Prophet like other Prophets who had died before him, and that there was no reason why they should not acknowledge his death. After much debate, in which both sides—the Medinans and the Meccans—expressed their opinions elaborately and freely, Abu Bakr was unanimously accepted to be the first Caliph. Soon there was a public meeting in the Mosque, and people from near and far flocked there to swear their oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr (Ibn Hisham, 1992).

The Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, categorically rejected racism and tribalism. He also put an end to tribal wars. Sir William Muir makes the following comment:

The first peculiarity, then, which attracts our attention is the subdivision of the Arabs into innumerable bodies… each independent of the others: restless and often at war amongst themselves; and even when united by blood or by interest, ever ready on some significant cause to separate and give way to an implacable hostility. Thus at the era of Islam the retrospect of Arabian history exhibits, as in the kaleidoscope, an ever-varying state of combination and repulsion, such as had hitherto rendered abortive any attempt at a general union… The problem had yet to be solved, by what force these tribes could be subdued or drawn to one common center; and it was solved by Muhammad (Muir,1988).

Instead of tribalism and tribal attachment, the Prophet Muhammad instituted virtue and God-consciousness. He also instituted allegiance or public consent. People were free to elect their administrator. So after the Prophet’s death, his followers came together and discussed among themselves who would be their new leader. Since the one who would lead the newly-established Muslim community would succeed the Prophet in his leadership in all things except Prophethood, he was named the Successor. The Caliph means the one who succeeds. So the leaders of the Muslim community after the Prophet’s death were called Caliph.

1- The Wars of Apostasy

Abu Bakr had to struggle with apostates and false prophets. What elements caused the wars of apostasy? First, the death of the Prophet was a great shock to Muslims. For the first time in the lives of both the Meccans and the Medinans, they were united around a single religion. Their centuries-old customs and feudal or tribal values and understandings were abolished. Their absorption of the new system would not be easy. They accepted this system in the footsteps of the Prophet Muhammad. So his death was a great shock. Adoption of the new system was difficult especially for the newly-converted desert tribes. Some of them left the new religion and followed false prophets who appeared among them and called them back to their old customs.

Secondly, Islam instituted zakat (alms-giving or charity). It was collected from the rich and spent for the well-being of the poor and for the wayfarers left without money to complete their travel. It was also used for those who cannot pay their debts, and for those who strive in “God’s cause”. Some desert tribes refused to pay it after the Prophet’s death. This signaled their revolt against the new administration in Medina.

Thirdly, the influence of the Romans from the north and the Persians and the Abyssinians from the east and the south encouraged the distant tribes to return back to their own beliefs and customs. (As?m, 1981).

Abu Bakr succeeded in putting down the rebellions and re-instituted unity in Arabia. His good reputation among people, his character, and his wise measures were influential in surpassing the rebellions and re-instituting the unity. He sent military units against the revolting tribes. In the end, those tribes gave up their disobedience.

2- Usame’s punitive expedition

The changes brought about by the Muslims in Arabia drew the attention of the Roman (Byzantium) Empire. In order to prevent their growing strength, they sent armies. During the time of the Prophet, Roman and Muslim armies fought in Muta, on the border of Jordan. No side could overpower the other in this first encounter. One year before the Prophet’s death, Romans organized another powerful army. On hearing this, the Prophet left Medina with his army and went as far as Tabuk, in the far north of Arabia. However, the Prophet’s illness caused this army to stay in Madina without departing. After his death, due to the news of rebellions in some desert tribes, some Muslims wanted to cancel this expedition. But Abu Bakr, as the newly-chosen Caliph, firmly opposed the idea, saying: “I will never cancel anything initiated by the Prophet”. The curious thing about this army was that it was made up of mostly the early Companions of the Prophet, but its leader was Usame ibn Zayd, who was only 18 years old. During the lifetime of the Prophet, his old Companions objected, but they were given a heated sermon in which both Usame and his father were praised as competent leaders (At-Tabarî, 1987).

