On the last day of summer

Ten hours before fall…

….My grandfather took me

Out to the Wall.

For a while he stood silent

Then finally he said,

With a very sad shake

Of his very old head,

“As you know, on this side of the Wall

We are Yooks.

On the other side of the Wall

Live the Zooks”

Thus, The Butter Battle Book, written by the well known author, Dr. Seuss invites the young reader to the world of Yooks and Zooks. The colorful illustrations of the book show from the first two pages that Yooks and Zooks are creatures quite alike in appearance with the only difference that Yooks dress in blue while Zooks are dressed in orange. Hence one cannot grasp at the beginning why a wall stands between them. Yet, the following words of the grandfather introduce to the reader another “important” difference without delay.

Then my grandfather said

“It’s high time that you knew

Of the terrible, horrible thing that Zooks do

In every Zook house and in every Zook town

Every Zook eats his bread

With the butter side down!”

“But we Yooks, as you know,

when we breakfast or sup,

spread our bread,” Grandpa said,

“with the butter side up

That’s the right, honest way!”

Grandpa gritted his teeth.

“So you can’t trust a Zook who spreads bread underneath!

Now, I see you smile at the “horrible” crime Zooks commit but don’t dismiss it as a funny little story. Rather try to remember how your own parents, your teachers, or even books you read shaped the way you looked at others. How much of this acquired knowledge and experience caused prejudice, fear, and hostility? Or if you please, take a greater challenge and ponder on how you interact today with people that are different from you. Do you erect walls or do you build bridges?

As you reflect on yourself and your life consider how the grandfather Yook delivers an important warning to his grandchild.

Every Zook must be watched!

He has kinks in his soul!

That’s why, as a youth, I made watching my goal,

watching Zooks for the Zook-Watching Border Patrol!

In those days, of course

the Wall wasn’t so high

and I could look any Zook

square in the eye

If he dared to come close

I could give him a twitch

With my tough-tufted

Snick Berry Switch

Isn’t it interesting that the difference between Yooks and Zooks instead of becoming a reason for curious attraction toward each other became a pretext for hostility and suspicion? Then again, this is no novelty to us, is it? When fear and hostility join hand, the clash is sure to come.

For the Yooks the clash began when one day a Zook named Van Itch slingshot the Grandfather’s “Tough-Tufted Prickly Snick-Berry Switch.” The Yooks then developed a machine with three slingshots interlinked, called a “Triple-Sling Jigger.” This gun worked once (Van Itch got scared and ran off), but the Zooks counterattacked with their own creation: The “Jigger-Rock Snatchem,” a machine with three nets to fling the rocks fired from the Triple-Sling Jigger back at the Yooks’ side “just as fast as we catch ‘em.”

Page by page the conflict between the two sides escalates and leads to a long arms race for bigger and better weapons to outdo the other, which unsurprisingly brings the Yooks and Zooks on the scary threshold of mutual destruction.

The Butter Battle Book was written during the Cold War era, and many critics think that the book reflects the concerns of the time, especially the perceived possibility that all life on earth could be destroyed in a nuclear war. The book’s apparent position regarding the arms race could be one of the reasons why The Butter Battle Book was once removed from the shelves of public libraries during the Cold War. Another reason could have been educators’ worries about the inappropriateness of introducing the idea of annihilation to young children.

The Butter Battle Book has also been seen as an enjoyable satirical work, with its depiction of a deadly war based on a senseless conflict over something as trivial as a breakfast food. The book’s delightful illustrations and its tongue twisting rhymes make the book fun to read.

Let’s go back to the book because meanwhile, both the Yooks and the Zooks have come to the end of their race. Both sides have developed the same equally powerful destructive bomb: “the bitsy big boy boomeroo.” On the last page of the book grandfather and Van Itch stand still about to drop the bomb and we hear the grandchild’s fearful cry:

“Granpa!” I shouted “Be careful! Oh Gee!

