It’s no secret – or at least it shouldn’t be – that climate change is one of the most important issues of our time. Very recently, a report came out saying that the planet could be facing serious consequences of climate change by 2040 – a mere 22 years from now (“Major Climate Report Describes a Strong Risk of Crisis as Early as 2040,” New York Times, Oct. 7, 2018). At a time when many political leaders seem unable to offer meaningful solutions, hamstrung by partisanship or economics, many people have turned to faith leaders for solutions. In 2015, for instance, Pope Francis issued Laudato Si’, a Catholic encyclical devoted entirely to ecological ethics and theology.

Two scholars explore Francis’ encyclical in Nature and Environment in Contemporary Religious Contexts edited by Muhammad Shafiq and Thomas Donlin-Smith. And though Francis might be the most quoted religious figure in the collection, Shafiq and Donlin-Smith have gathered 17 peer-reviewed essays submitted to a conference on nature and the environment in religions, hosted by the Hickey Center for Interfaith Studies and Dialogue at Nazareth College. Taken together, they offer an inspiring and hopeful look at how religions and faith leaders are approaching humanity’s biggest challenge.

Although Francis has been one of the loudest and most prominent religious voices urging a new ecological theology, I want to look at some of the lesser known voices who are advocating for interdisciplinary and interfaith solutions to climate change. For example, Hussam S. Timani writes compellingly about how secularism and modernity – and the so-called advances of contemporary science – have actually led to the on-going ecological disaster. As he lays out in his paper “Modernity, Secularism, and the Exclusion of Nature: Why Religion Matters,” he believes that answers might be found in the ecological consciousness commanded by religion, and looks specifically at Christianity and Islam.

Timani is not just concerned with the environment, though. He believes that Western modernity has estranged man from nature – and from meaning. It is this lack that has led humanity to so voraciously consume the planet’s resources, searching for a higher purpose that has been lost as more and more people have moved away from faith.

He sees potential solutions in both Islam and Christianity. Of Islam he writes, “Being a servant of God, man must preserve and protect what God has entrusted him with and restrain from exercising dominion and power over nature” (p. 41). And, like many scholars of a more compassionate, thoughtful Christianity, Timani finds hope in the words of Richard Niebuhr, who “spoke of ‘loyalty to the community of life’” (p. 49).

Timani also engages with critics of religion – namely, Todd Jared LaVasseur’s critique that all major religions are anthropocentric, or the belief that humans are the most important creature. While true, Timani believes that religions call for a conscientious anthropocentrism, as opposed to the reckless consumption of resources espoused by Western materialism.

In his essay, “Dietrich Bonhoeffer as an Ecological Theologian,” Jamison Stallman also places the blame for our current ecological crisis on Western materialism. He examines climate change and a possible way forward through the theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the early 20^th century Lutheran theologian, and the writings of environmental ethicist Larry Rasmussen.

In Sanctorum Communio (literally “a congregation of saints” and also the title of Bonhoeffer’s doctoral dissertation), Bonhoeffer asserts that, in Stallman’s words, “I become an individual when I recognize that there is a self-conscious You” (p. 90). It is only through a person’s relation to other humans that they can have any identity at all. Community is necessary for there to be an individual.

Of course, as we all know, any time two self-conscious “I”s come into contact, there will be an ethical tension. But this, Bonhoeffer asserts, is how person-hood and community are constantly being shaped and re-defined: by managing such ethical barriers.

Larry Rasmussen’s view of humans as “biosocial” is similar to Bonhoeffer’s insistence on community. But he extends the idea further, beyond just a community of Christ, to include the entire ecosystem. Western materialism, Rasmussen believes, has detached humanity from its ecological “niches” – that is, the systems and communities within which humans live (this is referred to as “niche theory”). Western materialism has moved humanity to a place above these systems, not of them. It is only by conceiving of ourselves as of the ecosystem – and in relationship with it – can we begin to repair the damage we’ve done. We cannot exist but in relation to other creatures and systems. 

Though most of the scholars are writing from the perspectives of the three Abrahamic faiths, three authors (one from each section of the book) explore other faiths and their relationships to the environment.

In section one – titled “Our Human Contexts within Nature” – Tatjana Myoko V. Prittwitz writes about “A Vast Net of Interconnected Diamonds: Buddhist Views of Nature.” Prittwitz begins with a fascinating (and humbling) thought experiment, asking the reader to think about everything in their life – their clothes and food, the chair they sit on and the car they drive, the roads and planes that make transit possible – and to consider how these objects and systems were made and how many people played in role in making them. “…our existence is dependent upon billions upon billions of people, actions, and things. What we call a separate self is in fact a vast net of … interconnection” (p. 68). Despite approaching the issue from a Buddhist perspective, Prittwitz concludes something similar, albeit slightly different, to the Muslim perspective of Timani and the Christian perspective of Stallman: “Out of the realization of interdependence comes the imperative of global responsibility …” (p. 70). Prittwitz alludes to this same universality in Native American spirituality, shamanistic rituals, and Tibetan animism, suggesting that most religions, no matter how seemingly disparate, are motivated and inspired by interconnectedness.

Appropriately for section two – “Imperatives from Sacred Texts and Tradition” – Nawaraj Chaulagain provides a close reading of the Sanskrit text Devi Mahatmya (literally “The Glorification of the Goddess”). Chaulagain writes that “The cosmic order is sustained through a continuously dynamic process of creation, preservation, and destruction for re-creating…” (p. 185). Considering the current crisis, this “dynamic process” can only be seen as hopeful!

Similar to Bonhoeffer’s grappling with original sin in Sanctorum Communio, the Devi Mahatmya contends with “the eternal battle … between the good and the evil …” And from an ecological perspective, it is grappling with “the perpetual conflict between those who are part of … the ecosystem and natural order … versus those who are against it…” (p. 186). Lastly, the Hindu festival of Navaratri pays homage to the natural world (rivers and mountains are particularly sacred in Hinduism). Chaulagain calls this “ecological worship”: “The Navaratri calls for the preservation of the earth” and involves the planting of barley seeds and the use of water from sacred rivers (194-95).

Throughout the essays, two dominant approaches to humanity and the environment tend to take shape (albeit with exceptions). Whereas Islam, Judaism, and Christianity tend to situate man as “stewards” of the world, Hinduism and Buddhism often view humanity as being “interconnected” with the world.

Leocadie Lushombo explores one of the exceptions: Central African Christianity, which tends towards interconnectedness. In her piece “Mitigating Deforestation in the Congo Basin and Climate Change: The Ethic of Environmental Responsibility Based on African Spirituality,” Lushombo ties micro environmental damage to macro climate catastrophe. She cites studies showing that deforestation in the Congo Basin “causes a decrease of precipitation of about 5%-15% in the Great Lakes region [in the US]…” (p. 275). Deforestation of the Amazon and Central Africa are causing droughts in the breadbasket of America. Meanwhile, it is leading to deluges in the Arabian peninsula. Such deforestation can be directly tied to the ills of colonialism and globalization. It’s also exacerbated by an influx of refugees – and as climate change worsens, it will lead to even more refugees.

Resistance to the dominant ideologies of Western exploitation and capitalism can be found in African spirituality, including African Christianity. Lushombo quotes Magesa, who wrote “What the African religious world view emphasizes, therefore, are relationships …” (p. 281). In traditional African practices, she finds hints of the “humanity as caretaker” worldview mostly associated with the Abrahamic faiths. She writes, “In order to maintain harmony with nature, it is a moral obligation to function as God’s stewards … and not as rulers” (p. 286). Lushombo sees solutions to over-logging and resource exploitation in the ideologies of both interconnectedness and stewardship.

The other essays in the book support this conclusion. Whether a faith views humanity as a steward of nature or interconnected with nature, is immaterial. All faiths believe that taking care with the natural world is critical to humanity’s future – in this world and the next. As our species grapples with climate change triggered by capitalism run amok, all people of faith – regardless of ideology – must come together to begin healing our planet through a new theology of ecology. This essay collection, with its focus on peacebuilding and interreligious dialogue, would be a good starting point.

Consanguinity itself does not make an individual “sick,” but it affects the probability of an autosomal recessive disorder (which requires two copies of the same mutation) if there is such a mutation which runs within the family (with the word “if” emphasized). Consanguinity should be regarded as a complex issue due to socio-economic factors and health concerns.

In clinical genetics, unions between individuals who are second cousins or closer are considered “consanguineous” (inbreeding coefficient, F 0.0156). Incestuous unions (e.g. brother-sister, father-daughter) will not be included in the description of consanguinity in this article, and are obviously outlawed in every society and faith.

Speaking from a statistical geneticist’s perspective, consanguinity affects the probabilities of certain genotypes occurring in offspring. For example, approximately 6.25% (F = 0.0625) of the alleles (a variation at a particular location in the genome) are expected to be homozygous in the offspring of first cousins; and 12.5% (F = 0.125) in the offspring of double first cousins. See Figure 1 for different types of consanguineous unions.

Historically speaking, consanguinity must have been unavoidable during the initial stages of mankind. However, even when human population sizes reached considerable figures, there is a great deal of evidence that consanguineous unions/marriages were widely practiced in ancient societies, especially amongst the ruling and/or land owning elite. For example, many Egyptian Pharaohs, Holy Roman Emperors, and members of the Spanish Habsburg dynasty used within-family unions as a way to keep the wealth, “royal blood,” and/or “edification” within the family. 1-3 However, this is not to say taboos did not exist in other populations.

Though now taboo in Western countries, first cousin marriages were not uncommon in Europe and North America until the mid-19th century, again especially among individuals with high socio-economic status 7. For instance, Darwin married his first cousin, Emma (Wedgwood), in 1839. Yet, in the later half of the 19th century, scientific debates led to marriage between cousins being banned in 12 US states. 7,8

Consanguineous unions occur very rarely in Western countries for a variety of sociological (e.g. cultural) and statistical reasons, but the complete opposite is true in certain regions of the world where union of kin is seen as the default choice, for a variety of socio-economic reasons. Analysis of currently available data suggests that over one-tenth of the world’s current population is composed of families where the parents are related as second cousins or closer 7.

Although a great majority of consanguineous families do not produce deficient offspring, it is still true that there is a risk of unions with close relatives.

The genetic risk comes from the fact that union of kin results in an increase of homozygosity (or more correctly autozygosity) in the offspring, which translates into a higher chance of being homozygous for any allele within the family gene pool. If any of these alleles are autosomal recessive mutations, this increase in probability applies to these alleles also. This simple fact is the main difference between union of kin and union of unrelated individuals (coined the name “inbreeding depression”); as there are many disease causal mutations out there in outbreeding populations (e.g. in Western populations), 21 but because they are very rare, they do not get to meet their counterpart in the union of unrelated individuals, thus their homozygous effects are never seen. This is why extremely rare autosomal recessive disorders are mostly seen in regions where consanguinity levels are high.