3- Compilation of the Qur’an

1200 Muslims were killed in the battle called Aqraba, among them were many who were committing the Qur’an to memory. Umar ibn al Khattab, whose brother Zayd was among the dead, thought deeply of what might happen if wars continued and more such people were killed. He reached the conclusion that if the Qur’an was to be preserved, it ought to be compiled into one volume. At that time, it was scattered among the companions of the Prophet, with each preserving certain portions of it. Methods of preservation differed. Some had it written on parchment; others on palm branches stripped of leaves; a third group was written on bones; and a fourth on stone tablets; a large number also memorized it by heart. If many of those who had memorized it were killed, then a part of the Holy Book might disappear. So Umar went to the caliph, who was then sitting in the Prophet’s grand Mosque. He discussed his idea with him, but Abu Bakr rejected it because it was not something done by the Prophet. A lengthy debate followed, after which Abu Bakr was convinced that Umar was right (Ezzati, 1978).

Abu Bakr’s compilation of the Qur’an is regarded by many as his most significant legacy. It was even more significant than the wars of apostasy and the conquest of Iraq and Syria. Ali ibn Abi Talib used to say: “May God have mercy upon Abu Bakr! He is worthy of being superbly rewarded because he was unique in compiling the Qur’an” (Ibn Hajar, 1988).

Harun Gultekin is a teacher at Pioneer Academy of Science, New Jersey.

References

• Al-Bukhari, Muhammad. 870. SahihBukhari. Haidth no: 4/1701.
• at-Tabarî. 1987. Abu Ja’far Muhammad ibn Jarir, Tarikh al-Umamwa al-Muluk, Beirut.
• Cevdet, Ahmed (Pa?a). 1976. K?sas-? Enbiya ve Tavarih-i Hulefa, Bedir Publishing, Istanbul.
• Ezzati, Abul-Fazl. 1978. An Introduction to the History of the Spread of Islam, London, News and Media Ltd.
• Ibn al-Athir. 1280. Usd al-ghaba fi ma’rifat al-sahaba, Cairo.
• Ibn al-Kathir, Abu’l-Fida’ Isma’il. 1932. al-Bidayahwa’n-Nihayah, Vol. 14, Beirut.
• Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani. 1988. Al-Isabah fi Tamyiz as-Sahabah, Daru’l-Bayan, Cairo.
• Ibn Hisham. 1992. al-Sirah an-Nabawiya, Dar al- Fikr, Beirut.
• Köksal, M. Asim. 1981. ?slâmTarihi, ?amil Publishing, Istanbul.
• Muir, Sir William. 1988. Life of Muhammad, Osnabrück: Biblio.

I argue against these claims, based upon strong empirical evidence indicating that war does not occur among democratic states, the so-called zone of peace. As democratic regimes replace authoritarian regimes, future generations will study wars as an obsolete part of history.

This article has three parts: tracing the roots of the democratic peace argument and providing supporting evidence, examining the three mechanisms offered to explain the absence of war among democratic states, and critically evaluating the democratic peace argument.

Does democratic peace exist?

One should define democracy before answering the above question. Democracy is a combination of two Greek words: demos (people) and kratos (rule)”rule by the people. In a direct democracy, citizens are directly engaged in the law-making process though a majority system. In a representative democracy, as we have today, citizens use their legislative powers through their elected representatives. Both types also require a constitutional framework through which the majority can exercise its power and through which the individual and collective rights of people are guaranteed.

The roots of democratic peace argument can be traced back to the German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) Perpetual Peace essay, published in 1795.(3) He argued that although state rulers decide to start a war, it is the people who suffer the consequences (e.g., the loss of money, property, and lives). Thus they are reluctant to engage in war. Since rulers of democratic states are accountable to the people, they are less inclined to initiate a war.

Kant also identified commerce as another reason for perpetual peace among democracies. Increasing trade leads states to realize that they have much to loose from conflict and thus reinforces their desire to avoid war. Finally, the existence of a pacific union prevents the outbreak of war between democracies. Such a union reinforces the idea that democracies have common goals and interests, and further mitigates the desire for armed conflict.