Who’s going to drop it?

Will you…? Will he…?”

“Be patient,” said Granpa. “We’ll see.”

“We will see…”

You may feel unsatisfied with the inconclusive ending, yet some literary critics deem it perfect for provoking discussion on how Zooks and Yooks might develop alternative ways to solve their problems. In fact, this entire book could be an excellent manual for peace studies educators to incorporate conflict resolution on both small and large scales.

On the other hand a National Review article published in July 27, 1984 (shortly after the book came out in print) draws attention to the idea that the inconclusive ending of the book could do damage to the cause Seuss is professing. The article claims that: “By ending inconclusively, with neither side having fired a serious shot and with each side wary of the nuclear weapons of the other, Seuss reminds us that nuclear weapons have kept the peace for nearly forty years now.” According to this article children may as well conclude that the surest way to achieve peace is to remain strong albeit strong at times might translate into inventing and possessing weapons of mass destruction.

Parental or teacher guidance during the reading of this book could be of great help in this case. Thought provoking questions can be addressed such as: Can the non-existence of war be considered real peace? Is a cold war the most peace that can be achieved?

Conclusion

Because history seems to repeat itself The Butter Battle Book and its message are far from obsolete even today, two decades later. As we hear with dread news of wars and ongoing nuclear armaments, as the map of the world is marked with more “hot spots,” we get the gut feeling that maybe we are living in the land of Yooks and Zooks. We feel that it is imperative to promote peace and prevent the infamous prediction of the so called clash of civilizations.

If we, people of this world, should wage a war why not wage one to eradicate poverty, ignorance and hostility? If we should take up arms can’t they be sound education, tolerance, love, and mutual understanding? With the situation as it is, it seems like we don’t possess the luxury to lay back and say: “We’ll see…. We will see…”

It brings hope to see that many people think likewise and have already rolled up their sleeves for the noble cause of peace making. The opportunities to get involved in this noble cause for peace are limitless starting from nonprofit organizations promoting tolerance and peacemaking to small groups that act against prejudice and discrimination. If you feel you are too insignificant to make an impact, then here is something simple to do; read The Butter Battle Book with a child and talk about all the beauties that come with peace.

Mirkena Ozer pursues creative writing at University of Georgia, Atlanta.

References and notes

1. http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+Butter+Battle+Book.-a03363441.

Biological weapons (BWs), defined as infectious bacterial or viral agents used to harm others, have a long history2: Primitive peoples used arrows poisoned with biological toxins from animal and plant extracts, and also poisoned their enemy’s water supply with fecal extracts. Medieval warriors besieging the Russian city of Kaffa catapulted plague-infected corpses over its walls. Europeans knowingly gave smallpox- or measles-infected blankets to Native Americans, who had no resistance to these diseases. BWs reportedly were used during WWII. Over time, BWs have come to include biologically derived toxins and poisons.3 Among the most dangerous agents are smallpox, botalinum toxin (Btx), anthrax, and ricin.4 Some are highly lethal, while others incapacitate the host or primarily harm animals and plants. Today, many countries are believed to fund such research.

BWs Become a Modern Issue

Japan started the first offensive biological weapon program in 1918 with Unit 731, a special army unit dedicated to BWs production and experimentation. In 1931, it moved to Man-churia, China, where it conducted experiments on Chinese people and actually attacked several cities with different BWs until 1942. At least 10,000 Chinese died during those experiments. In 1942, the U.S. learned of this program and started its own. By 1969, it had weaponized the agents causing anthrax, botulism, tularemia, brucellosis, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, and Q fever.5

In 1969, President Nixon declared that the U.S. unilaterally renounced first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical agents and weapons, and unconditionally renounced all methods of biological warfare. Henceforth, the U.S.’s biological program would research only strictly defined measures of defense, such as immunization. All stockpiles were ordered to be destroyed. The U.S. and 165 other countries have signed the Biolog-ical and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC), and 144 countries have ratified it.6