Despite the risk of heritable disease (albeit small, as discussed above), why are consanguineous marriages still common in many populations? There are many factors including socio-economic, ethno-cultural, religious and geographical; however the former duo (i.e. social and economic factors) seems to be key.17 Sociological studies in communities with high consanguinity rates show that the relationship between the husband and wife was found to be stable due to higher compatibility of life style, social relationships, and the family members from both sides. It is believed that consanguinity can also result in more female autonomy4 through better relationships with her in-laws as they can support her in times of need,17,22 Families concerned with the transmission of cultural values may also seem to practice it more. Consanguinity is a social reality of many communities. It relates to a number of social dynamics in respective cultural habitats with quite a number communal and health consequences. It is significant to be aware of these dynamics and consequences to be able to make a fair analysis on cultures and lifestyles unknown to us.

References

1. Alvarez, G., Ceballos, F.C. & Quinteiro, C. The role of inbreeding in the extinction of a European royal dynasty. PLoS One 4, e5174 (2009).

2. Ceballos, F.C. & Alvarez, G. Royal dynasties as human inbreeding laboratories: the Habsburgs. Heredity (Edinb) 111, 114-21 (2013).

3. Paul, D.B. & Spencer, H.G. “It’s Ok, We’re Not Cousins by Blood”: The Cousin Marriage Controversy in Historical Perspective. PLoS Biol 6, e320 (2008).

4. Bittles, A.H. A Background Summary of Consanguineous Marriages. Available online: http://consang.net/images/d/dd/01AHBWeb3.pdf (2001).

5. Tadmouri, G.O. et al. Consanguinity and reproductive health among Arabs. Reprod Health 6, 17 (2009).

6. Bittles, A.H., Mason, W.M., Greene, J. & Rao, N.A. Reproductive behavior and health in consanguineous marriages. Science 252, 789-94 (1991).

7. Bittles, A.H. & Black, M.L. Consanguinity, human evolution, and complex diseases. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107, 1779-1786 (2010).

8. Ottenheimer, M. Forbidden relatives: the American myth of cousin marriage, (University of Illinois Press, 1996).

9. Imaizumi, Y. A recent survey of consanguineous marriages in Japan. Clin Genet 30, 230-3 (1986).

10. Bener, A. & Alali, K.A. Consanguineous marriage in a newly developed country: the Qatari population. J Biosoc Sci 38, 239-46 (2006).

11. al-Gazali, L.I. et al. Consanguineous marriages in the United Arab Emirates. J Biosoc Sci 29, 491-7 (1997).

12. Jurdi, R. & Saxena, P.C. The prevalence and correlates of consanguineous marriages in Yemen: similarities and contrasts with other Arab countries. J Biosoc Sci 35, 1-13 (2003).

13. Hamamy, H. et al. Consanguineous marriages, pearls and perils: Geneva International Consanguinity Workshop Report. Genet Med 13, 841-7 (2011).

14. BITTLES, A.H. WHEN COUSINS MARRY: A REVIEW OF CONSANGUINITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. in Perspectives in Human Biology 71-83 (1995).

15. Tuncbilek, E. & Koc, I. Consanguineous marriage in Turkey and its impact on fertility and mortality. Ann Hum Genet 58, 321-9 (1994).

16. de Costa, C. Pregnancy outcomes in Lebanese-born women in western Sydney. Med J Aust 149, 457-60 (1988).

17. Darr, A. & Modell, B. The frequency of consanguineous marriage among British Pakistanis. J Med Genet 25, 186-90 (1988).

18. Hoodfar, E. & Teebi, A.S. Genetic referrals of Middle Eastern origin in a western city: inbreeding and disease profile. J Med Genet 33, 212-5 (1996).

19. Wikipedia.org. Cousin marriage law in the United States by state. Vol. 2013 (2013). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cousin_marriage_law_in_the_United_States_by_state

20. Hashmi, M.A. Frequency of consanguinity and its effect on congenital malformation–a hospital based study. J Pak Med Assoc 47, 75-8 (1997).

21. Ng, S.B. Targeted capture and massively parallel sequencing of 12 human exomes. Nature 461, 272-276 (2009).

22. Hussain, R. & Bittles, A.H. The prevalence and demographic characteristics of consanguineous marriages in Pakistan. J Biosoc Sci 30, 261-75 (1998).

23. Bittles, A.H. et al. Consanguineous marriage, a familiar story full of surprises. in Health and Ethnicity (eds. Macbeth, H. & Shetty, P.) 68-78 (Taylor & Francis, 2001).

24. Clark, C.J., Hill, A., Jabbar, K. & Silverman, J.G. Violence during pregnancy in Jordan: its prevalence and associated risk and protective factors. Violence Against Women 15, 720-35 (2009).

25. Assaf, S. & Khawaja, M. Consanguinity trends and correlates in the Palestinian Territories. J Biosoc Sci 41, 107-24 (2009).

26. Ober, C., Hyslop, T. & Hauck, W.W. Inbreeding effects on fertility in humans: evidence for reproductive compensation. Am J Hum Genet 64, 225-31 (1999).

27. Bittles, A. Consanguinity and its relevance to clinical genetics. Clin Genet 60, 89-98 (2001).

28. Dyer, O. MP is criticised for saying that marriage of first cousins is a health problem. BMJ 331, 1292 (2005).

Cultural differences have a potential to trigger conflicts at all levels, and the response each society gives to these conflicts depend on what they hold most dear as a foundational norm: independent existence of individuals or social interdependence. This calls for awareness in differences and discussion to benefit from cultural diversity.

Michael was having a problem with his neighbor next door. He decided to seek advice from his coworkers on the issue. Paul suggested that he express the problem openly right away, and, if that wouldn’t help, to take the neighbor to the court. Akihiro, on the other hand, warned him not to get too serious, and recommended him to write a letter which talks about their good memories in the past and how pleasant their neighborhood was. The backup plan in this case would be to invite a mutually respected neighbor of theirs to mediate the situation.

Of course, Michael has many other options to address the given problem. Yet, it is interesting to note the differences between the suggestions of the two coworkers. One party is focused on the issue per se and pursues a direct approach; whereas the other is concerned about the relationship and follows indirect/accommodating means to handle the situation. This article is intended to provide a better understanding of these two main approaches in conflicting situations. Since the responses to unease are generally situational, we may not judge whether any of the resolution efforts are good or bad, but rather, look closely on their rationale respectively.

Cultures differ on various aspects of life. Naturally, the approach of their members to conflict will also vary depending on the value they place on issues of interest and dominant cultural characteristics. A close examination of these features in a given society will give an idea on how its members would respond to conflicting situations in general. Given the growing interconnectedness of societies today, such knowledge of cultural tendencies might help in the development of strategies for conflict resolution and prevention.

Societies that promote independent existence of individuals are referred to as individualistic, and those which assume a great deal of social interdependence are grouped as collectivistic cultures.¹ Prior to discussing responses to conflict in these two types of cultures, it may be better to highlight some examples of their interpretations which will provide hints about their foundational norms.

He who hesitates is lost. (American expression)

Strike while the iron is hot. (American expression)

More haste, less speed. (Chinese expression)

A deliberate inaction is better than a blind action. (Chinese expression)

Different cultures may have different viewpoints about the same issue. This affects the responses of their members and the methods they favor in various situations. Existing theories in social sciences, which generally reflect social values of individualism and autonomy, may be inadequate in societies that do not share the same values and foundational norms, and vice versa. Such a cross-cultural analysis requires an understanding of the prevalent cultural values and norms in a given society.¹ These shared values, through which cultures develop and continue, are communicated in a variety of ways. One technique that commonly appears is the use of proverbs or sayings, and such quotes throughout the commentary will provide a general idea about some differing characteristics of these two cultural approaches.

Rather than criticizing or promoting any specific cultural aspect, this piece aims to discuss another dimension of multicultural approach to serve to break the stereotyped images (if any) about different cultures, and to help accept everybody as they are in a world of cultural diversity. Once we have a broad picture, we will further look into how interpersonal conflict is handled, and conclude with some overarching suggestions to foster mutual understanding in cases of unease.

Two’s company, but three’s a crowd. (American expression)

If you congregate, you live. If you scatter, you die. (Korean proverb)

One who leaves the herd, gets snatched by the wolf. (Turkish proverb)

One palm makes no applause. (Chinese proverb)

Two widely held worldviews have become evident in the cross-cultural literature as variables on which most cultures vary: individualism which objectifies the self, and collectivism which submerges the self to emphasize the group. A middle course in the de bate between those who claim the primacy of society and those who emphasize the primal significance of the individual would state that there is no society without an individual; and also that no individual can survive without society.² These concepts do not necessarily form opposite poles and may coexist due to the enormous intercultural mix, yet one approach may still have dominance to the other in a given culture.³

“The freedom to be an individual is the essence of America.” (Marilyn vos Savant)

“It is hard to be an individual in Japan.” (Haruki Murakami)

In individualistic societies, a person is an autonomous entity defined by a somewhat distinctive set of attributes, qualities, or processes; and these internal attributes determine the behavior. Yet, in collectivistic societies, a person is an interdependent entity who is part of the encompassing social relationships. This is not to say that a person in such a society lacks unique attributes, but rather that these are not primary forces that guide the behavior. In such societies, behavior is a consequence of being responsive to others and origins of behaviors are relationships and social harmony.³

He who converses not knows nothing. (English proverb)

He, who knows, does not speak. He, who speaks, does not know. (Lao Tzu)

In Western cultures, a highly verbal individual is perceived more positively, whereas in Eastern cultures perceptions for highly verbal individuals may not be that positive. Traditionally, communication apprehension has been attributed to a weak sense of identity and is viewed as a deficiency; but on the contrary, this reticence may be due to politeness or a tendency to preserve harmony in collectivistic cultures, depending on the social context.