Michael Doyle, a former professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton and now assistant secretary general of the UN, revisited Kant’s perpetual peace argument.(4) He showed that, as Kant had predicted, there is no historical case of two democratic states fighting each other. Using the correlates of war data prepared by University of Michigan researchers, he listed all the democratic states and interstate wars occurring after 1815. He pointed out that although wars occurred between non-democratic states and between democratic and non-democratic states, there has been no war between democratic states since 1815.

Doyle listed three different factors to account for this: caution, respect, and interest. Democratic leaders are cautious when initiating military conflict, for otherwise their constituencies will punish them by removing them from power. Rulers of democratic states respect each other because they respect their populations. Democratic rulers may reason that military dictators will not respect the citizens of a democracy because military dictators do not respect their own people. Finally, the level of trade among democratic states is so high that they become dependent on each other. This interdependence decreases the utility of military force during disputes.

Supporters of the democratic peace argument have examined such long-term rivalries Argentina and Britain, Pakistan and India, Greece and Turkey to see whether being a democracy has had any impact on military hostilities between these pairs. Greece and Turkey provide an example of how dictatorships are more prone to war. They have fought three wars, but not when both of them were democratic. This also has been true with Ecuador and Peru, Argentina and Chile, and Brazil and Argentina, all of which have had bitter rivalries. The Falklands War between Argentina and Britain took place when Argentina was a dictatorship and resulted in the military rulers being replaced by a stable democratic regime.

Like inter-state conflicts, civil wars provide another set of empirical support for the democratic peace argument. Democratic states rarely experience civil wars. Why would any group launch a war to control a state when they could pursue their goals peacefully through electoral participation? Democratization is, then, a way to prevent civil wars. Dean Babst and William Eckhardt conducted a 42-year study of all independent countries from 1950 to 1991. Their study found that although 90 percent of dictatorships have experienced some form of civil war, no civil wars occurred in democratic states during that period.(5)

The end of the cold war

The end of the cold war popularized the idea of democratic peace. However, there were some differences about the new world order that was to replace the cold war. Robert Kaplan predicted a coming anarchy,(6) in which a state’s control over its population vanishes and different armed groups create an anarchic environment. Samuel Huntington saw a coming clash of civilizations,(7) in which states belonging to different civilizations would fight each other. John Mearsheimer defined the new world order as back to the future,(8) in which the superpowers’ departure from Europe would create a power vacuum that various European countries would seek to fill through conflict. The democratic peace argument offered an alternative model for the new world order.

American officials upheld the democratic peace argument. In 1992, Secretary of State James Baker said: The cold war has ended, and we now have a chance to forge a democratic peace, an enduring peace built on shared values”democracy and political and economic freedom. The strength of these values in Russia and the other new independent states will be the surest foundation for peace”and the strongest guarantee of our national security”for decades to come.(9) Similarly, President Clinton declared in his 1994 State of the Union Speech: Ultimately the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other.(10) And at the height of the crisis in Haiti in 1994, he supported military intervention on the grounds that: Democracies here are more likely to keep the peace.(11)

The idea of democratic peace is not new to American foreign policy. Woodrow Wilson made a similar argument as early as 1917: A steadfast concert of peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith w/in [a concert]. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer to the interest of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.(12)

Two explanations

There are two key issues here. First, democratic peace does not mean that democratic states are peace-lovers, for democratic states do initiate war with authoritarian states. In addition, pacifist public opinion cannot explain democratic peace, for such a situation would lead to democratic states having peaceful relations with all states, whether democratic or not. Therefore any explanation for democratic peace must account for the absence of war between democratic states and the persistence of war between democratic and non-democratic states.

Second, correlation does not mean causation. Correlations establish empirical and observable regularities between two variables (democratic states and war), but do not explain the underlying mechanisms causing the observed empirical regularity. For example, there has been no war between states having McDonald’s restaurants. This perfect correlation, however, does not mean that McDonald’s restaurants lead to peace (the so-called McDonald’s peace theory). Clarifying underlying mechanisms prevents explanations based on spurious correlations.