But the BWC cannot be effective if it cannot be enforced. For example, the USSR signed it but continued its programs. In 1979, at least 66 people died after an accidental anthrax release from a plant near Sverdlovsk. Soviet authorities denied any BWs production, but years later President Yeltsin confirmed that anthrax was being researched at that time.7 Yeltsin further asserted that all such programs were stopped and that stockpiles were being removed. However, evidence suggests that part of the offensive programs continue.8

The USSR’s demise (1991) led to the spread of BWs production information. According to Margolis, some of the 60,000 scientists and technicians formerly employed by its biological warfare establishment reportedly are working in Iraq, Israel, Iran, Syria, and Serbia, all of which already have extensive arsenals of biowarfare weapons. India also may have received substantial Russian aid.9

Iraq announced its BWs program in 1995. Fortunately, such agents were not used during the Gulf War, possibly due to fear of nuclear retaliation. The UN destroyed whatever it could find of Iraq’s BWs program in 1996.10 China, Iran, Taiwan, Syria, Cuba, North Korea, Egypt, Israel, and Libya are suspected of having similar programs.11

Why Would Anyone Use BWs?

In the eyes of nations or groups that put their own ideology or interests above all other considerations, including human life and future generations, such weapons might appear attractive. Consider the following points:

BWs probably are more effective on a per-quantity basis than more conventional weapons. Just 8 ounces of Type-A botalinum toxin, “the most lethal substance known,” could kill every living creature on Earth.12 One gram of anthrax contains 100 million lethal doses, and a few kilograms can kill as many people as died at Hiroshima.13 Generally speaking, several kilos of a biological agent can have the impact of several tons of nerve gas. BWs are extremely effective because they are highly toxic and are living organisms that multiply in and infect target hosts.

Producing chemical and nuclear weapons requires sophisticated equipment and highly trained personnel; BWs require only a modest level of education and investment. Kathleen C. Bailey, a former assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, is “absolutely convinced” that a major biological arsenal could be built with $10,000 worth of equipment in a 15×15 ft. room.14

For example:

To infect 1 sq. km., it would cost approximately $2,000 using conventional weapons, $800 using nuclear weapons, $600 using chemical weapons, and $1 using biological weapons. Any nation with a reasonably advanced pharmaceutical and medical industry can mass produce BWs.15

Weaponized anthrax probably could be produced in a small house, apartment or RV for less than $100,000. The program could be run by perhaps less than a dozen technicians with the equivalent of a BS degree led by one supervisor with a Ph.D. The relevant basic knowledge for most biological weapons-grade microbes is freely available, and equipment and chemicals can be obtained from dozens of suppliers.16

A live weapon needs only a small sample for mass production. Some agents exist naturally in the soil or can be ordered from a biotech company. Various researchers have claimed that Saddam Hussein used the latter method to acquire his original anthrax culture.17 BWs are hard are to detect in the production phase, for most bioweapons can be produced in hidden and/or mobile conditions.18 When detected, the place can be quickly cleaned and transformed into an ordinary pharmaceutical research or biology lab. Furthermore, such anti-terrorist sensor systems as metal detectors, x-ray machines, trained dogs, or neutron bombardment cannot detect BWs.19

Damage is confined to people (and possibly other living things), thus leaving infrastructure intact20; the sheer terror caused by such a threat21; ensuing governmental panic22; and the time lag between release and detection makes identification and apprehension very remote.23 But BWs also have certain drawbacks, among them:

The need for effective delivery. Most biological agents infect through inhalation. Too-large particles are caught in the respiratory system; too-small particles are exhaled. To stay in the lungs, the particle should be between 1 and 5 Angstroms. In fact, a BW attempt in Japan failed because the dissemination tool was ineffective.24

Even if disseminated, the desired result is far from certain. Most biological materials, including spores, are destroyed by exposure to ultraviolet light and drying. Agents released in the air may disperse in unexpected ways due to changes in wind patterns. Rain may wash the agents out of the air before they reach their target. Also, BWs can turn around and infect those who released them.