Stand up for your own rights. (American expression)

Unless you blow your own horn, who will? (American expression)

Once you preach, the point is gone. (Zen phrase)

Mature rice plants bow down lower. (Korean expression)

According to individualistic point of view, communicators can get things done by being assertive. On the other hand, from the collectivistic standpoint, people are expected to preserve group identity and may be discouraged from asserting themselves as individuals. Therefore, it will not be a true assumption to attribute this lack of assertiveness to some negative traits such as low self-esteem, shyness, disinterest, or ignorance.³

Cultural dimensions of conflict resolution

“The practice of peace and reconciliation is one of the most vital and artistic of human actions.” (Nhat Hanh)

Keeping all the above examples in mind, now let’s briefly compare and contrast responses to conflict in individualistic and collectivistic societies:

Since individuals’ self-articulated interests are of utmost importance, individualistic perspective frames conflict as the divergence of interests or issues, which limits the focus of solution efforts solely to reconciling the differences in interests between parties. Yet in collectivistic cultures, social harmony is a critical aspiration and community involvement is likely even in interpersonal matters. Then, a deeper and wider analysis that will address the concerns of both types of approaches should better view conflict as a situation and place the situation to the heart of any resolution endeavor.¹

“He who wants to persuade should put his trust not in the right argument, but in the right word. The power of sound has always been greater than the power of sense.” (Joseph Conrad)

The one who raises his/her voice has already lost. (Japanese proverb)

Members of individualistic cultures tend to prefer direct/dominating/prompt communication styles, since they deem open discussion as the best way to deal with their interpersonal problems. On the other hand, individuals in interdependent societies are less likely to “express negative emotions (such as anger) to confront each other, and to use verbal aggressiveness and open discussion in conflict situations. They may avoid reactions to their relational problems that can potentially cause further conflict”. Among them, the stress is not so much upon the individual and his/her interests, but on the maintenance of the collectivity and the continuation of harmonious relationships; conflict is viewed as damaging to social fabric and relational harmony, so it should be avoided as much as possible. This naturally leads to the adoption of high compromising and avoiding behaviors and a relatively low preference for competing and assertive postures which emphasize the value they place on maintaining social harmony rather than personal interests in conflict interactions.³

“Peace is not absence of conflict; it is the ability to handle conflict by peaceful means.” (Ronald Reagan)

There is a natural tendency to avoid conflicts as much as possible. While it is a major strategy to preserve harmonious relationships in Eastern cultures, Western societies may view accommodation efforts as giving up critical values and personal rights. Furthermore, according to the Western approach, people will prefer to avoid conflict only if their stake in an issue is not high enough to get involved, whereas collectivist cultures actually utilize it as a social remedy.³

In collectivistic societies, “understanding is seen not as the result of putting meaning into words, but rather as the greater understanding of shared perspective, expectations, and intimacy”, and avoidance is utilized as a strategy to handle the conflict. Besides expressing the discomfort indirectly/nonverbally in a polite and educating way, non-confrontational communication modes in problematic situations include, but are not limited to: “(a) the use of management to prevent a conflict before it happens, (b) expression of conflict emotions like anger or frustration by non-communication, such as ignorance or silence, (c) pretense of being harmonious in peoples’ presence, even though parties are actually avoiding each other, (d) management of conflict using a third party, (e) tendency of directing accusations against oneself.”³

Cultural differences in third party intervention

“The Believers are but brothers; so make peace and reconciliation between your brothers… ”⁴

How, when, and why a third party interferes has been the central focus of conflict resolution studies. Models on interpersonal conflict that assume a great deal of individual autonomy and privacy in interpersonal matters hardly speak about engaging one’s social network into a conflict, however interpersonal conflict intervention in a collectivistic setting will not take place only between contending individuals and the intervener, but is likely to engage other entities (e.g. extended family members) almost in any given conflict. This involvement of others, with the purpose of securing, improving or sustaining a resolution, can be added strength for conflict intervention and resolution.¹

“Washing one’s hands of the conflict between the powerful and the powerless means to side with the powerful, not to be neutral.” (Paulo Freire)

Western literature on interpersonal conflict intervention generally undermines the adjustment of the involvement style depending on the stage of the disagreement. However in collectivistic societies, “third parties are expected to function in a reconciliatory mode, unless clear injustice or deviance takes place. In this case, third parties should get actively involved in restoring justice and eliminating deviance before returning to the reconciliatory role.” Consultation may be utilized “when relationship issues (perception and attitudes) are not suitable for mediation, and to help parties clarify their underlying needs (security, or identity for example) and interests tied to such needs. Mediation, on the other hand, aims at negotiating certain substantive issues, based on a clear understanding of relationship issues and parties’ own needs and interests.”¹

Adhering to the common good while not favoring any of the parties has good intentions, yet the mediator may face difficulties in modern diverse societies, where notions of common good may be too diverse and vague; focus being on the individual. Material resources are often the codes used, thus legal procedures are vital parts of the resolution in these societies, and mediators are expected to be professionals who are knowledgeable of legal procedures. Thus, actions in a resolution process are task-oriented. Conversely in collectivistic societies, where the main focus is on social harmony and social norms/values form the basis of a solution, mediators are generally seniors (in terms of age or hierarchy) who are knowledgeable of cultural norms. Some codes mainly used by interveners in these cultures include honor, dignity, unity, future of the next generations, religious values, and tradition of forgiveness.^1,5

Speaking of religion and its role in conflict, one’s voluntary sacrifice from his/her rights in some conflicting situations, repelling evil with what is better,⁶ and forgiveness has been encouraged for thousands of years by major world religions.⁷ “Adherents of these religions have claimed that forgiveness yields numerous emotional and spiritual benefits, and can dramatically transform one’s life.”⁸ Hence, it may be useful to explore their resources, which are rich with conflict intervention principles, values and models, in a way that would prepare them for contemporary practice. For instance, it is stated that reconciling a dispute between two parties is a charity,9 and that “kind words and forgiving of faults are better than charity followed by injury.”¹⁰

The most beneficial approach for the involved parties in a conflict situation would be an attempt to address fully the concerns of both parties and to find mutually satisfactory solutions to the cause of the conflict. This collaborative approach is of utmost importance and most viable, particularly when the issues are critical and maintaining an ongoing relationship is important. For an effective assistance, third parties involved in mediation processes should carefully study the needs and values of contending parties and have cultural awareness in order to provide mutually satisfactory resolution options regardless of the society they operate.

Considering that disagreements could be resolved much easily when parties are aware of corresponding needs/values and interests/concerns, getting to know one another would be an important basis for any resolution endeavor. Therefore, the more we exchange ideas without prejudice, the more we’ll understand each other. Although some disagreements yield positive outcomes and new ideas, intense conflicts generally drain energy and resources. Hence, it is heartening to observe that peace studies such as conflict resolution are blossoming, despite some scholars expecting a “clash of civilizations” and some claiming that we are at the “end of history.” Contrary to the arguments that define life as a series of struggles for limited resources, this relatively new field of social sciences will help humanity make the best out of its potential and reach a better state of living. Comprehensive resolutions which are globally applicable to disagreements in-between individuals, organizations, or nations overall, call for good deeds, positive motives, and pure intentions without self-interest. Tolerance, forgiveness, altruism, compassion, submission to ethical/moral codes, fairness, openness of hearts and minds, and welcoming people as they encompass some of the universal means to cure conflicts at various levels.

References

1. Abdalla, Amr. 2000. “Principles of Islamic Interpersonal Conflict Intervention: A Search within Islam and Western Literature.” Journal of Law & Religion 15, no. 1. 151-184.

2. Nasr, Seyyed H. 2002. The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity. San Francisco: HarperCollins.

3. Kim, Min-Sun. 2002. Non-Western Perspectives on Human Communication: Implications for Theory and Practice. Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Sage Publications.

4. Qur’an, 49:10.

5. Abu-Nimer, Mohammed. 1996. “Conflict Resolution in an Islamic Context: Some Conceptual Questions.” Peace and Change 21, no. 1. 22-40.

6. Qur’an, 41:34.

7. For some of the Qur’anic verses on interpersonal forgiveness and reconciliation not mentioned in the text, the reader may refer to 2:280; 3:134, 4:128, 135, 149; 24:22; 25:63; and 42:37, 40, 43.

8. McCullough, Michael E., Kenneth I. Pargament, and Carl E. Thoresen. 2000. Forgiveness: Theory, Research, and Practice. New York: The Guilford Press.

9. Bukhari, Sulh, 11; Muslim, Zakat, 52.

10. Qur’an, 2:263.

In the twentieth century, like other religious communities around the world, Muslims had to come to a resolution regarding the compatibility of their religion with science. Today, at least at the fundamental level, this is not an issue, however, the same pattern of questioning is extended to the use of the products of science: is it permissible to donate one’s organs? Under what conditions is abortion permissible? Can a person perform daily prayers (salaat) while onboard vehicles? etc. Along the same line of thought, psychology is under scrutiny in terms of its use for understanding mechanisms of cognition and behaviors, character education and methods of therapy.

Putting Islam and psychology into a perspective

Islam aims at the prosperity of humanity both in this world and in the next. As its prerequisite, Islam requires a conscious and willful submission from its followers. In this brief description, the key words are conscience and will. Without a healthy conscience and free will, human beings can neither be responsible for their actions nor submit to Islam. Therefore, at the fundamental level, Islam calls for action in order to foster the development and exercise of conscience and free will.

Psychology is a discipline that is intended to understand behaviors. It is the study of not only the problematic ones but also the everyday behaviors such as how we remember or forget, learn a language, make selections, or adjust to a society. In this sense, a healthy psychology means a soul in good health that can exercise its free will and associate their actions with their conscience.

The two previous paragraphs imply that essentially psychology is a useful body of knowledge for practicing Islam. With this perspective, there should be no conflicts or compatibility issues between Muslims and psychology. Furthermore, due to their religion that promises to satisfy all faculties of human existence, Muslims should have a completely healthy psychology. Now, let’s think about the Muslim world with this idea in mind.

Journey to ground zero

While reading the cases below, imagine yourself in similar situations. While reading we have to bear in mind that many of these cases are not exclusive to Muslim societies, and their reasons have diverse economic, political, and socio-cultural dimensions (please read footnote 1 for more explanation):

– The near past of the contemporary Muslim world contains wars and sectarian conflicts. There are children in those places whose parents, siblings or friends are dying in the clashes. There are consequences of these traumatic events in the development of their psychology.

– In other places, there are Muslims who feel an obligation to hide their religious practices in order not to be an outcast from the society. The children and the adolescents in such atmospheres are likely to develop a feeling of guilt or inferiority.

– In some parts of the Muslim geography, there are girls who are forced to marry someone that they did not want to, or forced to marry an old man. They struggle for emotional survival, and in the meantime, they try to raise their children. There are many suicidal cases among them, and their yearning for revenge is transmitted to their children.

– There are children who barely hear words of appreciation from their fathers, or have almost no one-on-one time with them. There are children who rarely see their mother being treated respectfully by their father. Such children are likely to establish families in which they use their children as race horses to achieve certain goals in life, and in which the wife is treated very much like a loyal servant.

Due to these unfavorable situations, some Muslims who were victims of these situations face various psychological challenges, which can lead to real problems. These problems are not necessarily acute schizophrenia or paranoia, but more subtle things that penetrate the individual and social life thoroughly, such as excessive self-assertion or self-annihilation, negligence in parenthood, malpractices in the family life, gourmandism, back-biting, obsession and compulsion. In such conditions, people have more difficulty in exercising their free will towards what is taught in Islam; because they develop several psychological immune responses for protection. Hence, their free will is no longer as free as they think.