Researchers offer two mechanisms to explain peace among democratic states: normative and institutional.

Normative: Normative democratic peace researchers assume that decision-makers use conflict resolution tools developed in domestic politics when dealing with external problems and expect other decision-makers to follow a similar strategy. As a result democratic leaders, when dealing with a democratic state, try (and expect other democratic leaders) to establish consensus through nonviolent means to solve external problems. While dealing with non-democratic leaders, however, democratic leaders tend to resort to violence easily because they expect authoritarian leaders will use violent means.(13)

For example, when dealing with Hitler or Stalin, democratic leaders inferred that they would use negotiations to gain time for military preparations, for these leaders did not come from a culture where problems were solved through negotiations. Thus, democratic leaders do not expect to reach a negotiated agreement with authoritarian leaders.

Institutional: Institutional democratic peace researchers argue that democratic institutions cause peace among democratic states. In democracies, the presence of checks and balances and high levels of public involvement in the political process constrain state leaders and prevent hasty decisions. These constraints also slow down the decision-making process. As a result, third parties have time to intervene among democratic states and help them solve their problems peacefully.

Democratic leaders do not fear a surprise attack when they have a problem with other democratic states, because they are aware that those states have democratic institutional mechanisms. Since there is little, if any, constraint in an authoritarian state, authoritarian rulers can make quick decisions. Therefore democratic rulers fear a surprise attack by an authoritarian ruler. Furthermore, since authoritarian rulers know that democratic leaders are constrained, they tend to push democratic leaders for more concessions. Such a tactic might escalate a crisis into a war.

Lastly, democratic rulers are elected and are cautious about using violence, for they can be punished by their constituencies. Authoritarian rulers do not have to worry about elections.(14) For example, Saddam can start a war quite easily because he needs no one’s approval and is not affected by the outcome. So far, Saddam has launched and lost two wars, both of which inflicted enormous misery on Iraqi people”and yet he remains in power. In democratic countries, however, people punish rulers who start wars without their approval by not re-electing them.

Problems

The democratic peace argument is not immune from problems.(15) First, there is no one definition of democracy, for researchers use different data sets with different codifications to measure levels of democracy. Various definitions (e.g., free elections, at least one peaceful transfer of power, universal suffrage, free press, free expression, and human rights) make it harder to test democratic peace argument. It also can cause one researcher to codify a given country as democratic while another will classify it as authoritarian.

Second, there is no consensus on how to define war. This is important, for even though democratic states did not openly fight each other, they did conduct covert operations against other democratic regimes and brought less-democratic regimes to power. For example, the US and Britain overthrew the democratically elected Mossadegh government in Iran in 1953 and replaced him with the less-democratic Shah. Similarly, the CIA helped overthrow the democratically elected Allende government in Chile in 1973 and replace him with the authoritarian Pinochet.

Third, democracies have been quite rare in history. Therefore, chances for a war between them were low. The geographical distribution of democratic countries further weakens the importance of the democratic peace argument. For example what is chance of democratic New Zealand fighting democratic Spain?

Only after WWII did the number of democracies begin to increase. During this period, however, all democratic states were allies. Thus skeptics argue that security concerns rather than regime type explains democratic peace. Mearsheimer for example, argues that European democracies may experience another war after the end of the cold war.

From democratic peace to perpetual peace

Overwhelming evidence indicates that democracies are better in terms of providing internal peace for their citizens and can serve as the building blocks of a global and perpetual peace. Democratic norms and institutions provide a strong basis for peace among democratic countries. At the turn of the twentieth century, there was only a handful of democratic states; there were 22 by 1950. By 2000, according to Freedom House criteria, 85 counties had governments that came to power through free elections and respect basic human rights and the rule of law. As the number of democracies increases, the zone of peace will expand.