BWs’ live nature is a two-edged sword. The disease spreads easily, but no one can know when it is safe to live in the infected area. An agent’s lifespan is a major concern, for it can become part of the local microflora and thus threaten any military follow-up activities for an unknown length of time.25

Vulnerability to Attack

BWs have two main uses: on the battlefield and on a civilian population. Battlefield Use: BWs have several drawbacks here, such as high dependence upon external conditions, delayed effects, possible self-infection, uncertainty over when an infected area is safe enough to return to, and neutralization by vaccination or protective clothing. Use on a Civilian Population: This is the true horror, for civilians would not be prepared for such an attack and the resulting epidemic would be very hard to control. If the attack is covert, authorities would be unable to identify the source and unaware of the attack until infected people start showing up in the hospitals. When they finally identified the agent, the infection would be widespread. If a vaccine did not exist, health professionals would be unable to offer much help. The U.S. considers itself very vulnerable to such an attack and is working to protect itself.

Given that BWs are not hard to obtain, why have they not been used on civilian populations so far? The main reasons seem to be fear of a reprisal attack and of alienating the public to one’s cause. Potential users apparently feel that the disadvantages far outweigh the advantages. But as they may not always feel that way, the U.S. and other nations are studying how to prepare their national health care infrastructures and personnel to deal with such an event.

A Recent Development

On July 26, 2001, the Washington Post announced that the U.S. would withdraw from the BWC on the grounds that a newly proposed protocol “would not prevent cheating, and could encourage espionage against the U.S. pharmaceutical and chemical industries.” One wonders if other countries will follow suit.

Conclusion

Many Web sites discuss this vital issue, such as: www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/: strengthening the BWC; www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil/about_us/general.html: Department of Defense focal point for data related to Chemical Warfare/Chemical and Biological Defense technology; www.asanltr.com/: specializes in nuclear, biological, and chemical defense and protection issues; www.geocities.com/nbclinks/: gateway for nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare data on the Web; and www.seanet.com/~gtate/cwoff.htm: gives access to various chemical warfare-related Web pages.

All religions condemn such horrific weapons on the grounds that all life is inherently sacred and worthy of respect. However, realpolitik, greed for profits, ideological conflict, and the need to assert or maintain control of natural and other resources deafens many governments and people to the appeals of religion.

Unfortunately, one nation’s and even one group’s decision to head down this path causes others to follow for the sake of self-preservation. We are well-advanced on this path, and no one can say where it will end