Atop the ivory tower

One of the premises of science is that the gained knowledge must be objective, i.e. independent of the person. In fact, when we consider the human behavior at a broad level, it is possible to reach some universal rules as well. However, the rise of the social sciences in the past century and the consequent accumulation of knowledge severely challenged the premise of objectivity in the humanities. Innate variations in perceptions of the same phenomenon, diversity in the ideals for humanity, various interpretations of the meaning of life are only a few among many reasons that rendered social sciences rather subjective. Being one of the social sciences, psychology is no exception to this subjectivity. As such, the meaning and applications of psychology in different communities exhibit distinct properties.

Modern psychology as a branch of science has been mainly developed by Western scholars. In doing so, they based their statistical works on their own communities. Thus, the observations and conclusions made by them were reflective of Western societies. At a first glance, one can say that humanity shares a lot in their innate character, and so this knowledge base is useful for everyone. True, but when it comes to building characters, one needs to define an ideal and come up with ways to achieve that ideal, given the conditions of the society. The differences in the definition of an ideal bring an essential subjectivity to the table. Aside from this, the difference of the settings in each society necessitates a special focus and a deeper understanding for each and every group of people.

Richard Nisbett, one of the most cited social psychologists, confesses that as a built-up science over the years, psychology was wrong in assuming human cognition to be the same everywhere. He says that these differences are even scientifically measurable. According to Nisbett’s studies, the world is more complex to Easterners than to Westerners, and everything is considered “in relation to one another in no simple and deterministic way.” Therefore, harmony is almost everything in the East. If something is considered as a breaker of “the harmony,” it tends to be refused even if blind conservatism would be the result. In the West however, self sufficiency is valued over dependency and individuality is preferred over conformity. So, psychological treatments that aim to help people become “their best” and “shine their egos” are misfit to the Eastern social context. This is only one example showing that the studies in the Western world do not entirely represent the Eastern world. Still, the rest of the world is copying what the Western world finds in the psychological studies, even though it is known that the dress does not fit the rest.

Another issue with the modern psychology is the position of faith and religion. To modern psychology, religion is nothing more than statistics that say, “Religious practices can be good for recovering from mental and bodily problems, and an adherence to a faith enhances the protection against certain troubles” or, “religious disciplines may lead to psychological complications.” Along the same lines, God is either a concept that is out of concern or is no more than a product of our brain. The entire body of spiritual development for that matter, e.g. Sufi practices, is nothing more than a beneficial cultural activity. A vast majority of psychologists would diagnose with schizophrenia a person who is experiencing some spiritual perceptual aspects, which are not counted as hallucination in Muslim society. Thus, although modern psychology may respect a patient’s beliefs in God, angels, afterlife, etc., it would not necessarily be able to suggest a cure that can resonate within a Muslim mind.

Focusing on errors

As a consequence of the aforementioned elements of psychology that are not compatible with Muslims, some Muslims make erroneous assumptions about psychology, often triggered by a motive to take pride in their religion.

For example, many Muslims would know Freud only due to his obsession with sexuality as the underlying motive for all human activity. Another erroneous example is towards behaviorism, which establishes deterministic action-reaction patterns of behavior; thus denial of the free will.

A final example to this matter is the emphasis on ego expression and its use in the motivation of the individual. As a daily life application of psychology, self-improvement techniques have been developed and are exported to Muslim societies. These techniques are originating from scientific research mixed with ancient mysticism. One can admit that there is useful information in those sources, but they have been interpreted and organized in such a way as to address the Western individual. And what is more, the picture of ego favored in the resultant teachings is clearly not justifiable with the truths of Islam.

The above examples do not necessarily represent all schools of psychology or the situation of all Muslims or psychologists. However, these are enough materials for the uneducated minds to shun psychology.

Stabilizing on Islam, the middle path

Despite the unfortunate picture drawn above, it is possible that the body of knowledge within psychology can be useful for Muslims. For this, one needs a pragmatic perspective gained through the Qur’an and the practice of the Prophet Muhammad, peace and blessings be upon him; the sources uncontaminated by cultural interference.

In the context of Islam and Muslims, something that is not a perfect-fit for the norms of some Muslim communities or contradicts them, can be acceptable in Islam (e.g., coexistence and cooperation of Muslims and non-Muslims). Conversely, something that is accepted and appreciated by some Muslim communities can be unjustifiable in Islam (e.g., status of women in social life). Given that guidance and counseling activities are adjusted according to the cultural norms, such activities unaided by the Qur’an and the practice of the Prophet are only likely to sustain the status-quo, without necessarily improving the state of the people in an Islamic manner. With the help of those two sources however, guidance and counseling activities can step outside the cultural norms and provide an improvement in an Islamic spirit.

For example, take the internal conflicts between different groups in a society. In original Islamic understanding, “unity within multiplicity” is taken as a basis in society. This understanding requires diversity under unity, or discrepancy in a harmonious way. Briefly, unity within multiplicity leads to “both/and” thinking style, instead of “either/or.” Therefore, claiming to be members of the final and universal religion, Muslims must be able to accommodate the variances among people instead of leveling them off completely under the banner of “unity.”

The same view leads to embracing the methods of psychology that agree with or serve Islamic ideals. For example, how many people would know Freud as the person who established a psychoanalytic theory in which the importance of childhood memories is emphasized? More importantly, who would know that he proposed a dynamic understanding for the subconscious? The analysis of childhood memories and tracking how they evolved in the subconscious throughout the life of the individual are things that are not in contradiction with the teachings of Islam. What is more, they can be key concepts for the Muslim world to remove their non-Islamic habits.

Similarly, it is well-known that both the Qur’an and the practice of the Prophet recommend rewarding laudable behavior to strengthen it and punishing evil action to curtail it. Behaviorism, thus gives hope to Muslims to change towards what is right using the right methods when they believe hopelessly that there is no way to become a good person after all wrongdoings. Therefore, conditioning-related phenomena, hence behaviorist methods in this sense, can be of importance within the Islamic educational framework.

Achieving the “perfect human”

Once the issues mentioned in this article are addressed, the psychological methods could be well-suited complements for becoming perfect Muslims. Then, issues like conflict resolution, social justice and poverty are going to be much easier to address. Self-improvement and personality development techniques are going to become a different way of servanthood through reliance on God and destiny. Above all however, for the realization of such goals, Muslims need to be educated about psychology in an Islamic spirit and need to use their free will to change themselves as necessary.

Sumeyra Tosun is a forensic psychologist and graduate student at Texas A&M University. Seth Mette is a postdoctoral fellow at West Virginia University.

Almost every society eventually creates an “other”that serves as such for certain political, economic, or social purposes. And in most cases, the identification of this “other” rests on a simplistic “us versus them” dichotomy: we are “good” people, and they are “bad” people. Because this simple dichotomy is more mythical than real, the maintenance of this myth requires a continuous pumping of misinformation into the public realm. Misinformation is not necessarily incorrect information; it is also purposeful manipulation of reality. Each society foregrounds the good acts of its own people and backgrounds their bad acts while foregrounding the bad acts of “others” and backgrounding their good acts. Thus, we all accomplish giving our own communities a delusional sense of moral and cultural superiority over others, which eventually turns the material conflicts between us and others into moral conflicts between good and evil.

The common “good Westerners-bad Muslims” dichotomy results in manipulation of the information provided to the people in the West about both Muslims and Westerners themselves. This is why in some of the Western media, evil acts of Muslim people are almost always associated with Islam while noble acts of Muslim people such as Mr. Osman are either ignored or associated with their nationality rather than their religion. In the same vein, evil acts of Western people such as those who gassed the nursery of a Muslim mosque in Ohio while about 300 people were praying inside in September 2008 are largely ignored by some of the mainstream Western media, for it goes against the “good Westerners” image.

A striking example that is used as evidence to the evilness of Muslims is the degree of support for terrorism among Muslims. Authors from Sam Harris to Robert Spencer have sought refuge in Muslim support for terrorism when they wanted to denounce Islam. Some surveys reveal that there are some Muslims who justify killing innocent people in certain circumstances. According to the respectable PEW institution’s surveys, 10 to 50 percent of people in different Muslim societies (with an average of 20-25%) often times or sometimes justify suicide bombing of civilian targets to defend Islam. Such findings are construed as evidence to both the belligerent nature of the religion of Islam and the evilness of the Muslim mind. Yet another truth that goes uncovered in some of the Western media is the fact that there is comparable support for terrorism among Western people as well. According to a 2007 survey by World Public Opinion, for example, 24% of Americans find “bombing and other types of attacks intentionally aimed at civilians” often times or sometimes justified. But such surveys never find a place in the some of the mainstream American media because they go against the common “good American-bad Muslim” dichotomy.

The problem of misinformation is not unique to the West. It is equally problematic in Muslim societies. Most Muslims have known the United States and Americans through the lenses of Vietnam, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and the like. But few of them are aware of such programs like Peace Corps or Volunteers for Prosperity because such good American acts go against the mythical “bad Americans-good Muslims” dichotomy in the Muslim world. Similarly, most Muslims have memorized many non-Muslim names for their brutal acts against Muslims, but very few Muslims are familiar with Muslim names who are held responsible for the crimes against humanity. Whereas the former figures confirm the mythical “good Muslims-bad non-Muslims” image, the latter contradicts it. Therefore, the former examples have been highlighted in the Muslim media and the latter has been ignored.

On the forefront of this universal misinformation campaign are two institutions: the media and governments. The media loves sensational, flashy news because such news pumps up their ratings. Consequently, the media capitalize on overstated evilness of some other people and the existential threat they pose to “our” society. In the same vein, our governments love the existence of “external threats to our national security,” mythical or real, because it allows them to divert public attention from failed domestic policies to international politics and also to implement certain political and military agenda that they could not have carried out without a foreign threat. John Mueller, a professor of political science from Ohio State University, estimated that “the lifetime chance of an American being killed by international terrorism is about one in 80,000-about the same chance of being killed by a comet or a meteor.” Yet whereas no sane American is obsessed with the adversity of a meteor falling on his/her head, many have been made to obsessively think, fear, and guard themselves against a terrorist attack by some evil others.

Most of us have been misinformed about other societies to some extent. We are all, therefore, in need of a therapy of knowledge refinement. But how do we do that? Personally, I think there are two effective ways/channels of refining our knowledge and acquiring authentic information about other societies. First, we need to diversify our sources of information by reading multiple and multi-national news papers or portals. Second, we need to diversify our pool of friends and include in it as many people from “other” societies as possible. Nothing is more powerful than a concrete counter-example when it comes to destroying a myth. As we diversify our sources of information and befriend people from other societies, we will realize that “we” are not as “good” as we are told we are, and “they” are not as “bad” as we are told they are, which will hopefully help us re-appreciate the essential commonality between all of us: humanity. Hopefully, we will then also realize that the major struggle is not between “good” us versus “bad” them but rather between the good people and the bad ones among us all. We need to find ways of testing or confirming knowledge we get from the media and not forget that the media is owned and operated by people, who, like us, have many presumptions, biases, priorities, or simply misconceptions, that can spill over when they are “reporting.”