The end of the cold war provided the opportunity to design a new world order. After more than a decade, it seems we can claim that the US foreign policy establishment believes in the democratic peace argument and actively supports democratization throughout the world. Time will show the success of these efforts. 

Footnotes

1. The author can be reached at.
2. Charles Kagley and Eugene Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 7th ed. (St. Martin’s Press: 1998), 347.
3. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, (1975). Online at: http://home.freeuk.com/ethos/kantperpe.htm.
4. Michael Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Philosophy & Public Affairs 12 (Summer 1983): 205-35
5. Dean V. Babst and William Eckhardt, How Peaceful Are Democracies Compared with Other Countries? Peace Research (1992).
6. Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy (Vintage Books: 2000).
7. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
8. John Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War, International Security 15, no. 1 (1990): 5-56.
9. Entire speech online at: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/ b920615.htm.
10. Entire speech online at: http://www.crisny.org/government/us/ us.sotu94.html.
11. The Economist (1 Apr. 1995).
12. Entire speech online at: http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1917/ wilswarm.html.
13. Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
14. Ibid.
15. For critiques of the democratic peace argument, see David Spiro, The Insignificance of the Democratic Peace, International Security 19 (Fall 1994): 50-86; Joanna Gowa, Democratic States and International Disputes, International Organization 49 (Summer 1995): 511-22; and Mearsheimer, Back to the Future.

This fundamental teaching of brotherhood and sisterhood regardless of religious affiliation is being overshadowed by suspicion, anger, mistrust, and other negative trends and emotions that continue to arise from our pursuit of ever-more comfort and possessions and our refusal to realize that such things are finite. As we continue to gather them into our hands, others are deprived of what they regard as their fair share and become fertile ground for resentment and either passive or active resistance. Their negative worldview is only strengthened and expanded by the continued lack of modern education, meaningful employment, adequate health care, freedom from fear, and many other things that those of us who are more fortunate take for granted.

Underlying the above quotations is the need to understand others, for there can be no love among people without mutual respect and acceptance of one’s right to be different. Calls to celebrate diversity and accept multiculturalism abound, but many individuals and institutions have yet to go beyond mouthing the words while doing nothing to make them a reality. This is the true challenge of the new millennium.

In this issue, we present several articles on what we should expect from believers; certain similarities among the monotheistic religions; the roles of men and women, parents and children, and how they should work together to create a better society; the place of prayer in one’s life; and the need for joining scientific and spiritual knowledge to improve the quality of life for everyone. In addition, we present several short articles on the values of introspection and self-reflection, self-reliance and the need to stop blaming others for what happens to us, and how we should view other people.

We analyze one nation’s successful quest for development to see if its methods can be applied by other nations. Also discussed is the potential of e-learning to spread relevant knowledge in areas that previously had no access to it, and the hope that they will be able to benefit from it. Two of our authors explain how democratic governing institutions prevent wars between democratic nations and civil wars within those same nations, and how the formation of social capital increases society’s overall well-being.

Our scientific articles discuss the benefits of lightning on our health and even our moods, and how the existence of what scientists call ‘dark matter’ could signal a change in how we perceive ourselves and our place in the universe.

We hope that you enjoy this issue and, as always, look forward to your comments.

As religion cannot be the source of happiness and misery at the same time, we examine these two perspectives. Among the examples typically cited to support the misery argument are Islam’s expansion (seventh to sixteenth centuries), the Crusades, and Europe’s ‘religious’ wars. While seemingly plausible at first glance, further analysis reveals that this argument overlooks key historical information and misrepresents others. In the following article, we examine this argument from a theological and historical perspective.

The Holy Scriptures

First we look at the religious sources: the holy Scriptures. The Qur’an condones war only in self-defense and preventing injustice and aggression, and equates killing one person unjustly with killing humanity (5:32). Examining early Islam’s so-called ‘religious wars’ reveals that each one was fought in self-defense or to prevent injustice. The total number of people killed in any battle of Prophet Muhammad never exceeded several hundred.(1)

The phrase holy war, the common translation for jihad, is a misnomer. Jihad essentially means struggling in God’s cause, of which war is only one form and allowed only under clearly defined circumstances. The New Testament tells victims to embrace aggressors with love or restore justice in the most appropriate manner (Matthew 5; Luke 17:1-5), while the Old Testament says: ‘Thou shalt not kill’ (Exodus 20:13, Deuteronomy 5:17) and ‘He that kills any man shall surely be put to death (Leviticus 21:17).