Footnotes

1. Rod Hafemeister, “Vaccines Will Not Suffice Fight Vs. Anthrax Needs Other Ammo,” Belleville News-Democrat (28 Dec. 1997). Online at: www.militaryreporter.org/anthrax.html.
2. R. E. Hurlbert, Microbiology 101, “Chapter XV, Adden-dum: Biological Weapons; Malignant Biology,” Washington State Univ. 1997). Online at: www.slic2.wsu.edu:82/hurlbert/micro101/pages/101biologicalweapons.html.
3. Henry E. Hardy, “Biological Weapons FAQ v. 0.44,” (1999): Online at: www.ocean.ic.net/ftp/doc/disaster/bio/biowfaq.html.
4. Partial online list: www.fas.org/nuke/intro/bw/agent.htm.
5. Thomas W. McGovern and George W. Christopher, Biological Warfare and Its Coetaneous Manifestations. Online at: www.telemedicine.org/BioWar/biologic.htm.
6. http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/bw-btwc-mainpage.html.
7. F. A. Abramova et al., “Pathology of inhalational anthrax in 42 cases from the Sverdlovsk outbreak of 1979,” Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, no. 90 (1993): 2291-94; G. W. Christopher et al., “Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective,” J Am Med Assoc, no. 278 (1997): 412-17.
8. Eric Margolis, “Another Doomsday Clock Is Ticking, Ticking,” Foreign Correspondent (20 June 1999). Online at: www.foreigncorrespondent.com/ archive/doomsday.htm.
9. R A. Zilinskas, “Iraq’s biological weapons: The past as future?” J Am Med Assoc, no. 278 (1997): 418-24.
10. Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project Web Page: www.stimson.org/cwc/bwissues.htm.
11. Margolis, “Another Doomsday,”(20 June 1999).
12. Robert H. Kupperman and David M. Smith, “Coping with Biological Terrorism,” in Brad Roberts, ed., Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future? (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), 35-46; Wayman C. Mullins, “An Overview and Analysis of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism: The Weapons, Strategies and Solutions to a Growing Problem,” American Journal of Criminal Justice 16:2 (1992): 95-119.
13. M. Asperilla, “Bioterrorism: The threat of the future.” Online at: www.sun-herald.com/2000/fron9.htm.
14. L. Cole, “The Specter of Biological Weapons,” Scientific American. Online at: www.sciam.com/1296issue/ 1296cole.html#1.
15. Ibid.
16. R. E. Hurlbert, “Biological Weapons: Black Biology,” Focus on Microbiology Education Newsletter (Spring 1998). Online at: www.microbelibrary.org/newsletter/nltrs98.htm.
17. For this and other claims of how the U.S. helped Iraq obtain the necessary ingredients for both biological and chemical weapons, consult Mark Phythian and Nikos Passas, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam’s War Machine (Northeastern Univ. Press: 1996); Alan Friedman, Spider’s Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq (New York : Bantam Books, 1993).
18. Hurlbert, Microbiology 101 (see footnote 8).
19. Robert S. Root-Bernstein, “Infectious Terrorism,” Atlantic Monthly (May 1991): 44-50.
20. Stanley L. Wiener 1991. “Terrorist Use of Biological Weapons.” Terrorism 14:2, (1991): 129; “Chemical and Biological Weapons and Terrorism,” in Susan Flood, ed., International Terrorism: Policy Implications (Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, The University of Illinois at Chicago, 1991), 65.
21. Robert H. Kupperman and Darrell M. Trent, Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1979).
22. Harvey J. McGeorge, “Reversing the Trend on Terror,” Defense & Foreign Affairs 16:4 (April 1988): 16-22.
23. Jeffrey D. Simon, Terrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons: A Discussion of Possibilities R/3771-AFMIC (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1989): 10; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: 1994), 483.
24. The ease of dissemination remains controversial. A detailed summary of the BWs delivery scenarios can be found in Ron Perver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the Open Literature. Online at: www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/miscdocs/purv_e.html#tab2.
25. Dr. Dane Jones. Online at: www.calpoly.edu/~drjones/ biowar-e3.html.

The media proclaims globalization’s advantages and disadvantages. Money flows from international lending institutions and TNCs to developing countries. Children receive an education, parents have better job opportunities, families benefit from improved medical care, and local farmers and industrialists can sell to an ever-expanding market. Countries begin to develop and climb out of debt, the quality of life improves, and children imagine a better future.

There are certain drawbacks, however. Those affected negatively sometimes seek refuge in intense nationalism or religious fundamentalism. Closer economic integration brings financial uncertainty and trans-border problems. Remember the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98? Over time, borrowed money can strangle a poor country, as in Africa. Development projects change people’s lives-and not always for the better, as illustrated by Mexico’s on-going Zapatista rebellion. National development policies can affect a region’s climate and, in the case of China with its huge population and rapid industrialization at the expense of its environment, the global climate.

Globalization has even changed our concept of time. Never has “time is money” been so accurate. Time has become an asset to be exploited, no longer a luxury to be enjoyed. Everyone wants to manage it better, to control it so that the hoped-for benefits will be attained. Now people say that the world is no longer divided between the haves and the have-nots, but between the fast and the slow.