Kaan Kerem has a PhD in political science. He is a freelance writer on philosophy and scientific thought.

Fortunately, the contributors to Schooling Islam (2007), eleven internationally renowned scholars brought together by Robert Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman to examine the different modes of modern Muslim education and their implications for national and global politics, provide new insights into Muslim culture and politics in countries as different as Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Mali, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Great Britain. The authors demonstrate that Islamic education is neither timelessly traditional nor “medieval,” but rather that it is complex, evolving, and diverse in its institutions and practices. Citing historical instances of pedagogical reform and attesting to a flexible list of texts and subjects used in religious instruction – (most notably, Arabic grammar and lexicography, rhetoric, logic, Islamic jurisprudence, the prophetic traditions (ahadith), Qur’anic interpretation (tafsir), theology (kalam), pre-Islamic and early Islamic poetry, mathematics, astronomy, philosophy and Islamic history, economics, politics and sociology, and modern adaptations of “customs and common usages” – ‘urf and ‘adat – including world religions, European history and languages) – they convincingly challenge the hyperbolic assertion that Islamic education deadens all sense of inquiry. Moreover, they reveal the extent to which the struggle to capture hearts and minds occurred in Muslim lands before the Western media discovered the madrasas, as well as the degree to which Islamic schools remain on the frontline of regional and national debates surrounding culture and politics. Finally, they unanimously conclude that the present struggle, which is concerned with both the political functionalization and the internal dynamics of Islamic education, will shape a generation of young Muslims and their relations with the West.

In his introduction to the volume, Robert Hefner remarks that the reform of Islamic education was given momentum by the decline of Muslim political power: “In colonial settings, Islamic schools were functionalized to sustain Muslim values and ‘ulama social standing, even in the absence of a Muslim-led state. After the Second World War, national independence seemed at first to offer Muslim educators an opportunity to relax their guard. But postcolonial nation-building only ushered in new struggles to control the commanding heights of public ethics and culture. This was no more forcefully the case than [in debates] on the question of where Islam should figure in new programs of mass education” (p.32). Recalling the resurgence of personal piety and public observance which swept through many Muslim societies in the 1970’s and 1980’s, and citing contemporary examples, like the increased involvement of the Egyptian ‘ulama in politics in response to the regime’s efforts to co-opt al-Azhar scholars, as well as the politicization of Pakistani madrasas, particularly during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Hefner states that the primary question today as regards Islamic education “is not whether it should be drawn up into broader political projects (functionalized), but whose projects they should be and how they should engage the plurality of peoples, powers, and ideas that marks our age” (p.33).

According to Hefner, a second line of reflection that emerges in the chapters of Schooling Islam concerns the internal dynamics of Islamic education rather than its functionalization. Indeed, a number of authors discuss how the rise of modern Islamic education has brought about a shift in the distribution and style of Islamic knowledge. The earlier pattern of informality and, in Louis Brenner’s phrase, “initiatic transmission” gave way to classrooms, fixed curricula, examinations, and professional teachers. In these relatively depersonalized settings, many believers came to view their faith as “a subject which must be ‘explained’ and ‘understood”’ (Eickelman 1992, 650) on the basis of formal doctrinal canons. The transmission of Islamic knowledge was abstracted from intimate teacher-student relationships, with their habits of dress, bearing, and deference, and repositioned in classrooms and quick-read textbooks (see Berkey, chpt.2). More recently, as debates over Islamic knowledge have moved from elite circles into restless, mobile and ever-more technologically savvy mass societies, the authority base of teachers in live classrooms and that of print textbooks have begun to be challenged by participants in virtual chat rooms and producers of YouTube video clips, who argue an increasingly diverse set of views. Many of the latest shifts in the internal dynamics of Islamic education – such as Muslims’ increasing reliance on electronic Qur’anic devices, online sermons, and instructional hajj videos, the integration of nasheed, “Islamic rap,” religious cartoons and children’s books in Islamic weekend school curricula, the emergence of international dawah conferences and online fatwa resources, and the recent (2004) establishment of the International Alliance of the ‘Ulama – have not yet been sufficiently examined by scholars of Islamic and social sciences.

The lack of evidence suggesting that the agonistic pluralism of Muslim politics and learning will diminish in the near future leads Hefner to make a third and final conclusion as regards the cultures and politics of contemporary Islamic education. Rather than viewing the ferment surrounding religious schooling as proof that the modern Muslim world dances to the beat of a different drummer than that of the West, East Asia, and Latin America, he reminds us that mass education of a moralistic temper has been the hallmark of nation-making and societal reform since the late nineteenth century’s “Age of Education” (Zeldin 1977); ie. that a moral agenda of one sort or another lay at the heart of state educational projects that unfolded in disparate parts of the late nineteenth-century globe (Fortna 2000, 35). Hence, Hefner argues, “[We] in the West would be truer to our own moral history were we to recognize that our schools and politics, too, bear the imprint of struggles over how children and citizens should ethicalize and behave. Current debates over Islamic education, then, do not represent Muslim civilization’s regression to some pre-modern past. They are a civilizationally specific response to the challenges of pluralism, knowledge, and ethics faced by all citizens in the late-modern world” (p.35).

Schooling Islam has been described as the most comprehensive work available in any language on madrasas and Islamic education. Because it gives a broad, comparative overview of educational developments in the Muslim world, and because each chapter’s bibliography directs the reader to more detailed sources of information, it can, indeed, be called “essential reading” for scholars and policymakers who are interested in the multifaceted cultures and politics of Islam and the future of the Muslim world.

Dr. Jeannette Okur is the translator of Tales from Rumi, a selection of Mathnawi stories adapted for young readers. She is currently conducting research on the portrayal of Muslim-American teens’ lives in a new literary genre called Islamic youth fiction.

“The work of Gulen’s followers in Turkey shows that Islam-as taught by Gulen-seeks tolerance, not conflict; it aims for a better society, not political power; and it manifests itself in prayer and concrete local action.”

“As early as the eighteenth century, Goethe knew that the East and the West were inseparable. However, today’s society has not been able to fulfill Goethe’s dream, although plenty of time has passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Societies remain trapped in prejudices and stereotypes that strengthen the view of a separate East and West. European enlargement has made this even more pronounced and overwhelming. But fortunately, today there are voices in the world which inspire courage; voices which are not given due attention, voices which, nevertheless, have for years promoted a different world view and have successfully served people and the public good,” read the invitation to a Potsdam University conference about the renowned Turkish scholar Fethullah Gulen and the movement named after him. The conference, titled “Muslims between tradition and modernity-the Gulen Movement as a bridge between cultures,” was jointly organized by the University of Potsdam’s Institute of Religion and the Forum for Intercultural Dialogue, Berlin and was supported by the German Orient Institute, Abraham Geiger College, and the Protestant Academy of Berlin.

Attended by thirty-two academics who presented papers and about 500 observers from all over the world, the conference was the first of its kind in that it had no Turkish or Muslim scholars on its editorial board, which instead featured academics such as Professor Karl-Josef Kuschel from Eberhard Karls University, Tübingen, Professor Christina von Braun from Berlin’s Humboldt University, and Professor Markus Witte from the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University of Frankfurt. Judging by this fact only, it may be said that the conference was a platform of outsiders looking at and discussing the Gulen Movement.

An outsider’s observations are always fruitful for a social movement, both when they are affirming and when they are critical. An outsider’s eye is the mirror where a social entity, whether it be an individual self or a collective personality, watches and re-defines its self. There were both admiring and critical presentations in the Potsdam Conference. Participants in the Gulen Movement must have recorded both the “commendations and condemnations” and will probably act to strengthen the former and correct the latter.

Strikingly there was a common point between the laudatory and critical presentations: both groups believed that the Gulen Movement offers the Western world a series of opportunities that should not be missed. Both affirmed that the principles of the Gulen Movement may help the Western world to deal with its problems, not only when they relate to Muslims, but also when they relate to the very roots of Western civilization. This point necessitates further discussion and may even open new “zones of activity” for the Gulen Movement and other similar Muslim social entities.

Professor Dr. Leonid R. Sykiainen, a professor of Islamic law and comparative legal studies as the State University–Higher School of Economics in Moscow, suggested, for example, that the Gulen dialogic approach should be adopted to the comparative study of Islamic and Western legal systems. Sykiainen claimed that at developed levels of dialogue the universal language of law should be utilized. “A comparative study of Islamic jurisprudence, which is on its own a magnificent art, should be one of the topics of a future Gulen conference,” he said. This call was important in the sense that it digressed from the established conference mode of “speaking about Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen Movement” and suggested “speaking about a legal issue through the Gulen paradigm.”

A similar suggestion came from Professor Dr. Reverend Simon Robinson, a professor of applied and professional ethics at Leeds Metropolitan University, UK, who underlined that the work of Gulen provides a basis for expanding the theory and practice of corporate responsibility. Robinson related the Gulen Movement’s sense of responsibility to the strong creation theology that develops a complex view of responsibility in terms of accountability, imputability, and moral liability. He observed how this core view of responsibility reinforces and validates plural responsibilities, including civil and global responsibility. “Hence, a conceptual bridge is established between religion, corporate responsibility, citizenship, and sustainability,” he said. Robinson called on the Gulen Movement to become involved more explicitly in the ongoing dialogue about global responsibility and to extend further the dialogue and practice of responsibility in business beyond its present networks to include, wherever possible, other faith networks and secular corporations.

Dr. Sylvia Powels-Niami, a lecturer in the Religious Studies and Jewish Studies departments of Potsdam University, claimed in her paper that with its focus on intercultural and interfaith dialogue, the Gulen Movement has assumed the important task of continuing the ancient Islamic dialectical tradition that gave birth to the development of Kalam as speculative theology by bringing reason and religion into harmony. Powels-Niami observed that the Gulen Movement’s activities are not only building bridges between the East and the West, faith and science but they have also the potential to revive the abandoned religious sciences of Islam and even develop new ones.

A suggestion for furthering Muslim–Christian–Jewish scholarly contacts and thus facilitating the emergence of new multi-disciplinary studies came from Professor Dr. Admiel Kosman, an organizer of the conference from Abraham Geiger College. Urging that the findings of the conference should be conveyed to the general public, Kosman suggested that a “joint study house” should be founded in either Berlin or in Istanbul where Muslim, Christian and Jewish texts and traditions can be studied and a new generation of imams, priests and rabbis can be educated with the kind of openness and tolerance Gulen promotes. Kosman was also the person who read the greeting letter which Fethullah Gulen sent to the conference.