Any aggression not conducted for self-defense or preventing injustice is not based on true religion. A good treatment of this in the context of Islam can be found in Prophet Muhammad as Commander.(2)

The Twentieth Century

The claim that religion is responsible for much of the bloodshed and death from a historical and statistical perspective is incorrect. The majority of deaths throughout history occurred during the twentieth century, and the majority of those happened during wars stemming from nonreligious motives.(3) World War II tops this list: 15 million soldiers and 25.5 million civilians. World War I is a close second: 9 million soldiers and 9.7 million civilians. Other examples include the Russian civil and the Russo-Polish wars (1917-21: 2 million soldiers, 7 million civilians), the Korean War (1950-53: 2 million soldiers and .9 million civilians), the Franco-Vietnam and US-Vietnam wars (1945-73: 1.3 million soldiers and 1.4 million civilians), the Sino-Japanese War (1937-41: 1 million soldiers and 1.2 million civilians), and the Soviet-Afghanistan War (1979-89: 500,000 soldiers and 1 million civilians).(4) These wars, which are responsible for the great majority of human loss through history, cannot be attributed to religious zeal.

The Soviet Union

While the motives of certain wars and other acts of aggression can be debated, certain self-proclaimed atheist, fascist, or otherwise nonreligious regimes, such as pre-World War II Germany and the Soviet Union, committed unprecedented crimes against their neighbors and citizens. According to Laqueur: ‘One of the cardinal features of the totalitarian dictatorships of the twentieth century was internal terror, the huge number of ‘enemies”and potential enemies’interned and executed. A striking example of this phenomenon is the era of Lenin and Stalin in Soviet Union. The atrocities committed during the time of Stalin are well documented.'(5)

According to the most conservative figures, allegedly based on secret KGB archives, between 510,307 and 1,727,970 Soviets were in labor camps between 1934 and 1950. A further 457,000 to 1,145,000 people were sentenced to labor colonies during roughly the same period. According to numbers released by Major General Anatoli Krayushkin, head of the Ministry of State Security’s archives, 3,853,000 arrests and 827,995 death sentences were made between 1917 and 1990. According to official KGB sources, 681,692 persons were killed between 1937 and 1938. In addition, 1,053,829 persons died in the Gulag between 1934 and 1953. To these numbers, one should add such figures as the Polish officers killed in 1940 in Katyn and other camps (15,000 to 20,000), and the Kazakhs who disappeared during the 1930s (1.5 to 2 million).

These are conservative estimates, given their source. Some researchers put the total number of deaths under the Soviets at between 10 and 20 million. According to Alec Nove, there were some 11 million ‘excess’ deaths between 1927 and 1937. Steven Wheatcroft, another Soviet-era researcher, says between 4 and 5 million people died.(6)

While Stalin remains notorious for internal terror, Lenin has been viewed differently’as a visionary whose ideals were betrayed by his followers. Is this correct? Recently declassified Soviet documents tell a different story. The following is a letter from Lenin to his comrades in which, appallingly, he mentions a specific number of people to be hanged: ‘Comrades! The uprising of the five kulak districts should be mercilessly suppressed… Hang (hang without fail, so the people see) no fewer than one hundred known kulaks.'(7)

In 1922, Moscow sought to confiscate all valuables of the Russian Orthodox Church and its monasteries to secure badly needed assets and to break the Church’s power over the peasants. Lenin hoped that the terrible famine sweeping Soviet Russia and Ukraine in 1921-22 would turn the peasantry against the Church. In the industrial city of Shuia, soldiers fired and killed several civilians (devout Christians) trying to protect their church. This event prompted the Politburo to delay further confiscation. When Lenin learned of this, he urged Politburo members to continue the campaign ‘mercilessly,’ as the time was ripe for such an action:

It is precisely now and only now, when in the starving regions people are eating human flesh, and hundreds if not thousands of corpses are littering the roads, that we can (and therefore must) carry out the confiscation of church valuables with the most savage and merciless energy… to secure for ourselves a fund of several hundred million gold rubles.