The growing access to and use of antibiotics has spawned new drug-resistant bacteria, which means that antibiotics are becoming less effective. Moreover, some nations and groups are exploiting the wide availability of the experts’ increasing medical and technological knowledge of bacteria to produce biological weapons. Without religion’s assertions that all life is equally valuable and sacred, and that we must work together to uplift everyone, one day such weapons might be used.

To understand the advantages and disadvantages of such interconnectivity, we must analyze its impact upon our selves and our lives. This is one of the purposes of reflection and self-criticism, for these practices show us where we fit in. Many people use these tools to pursue corporate, political, national, or personal interests, whereas many others use them to pursue interfaith dialogue in the hope that tolerance, understanding, acceptance, and cooperation will spread around the world.

But the real value of reflection and self-criticism lies in helping us relate to existence and the Divine, as well as to nature and others, so that we may prepare for our own resurrection and eternal life. Once we understand that such issues remain relevant, regardless of time or place, we realize that religion was not invented by “primitive” people to explain what they could not understand.

We hope that you enjoy this issue and, as always, look forward to your comments.

In May 1994, the world received a shock when 6 grams of highly purified (99.7 %) weapons-grade plutonium-239 was found in the house of a German businessman. It originated from one of Russia’s plutonium plants. This was the first of several such cases. In one raid, 310 grams of weapons grade ptutonium-239 was uncovered, a third of what is needed to make a massive kiloton nuclear bomb. It is believed that these ‘incidents’ are just the tip of the iceberg. The world is justifiably alarmed at the prospect of uncontrolled plutonium proliferation.

Plutonium is one of the most dangerous materials on earth. Five kilograms is enough to make a crude nuclear weapon. Some experts even believe that only one kg will suffice. Of course this is not the only reason that makes it one of the most dangerous of materials. Less than one thousandth of a gram is enough to cause cancer if inhaled. Plutonium is the second of the transuranium elements with an atomic number 94. It is a silvery looking and highly reactive material. It is so reactive that it is processed in special chambers filled with inert gases to prevent it from reacting with atmospheric gases and the moisture in the air, but it is not the reactivity of plutonium that attracts attention: it is its radioactivity. All transuranium elements are highly radioactive, but only plutonium and neptunium occur naturally, both in very minute amounts. The others are manufactured. The fact that plutonium occurs naturally means that it is stable enough to last if it can be produced by some means. Actually, it is very stable; its most prevalent form has a half-life of 24,131 years. Therefore; if manufactured, it is not easy to get rid of. Nearly all the plutonium that exists on earth today is produced this way.

The road to plutonium production

Of all radioactive materials, three are extremely important for nuclear energy generation by fission: plutonium-239, uranium- 233 and uranium-235. These are the only 3 radioactive materials which can provide a self-sustaining nuclear fission reaction. This means that by bringing together a critical amount of any of these three, a chain reaction can be initiated. This is the principle behind nuclear energy and nuclear weaponry.

Since the 1950’s, scientists have believed that plutonium and not uranium may be the ultimate solution to the world’s energy problem. Although uranium can be found naturally in several minerals, the fissile isotope U-235 is extremely low. With plutonium and uranium are both rare, one may ask ‘why has plutonium become so important?’. The answer is simple: in fast breeder reactors, more plutonium is produced than burnt. This process uses an isotope of uranium U-238, which is not fissile itself but more common than the fissile isotope U- 235. If you irradiate U-238-which we have plenty of-with highly energetic neutrons, it will capture them and eventually decompose into the most dangerous form of plutonium, Pu- 239 , by two successive 13-decays. After that step, plutonium is chemically separated from other material by means of remote controlled facilities. So if you have unusable U-238 you can turn it into highly desirable Pu-239 by using some U-235 or Pu-239. Once you have bred enough plutonium, you can start feeding in the new plutonium without the need for more U- 235 as fuel. The only drawback is that reprocessing and purifying it to use as nuclear fuel is not easy.