In his letter Gulen reaffirmed his conviction that dialogue will bring about universal peace and the good nature of the human being is going to come to the fore sooner or later. “What we need to do in order to reach this hopeful day is to set off on the journey. In this journey, every single step is important and is worth respect and praise. On this way, each step has to be based on mutual respect and understanding and this is not true only for states and nations, but also for individuals. Leading this dialogue is not a duty that falls only on the shoulders of governments or governmental organs. In order to light this torch of respect and peace, voluntary services run by civil society and individuals are at least as important as official ones. Humanity needs people that will carry that torch,” Gulen wrote in his letter.

A paper that received much applause from the audience was that of Dr. Rainer Hermann, an academic and a journalist with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Dr. Hermann has been observing the Gulen Movement for more than ten years. He was the very first western intellectual to realize that the Gulen Movement did not offer an alternative to the secular-democratic system, but to the politicization of Islam. At Potsdam, Hermann skillfully placed the Gulen Movement on the social map of modern Turkey: “The Republic of Turkey is not a secular state with a separation between religion and state, but rather a laicist state whose elites have long attempted to banish religion from society. Indeed, the ruling Kemalist elites still believe that the moment a religion expands beyond the private domain, it must necessarily become political and impose a theocratic order upon the state and society. Fethullah Gulen deserves the credit for overturning these prejudices. Gulen has made Islam into a social force that has fuelled much of Turkey’s democratization and modernization. People, and not politics, form the focus of his sermons and ideas… All this is new for Turkey, where the official discourse has never focused on the individual, but rather on the perceived need to fight the motherland’s inner and outer foes to preserve national security,” he told the conference. “Gulen’s work has fostered a form of Islam in Turkey that lives in harmony with the West and modern ideas without sacrificing any precepts of its faith. The work of Gulen’s followers in Turkey shows that Islam-as taught by Gulen-seeks tolerance, not conflict; it aims for a better society, not political power; and it manifests itself in prayer and concrete local action,” he said.

Dr. Rainer Hermann focused on the activities of the Movement in Turkey only. Hermann had seven points for the audience: (1) the Gulen Movement is a social and apolitical movement; (2) Gulen is a modern Muslim who looks for a synthesis of Islam and science and of Turkish culture, a culture of dialogue and tolerance, and Western civilization; (3) Gulen has promoted science as a means to understand the creation and as a means to prosperity; (4) Gulen leaves no doubt that Islam and democracy are compatible; (5) Gulen’s interpretation of Islam fits to Europe; (6) Gulen owes his success to various reasons, including the elevated social position of preachers; (7) Fethullah Gulen makes a crucial contribution to the modernization of Turkey.

Hermann was not the only one who expressed appreciation of the work of the Gulen Movement. Dr. Bekim Agai of Halle University, Germany, told the audience that thanks to the activities of the Gulen Movement, Turkish migrants in Europe are no longer a part of the problems of Europe, but are problem solvers, and not only on issues relating to the migrants themselves. Ercan Karakoyun, a PhD candidate at Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, and a participant in the Gulen Movement himself, informed the audience about the activities of the Movement in Germany and the contribution these activities have made to the integration of Turkish migrants into the general German society.

A controversial paper was presented by Swedish academician Dr. Klas Grinell. Though he accepted that the Gulen Movement is not engaged in party politics and is not attempting to gain political power, Grinell claimed that the Movement has a political stance: “This Movement supports democracy, human rights and EU membership for Turkey. This is a political position,” he said. Grinell said that having studied Gulen textually he regards Gulen as a conservative leader. But on the other hand he named Gulen as a perfect match for decolonial political theory. “Gulen is looking for dignity from within and not from outside when it comes to producing knowledge,” he said. This is a revolutionary position in epistemology indeed. Grinell had no explanation for labeling Gulen as both a conservative and a revolutionary, but his contribution underlined the fact that the Gulen Movement should not be studied in reference to the Jesuits, Opus Dei, or the Focolare Movement. If decoloniality is a party of Gulen’s revolutionary epistemology, it should be studied in reference to its own dynamics only. This should be the theme of a future conference.

Thus, the conference ended with the clear conviction that further studies need to be done on the Gulen Movement and on the solutions it proposes for the problems of the modern world. Though several questions were left untouched, the conference was a great success in the sense that it not only clarified certain reservations of the participants, but it also managed to reach the general public through media attention to the issue.

Kerim Balci is a columnist at Today’s Zaman, a leading English newspaper published in Turkey. He is also a PhD candidate on Philosophy of Language, Durham University, UK.

Gulen and those inspired by him have presented a new kind of Islamic intellectualism and altruism coupled with a deeper sense of activism and spirituality that has been missing from many contemporary Muslim movements of the twentieth century. The failure of many politically oriented Muslim movements around the world finds no reflection in the preaching and writing style of Gulen. The revival of other religious groups or non-Islamic religious traditions has not discouraged Gulen in any way from shaping his own ideals of spreading value-based education and people-oriented spirituality and cultural activities.

With the appearance of Muslim nation-states on the political map of the world, different kinds of extreme religious indoctrination have harmed the genuine revival of universal Islamic values. Gulen’s preaching demonstrates that he is quite aware of this intellectual weakness of the political movements of his many predecessors to uphold the moral and ethical values derived from Islamic scriptures and traditions. A good number of Muslim countries have based themselves on the nationalist ideals of the people concerned in order to try to prosper politically and economically. Like many Arabs and Persians, in the early years of the Republic many Turks also seemed to want to build a prosperous modern state based solely on nationalist ideals and thus tended to show a discriminatory attitude toward all kinds of religious traditions and phenomena based on religious beliefs. Many Islamic religious symbols were either misused or attacked disproportionately in the political games of capturing and upholding state power. Gulen’s voice of moderation surfaced at this juncture of dichotomous Muslim polity and the ideological struggles between extreme forces in the Muslim world. Gulen preached the path of moderation, honesty and sincerity to protect the interests of the masses, irrespective of the ethnicity or the religious practice of particular groups of people.

Unlike some religious leaders and clerics in other parts of the world who are his contemporaries, Gulen has never aimed to overthrow a secular government and replace it with a religiously oriented political party. He has never considered this as an option to eliminate corruption within the state and political system. Gulen finds this unacceptable as it contradicts the core principle of the non-compulsory character of Islamic religious practice and no state or society can be truly transformed merely by such partisan politics. Thus, Gulen has always preferred to promote sound education based on universal values in order to generate a virtuous society.

Modern-day Rumi

Many analysts and authors have called Gulen the modern-day Rumi of Turkey, the land where Rumi was put to rest for eternity in the city of Konya. A thirteenth-century poet, philosopher, and mystic, Rumi is celebrated by both Turks and Iranians, but he is also a matter of contestation between the two nations regarding his ethnic identity. But Rumi’s Sufi traditions cut across the lines between nationalistic and sectarian differences, and the truth of the matter is that eight hundred years ago national and ethnic identity played a very insignificant role determining someone’s contribution to Muslim civilization. In practice, Gulen has brought that glorious tradition back to the minds of millions of modern and religious Turks.

Gulen is neither a poet nor a mystic in its traditional or typical sense, but perhaps his series of writings on Sufism has earned him the title of Sufi. Gulen’s preaching is full of compassion for all, and none of his writings ignite any kind of hatred against anyone. That might be one of the reasons why Gulen has been considered seriously as a Sufi. A second reason could be his lifelong personal piety and austere lifestyle.

Muslims would probably not call Gulen a Mahatma Gandhi of Turkey or the Muslim world, though some Westerners have started to call him a Muslim Gandhi.¹ In the substance of his preaching and writing, Gulen is a voice very close to both Rumi and Gandhi; he has always sought truth in bringing people together for the causes of peace and humanity for all, irrespective of race and religion. Like Rumi, Gandhi also never abandoned any of his own religious traditions. However, both of them were disliked, if not hated, by many of their orthodox co-worshipers for their extraordinary humility towards the followers of other religions. Gandhi was killed in 1948 by a Hindu fundamentalist who, like many other orthodox Hindus, believed that Gandhi was betraying the cause of the Hindu religion and that he was influenced by the Muslim intellectuals of British India and the Sufis of South Africa. Away from the persecution of false accusations of igniting religious hatred in Turkey, Gulen lives in the USA where he has proven himself a champion of the cause of inter-faith dialogue and bringing people of all races and religions together to work for peace and harmony between nations and religions.

Spirituality and the Anatolian spirit

Many Muslim authors seem to believe that the modern Western mind is too materialistic to favor the core universal spiritual message of Islam. Thus, many Muslim analysts tend to conclude that it is useless to preach Islamic values to Westerners. Gulen does not accept this simplistic presentation of Western materialism as a barrier to spreading the peaceful message of the Qur’an and Sunnah upon which a compassionate society can be built. He does not believe that Westerners have any inherent problem in appreciating and accepting the spirituality derived from the fundamental sources of Islam; for him the question is how well Muslims can represent Islamic spirituality and the universal message of Islam so as to attract Westerners to build a global society based on genuine equality, tranquility, and humane treatment for all, irrespective of gender, race, and religion.

Gulen advocates a compassionate and brotherly form of Islam that emphasizes inner spirituality rather than an aggressive, outer expression of religious beliefs and coercive propaganda. In rediscovering this fine line of spirituality, Gulen has skillfully avoided the tendency to overemphasize a particular set of characteristics that might be seen as belonging to western or eastern, northern or southern people. He is critical of any kind of nationalistic or ethnic confrontational policies which lead to discriminatory attitudes to others, or dividing people between “us” and “them.”

His definition of nation does not compromise one race or ethnic group; Anatolia has always been a land of diverse ethnic groups and forms one united nation today. Free of any chauvinism, he addresses the colorful mosaic of Anatolia as “a crucible for peoples that have come from Central Asia, the Balkans, and Mesopotamia.”² Extrapolation of this notion automatically leads to the principle that the whole of humankind is the offspring of Adam and Eve. Gulen insists on seeing the potential for good in all peoples and religions. He stresses the merit of good deeds, and rejects the empty words of hostile propaganda and ways of terrorizing others.

Gulen believes that all human beings have an urge and need to achieve spiritual salvation expressed in their ability to appreciate the heavenly attributes which surround everybody in this world up to the end of physical existence on this planet. Gulen sees the world and human existence on earth as an open book of God Almighty, and the Qur’an is the glorious reflection of the process of the revelation of truth to the whole of humankind. Reading such thoughts in Gulen’s books or hearing them from him directly, many observers have believed that he is ultimately a Sufi and mystic and therefore his messages will not attract the younger generation of Muslims in secular Turkey and elsewhere whom they assume to be hot-blooded and radical. This assumption has found no ground in reality, however, as most of those inspired by him are young people.