One wise writer on matters of statecraft (8) rightly said that if it is necessary to resort to certain brutalities for the sake of realizing a certain political goal, they must be carried out in the most energetic fashion and in the briefest possible time because the masses will not tolerate prolonged application brutality…. the struggle against us will be made more difficult if right at this moment, precisely in connection with the famine, we suppress the reactionary clergy with maximal speed and ruthlessness.

Therefore I come to the categorical conclusion that precisely at this moment we must give battle to the Black Hundred clergy in the most decisive and merciless manner and crush its resistance with such brutality that it will not forget it for decades to come.(9)

In another letter, Lenin openly instructs his comrades to terrorize the state’s enemies:

To Comrade Krestinsky:

I propose to form a commission immediately (initially this can be done secretly) to work out emergency measures (in the spirit of Larin: Larin is right). Let us say you+Larin+Vladimirsky (or Dzerzhinsky)+Rykov? Or Miliutin.

It is necessary secretly’and urgently’to prepare the terror. And on Tuesday we will decide whether it will be through SNK (the Council of People Commissars) or otherwise.(10)

These letters demonstrate that Stalin’s internal ‘cleansing’ campaigns of the 1930s and 1940s only continued Lenin’s policy and practice, and were not, as some claim, a betrayal of his high ideals.

While love and respect for fellow human beings is an essential principal of all major religions, in practice this has not always been the case. Aggression in the name of religion has long been exploited to show that religion brings tyranny and misery. Certain individuals, organizations, states, and regimes have used religion to justify the suffering they have caused, but this does not prove that religion by itself is to blame. As a matter of fact, nationalism, ideological extremism, or simple greed for power and material gain have caused incomparably larger suffering, as shown by documented statistics of wars and internal terror.

Conclusion

We looked briefly at the former Soviet Union, an atheist regime that committed some of the worst crimes against its own people in the name of communist ideology.

The twentieth century saw unprecedented advances in science and technology and, unfortunately, unprecedented human misery and suffering. Most crimes against humanity, as documented by statistics and recently revealed secret archives, were committed by totalitarian regimes during the twentieth century. Thus it is to claim that religion is responsible for most of history’s bloodshed and death. This responsibility lies with modern racist, atheist, or simply greedy regimes and not with religion, which was revealed to guide people to true happiness in this world and in the next through their own will.

Footnotes

1. Ali Unal, ‘Killing for Religion?’ The Fountain, no. 2 (Apr.’June 1996), 14.
2. M. Fethullah Gulen, Prophet Muhammad as a Comman der (Truestar: 1998).
3. Richard F. Mollica, ‘Invisible Wounds,’ Scientific American (June 2000).
4. Ibid.
5. Walter Laqueur, The Dream That Failed: Reflections on the Soviet Union (Oxford University Press: 1994).
6. Ibid.
7. Letter to V. V. Kuraev, Ye. B. Bosh and A. E. Minkin, August 1918. Located in Richard Pipes, The Unknown Lenin (Yale University Press: 1996).
8. Editor Note: Lenin is referring to Machiavelli (1469-1527), an Italian political philosopher and statesman synonymous with placing politics above everthing else.
9. Ibid., Letter to the Politburo, March 1922.
10. Ibid., Memorandum to N. N. Krestinsky, Sept. 1918. 

Although the disintegration of the Soviet Union has, largely, put an end to the end of Cold War, the world has not become more peaceful. The bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia and other savage conflicts have signaled the emergence of a new nationalism. In this context, to justify the use of force we frequently hear talk of self-determination and the rights of peoples.