Today, things have changed. Countries determined to stay with commercial nuclear energy production need not use plutonium, fuels made of low-enriched uranium will suffice and unlike the past, reserves are enough to sustain nuclear energy production commercially. These fuels are not weapons-usable and are much cheaper and easier to handle. Reprocessing plutonium for reintroduction as nuclear-fuel is a very complex, dangerous and expensive process.

Given these facts, we may wonder why nations want to possess plutonium for nuclear energy generation. Another phenomenon differentiates plutonium from uranium: unlike uranium, all forms of plutonium can be made into weapons (although some mixtures of isotopes are less desirable to a weapons designer). If a nation insists on using costly plutonium rather than cheaper low-enriched uranium for energy generation, one may suspect that the country has other intentions.

Politics of plutonium

Plutonium has proliferated since 1942. Twenty-two countries possess or control separated plutonium in various forms and amounts, either for military or commercial use. As the nuclear warheads are decommissioned according to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, stockpiles are growing sharply in the world. Although long-standing governmental and commercial secrecy make estimates highly uncertain, roughly 1,100 metric tons of the material exist today. Approximately 260 tons of that stockpile are deployed in the form of surplus nuclear weapons. Of the roughly 650 tons of plutonium in commercial programs, approximately 530 tons are contained in untreated spent reactor fuel, while roughly 120 tons are stored in weapons-usable form or recycled as fuel awaiting potential future use. Every year, the world’s reactors collectively generate 60 or 70 extra tonnes of plutonium and at the moment there is no law against reprocessing it. By the turn of the century, this is estimated to reach around 1700 tonnes. It is calculated that by the year 2003, Russia will have accumulated enough plutonium to make 21,700 crude weapons, whereas US will have accumulated enough for 18,100 weapons.

Nuclear policies are among the most sensitive and closely guarded secrets of any nation. States are unwilling to disclose data related to plutonium stockpiles. International non-proliferation movements are pressurizing governments. Japan has a special attachment to plutonium since their nuclear energy generation policy was originally based on plutonium. It is now the only country to rely on plutonium for nuclear energy and is said to be reviewing its policy. A few months ago, US had declared that it would stop the transfer of plutonium handling technology to Japan because there was the risk that Japan may be using this technology to make nuclear weapons. After months of pressure from the international community and internal non-proliferation groups, last month Japan declared that at the end of 1993 it had 4684 kgs of plutonium inside the country and 6197 kgs in France and Britain waiting to be shipped to Japan, and became the first nation to give the exact figures about its stockpiles. Previously, US had started to declassify some documents about its plutonium stockpiles and reported that it has produced 89 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium since 1945 and it has 33.5 tonnes of it now stored in Texas. Russians can’t even decide how much plutonium they have. There are discrepancies between the accounting systems of their military and the ministry of atomic energy.

Before the end of the cold war there was the perceived threat of a nuclear war. The threat has now changed. The loose security measures in the underfunded Russian and other former eastern-block nuclear industries are a much greater threat than a nuclear war or the hazards of nuclear waste. A nuclear war is a remote possibility because everybody seems to be aware that it would be a zero-sum game with no winners. Also nuclear waste disposal technology is so powerful that once the waste is disposed, it is nearly impossible for the nuclear waste to return to circulation or effect the human environment again. On the other hand, growing stockpiles of nuclear material that can be made into nuclear weapons is certainty a greater threat, especially when it is in unsafe hands prepared to sell at very low rates. Russia has reported 900 illegal attempts to gain entry to its nuclear facilities and another 700 cases where nuclear workers tried to smuggle out nuclear material. We don’t have any reason to believe that all attempts were stopped. Some material may well have been smuggled secretly. Some experts say that it is possible to make a nuclear bomb equivalent to the one dropped on Nagasaki, out of 7 kilograms of spent nuclear fuel instead of 5 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium and the know how for it is at large now. That technology is now available to everybody who wants to learn it, from the US documents of 1950’s that are no longer classified. Add the international loose measures for the monitoring and reprocessing of nuclear waste to this and the threat we are face to face today is clearly evident.