Gulen and politics

Gulen is very active religiously and socially, while apparently very reluctant to play any part in the political moves of particular political parties or forces. As a non-political entity Gulen has become something of a center of gravity for many millions of Turkish people from all walks of life. Thus, even secular political parties have tried to use his style of preaching and argumentation to reach out to the voters. However, in his own life he is quite secluded from all kinds of political activities.

Some Westerners view Gulen’s way of life as monastic in the Eastern style. They may even see him as a Muslim Dalai Lama seeking nirvana throughout his entire life. However, even in his self-imposed exile in the USA he has never aspired to any media attention or publicity or popularity of any kind. He is deeply involved in interfaith activities and devoted to his Islamic duties as a true Muslim sacrificing every moment and everything quietly for the benefit of others.

Not sectarianism, but dialogue and diplomacy

Gulen does not devote much time to explaining the differences between Shi’as or Sunnis, Hanafis or Hanbalis, Malikis or Shafis, whereas many contemporary Muslim scholars give the utmost importance to these differences of sect and madhhab. According to such scholars, focusing on these distinctions is the right way to purify the Muslim nation from shirk (that is, any belief contrary to tawhid, the oneness of God), bida (illegitimate innovation in religious affairs), or just deviation from the siratul mustaqim (the straight path) demonstrated by the Prophet of Islam.

For Gulen, however, the most important thing is to establish a close relation between the human self and the sifats (Attributes) of God Almighty. Only when a great number of people are selflessly and honestly devoted to the higher spiritual cause prescribed by the holy ideals of Islam of making the entire human race preserve and protect its own dignity and surroundings for the benefit of all, can we hope to regain the lost glory of the Muslim civilization and the generosity and liberality of the Muslim nation for which we hope. Gulen does not believe that much can be achieved for these noble causes through military or political means. Dialogue and diplomacy is the better option for all sides in any ongoing conflict. Welfare-oriented governance is the best alternative to the corporate greed for profit and deception of all kinds aimed at making money for a tiny group of people in society.

Unlike most Muslim nations, Turks have never experienced direct foreign colonial rule of any kind. This unique feature of the Turkish nation has made Turks better prepared to accept the universality of Islam that has been expressed or reflected in thousands of Gulen’s sermons and in the numerous speeches delivered to Muslim congregations and interfaith meetings both in Turkey and the USA. Those ideas are crystallized in dozens of books written by Gulen. Alongside his preaching about universal values, Gulen has always been mindful of the troubles afflicting the hearts and minds of Turkish people. Knowing very well the risks of alienating himself from some of his own people, he has nevertheless shown great enthusiasm for reform of the education system in Turkey. In doing this, however, he has never allowed any sect, group, or political party to own or disown him completely. His strategy is very clear: whoever does good and honest work as a Muslim I should be with him, and I must avoid all kinds of bad or wicked works.

Opposition to Gulen

Ultra-secularist forces have tried unsuccessfully to use Gulen for their own political ends in various ways. One attempt was to characterize him as an innovator of religious reforms with little compatibility with the preaching and life of the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. Having failed in that, some anti-Islamic forces inside and outside Turkey are now trying to portray Gulen as the future Khomeini of Turkey. But Khomeini’s year-long stay in the city of Bursa in Turkey, once the capital of the Ottoman Empire, and his exposure to the Sunni communities in Turkey and Iraq did not make him Sunni, and Gulen’s exposure to the USA will not make him a revolutionary or worldly Islamic preacher. Gulen’s beardless face and modern dress do not make him less Islamic, but he is neither a fanatic nor a so-called modernist incapable of appreciating the attributes of God Almighty. Comparing Gulen’s educational and cultural movement with Khomeini’s revolution in Iran is either a reflection of ignorance about the many diverse methods of social reform with wide-ranging ramifications for the revival of Islamic values, or shows a complete lack of knowledge about the many dissimilarities between these two great Muslims nations.

In Gulen’s writing, Islamic revolution and jihad with its detailed rules and regulations are either absent or he limits himself to a clarion call for spiritual jihad that has nothing to do with war, violence, or even aggressive ways of spreading the religious message.

Our interest in our environment and our love for humankind – that is, our ability to embrace creation – depends on knowing and understanding our own essence, our ability to discover ourselves, and to feel a connection with our Creator… Humanism is a doctrine of love and humanity which is articulated recklessly these days, and it has a potential to be easily manipulated through different interpretations. Some circles try to impose an abstract and unbalanced understanding of humanism by confusing people about jihad in Islam and awakening suspicion in their hearts… Jihad can be a matter of self-defense or of removing obstacles between God and human free choice…”³

For many years now, Western commentators have asked why world-renowned Muslim and non-Muslim authors fail to demonstrate any clarity in the complicated issues related to Islam and jihad. In this area, Gulen is a voice of complete clarity and consistency in his presentation of Islamic issues and their correlation with universal humanitarianism. Thus, Gulen has filled, at least to some extent, an intellectual gap between the Muslim world and the West. His message is very clear for any careful reader, not least on matters like terrorism: “Terror can never be used in the name of Islam or for the sake of any Islamic ends. A terrorist cannot be a true Muslim and a true Muslim cannot be a terrorist. A Muslim can only be a representative and symbol of peace, welfare, and prosperity.”⁴

Questioning or challenging the universality of Western concepts of human rights is rather an easy job. However, to present a comprehensive and better alternative to a Western consumption-based society is a gigantic task that has been initiated by the Gulen movement in the areas of educational and cultural exchange between religions and nations.

Even Gulen himself may not even be able to imagine the impact he is having now on the Turkish public psyche and beyond in formulating a new and completely peaceful strategy to bridge the East and West or the Muslim world and the rest of the world. This is truly a huge intellectual advance wrought almost single-handedly by Gulen and based on his convincing arguments for peace and dignity for the whole of humankind. His emphasis on a value-based educational system without indoctrination is shown clearly in all his books. This emphasis has led to the founding all around the world of hundreds of schools sponsored by Turkish educators and businessmen where teachers are trying to implement Gulen’s ideals.

There is still more to say about the Turkish and Sunni features of the Gulen movement as it has been spearheaded by Sunni Muslims of Turkish origin. One might inquire into how an ultra-secularist state such as Turkey could have produced a social, cultural, and educational reformer like Gulen. However, it seems life-long dedication to the universal causes of Islam and humanity may ultimately produce such a result. Gulen’s followers never indulge in nationalistic, sectarian, or chauvinistic agendas in propagating Islamic values or an educational and cultural system within Muslim communities and beyond. This is the key to the remarkable success of the Gulen movement today. That is what has made him a living legend and, of course, the world’s most influential intellectual of 2008.

Maimul Ahsan Khan is a professor of law (Islam, Human Rights and International Commerce) at the University of Dhaka in Bangladesh.

Notes

1. Mark Scheel, “A Communitarian Imperative: Fethullah Gulen’s Model of Modern Turkey,” The Fountain, 61st issue, January–February 2008.
2. Gurkan Celik, Kate Kirk, Yusuf Alan, “Gulen’s Definition of Peace,” in: Dialogue: Asia-Pacific, Issue 15, January – March 2008, p. 8.
3. M. Fethullah Gulen, Toward a Global Civilization of Love & Tolerance, The Light, New Jersey, 2006, pp. 6, 8, 59.
4. Ibid, p.8.

I remember Karen Armstrong at the Islamophobia conference in Istanbul, telling us how Americans rushed to the bookstores after the notorious 9/11 events and swept the books they could find on Islam off the shelves, including her own. A Prophet for Our Time holds a critical ground, as attention turns to Islam and the Prophet with every scandalous event, whenever certain persons with “Arabic names” are engaged in violent acts, or some impudent remark or drawing to offend Muslims comes up in the West. Unfortunately, shock waves seem bound to keep coming, for as long as we wait for them to awaken us to the necessity of making an attempt to understand the “other.” As for Armstrong, this is what her efforts are all about: not only understanding the other, but also learning to respect them in order to live in a peaceful world.

A Prophet for Our Time is not a first. In fact, Armstrong published her earlier study Muhammad: A Biography of the Prophet in 1991, ten years before 9/11. Armstrong had seen that Western people were in no position to revise their negative impression of the Prophet. She writes that Western culture has a long history of Islamophobia that dates back to the Crusades, and that Christian monks of the twelfth century in Europe insistently defamed him. In her own words, “This distorted version of the Prophet’s life became one of the received ideas of the West, and Western people have always found it difficult to see Muhammad in a more objective light.” After 9/11, things got worse as some sectors of the Western media continued this tradition of hostility, and went so far as to make provoking insults. Her response in the face of this unfair attitude is virtually her mission statement on writing about the Prophet:

“We can no longer afford to indulge this type of bigotry, because it is a gift to extremists who can use such statements to ‘prove’ that the Western world is indeed engaged on a new crusade against the Islamic world. Muhammad was not a man of violence. We must approach his life in a balanced way, in order to appreciate his considerable achievements…”

A Prophet for Our Time is a short biography, but not in the classical sense. The author informs the reader about the culture and conditions of the time, with the awareness of addressing a Western audience. As the events unfold, the book focuses on different aspects of the Prophet’s life such as the underlying reasons behind his wars, marriages, and so forth. We have a portrait of a decent person who made certain decisions and acted in a certain way for fair and understandable reasons. Rather than a holy figure, we are presented with a moral and social reformer who, in the face of a new situation, falls into a deep trance and then comes up with what he “believes” to be revelations to settle the issue. It should be noted that the overall narration reflects in many ways the tradition of Orientalist scholarship in which elements of Islam are explained by reference to the pre-Islamic society of the Arabian peninsula.

Here, one cannot help but remember Said Nursi challenging the critics of the Prophet. He wrote that if a person claims to bring messages from God, he is either telling the truth, or is the greatest liar. What we see in A Prophet for Our Time however, is an attempt to find a position in between. A comment in The Economist about the earlier biography summarizes the author’s stance: “respectful without being reverential…”

The Muslim audience may find the book a bit disappointing. In fact, the book has various points on which Muslims will agree, beg to differ, oppose, and even find offensive. Take the Prophet’s marriages for instance. They are explained in quite an agreeable way. However, Muslim scholars reject the account of the Prophet’s marriage to Zaynab as given in the book. Muslims believe that God Almighty willed people to understand that an adopted son (Zayd) was not like a real son, and the revelation about this marriage simply shattered a pre-Islamic taboo. Although the book notes this dimension, it rather makes the case sound like a love affair. At this point, we had better turn our attention to the sources of the book.