Membership of the United Nations has increased sharply only twice in its history. The first time was in the late fifties and early sixties, at the people of the decolonization following the retreat of the Western imperial powers. The second time was after the disintegration of the Soviet empire and then, a little later, of Yugoslavia. In the latter case, the new sovereign nation-states were not colonies achieving a new independence.

It is thought that the latest increase in the number of nation-states will encourage distinct communities within larger states to seek some measure of independence. Although the legal right for self-determination as the basis for the use of force to gain independence is not new, it would be wrong to deny that the use of force is now perceived as a likely means of realizing full independence or some degree of autonomy. That perception is surely one of the strongest reasons behind many of the conflicts currently stretching taking place in Bosnia- Herzegovina, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Kashmir, Northern Iraq, Somalia, Dniester region of Moldova, the Abkhazian region of Georgia, etc. These are only some of the hot spots which have one, or more than one group of people engaged in armed struggle for independence. Of course the list could easily be enlarged.

Language is certainly a decisive factor in the assertion of ethnic identity. According to the Summer Institute of Linguistics, Dallas, Texas, there are 6,170 languages spoken in the world at this time (Grimes (ed). 1988, p.vii: quoted in Moynihan, 1933, p.72) However, there are only 184 states in the world, the latest additions being Eritrea, Monaco and Andorra.

The steady increase in the number of nation-states indicates that the process of state-building is far from over. International analysts John O’Loughlin and Herman van der Wusten expect the number to reach around 250 by the middle of the next century (O’Loughin and Van der Wusten, in Taylor (ed). 1993, p.l08). The way that number will be attained is likely to be by using force. That likelihood alone is enough reason for taking the issue very seriously. For, as the number of nation-states increases, so too do the chances of war between them as the conflicts of interest between the states become more complicated.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, it was a self-evident truth that wars, strictly speaking, could only be engaged in by established states. Other terms were used to describe other forms of violence such as insurrection, civil unrest, piracy, or rebellion. At most, there was ‘civil war’ where the adjective modified the idea and the law which applied.

Especially after the Second World War, opinions about what constitutes war and which entities in the international arena may wage war have altered. The swift break-up of colonial empires and the increasing consensus that there was a right of peoples to self-determination have led some to the view that wars of national liberation are international wars, albeit they are not inter-state wars (Wilson, 1988, p.134). It can he convincingly argued that the rules governing the Legitimacy of resort to force (jus ad bellum) and the rules governing the conduct of hostilities (jus in bello) have changed markedly since the Second World War and especially since 1960.

As the ethnic conflicts spread around the world, they are becoming another source of human misery in the aftermath of the Cold War. It is a reality of our time that secessionist, irridentist, and national liberation wars are the greatest killers-either directly through bloodshed or indirectly through hunger or disease stemming from such wars (Farley, 1986, p. 139). O’Loughlin and Van der Wusten hold that the causes of wars after the 1990s will most probably be ethno-nationalist disputes (Taylor (ed.), 1993, p.106), that is, related to national liberation or separatist movements. For the last two years, we have been witnessing through the nastiest example of such a conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Unless a remedy is found to these ethnic disputes, the peoples of the earth will not experience in the foreseeable future the peace that seemed to be, to so many, the promise of the end of the Cold War era. 

References

• FARLEY, Lawrence T. (1986) Plebiscites and Sovereignty: the Crisis of Political Illegitimacy, Westview Press, London.
• GRIMES, Barbara F.( ed) ( 1988) Ethnologue:Languages of the World. Summer Institute of Linguistics. Dallas.
• O’LOUGHLIN, J. & VAN DER WUSTEN, H. (1993) ‘Political geography of war and peace’, in Taylor(ed.)
• TAYLOR, Peter J. (1993) Political Geography of The Twentieth Century, Belhaven Press, London.
• MOYNIHAN, DANIEL P. (1993) Pandemonium:Ethnicity in International Politics, Oxford Univercity Press.
• WILSON, Heather A. (1988) International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, Clarendon Press.