An institution called the International Atomic Energy Agency is responsible for monitoring the nuclear reactors in countries with no nuclear arms and that have signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. It keeps an eye on those countries and makes sure no plutonium is secretly diverted to military use. There are countries like India and Israel that are not signatories and evidence that IAEA can be fooled. Both North Korea and Iraq recently declared that they had secretly produced 3 grams of weapons-grade plutonium. Even if the countries are unable to divert plutonium to the military, this does not prevent them from developing nuclear weapons. A nation can develop other parts of the bomb such as the case and electronics, and when the nation’s leader decides it is time to have a nuclear bomb, plutonium can be directed to the military. The nation would have a nuclear bomb in a few days.

With plutonium, the odds are weighed against the well being of humankind. If nation states persist in the costly production and use of plutonium, they risk weapons proliferation, environmental devastation and damage to human health. In addition to its dangers as a deadly nuclear weapon constituent, the release of plutonium into the environment also poses health and environmental risks. Even if plutonium does not reach and damage the environment and human health via the routes mentioned above, there is always the danger posed by the nuclear powered warships and submarines as a rather easy way to a nuclearly polluted environment. Four sunken nuclear submarines lie in the depths of the Atlantic and there are reports that the reactors and the war-heads they were carrying are leaking plutonium and other nuclear materials into the ocean. This may turn out to be the biggest environmental and health hazard ever encountered, if these nuclear materials enter the food chain. Although there is no risk that at that depth, fish will eat these materials, it is always possible that they can be carried to suitable places by strong ocean currents where fish may feed. A stronger possibility is that it may be eaten by plankton which is in turn eaten by fish. Indeed, the risks are enough to require that plutonium production is judged too dangerous to allow its dangerous continuous production. Building on the international non-proliferation regime and current practices in the nuclear industry, a more comprehensive and specific regime must be constructed to manage plutonium and hasten its elimination. But such an international step is not that easy to take. 161 countries are signatories to the non-proliferation treaty and any change such as the banning of plutonium reprocessing, requires that they all agree on the subject and sign again.

These risks might be more tolerable if plutonium held unquestionable economic value in the foreseeable future. But no proven technology exists to generate electricity from plutonium or highly enriched uranium at economically competitive costs. As noted above, fuels made of low enriched uranium are both cheaper and less dangerous. Also, they do not pose comparable health, environmental or security hazards. The reserves of low-cost, low-enriched uranium accessible world-wide may run out, but not before the late 21st century, and then only if nuclear energy use increases markedly without eliciting increased supplies from either more efficient uranium handling or discovery of new reserves. Such an outcome is unlikely. Plutonium for long-term research and development programs will always be available in the form of spent fuel, even after the large surpluses of separated plutonium are reduced.

Today, the nuclear arms race is not accelerating as it was in the late 1940s and again in the late l970s; rather, it is being reversed, and unlike the 1970s, plutonium is not seen as the millennial solution to the energy needs of the world or as the salvation for the international nuclear power industry. Today, plutonium is increasingly perceived as a global problem that must be solved. Even the research grants for the reprocessing technology of plutonium are coming to a halt. Central to the establishment of an international plutonium regime is giving priority to gaining control of surplus stockpiles of separated plutonium that could be most readily reintroduced into weapons. The difficulties lie not in the mechanics but in the politics of international storage and ultimate disposal. Because it will take time to determine how and where to dispose of plutonium, the issue of safe, secure storage must be addressed at once.

By internationalizing the disposal and safety problem, the plutonium regime could provide a forum for scientists, engineers, environmentalists and others to examine the world’s technical capabilities and geography in order to identify the best possible options for disposing of plutonium and other radioactive materials.