Some Western critics praise A Prophet for Our Time for being based on early Islamic sources such as Tabari and Ibn Ishaq. However, those who are familiar with Islamic studies know that the significance of these scholars of the early period was their compilation and recording of verbal reports which varied in reliability. Their works provided precious material for the next generation’s scholars, like Bukhari and others, who meticulously refined these reports and included the authenticated ones in their books. However, Orientalist researchers have felt very easy about referring to the early period compilations, taking the weak and unauthenticated reports as true, and rationalizing everything in their own way. Thus, most of the narrations from Tabari and Ibn Ishaq in A Prophet for Our Time are actually taken from just such an commentary by Alfred Guillaume.

The gharaniq issue can be given an as example. A Prophet for Our Time repeats the claim that the Prophet did not at first condemn the worship of the cult of the three gharaniq-the idols which pagans believed to be the three “daughters” of God. Different Muslim academics have indicated why such claims are impossible, so it will suffice to draw attention to a simple fact. Belief in one God, with absolute rejection of any idols, daughters, or sons to be ascribed to Him, was essential in Islam from the very beginning: the first martyrs of Islam, Sumayya and Yaser, preferred to die than to accept the idols of the Quraysh.

A Prophet for Our Time useful book from different aspects. Above all, Armstrong’s powerful language is especially commendable for its success in reflecting the author’s positive approach and dedication to mutual understanding between members of different faiths and to promoting a sense of “compassion” across the world. In this regard, Muslims as well as non-Muslims should respond to her call with their support. With due respect to her decent cause, I would still encourage those who would like to learn more about the Prophet to look for publications that are based on more authentic sources of Qur’anic exegesis and Traditions, and to be cautious about information derived from other sources that simply narrates narrations without any filters of authenticity.

Korkut Altay is a staff editor for The Fountain.

As cultural differences continue to be an important part of life, we need to examine how different cultures make sense of the world in terms of the meanings that represent the mind, and within which the concept of intelligence is defined. First, I will explore some basic philosophical views about the conception of intelligence which I believe constitute the root of cultural constructions of the notion.

Historical conceptions of intelligence

Some scholars of the past, such as philosophers, writers and theologians, explored intelligence but did not attempt to define the nature of intelligence. For example, in the Odyssey, Homer distinguished between good looks and good thinking. He remarked that one may have a poor physical appearance but may speak in an articulate way. Another man may be handsome but lack the ability to communicate well with others. Plato made his comments regarding the nature of intelligence in Theaetetus. In the dialogue, Socrates asks Theaetetus to imagine that there exists in the mind of man a block of wax that is of different sizes in different men. The block of wax can also differ in hardness, moistness and purity. Socrates suggests that when the wax is pure and sufficiently deep, the mind will learn easily and will not be subject to confusion. Because impressions in the wax are clear, it only will think things that are true. However, when the wax is impure or very soft or very hard, there will be defects in the intellect. People whose wax is soft will be good at learning but be apt to forget. People whose wax is hard will be slow to learn but will retain what they learn. People whose wax is shaggy or gritty, or whose wax is a mixture of earth and dung will have only indistinct impressions. Those with hard wax will have the same because there will be no depth to their thoughts (Sternberg 1985).

In the Posterior Analytics Book, Aristotle conceived of intelligence in terms of “quick wit.” For example, an intelligent person seeing someone in conversation with a man of wealth might conclude quickly that the person is seeking to borrow money from the wealthy man.

Cultural conceptualization of intelligence

In recent years, researchers have found that people in Eastern and Western cultures often have fundamentally different ideas about intelligence. Richard Nisbett, in The Geography of Thought, argues that these differences are due to the different cognitive styles of both cultures, including how intelligence is understood. He suggests that people in Western countries tend to view intelligence as a means for individuals to devise categories and to engage in rational debate, while people in Eastern cultures see it as a way for members of community to recognize contradiction and complexity and to play their social roles successfully.

I think, as Nisbett says these differences between Eastern and Western views of intelligence are related to differences in the basic cognitive processes of people in those cultures. In most cases, Western notions of intelligence are not shared by other cultures. For example, at the mental level, the Western emphasis on speed of mental processing (Sternberg 1981) is not shared by many cultures. In contrast, people in Eastern countries may even be suspicious of the quality of work done very quickly and emphasize depth rather than speed.

Similarly, Chen (1994) found three factors underlying Chinese conceptualizations of intelligence: nonverbal reasoning ability, verbal reasoning ability and memory. These factors differ substantially from American people’s conceptualizations of intelligence which have mostly mental attributions, such as: practical problem solving, verbal ability and social competence (Sternberg 1981).

About Eastern notions of intelligence, Das (1994) has suggested that in Buddhist and Hindu philosophies, intelligence involves waking up, noticing, recognizing, understanding, and comprehending but also includes such things like determination, mental effort, and even feelings and opinions (Sternberg and Kaufman 1998). In a related study, Yang and Sternberg reviewed Chinese philosophical conceptions of intelligence. The Confucian perspective emphasizes the characteristic of benevolence and of doing what is right. Again, Taoist culture emphasizes the importance of humility, freedom from conventional standards of judgment, and full knowledge of oneself which appears well-correlated with Plato’s “Know yourself” notion.
Differences between cultures in conceptions of intelligence have been recognized for some time. In a study, Gill and Keats (1980) reported that Australian University students value academic skills and the ability to adapt to new situations as critical to intelligence, while Malay students emphasize practical skills, such as speed and creativity, as well as both social and cognitive attributes in their conceptions of intelligence.

Studies done in Africa provide evidence of substantial differences in the notion of intelligence. Serpell (1974, 1977, and 1982) found that people in Zambia emphasize social responsibilities, cooperativeness, and obedience as important to intelligence; intelligent children are expected to be respectful of adults. In Zimbabwe, the word intelligence means to be prudent and cautious, especially in social relationships (Dasen 1984). As in many Eastern countries, service to the family and community, politeness and respect for elders are seen as the key to intelligence.

In his study. The Geography of Thought, researcher Nisbett, compares the Greeks and the Chinese in order toshow the different cognitive styles of East and West, which in turn causes different conceptions of intelligence. The Ancient Greeks were known for their strong sense of agency, the ability to exercise free will, while the Chinese found their belief system in harmony. The Greeks also had a curiosity about the nature of the world. They were not satisfied just to make systematic observations about the world; they were also interested in the underlying principles of their observations. Debate and confrontation were discouraged in Chinese society, whereas they were encouraged in Greece. The Eastern way of life is based on the principle that the life is ever-changing and filled with contradictions. It was interrelationships that defined the Chinese; who they were with would define who they were and what roles they were to fulfill. The sense of identity was defined by social context, by individual attributes while in Greece, objects and people would be analyzed separately. These fundamental differences in thought patterns have implications that extend to all aspects of life.

At this point, the differences seen in the individualistic culture of the West and the collectivistic (Petersen 2004) culture of the East need more attention to provide a better picture of the notion of intelligence in terms of its cultural construction.

Different thinking styles of East and West

There are some assumptions which are thought to be true by most Westerners. That is, they are individuals with characteristics that make them distinctive; moreover, we want to be unique. Westerners are in control of their own behavior and feel better when they believe that they can choose and control the outcomes of their actions. They are goal-oriented and success-driven (Nisbett 2004), and relationships can sometimes interfere with attaining success. Personal success and feeling positive about oneself are important for the sense of well-being.

Conversely, Easterners are less concerned with personal success; they are far more group driven (Nisbett 2004). Their sense of well-being is related to their being in harmony with those around them; moreover, rules that apply to relationships are not universal, instead relationships are dictated by the context and are unique to the roles each holds in that context. This collective sense of the East extends also to language. For example, in the Japanese language, there are many words for “I,” each dependent on the situation. Who “I” am is different when I am with a boss, co-worker, family member, or friend. In my home country, in Turkey which has strong Eastern roots; there is still the tradition of using “We” instead of ‘I’ in an effort to be humble and avoid egocentric ownership of success. In contrast, Americans rarely take context into account when asked for self descriptions. Moreover, Americans are more likely to overestimate their personal attributes (Nisbett 2004). On the other hand, it is the goal of harmony and fulfilling one’s role in social life to achieve collective success that prevails in Eastern culture.

Another notion of Eastern culture that has a substantial effect on its cultural conceptions of true intelligence and progress is self -criticism which is regarded as part of learning. Self-criticism is taught to Japanese children to help them learn how to solve problems and improve relationships with others. Again, in Turkey, the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, and some other Islamic scholars affect people’s conceptualizations of progress and success, such as, “Happy are those whose own faults preoccupy them too much to think of the faults of others” and “The strongest among you is the one who controls his anger.”

Differences in culture start early in life and continue throughout life. Western parents encourage their children to be independent. Generally they do this by focusing attention on objects. In Eastern cultures, parents focus attention on social relationships and feelings. When children grow up, the differences can be seen in experiments, for example, that Easterners’ have a superior ability to be aware of the emotions of groups of others (Peterson 2004). One theory that accounts for this difference is communication styles. In the West, it is the communicator who is responsible for making the information clear to the listener. In the East, it is the responsibility of the hearers to understand what they are told. The implication of these two contrasting styles can leave Americans feeling that Easterners are difficult to “read” because of their subtle and indirect communication styles. Conversely, Easterners may feel Americans are so direct that they may even be thought to be rude (Nisbett 2004).

Not surprisingly, the East and West have very different styles of dealing with conflict. As in ancient China, debate is still uncommon in the East. Because argument and debate pose a threat to group harmony, what Westerners consider controversial topics would not be brought up in conversation in the East (Becker 1986). Moreover, while debate is part of the rhetoric of science in the West, a skill Westerners are taught throughout their education, it is new to many Easterners that come to the West to pursue a scientific career.
Easterners and Westerners also differ in their perception of control. In Western culture, feeling in control promotes a feeling of well-being to a much greater extent than it does for Easterners (Nisbett 2004). On the other hand, Westerners have more difficulty tolerating ambiguous situations than Easterners. Westerners tend to believe that if things are going to change, it will be in the same direction and at the same level, whereas Easterners see the world as a complex dynamic system (Peterson 2004).

It is at this point that researchers (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, Norenzayan 2001) comment that Easterners appear to think more holistically, paying greater attention to relationship and context, relying more on experience-based knowledge than abstract logic and showing more tolerance for contradiction. Westerners are more analytic in their thinking, tending to separate objects from their context, to avoid contradictions and to rely more heavily on formal logic.

Conclusion

Taken all together, it is certain that people who grow up in different cultures do not just think about different things but they think differently. Thus, the connotations of the word intelligence do not only include a particular set of mental functions but also some value-based conceptions of appropriateness, such as competence, helpfulness, and so on. So, for example, when someone tells a parent that their child is very intelligent, they may be talking about child’s education, or their good relations with others, and sometimes their being a good listener, or lots of other meanings which all depend on the context of the culture in which people live.

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